





Harry Lintsen · Frank Veraart
Jan-Pieter Smits · John Grin
Well-being, Sustainability and Social Development






Fred Lambert, Ben Gales, Rick Hölsgens, Lilianne Laan 
and Frank Notten
With the Assistance of
Martijn Anthonissen, Önder Nomaler and Truus Lintsen
Additional material to this book can be downloaded from http://extras.springer.com.
ISBN 978-3-319-76695-9    ISBN 978-3-319-76696-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76696-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018934393
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018. This book is an open access publication.
Open Access  This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit 
to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if 
changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative Commons 
license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book’s 
Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication 
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant 
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book 
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the 
editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors 
or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims 
in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Cover Photo In the 1970s, concerns about nuclear waste and the impossibility of managing 
nuclear power not only stimulated a Broad Societal Debate in the Netherlands but also gave rise 
to massive protests ranging from refusals to pay a surcharge on the electricity bill – the so-called 
Kalkar levy – to demonstrations in Kalkar, the town where a joint German-Dutch-Belgian 
experimental reactor was being built. The picture was taken on September 28th, 1974.
Mieremet, Rob, National Archives of the Netherlands /collection: Anefo, Public Domain, 
927-4808 http://www.gahetna.nl
Printed on acid-free paper
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer International Publishing AG part 
of Springer Nature.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Harry Lintsen




The Hague, The Netherlands
Frank Veraart







This work is part of the research program Historical Roots of the Dutch Sustainability 
Challenge: The Impact of the Utilization of Material Resources on the Modernization 
of Dutch Society, 1850–2010 with project number 360-69-010, which is (partly) 
financed by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Additional 
financial support was granted by the Knowledge Network for System Innovations 
and Transitions (KSI).
Research was conducted at Eindhoven University of Technology, University of 
Groningen, University of Amsterdam and Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
This publication is made possible with financial support of Netherlands 
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into sustainable development and transitions was launched. More than 80 research-
ers from different disciplinary backgrounds and located at twelve universities and 
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Sustainability and Social Development: The Netherlands 1850–2050, was an open 
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as a book by Prometheus, also in 2018. Contributions to various chapters were made 
by Fred Lambert (Chaps. 2, 4, 5, 9, 14, 19 and 24), Rick Hölsgens (Chaps. 2, 6, 10, 
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Frank Notten. Research support was additionally provided by Martijn Anthonissen 
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various aspects of the programme. Giel van Hooff researched the illustrations and 
wrote the accompanying captions. Brigitte Möller, Nena van As and Marissa 
Damink helped to prepare the texts for the two publishers.
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Chapter 1
Well-being and Sustainability:  
Measurement System and Institutional 
Framework
Jan-Pieter Smits
Abstract This study aims to analyse the development of human well-being and sus-
tainable development from a long-term perspective. Though often used, these concepts 
are generally ill-defined. This chapter proposes to clear the decks by proposing unam-
biguous definitions of well-being and sustainable development. This emphasis on defi-
nitions and measurements echoes international efforts to develop standardised 
measurement protocols that may help society (and policy makers in particular) to 
assess the extent to which a society is moving in a more sustainable direction. The 
framework adopted in this chapter (the so-called CES Recommendations on Measuring 
Sustainable Development) charts the well-being of a country at a specific point in time, 
and also reveals the extent to which the precise way such well-being is generated ham-
pers the well-being of later generations or people elsewhere on the planet. Natural capi-
tal is a particular focus, inasmuch as this is a vital resource on which, in the end, all life 
depends. In this analysis of two centuries of well-being and sustainable development, 
the institutional evolution of society over time also plays a prominent role.
Keywords Well-being · Sustainable development · Economic growth · Natural capital
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Contents
1.1  Toward a Better Understanding of Well-being  4
1.2  Why Study Well-being and Sustainability in a Historical Perspective?  6
1.3  The Dutch Case  7
1.4  New Perspectives on Growth and Measurement  9
1.5  Research Methodology in Brief  12
1.6  The Measurement Framework for Well-being and Sustainability  13
1.6.1  Brundtland Definition  13
1.6.2  Well-being ‘Here and Now’  14
1.6.3  ‘Here and Now’ Versus ‘Later’  15
1.6.4  ‘Here and Now’ Versus ‘Elsewhere’  15
1.6.5  The Measurement Framework of Well-being and Sustainability (the CES 
Recommendations)  16
1.7  Natural Capital and the Three Material Flows  18
1.8  Institutions and Dynamics  20
 Literature  23
4
1.1  Toward a Better Understanding of Well-being
The gross domestic product is an almighty figure in public and political debate: how well is 
it going with the economy, for that matter with you as a person?... [But] the gdp does not 
measure how the country is doing, not even how the economy is doing. It only measures the 
magnitude of market production. In politics there is a need for figures that say more, namely 
figures that say something about well-being. This is more than only gdp (gross domestic 
product).1
These critical words were spoken by Agnes Mulder, parliamentarian for the Christian 
Democratic Alliance (CDA) in a parliamentary debate on well-being, in June 2016. 
Parliament was debating recommendations by the Temporary Parliamentary 
Commission on Well-Being, a commission charged with investigating how the gross 
domestic product can eventually be replaced by a system of measurement that does 
justice to well-being in the broadest sense of the term.2 Verhoeven of the Democrats 
66 party explained the shortcomings of the gdp in yet another way:
If a contractor builds a house this month, the Dutch economy grows. This everyone under-
stands. If that house is demolished next month, the Dutch economy grows even faster. If the 
house is subsequently rebuilt, there is even more growth. This is the strange effect you get 
if the gross domestic product is a synonym for growth. The gdp also increases if more gas 
is pumped up in Groningen. Is that good for our well-being? No, think the people in 
Groningen, and rightly so...
Marianne Thieme, leader of the Party for Animals, was explicitly negative: gdp 
includes economic activities ...
... that in and of themselves are anything but a positive contribution to well-being. Think of 
traffic accidents, air pollution, animal misery, animal disease epidemics and the incineration 
of whole forests in power plants. ... Why do we trap ourselves in economic indicators that 
say nothing of the power of our sense of community, care for one another, care for the vul-
nerable, or the opportunities to develop your talents? Why do we want to measure and 
express everything in money, except that which makes life really worth living?
However, these critical remarks did not mean that the Second Chamber was about 
to reject the gdp as indicator. Parliamentarian Veen of the People’s Party for Freedom 
and Democracy (VVD) emphasized that the gdp was still relevant:
I share the conclusion that the gross domestic product is inadequate as an indicator of well- 
being, broadly conceived. It only says something quantitatively about the magnitude of our 
economy. But I also share the conclusion that this is the best available alternative for deter-
mining well-being and international comparisons ... tax incomes and employment levels ...
1 All quotes from this debate are from the official edited minutes. See https://www.tweedekamer.nl/
kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail?vj=2015-2016&nr=99&version=2#idd1e668761




Klever, of the Party for Freedom (PVV) struck a different note. She failed to see the 
need to develop new measures of well-being. Citizens know full well what the con-
cept well-being means for them, namely if at the end of the month they have enough 
money left in their pockets:
Of course health and safety are of importance, but if you want to achieve these you first 
have to ask yourself how we are going to pay for them. In order to pay for this you need a 
gross domestic product and you have to look and see what part of the gross domestic prod-
uct you want to spend on our safety, our care system, our education and so forth. That is 
ultimately a political decision. For the average nurse or police officer who works 40 hours 
a week and who sees ever more of their tax money lost, the concept of ‘well-being’ doesn’t 
change in the least, because someone like that just looks at what is left over in their pockets 
month by month as spending money.
In the end Dutch Parliament agreed to put well-being and sustainable development 
high on the political agenda and to devote an annual debate to the topic. This is not 
an isolated development. Globally there is a growing conviction that society is on 
the wrong road. This conviction is not limited to activist environmental groups, but 
is also starting to enter into the discourse of mainstream politics. In 2008 the former 
French president Nicolas Sarkozy invited two Nobel Prize winners, Joseph Stiglitz 
and Amartya Sen, to prepare a report aimed at investigating how new benchmarks 
for well-being and sustainability could be developed.3
This Stiglitz Report marked the start of a search for a new ‘compass’ that would 
enable politicians and policy makers to determine their course. Up to then the con-
cept of economic growth had been dominant – as measured with the aid of the key 
indicator gdp. Now for the first time this standard vision was being critically 
assessed. To what exactly does the concept of well-being refer? And what deter-
mines this well-being and its sustainability?
These questions have also moved to the forefront within international organiza-
tions like the OESO, in the Progress of Societies4 projects and the Better Life 
Initiative.5 Both projects aim at finding better indicators for measuring well-being 
and sustainability. In Europe the European Commission has taken the lead with its 
GDP and Beyond6 initiative, in which various societal organizations, policy makers 
and academics are asked to reflect on better ways to measure and shape societal 
progress.
3 J. E. Stiglitz, A. Sen and J.P. Fitoussi, Report by the commission on the measurement of economic 





1 Well-being and Sustainability: Measurement System and Institutional Framework
6
The crisis of 2008 added fuel to these fires. According to the organizations 
involved, this crisis demonstrated that the structure of our economic system only 
creates ever more problems.7 The sustainability of our well-being over the long term 
is ever more uncertain. On the economic front there is the chronic instability of the 
financial sector with its associated ‘bubbles’ that have produced serious economic 
disruptions. In addition to this financial and economic crisis there is also talk of an 
ecological crisis. The realisation is dawning that problems like climate change and 
global decline in biodiversity are endangering life on earth. Moreover, tensions 
among different populations, both within and among nations, are also increasing to 
the extent that one can also speak of a social crisis.
The most prominent example of the striving for a more sustainable world is 
doubtless the Post-2015 Agenda of the United Nations.8 This ambitious policy ini-
tiative, kicked off by world leaders at a UN top level conference in September 2015, 
contains a list of policy goals aimed at making the world more sustainable by 2030. 
These Global Goals for Sustainable Development will have a major effect on politi-
cal and policy processes, both on global and national levels. The challenge will be 
to build a world in which all people have an acceptable quality of life, in which 
well-being is more equally distributed, and where the interests of future generations 
are also taken into account.
The debate in the Dutch Second Chamber on gdp reflects this development. 
Cabinet and parliament have a clear need for robust knowledge on the basis of 
which decisions regarding well-being and sustainability can be made. At present 
cost-benefit analyses to support policy decisions are based on a rather limited eco-
nomic perspective. In addition, social and political debates are generally dominated 
by short-term visions. Long-term consequences of the behavior of producers and 
consumers or of government policy are not at present an integral feature of political 
discourse. The Temporary Second Chamber Commission on Well-Being has sug-
gested a framework for the annual debate on questions of well-being and sustain-
ability. The commission recommends monitoring well-being and sustainability on 
the basis of the measuring system that also forms the basis of this study.
1.2  Why Study Well-being and Sustainability in a Historical 
Perspective?
Where political debate in general has eyes only for the most recent developments, 
this study will examine long-term societal developments throughout a period of 
more than a century and a half in terms of changes in well-being and sustainability. 
In contrast with most traditional economic-historical studies we will not focus on 
economic growth, but rather on the growth of well-being. To what extent does the 





growth of well-being depend on depleting vital resources, not only in the Netherlands 
but also elsewhere in the world?
This is obviously crucial for assessing the extent to which a certain level of well- 
being can be sustained over longer periods of time. Has well-being been generated 
on the basis of sustainable development, i.e. are vital resources -whether domesti-
cally or abroad- not being depleted over time? Significantly, well-being and sustain-
able development can have identical meanings, but only on condition that the current 
generation in a given country also concerns itself with the aspirations to well-being 
of people in other parts of the world and of future generations. Only when these 
aspects are incorporated into present-day preferences can well-being and sustain-
ability be seen as identical concepts.
An historical analysis can provide deeper insights if only because sustainability 
is in essence an intergenerational issue. Choices we make about well-being in the 
past influence the well-being of later generations due to the possible depletion of 
vital resources like nature and the environment. Thus, present-day sustainability 
problems such as climate change and loss of biodiversity have their roots in choices 
made by prior generations. An historical analysis may reveal which aspects of pro-
ducer and consumer behavior have wreaked such havoc and what kinds of technolo-
gies and institutions have facilitated the present sustainability problem. In this 
connection it is especially important to describe how societal developments can 
sometimes lead to outcomes that are both undesired and intolerable. This requires a 
sensitivity to emergent institutional rigidities that make it difficult to bend develop-
ments in a more positive direction.
In addition, the theme of sustainability is not just a present-day phenomenon. 
Sustainability, as defined by Brundtland et al. in the report Our Common Future, is 
an issue that also cropped up in the past, accompanying attempts to achieve progress 
through modernisation.9 Then too, efforts were made to solve the sustainability 
problems of the moment. This study questions the paths along which and the meth-
ods by which, between 1850 and 2010, historical actors succeeded in solving their 
problems; and the ways in which, more often than not, the solutions chosen also 
generated new problems. We maintain a focus on how the processes of economic 
growth and sustainable development were entangled. Which technologies and insti-
tutional frameworks made it possible for economic development to be associated – 
or not – with sustainable development? This volume will provide a deeper insight 
into the complex relationship between economic growth and sustainability.
1.3  The Dutch Case
There are some long-run features of Dutch society that make it an interesting case 
for a historical analysis of changes in well-being and its sustainability. Compared to 
other countries, the agricultural productivity, population density and energy 
9 J.A.  Du Pisani, ‘Sustainable development  - historical roots of the concept’, Environmental 
Sciences 3(2006) nr. 2, 83–96.
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intensity of the economy are high. Besides, even at an early stage the Dutch econ-
omy was quite open and imported large quantities of natural resources. The result-
ing strong impact on the natural environment has deep historical roots, going back 
to the Golden Age of the Dutch Republic (the period 1580–1640) or even earlier. 
The economic success of the Dutch Republic is well documented, especially by 
Anglo- Saxon scholars.10 So far, the sustainability aspects of economic development 
have not been systematically analysed from a long-run perspective (even though the 
phenomenon was signalled by Anglo-Saxon contemporaries such as William Petty 
and Matthew Hale).
The roots of the modernisation of the Dutch economy can be traced as far back 
as the late Middle Ages. In this period the rising levels of the North Sea –the so- 
called late medieval transgression- had a far-reaching impact on arable production 
in the coastal provinces. As a result of the rising levels of seawater and of soil sub-
sidence, agricultural land became less suitable for arable production.11 Hence, farm-
ers reoriented their output toward livestock farming. As livestock farming is much 
more capital-intensive than arable production, a substantial labour surplus was gen-
erated in the coastal provinces. This surplus could be relatively easily absorbed by 
the urban sector, especially because from the last quarter of the sixteenth century 
onwards, Amsterdam had become one of the main staple markets in world trade.12 
Not only trade, transport and international financial services flourished in the econ-
omy of Holland, but industrial activities also witnessed strong growth, above all the 
‘trafieken’, industries which processed imported raw materials. Most of these 
‘refined’ products were subsequently exported.
This quite specific form of economic specialisation had far-reaching environ-
mental consequences. Even at an early stage the Netherlands was a strongly urban-
ised area characterised by a high population density. In European urbanization 
1500–1800, Jan de Vries presents figures which show that in Europe around 1700 
9% of the population lived in cities, as against 34% in the Netherlands. This was 
much higher even than Great Britain and Wales with their 13% urban population.13 
Population pressure continued to increase throughout modern times.. During the 
twentieth century population growth in the Netherlands was quite high in  comparison 
with other Northwest European countries.14 The high and increasing population 
pressure had a substantial effect on the natural environment, in terms of the pollu-
tion of soil and water and the subsequent loss of biodiversity.
The high urbanisation was made possible by a highly productive agricultural sec-
tor. Jan de Vries has analysed the roots of the high productivity of the rural Dutch 
10 J. de Vries, ‘On the modernity of the Dutch Republic’, Journal of Economic History, 32 (1973) 
191–202; J. Israël, The Dutch Republic: its rise, greatness and fall, 1477–1806 (Oxford 1995).
11 J.L. van Zanden, ‘Op zoek naar de ‘missing link’ ‘, Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis 14 
(1988), pp. 359–386.
12 T.P. van der Kooij, Hollands stapelmarkt en haar verval (Amsterdam 1931).
13 J. de Vries, European urbanization 1500–1800 (London 1984).
14 J.L. van Zanden, Een klein land in de 20e eeuw. Economische geschiedenis van Nederland 1914–
1995 (Utrecht 1997), pp.29–31.
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economy in the Golden Age in great detail.15 In the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries Dutch agriculture continued to operate at the technological frontier. However, 
productivity growth in agriculture resulted in quite severe environmental problems, 
especially due to the quantities of manure that were produced and used.
During the twentieth century the industrial sector also began to burden the natural 
environment. In the second half of the twentieth century the energy intensity in the 
Netherlands increased faster than anywhere else in the Western world.16 Nowadays 
energy consumption per capita is among the highest in the European Union, whereas 
the share of sustainable energy is quite low by international standards.17
Lastly, compared to the rest of the European Union the Netherlands imports large 
quantities of natural capital from the least developed countries. Quantitative analy-
sis shows that former colonial powers like the Netherlands still stake huge claims on 
the natural capital of the poorest countries. Dutch trade data indeed reveal a strong 
path dependency in terms of trade specialisation.18
The specific dynamics of economic development and structural change makes 
the Netherlands an interesting case with which to study human well-being and sus-
tainable development from a long-run perspective.
1.4  New Perspectives on Growth and Measurement
This study evaluates more than 150 years of societal development from the per-
spective of human well-being and its sustainability. It tries to identify some of the 
main determinants of well-being and sustainability and explores how these findings 
may help in shaping a path toward a low-carbon society which may foster well-
being in the broadest sense of the word. It also describes which institutional 
arrangements governed societal changes in the past and asks what light this sheds 
on the institutional prerequisites for the present transformation toward a green, 
sustainable economy.
The historical analysis presented in this book has yielded two important findings. 
First, a well-being paradox is identified. Nowadays, compared to other countries, the 
Netherlands ranks high in terms of the life satisfaction of its citizens. Nevertheless, 
a substantial segment of society does not share this positive outlook on life. This 
phenomenon is not unique for the Netherlands, as indicated by the substantial rise of 
populism throughout the western world. This study shows that also in earlier periods, 
a high ranking on various ‘lists’ went hand in hand with feelings of strong discontent 
in society. This study may help to better understand this paradox of well-being.
15 J. de Vries, The Dutch rural economy in the Golden Age, 1500–1700 (London 1974).
16 A.  Maddison, Dynamic forces in capitalist development. A long-run comparative view (New 
York 1991).
17 CBS, Monitor Duurzaam Nederland 2014: indicatorenrapport (Den Haag 2014).
18 H.  Langenberg and J.P.  Smits, ‘Invoer van grondstoffen uit LDCs: Geworteld in koloniale 
tijden?’, Internationaliseringsmonitor 2015 (4), pp. 42–57.
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A second finding of this study concerns the significant impact of the Dutch econ-
omy on scarce natural resources. Until the 1960s the Netherlands were on a more or 
less sustainable growth trajectory. Of course, economic development laid a claim on 
natural resources, but within the limits of sustainability norms as defined by the 
present generation. In the course of the 1960s, on the one hand the coupling between 
GDP and improvements in quality of life became much looser (it even inverted on 
some indicators), while, on the other hand growth became decisively non- 
sustainable. From this moment on energy consumption and the resulting emissions 
of CO2 skyrocketed. The depletion of resources was not restricted to the Netherlands. 
Natural capital in the least developed countries was also depleted due to the rela-
tively high level of Dutch imports.
This trade pattern has deep historical roots. In order to arrive at a more sustain-
able way of life, it is important to move toward a more circular economic system in 
which vital product chains are closed. However, given the open nature of the Dutch 
economy and in the light of the outsourcing of economic activities by firms and the 
increasing complexity of global value chains, the closing of many of these chains 
has become quite difficult. Due to the continuous efforts of countries and firms to 
specialise on the basis of their revealed comparative advantages, today’s economy 
has become strongly globalised. However, the downside of these economic dynam-
ics is a world with long and complex product chains which put a considerable bur-
den on natural resources.
These two main problems – the increasing distance between state and society as 
well as the sustainability challenge – cannot be dealt with in isolation from each 
other. After all, in order to make a fundamental transition to a more sustainable, 
low-carbon, society, drastic measures need to be taken. In the best case, this will be 
supported by the active involvement and passive consent of citizens, who recognise 
it as an opportunity to co-shape well-being. In the worst case, this transition will be 
experienced by particular groups in society as just another episode in the never- 
ending story of the neglect of their needs and wants, reinforcing the first problem 
and undermining the legitimacy of strategies to address the second one.
Such great transformations also occurred at earlier periods in history. In fact, this 
book deals with the great transformation that took place in the period 1850–1960. 
The greatest challenge facing Dutch society were the extremely low levels of human 
well-being. Around the mid-nineteenth century a substantial part of the population 
was barely able to survive. These problems were alleviated partly thanks to the 
intervention of physicians and other professionals who got the poverty problem and 
especially the poor state of local hygiene on to the political agenda. The poor quality 
of life of the masses was also improved by decreasing income inequality, especially 
as a result of the tax reforms of the 1860s. Lastly, economic growth ultimately pro-
duced higher incomes and an increase in material well-being.
However, this economic growth was in itself the cause of new problems. New 
technologies proved to be more energy and material intensive. From the 1960s 
onwards this resulted in increasing claims on natural resources. The ‘great transfor-
mation’ which occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was anal-
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ysed in depth by Karl Polanyi.19 He argues that some of the negative effects of 
economic development – such as the poverty problem – were overcome because the 
state became more active from the nineteenth century onwards, compensating for 
some of the social problems created by the functioning of liberal markets.
Following Polanyi, some authors now suggest that a new ‘great transformation’ 
is needed, one in which mechanisms will be developed to fight the present sustain-
ability crisis. It is suggested that two types of (re) embedding of economic develop-
ment are needed.20 First of all, an embedding in society is necessary. Increasingly, 
groups of citizens feel that their voices are not heard by politicians. New types of 
social structures – or the re-discovery or restoration of old organisational forms – 
are needed, which would enable the state and different segments of society to be in 
closer contact with each other. This may also yield more, and more widespread, 
legitimacy for policies promoting the transition to a more sustainable society. But 
this will require a second re-embedding of the economy, nowin nature. More than 
ever, ecological limits need to be observed and respected. Economic policy as well 
as producer and consumer behaviour should be adapted to these limits.
This of course leads to the question whether the coming great transformation, 
possibly characterised by these two re-embeddings, can be realised within the para-
digm in which modernisation is dominated and evaluated by gdp growth. There is a 
rich body of literature which claims that environmental burdens can be eased within 
the present-day growth paradigm.21 Through the introduction of green technologies 
we could have the best of both worlds: economic growth and the preservation of 
nature and the environment. Others claim that this is not an option. According to 
them the only answer to the increasing environmental problems is to abandon the 
desire for economic growth. In the post-growth paradigm, sustaining the present- 
day well-being of western society is judged sufficient.22 Not only would more 
growth result in unacceptable environmental damage, from a well-being perspective 
there is also no longer a need for further growth.
Recently, the environmental economist Jeroen van den Bergh has suggested an 
alternative position.23 In his proposal he makes a careful distinction between the 
issue ofwhether economic growth is still possible in the light of ecological con-
straints, and the critique of gdp as the leading indicator in policy making. Van den 
Bergh is quite clear about the value of gdp as a leading indicator. It is a wrong com-
19 K. Polanyi, The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time (Boston 
1944).
20 R. Kemp et al., ‘The humanization of the economy through social innovation’, Paper for SPRU 
50th anniversary conference (version august 2016).
21 Nowadays especially the green growth paradigm maintains that economic growth and an accept-
able pressure on the natural environment can go hand in hand, see for example: http://www.oecd.
org/greengrowth/
22 See for example: F. Schneider, G. Kallis and J. Martinez-Alier, Crisis or opportunity? Economic 
degrowth for social equity and ecological sustainability. Journal of Cleaner Production (2010) 
18(6): 511–518.
23 J. van den Bergh, ‘Green agrowth as a third option: Removing the GDP-growth constraint on 
human progress’, EU Policy paper (WelfareWealthWork), no 19 (2015).
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pass and should therefore be abandoned as soon as possible. He is especially critical 
of what he calls ‘gdp growth fetishism’. In that sense his position reflects the gdp 
critique as voiced by a majority in the parliamentary debate quoted at the beginning 
of this chapter.
Van den Bergh coins his perspective as ‘a-growth.’ Rejecting gdp as a guiding 
principle, he is ‘agnostic’ when it comes to the possibility of its growth. He claims 
that society should first define the environmental damage it deems acceptable in 
relation to sustaining an acceptable level of well-being. Perhaps, he says, gdp 
growth is possible, perhaps not. He makes no a priori statements about the possibil-
ity of growth in a context that respects environmental limits and that focuses on 
well-being in the broadest sense. Systematic comparison between gdp series and 
indicators of well-being and sustainability will answer that question.
The next section will briefly indicate the methodological framework used to anal-
yse these developments. Those not interested in a more detailed description of that 
framework can make do with reading this paragraph and then move on to Chap. 2.
1.5  Research Methodology in Brief
The following points of departure have guided the selection of themes, the use of 
concepts, the empirical descriptions and the analysis:
The Measurement Framework for Well-being and Sustainability Researchers at 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) have developed a measurement framework that enables 
them to map well-being, broadly conceived, and its sustainability. This framework 
measures economic, ecological and societal aspects of existence. The core question 
is whether the way in which well-being is achieved in the ‘here and now’ is not 
achieved at the cost of the depletion of vital resources, whether in the Netherlands 
or in the rest of the world. But whereas the CBS measurement framework relies on 
about 100 indicators, this study, in accord with international usage, employs a so- 
called ‘small indicator set.’
Well-being in its original meaning includes whatever contributes to quality of 
life, insofar as scarce resources are mobilised to constitute this quality of life. But 
in politics and societal debates the concept of well-being has to a remarkable extent 
been equated with the gross domestic product (gdp). In response a much broader 
concept of well-being, broadly conceived, has been proposed and gained wide 
political support: In April, 2016, a parliamentary committee decided that discussing 
the state of well-being, broadly conceived should become a yearly routine. This 
concept of ‘well-being, broadly conceived’ truly denotes quality of life in the broad-
est sense. That said, in the remainder of this study, with few exceptions, we will 
simply  ad sense, to denote our quality of life or the extent to which people have 
been able meet their preferences. This well-being can be measured in objective as 
well as subjective terms. The latter relates to the ways in which people perceive 
their quality of life.
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Natural Capital Natural capital occupies a special place within the debate on sus-
tainability. That is because it is a critical resource, essential for the continued exis-
tence of life on earth. Natural capital forms, as it were, the physical basis on which 
well-being is built. The development of this natural capital is mapped through time 
by means of material flows. The analysis includes the entire chain from nature via 
producers to consumers.
Multilevel Dynamics, Including Institutional Evolution Transitions are coherent 
changes in a society’s (or sector’s, city’s) set of interrelated and interacted dominant 
practices and the structures in which these are embedded, informed by a new set of 
problems and normative orientations.24 Regarding structure, in the analyses special 
attention is devoted to the evolution of the material dimension of structure (physical 
infrastructures) as well as to its institutional dimension: the so-called institutional 
rectangle, i.e. the specific nature of and alignment between state, market, civil society 
and knowledge infrastructure.25 Also, given the nature of our unit of analysis (a coun-
try), our focus on the relations between social practices, nature and environment and 
our interest in capital flows, we will also pay attention to place and connections.
1.6  The Measurement Framework for Well-being 
and Sustainability
1.6.1  Brundtland Definition
The analyses of well-being and sustainability in this book are based on a measure-
ment framework for sustainable development that was constructed by employees at 
the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).26 Statistics Netherlands developed 
this framework as an alternative for the usual indicators that are derived from the 
system of national accounts (including the gdp) and that illuminate only the eco-
nomic aspects of well-being. The measurement framework developed by CBS has 
been embraced by an important part of the statistical community. Meanwhile 60 
24 J. Grin, J. Rotmans, J. Schot, Transitions to sustainable development: New directions in the study 
of long term structural change (New York 2010), 1–3.
25 J.  Grin, ‘Understanding transitions from a governance perspective’, in: J.  Grin, J.  Rotmans, 
J. Schot, Transitions to sustainable development: New directions in the study of long term struc-
tural change (New York 2010): 237–248.
26 Under chairmanschip of Statistics Netherlands an international working group developed the so-
called Conference of European Statisticians Recommendations on Measuring Sustainable 
Development, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe prepared in cooperation with the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Statistical Office of the European 
Union (Eurostat) (New York and Geneva 2014). In short, CES Recommendations on Sustainable 
Development (2014): https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/publications/2013/CES_SD_
web.pdf. The CES measurement framework is followed almost seamlessly in the indicator report of 
the Monitor Sustainable Netherlands: http://www.monitorduurzaamnederland.nl/
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countries have indicated that this framework is the best way to map well-being and 
sustainability. That of course does not make it an internationally accepted standard. 
Universal acceptance will be a complex and time-consuming process, as indeed that 
of the gdp once was.
The measurement framework elaborates on the definition of sustainable develop-
ment given in the Brundtland Report,27 written by the UN Commission for 
Environment and Development (WCED):
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present, without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, here or in other parts of 
the world.
In other words, well-being and sustainability are viewed in the light of a just distri-
bution of well-being and of the resources necessary to generate well-being. This 
pertains not only to a just distribution between generations, but also to the justice of 
the distribution within the present generation. The latter stipulation is above all a 
question of a just distribution among prosperous countries and the (poorest) devel-
oping countries. The Brundtland Report has canonized a strand of thought about 
sustainability that conceives sustainability as not solely an ecological problem. 
Economic and societal phenomena were explicitly included in the analysis. In addi-
tion the Brundtland Commission emphatically addressed international differences 
in well-being, in particular the growing gap in well-being between North and South.
While well-being and sustainability are inherently concerned with the ‘here and 
now’, they also speak to the effects of maintaining our present quality of life, both 
on future generations (‘later’ dimension) and on people elsewhere in the world 
(‘elsewhere’ dimension).
1.6.2  Well-being ‘Here and Now’
Well-being is a much broader concept than simply material well-being, a condition 
that is often measured in terms of consumption of goods and services. Well-being 
also includes our health, level of education and the quality of the natural and social 
habitat. The resources or capitals necessary to build up well-being are also broadly 
defined. These include not only economic capital like machines and tools, but also 
human capital (health, knowledge and skills), social capital (the quality of social 
networks and institutions) and of course, above all, natural capital.
Natural capital occupies a special position, because it can be seen as the founda-
tion of well-being. The usual economic view of natural capital is anthropocentric, 
seeing nature only as ‘useful and productive’ and as a purveyor of ‘ecological ser-
vices’ to humans. This ignores the fact that that certain forms of natural capital, like 
biodiversity, have an intrinsic value quite apart from the specific ‘utility’ it might 
have for humans.
27 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (London 1987).
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1.6.3  ‘Here and Now’ Versus ‘Later’
From an intergenerational perspective a development is sustainable only if it makes 
it possible for future generations to achieve at least the same level of well-being as 
we now enjoy. Of course we have no inkling of the preferences of future genera-
tions; we do not know what and to what extent they will want to consume. The only 
way we can determine whether the present generation is on the road to sustainabil-
ity, is to check whether we are leaving enough resources for coming generations. A 
necessary condition for sustainability is therefore also that the per capita quantity of 
resources (of all the distinct forms of capital) may not decline. Future generations 
must have access to the same (per capita) quantity of economic, human, natural and 
social capital in order to meet their needs for well-being.
Tensions may exist between population growth and economy on the one hand, 
and demands made on natural capital on the other. This is also the reason why in this 
study population growth is an important contextual variable. Societal developments 
are often related to population growth, in order to assess whether enough per capita 
resources are handed over to coming generations. This should not be taken to sug-
gest that economic growth and demands on the environment are necessarily indis-
solubly linked. Within a more circular economy the demands made on nature and 
the environment can be significantly reduced even in times of economic 
expansion.
It should be noted that the above figure only shows the potential for sustainable 
development. On the one hand there are no guarantees that future generations will 
also mobilize the resources they have inherited in a sustainable way. On the other 
hand it is entirely possible that in consequence of technological developments, 
resources may be more efficiently exploited in the future. In that case society could 
generate the same well-being with fewer resources.
1.6.4  ‘Here and Now’ Versus ‘Elsewhere’
The capital-based approach sketched above addresses a fundamental aspect of the 
Brundtland definition, namely the intergenerational aspect of sustainability. This 
approach is also useful for studying the transborder effects of sustainable develop-
ment, that is to say the extent to which countries can influence one another with 
respect to the construction of their well-being.
A country can exploit its own domestic resources for the construction of a certain 
level of well-being, but it can also choose to import them. In an analysis of well- 
being and sustainability it is therefore also important to consider international flows 
of different forms of capital, and in particular to evaluate how the production and 
consumption activities of one country affect the natural capital of other countries. 
The other forms of capital are of course also important. In this way, the quality of 
life in a country can be influenced by the import and export of economic capital 
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(machines and tools), as well as human capital (namely the flow of knowledge asso-
ciated with migration). This makes the ‘elsewhere’ dimension (that indicates the 
effects on the rest of the world of the striving for well-being in a given country) the 
final element in the definition of sustainability. In this study we shall look especially 
at the extent to which natural capital elsewhere in the world was utilized by the 
Netherlands.
1.6.5  The Measurement Framework of Well-being 
and Sustainability (the CES Recommendations)
CBS regularly publishes a Monitor Sustainable Netherlands, in which well-being 
‘here and now,’ ‘later’ and ‘elsewhere’ are described. These Monitors map trends 
since 2000. In this study we shall for the first time attempt to apply this measure-
ment framework to a long term analysis. Of course not all the indicators used in the 
CBS framework will be available for the period since 1850.28
We have therefore opted to work with a ‘small set’ of indicators. The so-called 
CES Recommendations for Sustainable Development29 are taken as a point of 
28 In certain cases indicators had to be defined somewhat differently than in the present-day mea-
suring system, due to the lack of availability of sources.
29 See the report of the Conference of European Statisticians Recommendations on Measuring 
Sustainable Development (New York and Geneva 2014).
Core Concepts in the CBS Measurement Framework for Well-being  
and Sustainable Development
Sustainable development: Development that meets the needs of the present 
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs, here and elsewhere in the world.
Well-being (broadly conceived) or quality of life: A broad concept that is not 
limited to the ‘utility’ that people derive from the consumption of goods 
and services, but that is also related to the freedom and the possibilities 
people have for satisfying their needs for well-being.
Resources (capitals): A supply or resource from which a yield can be derived. 
Initially capital was regarded strictly as an economic, material concept 
(like machines, tools, buildings and infrastructure). The concept of capital 
has gradually been broadened, to the point that it now also includes natu-
ral, human and social capital.
Ecological quality of life: This concept focuses on the intrinsic value of 
nature and its ecosystems, quite apart from the question whether these 
have a direct economic value for humans.
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departure. These international guidelines indicate how, for countries with limited 
databases, the large set of indicators can be reduced to a set of 24 indicators. The 
strategy was to choose one indicator for each discrete theme, one that could act as 
a kind of proxy guiding indicator that in essence covers a broader terrain. The 
theme health, for example, can be charted by means of a large number of indicators, 
but life expectancy can be seen as an overarching indicator that provides a good 
summary of general trends in changing health patterns. In certain cases where 
themes had a rather heterogenous character it was found necessary to adopt multi-
ple indicators in order to cover the theme adequately.
The themes and indicators are presented in the CBS Monitor in three ‘dashboards’, 
as indicated in Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. This measurement system covers the full 
scope of societal development. But the debate on well-being and sustainability 
emphasises natural capital. That is why we will delve into natural capital more deeply.
Table 1.1 Dashboard well-being ‘Here and Now’
Theme Indicator
Well-being
Consumption, Income Consumer expenditure
General income inequality
Gender income inequality






Physical safety Murder victims
Work Unemployment
Education Level of education
Leisure time Leisure time
Natural environment
Biodiversity MSA
Air quality SO2 in air
Greenhouse gasses




1 Well-being and Sustainability: Measurement System and Institutional Framework
18
1.7  Natural Capital and the Three Material Flows
The Monitor of Well-Being utilises a broad concept of well-being. Concerning the 
question of the depletion of vital resources, the Monitor distinguishes four capitals: 
natural, economic, human and social capital. This book, however, devotes particular 
attention to natural capital, and that for two reasons. First, natural capital can be 
seen as the foundation on which the entire economic and social system is built. 
Humans are able to construct (material) well-being by utilising natural resources. In 
the second place we can view a portion of available natural capital as critical capi-
tal. Were economic, human or social capital to be seriously threatened, well-being 
would doubtless be severely compromised. But if nature and the environment are 
damaged beyond repair, ecosystems can collapse and with them the very founda-
tions of economy and society.
Natural capital is rooted in ecosystems that a society has at its disposal ‘by 
nature’ in order to produce useful goods and services. Humans have had little to no 




Non-energetic resources Gross domestic consumption
Biodiversity MSA
Air quality SO2 emissies
Greenhouse gas emissions
Water quality Public water supply
Economic capital
Physical capital Economic capital stock
Financial capital Gross national debt













Natural resources Import of raw materials
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part in creating these ecosystems, hence the term ‘by nature.’ Natural capital com-
prises non-living nature – the ground, the air, water – as well as living nature, the 
trees, the insects, the birds and other organisms. Living and non-living nature have 
their own dynamics and exchange matter and energy. Every organisms lives by vir-
tue of metabolic processes or metabolic relationships. A set of close interactions 
between living and non-living entities is called an ecosystem.30
A natural ecosystem in its pure form can hardly be found in the Netherlands 
because its territory is the product of human intervention. The territory of the 
Netherlands has been worked to its remotest reaches and in part wrested from the 
water. In this case we speak of colonised ecosystems, ecosystems influenced by 
human practices. The Dutch live in such systems also thanks to metabolic relations, 
but these relations provide even more, namely a stream of products with which the 
Dutch produce their existence, material culture and society.
This is why we define natural capital as the ability of colonised ecosystems to 
provide so-called ecosystem services, in other words the ability to generate yields 
of food, energy, potable water etc.31 According to this definition, a colonised ecosys-
tem is a separate complex of internal interactions among people, water, air and soil 
with plants, animals and micro-organisms. In addition to this internal dynamic, a 
colonised ecosystem has an exchange of matter and energy with nature (for example 
solar radiation and rainwater) and society (for example, machines, artificial fertil-
iser, and wheat) (see Fig. 1.1).
30 R.C. Hoffmann, An environmental history of medieval Europe (Cambridge 2014), 5–7 and his 
inspiring introduction, 1–20.
31 See for the distinction between natural and colonised ecosystems: Hoffmann, An environmental 
history, 7–11. There is a plethora of literature on ecosystems and ecosystem services. See among 
others: TEEB, The economics of ecosystems and biodiversity: An interim report (Cambridge 
2008), 12; and J. Dirkx et al., Balans van de leefomgeving 2014 deel 7: Natuurlijk kapitaal als 




farming on the sand
grounds in Brabant):
people, institutions, living
and non-living nature with
social, biological and
natural laws
From nature to colonized ecosystem: CO2,
solar radiation, rainwater, etc.
From colonized ecosystem to nature:
emissions, erosion, nesting place
From society to colonized ecosystem:
machines, artificial fertilizer, etc.
From colonized ecosystems to society:
wheat, sand, potatoes etc.
Fig. 1.1 The colonised ecosystem
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As point of departure for understanding the yields of colonised ecosystems in 
this study we will examine three categories of raw materials and sub-soil assets:
 – Bio-raw materials: all agricultural yields (crops, cattle, fishing, and forestry)
 – Mineral sub-soil assets: all yields from underground extraction of an inorganic 
nature, including sand, clay, marl, stone, iron ore and other ores.
 – Fossil sub-soil assets: all yields from underground extraction of an organic 
nature, namely turf, coal, oil and gas.
With these categories as point of departure, an all but complete image of material 
flows in the economy can be constructed. We shall follow the development of raw 
materials and underground resources through time in great detail, including not only 
domestic, but also foreign sources. We will also investigate the economic processes 
in which these raw and underground materials are used. In this way we can recon-
struct quite precisely the way in which the Netherlands exploited its natural capital 
from 1850 on. Special attention will be devoted to the supply chains along which 
these raw and underground materials find their way to the end user. In this way we 
can analyse how deeply these material flows reach into the capillaries of the social 
order, and which role they play in processes of economic growth and social change.
1.8  Institutions and Dynamics
Up to this point the promotion of well-being and sustainability has been sketched as 
a structural and rather abstract process. In this process, institutional and material 
structures and their evolution are key factors, as is spatiality (place and connec-
tions). But, in the end, structuration theory tells us, in John Law’s (1992) famous 
shorthand, that ‘structure is a verb’: structure matters to the extent that, and through 
the ways in which, actors reproduce or transform them in their practices (of produc-
tion, consumption, policy making, innovation etc.). This study therefore pays due 
attention to agency and practices. Most specifically, we will discuss the (contesting) 
ways in which, in a specific period, different groups of actors defined the problem 
of well-being as well as the normative orientations guiding practices (like ‘intensi-
fication of production’).
An illuminating framework for understanding such long term processes of trans-
formative change is offered by transition studies. A basic theorem from that field is 
that transitions may occur if fundamental changes in (or the emergence of novel) 
practices, structural change and long term trends (such as individualisation or 
Europeanization) coincide and dynamically reinforce each other over time. Absent 
such interconnected dynamics, the coherence of the system of practices and structures 
J.-P. Smits
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reproducs itself and resists change. This theorem is rooted in a range of historical 
studies32 as well as a review of literature on innovation.33
As noted above, in discussing structure and structural change, we will pay spe-
cial attention to physical infrastructure (above) and to institutional context. More 
specifically, we will focus on institutions in the domain of (1) politics and govern-
ment, (2) the economy, (3) a societal ‘midfield,’ i.e. civil society and (4) science, 
technology and innovation.
Institutions may be defined as rules maintained by humans that structure their 
political, economic and social behavior.34 There is a distinction between formal and 
informal institutions. Formal institutions are associated with the legal system (in 
particular the Constitution), rules for decision-making, property rights, agreements 
and contracts. Next to these there exist informal institutions like rules of behavior, 
customs and conventions. Such rules generally have deep socio-cultural roots and 
are implied in e.g. families, schools and neighbourhoods.
The state, the market and the societal mid-field (civil society) can be seen as 
crucial institutions and principles of social order.35 It should not be assumed that 
there is some ideal combination of these various institutions. Every generation will 
have to provide its own answers to the challenges of its time, answers that consist of 
repeated restructurings of the institutional system.
The State, or Political and Governmental Institutions These institutions determine 
the legal framework by means of which personal freedoms, property rights, and the 
legal security of citizens are specified. They fulfill functions in the anchoring of 
stability, safety, security and the prevention of corruption and preferential treatment. 
The state also co-determines the rules of the game in the market, e.g. as a safety net 
for market failure and as an inhibitor of monopolistic entrepreneurial practices like 
cartel-forming. The state can also intervene at moments when market forces gener-
ate intolerable levels of social inequality.
The Market or the Economic Institutions These institutions determine the eco-
nomic rules of the game. They specify the scope of action for entrepreneurs, capital-
ists, workers, consumers and other groups. They set out the playing field for 
32 J.  Schot, ‘The usefulness of evolutionary models for explaining innovation: The case of the 
Netherlands in the nineteenth century’, History and Technology 14 (1998) nr.3, 173–200; 
F.W. Geels, Technological transitions and system innovations: A co-evolutionary and socio-tech-
nical analysis (Cheltenham 2005); J. Schot and F. Geels, ‘Typology of sociotechnical transition 
pathways’, Research Policy 36(2007), nr.3, 399–417; F.W. Geels et al., ‘The enactment of socio-
technical transition pathways: A reformulated typology and a comparative multi-level analysis of 
the German and UK low-carbon electricity transitions (1990–2014)’, Research Policy 45 (2016), 
nr.4, 896–913.
33 A.  Rip and R.  Kemp, ‘Techological change’, in: S.  Rayner and E.L.  Malone (Eds.), Human 
choice and climate change. Vol II, Resources and technology (Columbus1998) 327–399
34 D.C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge-New York 
1990).
35 Zie: Y. Hayami, Development economics: From the poverty to the wealth of nations (second edi-
tion) (Oxford 2001), chapters 8 en 9.
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economic initiatives and competition. They provide the security necessary for mar-
ket actors to engage in transactions. Countless economic regulatory systems ensure 
that supply and demand are coordinated as well as possible, so that citizens have 
access to goods and services to improve their quality of life.
Civil Society, or the Societal Mid-Field The institutions in this quadrant are crucial 
for the political process. Politics is here considered as the game through which the 
rules prevailing in economy and society are continually adapted to new situations. 
Groups coalescing around specific interests attempt to influence that game. In this 
way it is possible for specific social groups to gain the advantage over others and for 
vested interests to be protected to the extent that modernisation processes can take 
off only with the greatest difficulty.36 In such cases the question is how the societal 
mid-field is organised and which initiatives from within this institutional quadrant 
can lead to change. The science, technology and innovation system is a fourth cru-
cial institution. While this may possibly not immediately be seen as a principle of 
social ordering, it is certainly of essential importance for the analysis of well-being 
and sustainability. After all, technology and innovation are among the important 
motors of improvement in the quality of life. Not only can technology and science 
be seen as engines of the economy (and thereby of the increase of material 
prosperity),37 but the development of new technologies can make the employment 
of scarce resources – like natural capital – more efficient. At the same time the role 
of science and technology in relation to sustainability is suspect because an inten-
sive exploitation of natural capital has also led to negative effects.
In this chapter the methodological framework has been presented by means of 
which we propose to analyse 150 years of well-being and sustainability.. The CBS 
measurement framework enables us to trace the main lines along which well-being 
‘here and now’ has developed and the extent to which that has depleted resources in 
the Netherlands or elsewhere in the world. We pay special attention to natural  capital 
and will chart its historical development with the aid of detailed descriptions of 
material flows. These data will enable us to assess the extent to which economic 
developments in the period 1850 to the present have culminated in an increase of 
well-being and sustainability, or perhaps not. These descriptions will be consis-
tently framed within the ‘institutional quadrants,’ a strategy that reveals how the 
structural contextual factors with which actors saw themselves confronted did or did 
not lead social development in the direction of greater well-being and 
sustainability.
After this methodological exposition the following chapter wil sketch the histori-
cal situation prevailing at the outset of this study. What was the state of Dutch soci-
36 Jan de Vries remarks how in the course of the eighteenth century the institutions became rigid 
because the political elite forbade economic innovations that would compromise their position: J. 
de Vries, ‘Barges and Capitalism’, AAG Bijdragen 21 (1978). Until the 1860s social change was 
inhibited by institutional ossification, see: J.L. van Zanden and A. van Riel, Nederland 1780–1814. 
Staat, instituties en economische ontwikkeling (Amsterdam 2000), 48–56 and 96–101.
37 Maddison, Dynamic forces in capitalist development: A long-run comparative view.
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ety around 1850? How can we compare the Netherlands in 1850 with its present-day 
condition? How can we characterise the big changes in the domain of well-being 
and sustainability?
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Chapter 2
The Great Transformation 
and the Questions
Jan-Pieter Smits and Harry Lintsen
Abstract This chapter opens with an overview of Dutch society midway through 
the nineteenth century, showing that at the time poverty was the main social prob-
lem. This is followed by a comparison between the benchmark years 1850 and 
2010. The comparison shows that over the course of the intervening 160  years, 
Dutch society realised a vast increase in well-being. Extreme poverty was gradually 
eliminated, though in so doing sustainability issues emerged. Economic modernisa-
tion made inordinate demands on natural capital. After 1960, in particular, eco-
nomic growth had an increasingly negative impact on human well-being and on 
sustainability.
Keywords Poverty · Well-being · Sustainability · Natural capital
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2.1  A Landscape of Horrors1
In 1845, for the first time in history, the potato harvest failed nearly everywhere in 
Europe. The Netherlands were not spared.2 In the hot and moist summer of that year 
the mold Phytophthora Infestans had spread unusually quickly. The leaves of the 
potato plant were infested first, after which the underground tuber quickly began to 
rot. Farmers looked on, astonished. This they had never seen before. The conse-
quences were catastrophic. Since the eighteenth century the potato had been a staple 
of the popular diet. Potato prices skyrocketed in response to the extreme scarcity 
and prices of wheat and bread soared with them. There was widespread hunger. The 
population grew restless and Leiden, Delft, The Hague and Haarlem were the scene 
of food riots.3 The police were powerless against mobs, rowdiness, vandalism and 
sometimes plunder. Grocers who were suspected of profiteering were especially 
targeted. The army had to be called in to restore order. The situation deteriorated 
with the failure of the rye harvest in 1846.
This was only the beginning of a war of attrition. The Netherlands was being 
lashed by a variety of scourges. Many lost the gamble with death. In the summer of 
1846 typhus and typhoid fever, among others, reared their ugly heads. By the end of 
August a malaria epidemic had developed. The sick barely had time to recover due 
to the cold winter that followed. Bronchitis and flu became epidemic, in many cases 
ending in death. In subsequent months malaria returned and, abetted by dysentery, 
measles and associated ills, decimated the population. ‘... The sick are extremely 
weakened by the repeated fevers,’ as Amsterdam’s Medical Commission noted:
at every illness, even without accompanying fevers, all the sufferers experienced an almost 
instantaneous loss of vitality and even the healthy complained of a certain degree of slug-
gishness and apathy. The apathy and exhaustion...were...the precursors and harbingers of 
the tremendous storm that was about to break... namely the widely feared Cholera Asiatica.4
The cholera epidemic broke out halfway through 1848 and reached its peak in 1849. 
After that the Netherlands was able to lick its wounds, but not for long. New dramas 
followed. 1853 witnessed the start of the Crimean War, a struggle between the 
Russian Empire and an alliance of among others Turkey, France and England. Its 
effects were felt, even though the war, that lasted two years, took place at a distance 
of more than 2000 km. It drove international wheat prices up and seriously depressed 
1 The introduction is based on: H. Lintsen et al., Made in Holland. Een techniekgeschiedenis van 
Nederland [1800–2000] (Zutphen 2005), 23.
2 J.  Bieleman, Geschiedenis van de landbouw in Nederland 1500–1950 (Amsterdam 1992), 
132–133.
3 R. van der Wal, Of geweld zal worden gebruikt. Militaire bijstand bij de handhaving en het herstel 
van de openbare orde 1840–1920 (Hilversum 2003), 57–66.
4 Quoted in: J.M.M. de Meere, Economische ontwikkeling en levensstandaard in Nederland 
gedurende de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw (‘s-Gravenhage 1982), 112.
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Dutch wheat imports. Access to food in those years was at least as problematic as 
during the potato crisis.5
In March 1855 the Grebbe Dike was breached over a length of 150 meters. The 
Land of Maas and Waal and the Gelderland Valley were flooded. Other parts of 
Gelderland and North Brabant followed. Water and ice floes caused great damage.
Severe floods and dikes have covered parts of our fatherland with disasters and have cast 
thousands of our countrymen, robbed of all property and goods, into frightful misery. Every 
single source of life has ceased to flow, there where water covers the otherwise so fertile 
fields...6
The king visited the affected region. The Dutch opened their purses to the victims. 
Fund-raising events were organized.7
Around 1850 the Netherlands experienced bad times. There was hunger. Illness 
reigned everywhere. The death rate increased and life expectancy declined. The 
social order was under duress and criminality increased. In the region of the big riv-
ers and along the coast floodwaters had to be kept at bay.
Is this the background against which we have to paint a picture of well-being and 
sustainability in the Netherlands since 1850? Further analysis demands the specifi-
cation of an initial situation. This consists in the first place of a brief characteriza-
tion of Dutch society.
In the second place, we want to confront the situation at that time with the situa-
tion now. We tackle this with the Monitor from the previous chapter. The three 
‘dashboards’ with indicators serve as points of departure. (1) well-being in the 
Netherlands ‘here and now,’ (2) resources available for future generations, ‘later’ 
and (3) the Netherlands in the world, ‘elsewhere’. We fill in the ‘dashboards’ with a 
series of numbers for the various indicators pertaining to diverse themes. The start-
ing period of the investigation (the middle of the nineteenth century) can thereby be 
contrasted with the present day. This exercise should be seen as a preliminary explo-
ration. What do the numbers say?
In the third place we provide an impression of the development of natural capital 
between 1850 and 2010.
As might be expected, the conclusion is that we can speak of a Great 
Transformation. It is almost impossible to imagine how fundamentally the 
Netherlands has changed. This chapter provides a characterization and poses funda-
mental questions raised by the transformation.
5 M.T. Knibbe, ‘De hoofdelijke beschikbaarheid van voedsel en de levensstandaard in Nederland, 
1807–1913’, Tijdschrift voor Sociaal-Economische Geschiedenis 4(2007), nr. 4, 98.
6 ‘Watersnood’, Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 11-03-1855.
7 See the numerous advertisements in the newspapers in that year. Source: Delpher Kranten, key-
word ‘watersnood’ (flooding).
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2.2  The Netherlands Around 1850
The historical literature provides a mixed image of Dutch society halfway through 
the nineteenth century. On the one hand it is evident that in this period the Netherlands 
is highly developed. Per capita income is among the highest in the world. Moneywise, 
the Netherlands remained the world’s richest country until about 1800. After that, 
Great Britain, where the industrial revolution raged in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, took the lead from the Netherlands.8
The high level of economic development is also reflected in a number of struc-
tural features of Dutch society in this period. The degree of urbanization, amounting 
to 21% in 1850, was one of the highest in the world.9 European countries with levels 
of income similar to the Netherlands hovered around only 6%.10 This high level of 
urbanization was made possible to a large degree by the high productivity of Dutch 
cattle husbandry in particular. This freed an important part of the agricultural labor 
force to find work in trade, transport and services in the strongly commercialized 
economies of the coastal provinces.11 Finally we can point to the high level of lit-
eracy, often ascribed to the Protestant church that of course attached great impor-
tance to the ability of believers to read the bible themselves.
Nonetheless, in the first half of the nineteenth century this high level of economic 
development also had its dark sides.12 The province of North Holland for example, 
traditionally one of the most prosperous regions of the country, suffered from de- 
urbanization. Especially in the cities around the Zuiderzee, employment declined to 
the extent of encouraging a sizeable migration to the countryside. Data on con-
sumpiton also show that material well-being was threatened. Consumption of meat 
exhibited a significant drop, which is taken in the literature to be a sign of strong 
social-economic decline. Finally, we can point to the state of government finances. 
At the outset of the 1840s this was in a deplorable condition. In 1844 ‘bankruptcy’ 
of the Dutch state could barely be prevented.13
This is a diffuse image. The Netherlands exhibits aspects of a highly developed 
society, while at the same time there are indications of stagnating social develop-
ment. How can this be understood? Richard Griffiths asked this questions years ago 
in a publication entitled Achterlijk, achter of anders? (Backward, behind or 
8 A. Maddison, Monitoring the world economy (Parijs 1995), 23. For updates of this database see: 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/data.htm
9 J. de Vries, European urbanization 1500–1800 (London 1984).
10 A.  Burger, ‘Dutch patterns of development: economic growth and structural change in the 
Netherlands’, Economic and social history in the Netherlands 7 (1996), 109–132.
11 For a elaborate analysis of the commercialization of the agrarian sector during the Dutch 
Republic see: J. de Vries, The rural Dutch economy in the golden age, 1500–1700 (New Haven 
1974).
12 De Meere, Economische ontwikkeling en levensstandaard.
13 J.T.  Buys, De Nederlandsche staatsschuld (Haarlem 1857), 149–158; I.J.  Brugmans, 
Paardenkracht en mensenmacht (Den Haag 1961), 187.
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different?).14 In certain respects the nineteenth century Dutch economy certainly 
lagged behind. The process of industrialization that was so successful in Great 
Britain and Belgium barely took off in the Netherlands. But ‘backward’ is certainly 
not a justifiable qualification in view of a number of ‘modern’ characteristics of 
Dutch society sketched above.
The key to the paradox can be found in the ‘different’ nature of Dutch society. 
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century the Netherlands found itself in 
the middle of a far-reaching structural transformation, framed in the literature as the 
transition from a commercial capitalistic to an industrial capitalistic system.15 
During the Dutch so-called Golden Age (1580–1672) the Netherlands witnessed an 
economic dynamism unknown in those days. Amsterdam’s staple market became 
one of the most prominent centers of world trade, around which countless process-
ing industries and a flourishing financial and transport sector developed.16 Around 
1650 material well-being had climbed to such heights that per capita income was 
the highest in the world. This exceeded that of Great Britain by no less than 30%.17
The tide turned in the eighteenth century. The Republic’s economy declined into 
a ‘stationary state’ and all but ceased growing.18 This can in part be attributed to 
external factors. The currents of world trade shifted, threatening the functioning of 
Amsterdam’s central staple market.19 But this is not the whole story. Economic 
dynamism gradually disappeared and the obsolete institutional system hindered the 
emergence of new entrepreneurial initiatives. In the eighteenth century economic 
and institutional rigor mortis assumed such proportions that the literature speaks of 
an ‘obsolete economy.’20
The greatest obstacle to innovation was the political and economic elite of the 
Republic, that clung to its privileges and sources of income and that consciously 
resisted new and potentially more profitable economic activities as a threat to their 
vested interests. Halfway through the nineteenth century the Netherlands was forced 
to eat the bitter fruits of this shortsighted attitude.21 Certainly, in a number of 
respects one could always point to a positive inheritance from the period of the 
Republic (high income levels, robust level of commercialization) but the  institutional 
14 R.T.  Griffiths, Achterlijk, achter of anders? Aspecten van de economische ontwikkeling van 
Nederland in de 19e eeuw (Amsterdam 1980).
15 J.L. van Zanden, Arbeid tijdens het handelskapitalisme. Opkomst en neergang van de Hollandse 
economie 1350–1850 (Bergen 1991).
16 T.P. van der Kooij, Hollands stapelmarkt en haar verval (Amsterdam 1931).
17 Zie hiervoor: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/data.htm
18 J.L. van Zanden, ‘The Dutch economy in the very long run. Growth in production, energy con-
sumption and capital in Holland (1500–1805) and the Netherlands (1805–1910)’, in: A. Szirmai, 
B. van Ark en D. Pilat, red., Explaining economic growth. Essays in honour of Angus Maddison 
(Amsterdam 1993), 267–283.
19 Joh. De Vries, De economische achteruitgang van de Republiek in de achttiende eeuw (Leiden 
1959).
20 J. de Vries, ‘Barges and capitalism’, AAG Bijdragen 21 (1978).
21 J.L. van Zanden and A. van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914. Staat, instituties en economische 
ontwikkeling (Amsterdam 2000), chapters I.3 en 2.4.
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system functioned as a brake on social renewal. On the one hand the old commercial 
capitalist system no longer generated sufficient growth and employment, and on the 
other hand the institutions hindered the modernization of social life.
There was also a large income differential. While the per capita income might 
have been very impressive by international standards, the bulk of this income was 
pocketed by the political and economic elite, especially the merchants of the prov-
ince of Holland. A large part of the population lived in poverty. This poverty was 
exacerbated by the tax system. Tax burdens were distributed quite unevenly across 
the population and lay especially heavy on workers’ families.22
In the course of the second half of the nineteenth century the obstacles to eco-
nomic renewal were gradually eliminated. From the 1860s on the Netherlands expe-
rienced a successful transformation from a pre-modern commercial capitalistic to a 
modern industrial capitalistic structure. What did this transformation bring to the 
Netherlands in terms of well-being and sustainability? This is the central issue of 
this book. For a first assessment we compare the situation in the middle of the nine-
teenth century with the present-day situation and take the CBS monitor as our point 
of departure..23
22 E.  Horlings and J.P.  Smits, ‘Private consumer expenditure in the Netherlands, 1800–1913’, 
Economic and social history in the Netherlands 7 (1996), 15–40.
23 The CBS measurement framework relies on about 100 indicators, this study, in accord with 
international usage, employs a so-called ‘small indicator set.’The choice of the themes is justified 
in part II of the CES Recommendations on Sustainable Development (New York/Geneva 2014). We 
have of course tried when choosing indicators to follow these recommendations as closely as pos-
sible. Sometimes however, laking sufficient data, we had to make use of ‘proxies’ that could be 
considered an adequate measure of the given theme. The following differences with the CES 
Recommendations on Sustainable Development (New York and Geneva 2014) should be noted:
 – Obesitas as indicator for nutrition is replaced by height.
 – The bird index as indicator for biodiversity is replaced by ‘Mean Species Abundance’ (MSA)
 – Fine dust as indicator for air quality is replace by SO2.
In a number of cases, due to the availability of sources or because of the representation of the 
historical theme, indicators had to be defined slightly differently than in the measurement system. 
For example, ‘attendance at elections’ as an indicator for political institutions has been replaced by 
the ‘democracy index’.In the recommendations population size is used as a general indicator for 
the context. That is how it is used in this study.
The values of the indicators for the reference dates 1850, 1910, 1970 and 2010 come from the 
following sources:
 – J.L. van Zanden et al. (red.), How was life? Global well-being since 1820 (OECD Publishing 
2014): general income inequality, life expectancy, height, murder victims, level of education, 
MSA, democract-index.
 – F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchreport 
Eindhoven University of Technology, oktober 2016): gross domestic consumption non-fossil 
raw materials, import of raw materials.
 – H. Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the Netherlands: Sustainability challenges in a historical 
and comparative perspective (Groningen 2016), appendix VIII: CO2.
 – K. Breedveld, M. Cloïn en A. van den Broek, Ruimte voor tijd. Op weg naar een monitor tijd-
sordening (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, Den Haag 2002): free time
 – J.P.  Smits, E.  Horlings en J.L. van Zanden, Dutch GNP and its components, 1800–1913 
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2.3  Well-being ‘Here and Now’: 1850 Versus 2010
Well-being ‘here and now’ is the monitor’s first dashboard and includes a broad 
palette of themes, among which well-being, labor, air quality and trust in institu-
tions. Quite in line with expectations, material well-being – measured as per capita 
consumption – increased in the period 1850–2010 (Table 2.1). In fact it grew by a 
factor of almost six, while the Dutch population increased from 3.1 million to about 
16.6 million inhabitants.
Well-being also increased in a broader sense. The average life expectancy, an 
indicator of health and the physical condition of the Dutch population, was 37 years 
in 1850. That is less than half the present life expectancy. The nutritional and hous-
ing situations are also much improved. The number of years of schooling, at present 
an important factor in personal development and economic life-chances has 
increased by eight years on average. An indication of political participation is the 
democracy index, for which 100% denotes the theoretical maximum.24 In the 1840s 
this was 0.31% and at present 39%. By today’s standards the quality of life in 1850 
as measured by these indicators must be judged to be low or very low. Well-being in 
terms of satisfaction with life cannot be measured for 1850. It is, however, hardly a 
daring supposition that the well-being of the Dutch has increased.25
In several respects the years around 1850 distinguished themselves in a positive 
sense. The number of murders per 100,000 inhabitants, a measure of personal safety, 
was low (0.8), even lower than at present in the Netherlands (1.1). Also, the quality 
of the natural environment was high. Biodiversity, for example – expressed in ‘Mean 
Species Abundance’ (MSA)  – where 100% represents the original pre-human 
(Groningen 2000): unemployment in 1850 and 1910
 – Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), among others Statlines: the values of the other 
indicators.
 – For statistical substantiation of the values of the indicators, see the relevant sources.
24 The democracy index is defined as the product of the participation index (the percentage of the 
adult population that votes in elections) and the competition index (one minus the proportion of the 
vote going to the winning party in national elections). J.L. van Zanden et al. (eds.), How was life? 
Global well-being since 1820 (OECD Publishing 2014), 163.
25 An indication could be a comparison between the Netherlands at that time and present-day coun-
tries with the same level of material well-being. Then it cannot be otherwise than that the Dutch 
must have been unsatisfied or dissatisfied with their lives. In 1850 the Netherlands had a gdp/capita 
of 2330$ (1990 PPP$). From the Human Development Report (2010, table 1, 143–145) we select 
the first country with a gdp/capita below 2350$ (2008 PPP$). That turns out to be Kyrgyzia with a 
satisfaction score of 6. Subsequently the lowest country with a gdp/capita above 2300$. That turns 
out to be Yemen with a satisfaction score of 4. In this table the Netherlands occupies seventh place 
with a score of 9. All scores are rounded off.
One could also imagine that the Dutch may have felt themselves relatively happier than the 
inhabitants of other countries. After all, the Netherlands was among the richest countries in the 
world.
The problem was that means of communication were limited and most Dutchmen were not 
acquainted with the situation elsewhere. They were familiar with their own situation where there 
was a huge gap between rich and poor. Poverty and inequality have a big impact on well-being.
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Income inequality, general gini coefficient: 0−1 0.48 0.32





Satisfaction with life score 0−10 ? 8
Personal
characteristics
Health Life expectancy years 37 81
Nutrition Height cm 165 (183)
Housing Housing quality % slums and hovels 30 á 50 <1
Public water supply m3/capita 0 120
Physical safety Murder victims number per 100.000
inhabitants
0.8 (1.1)
Labour Unemployment % workforce 6.4 5.0
Education Level of education years 3 (11)
Free time Free time hours/week ? 44.7
Natural
environment
Biodiversity MSA % of original
biodiversity
73 (63)
Air quality SO2 kg SO2/capita 1.3 4
Greenhouse gas emissions ton CO2/capita 1.2 10.6
Water quality Public Water supply m3/capita 0 120
Institutional
environment





Democracy democracy-index 0−100 0.31 (39)
Table 2.1 Dashboard well-being ‘here and now,’ 1850 versus 2010
Legend
Positive development
Negative development  
Note: The numbers in brackets are from J.L. van Zanden et al. (ed.), How was life? Global well-
being since 1820 (OECD Publishing 2014) and relate to the year 2000. Numbers for these indica-
tors – measured according to the same methodology – are not available for 2010
Source: See note 23 of this chapter
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 biodiversity – was higher than at present (73% compared to 63%).26 However, there 
was in that time also a major environmental problem, namely the organic pollution 
of surface water and hence the drinking water. That was the cause of serious public 
health problems.
These figures are not so much the end, but rather the beginning of stories and 
analyses about the environment, safety, democracy, health etc. In those stories the 
historical context has to be prominent. In the tables, we have compared the figures 
for 1850 with those for today. But how should we judge these figures in the context 
of the middle of the nineteenth century? What did Dutch people at the time think 
about the different themes?
Take for example the democracy index, indicating that at that time democratic 
quality was utterly lacking. This indicator has to be seen in relation to the inception 
of parliamentary democracy. The 1840s was a turbulent decade in politics. King 
William I, who for many years had ruled as an autocrat, abdicated his throne. This 
precipated a discussion on the organization of the state. This was resolved in 1848, 
at least for the time being, with Thorbecke’s new constitution stipulating direct par-
liamentary elections and introducing ministerial responsibility. This constitutional 
revolution did not, however, imply the simultaneous emergence of a corresponding 
political culture. Political instability persisted in subsequent years and there cannot 
have been much trust in the new political institutions.27
Political instability must certainly be seen as an issue and as an important well- 
being problem in terms of the monitor. In relation to quality of life another important 
theme must also be considered. This has to do with two indicators, namely the level 
of consumer expenditures (150 guilders/year per capita) in combination with income 
inequality (Gini coefficient of 0.48, where 1 is maximum and 0 no inequality). These 
reveal – from today’s perspective – a disturbing fact, namely that an estimated 21% 
of the population must have lived under the poverty line, in other words must have 
been ‘extremely’ poor (for the calculation and the norms see Chap. 4).
On the basis of a first orientation to the quality of life around 1850 two important 
well-being themes have cropped up: political instability and poverty. There may be 
other themes of equivalent importance. We will come to these in the course of our 
investigation. Of the two themes mentioned, we will devote most attention to pov-
erty. As we noted earlier, we have chosen to focus on physical existence and natural 
capital in the Netherlands. The political situation will be considered primarily in 
relation to this material aspect.
Poverty as a grave sustainability problem in terms of minimal quality of life 
demands closer study. Which categories of the poor can be discerned and what was 
the nature of their poverty? Was the Netherlands in a position to solve poverty with 
the resources then available and in particular with the available natural capital?
26 For the rest, the emission of CO2 – one of the greenhouse gasses – was low: 1.2 tons of CO2 per 
gdp/capita over against 10.1 nowadays. That of SO2 – an indicator of air pollution – 0 as compared 
to 80 kton SO2 per gdp/capita.
27 P. de Rooy, Ons stipje op de wereldkaart. De politieke cultuur van Nederland in de negentiende 
en twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam 2014), 75–79.
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The problem of poverty was not unique for the Netherlands around 1850, but an 
issue indissolubly connected with the history of humanity. This raises an important 
question. From today’s perspective poverty is a big problem, but did it have the 
same importance in 1850? Contemporaries may have seen poverty as a destiny 
about which little could be done or as an issue that was under control thanks to 
charitas and poor relief. But if that was not the case, the question becomes: what 
initiatives did contemporaries undertake to solve the problem and what conse-
quences did these have for the available resources?
It is also important to appreciate how standards for poverty and quality of life 
have changed over the course of the last century and a half. People demanded an 
ever higher quality of life. Many inhabitants of the Netherlands would have per-
ceived a normal worker’s home of 1850 as a hovel only 50 years later. This study is 
alert to how norms change in the course of time and how increases in quality of life 
and adaptation to new demands for quality took place. At the same time our analysis 
pays attention to what is called ‘contested modernization.’ The growth of well-being 
sometimes assumed unbridled forms, giving rise to entirely new problems of quality 
of life. Whereas in 1850 the field of food and health was dominated by malnutrition, 
the last decades have confronted us with obesitas as a new social problem.
2.4  Well-being ‘Later’: 1850 Versus 2010
Capitals or resources for ‘later’ are the theme of the second dashboard of the CBS 
monitor. From today’s perspective, there was an enormous potential to develop the 
resources available in 1850. This is a simple conclusion in retrospect, but how was 
this viewed at the time?
The indicators of natural capital, as is to be expected, show a modest per capita 
consumption of energy and raw materials in 1850 (Table 2.2). At the time, energy 
was extracted from domestic turf and to a lesser extent from coal – which was for 
the most part imported. Raw materials also included mineral sub-soil assets (clay, 
sand and earth) and agricultural produce. The available natural capital could have 
been more intensively and extensively exploited – even on the basis of technologies 
then existing.
The sustainability monitor reveals a dilemma here. Biodiversity and air quality 
were in good shape, compared to today. From today’s perspective, intensive exploi-
tation of natural capital suggests a negative and undesirable development, while the 
solution for poverty as an important sustainability issue requires precisely that. 
Natural capital demands a fundamental analysis. To what extent did the exploitation 
of natural capital result in the depletion of raw materials, the pollution of the envi-
ronment and the destruction of ‘nature?’ To what extent were prior generations 
aware of this and were nature and environment seen as relevant issues?
History shows that the exploitation of natural capital could occur in many 
different ways and that it did not always imply sustainability problems, for 
example in the case of a circular economy. History also shows that some problems 
J.-P. Smits and H. Lintsen
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could be easily eliminated in consequence of the transition from the use of coal to 
oil to natural gas (like air pollution as a result of SO2 emissions, while others were 
more intractable (like the ever-increasing manure surpluses in the dairy industry 
and the consequent eutrophication of the soil and sub-soil). This study singles out 
the negative effects that have followed on the exploitation of natural capital in the 
Netherlands. This makes it possible to acquire more insight into the roots of 
today’s sustainability problems like climate change and the loss of biodiversity. 
These problems do not stem from the most recent period, but are the result of 
long-term manipulation by humans of the natural environment. It is only by adopt-
Natural capital






Biodiversity MSA % original biodiversity 73 (63)
Air quality SO2 emissions kg SO2/capita 1.3 4
Greenhouse gas emissions ton CO2/capita 1.2 10.6
Water quality Public water supply m3/capita 0 120
Economic
capital
Physical capital Economic capital
stock/capita
index: 1850=100 100 1046
Financial
capital
Gross national debt % gdp 194 59
Knowledge Stock knowledge capital index: 2010=100 0 100
Human capital
Health Life expectancy years 37 81
Labor Unemployment % workforce. 6.4 5.0
Level of
education
Schooling years 3 (11)
Social capital








Theme Indicator Unit ±1850 ±2010 Evaluation
corresponding
CBS methods
Table 2.2 Dashboard well-being ‘later’, 1850 versus 2010
Legend
Positive development
Negative development  
Note: The numbers in brackets are from J.L. van Zanden et al. (ed.). How was life? Global well-
being since 1820 (OECD Publishing 2014) and relate to the year 2000. Numbers for these indica-
tors – measured according to the same methodology – are not available for 2010
Source: See note 23 of this chapter
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ing an intergenerational perspective that we can assess the extent to which societal 
activities have really increased our well-being.
With economic, human and social capital exhaustion can be prevented by rein-
vesting in the associated resources. The figures show that these forms of capital 
exhibit definite improvement between 1850 and 2010. It is also important to inves-
tigate the quality of the investments. For example, one of the three themes within 
economic capital in the Monitor is physical capital. This consisted for the most part 
of ‘classic’ investments in buildings (houses, workplaces, churches, government 
buildings), in infrastructure (roads, waterways and land reclamation) and in tools, 
machines and means of transport (sailing ships, windmills, etc.).28 The question is 
how much was invested in a modern economy, e.g. in railways and steam engines, 
textile and bread factories.
From today’s perspective human capital in 1850 was of a low quality, among 
other things because of widespread poverty, low life expectancy and a low level of 
schooling. Nowadays we see a connection between these factors and low levels of 
economic growth and well-being. To what extent did contemporaries want to invest 
in the improvement of public health and schooling in order to improve well-being 
in the future?
Social capital, a measure of social integration and political culture, is represented 
in the Monitor by two indicators: the democracy index and generalized trust. These 
indicators – as far as can be ascertained – paint a negative picture. What influence 
did the problematic nature of social capital have on the issue of poverty?
2.5  Well-being ‘Elsewhere’: 1850 Versus 2010
Nowadays, largely thanks to the Brundtland Report, much more attention is paid to 
how countries pursuing their own well-being lay a claim on resources elsewhere in 
the world. This issue will also occupy us in this volume. That said, the third dash-
board of the monitor – ‘elsewhere’ – is based on only a very limited set of indicators. 
There is still much uncertainty – especially for historical research – about indicators 
that get to the core of the problematic transboundary dynamics of well-being.
Here we will hew to the international framework and work with two indicators: 
development aid and import from developing countries (Table 2.3). ‘Development 
aid’ and ‘developing country’ are anachronisms for the nineteenth century and have 
no meaning for an analysis of the situation in 1850. The notion of ‘developing  country’ 
refers to the large present-day differences in well-being between, for example, the 
Netherlands and other countries. Such differences also existed in 1850. As noted 
above, the Netherlands and Great Britain were then the richest countries in the world. 
Most of the world was significantly poorer than the Netherlands. In comparison with 
the Netherlands, global poverty must have been of a different order altogether. The 
majority of the world population must have lived around or under the poverty line.
28 J.L. van Zanden en A. van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914. Staat, instituties en economische ontwik-
keling (n.p. 2000), 346–351.
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The evaluation of the third dimension will take account of this context. We will 
take Dutch imports as a point of departure (Table 2.3). In 1850 these amounted to 
about 1300 kiloton, or 0.4 ton per Dutchman compared to about 214,000 kiloton or 
12.9 tons per Dutchman in 2010. Imports have increased dramatically, both abso-
lutely and relatively. The increase is indicative of the globalization of which the 
Netherlands is a part. Where do the imports come from? How did they influence – 
insofar as this can be determined – resources elsewhere? In present-day terms: what 
was the ‘footprint’ of the flow of foreign goods to the Netherlands?
In this connection the Dutch colonies demand special attention. Recent reports 
reveal that in comparison with other EU countries the Netherlands imposes a heavy 
burden on the natural resources of the poorest countries.29 It has been suggested that 
this passing of the buck can be partially explained by the Netherlands’ colonial 
past.30 In this book we investigate what role foreign regions, and in particular the 
colonies, played in the growth of Dutch well-being.
2.6  Natural Capital: 1850 Versus 2010
The results of the Monitor for 1850 and 2010 reveal that over the last century and 
half the Netherlands has depleted some of its available natural capital. Hence this 
volume will examine the development of natural resources in greater detail by 
means of an analysis of raw materials and their derivative material flows.
29 CBS, Sustainablility monitor of the Netherlands 204. Indicator report (Den Haag 2015), 34–37.
30 H.  Langenberg and J.P.  Smits, ‘Invoer van grondstoffen uit LDCs: geworteld in koloniale 
tijden?’, Internationaliseringsmonitor 2015 (4), 43–57. See: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publica-
tie/2015/44/internationaliseringsmonitor-2015-vierde-kwartaal







Development aid % gdp − 0.8
Natural
capital
Natural capital Import of raw materials ton/capita 0.41 12.9
Table 2.3 Dashboard well-being ‘elsewhere,’ 1850 versus 2010
Legend
Positive development
Negative development  
Source: See note 23 of this chapter
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Table 2.4 shows how big the increase in raw materials was between 1850 and 
2010. For bio-raw materials there was a 13-fold increase and for mineral and fossil 
sub-soil assets the factor was even higher (respectively 71 and 65). Population 
growth in this period goes some way toward providing an explanation for this explo-
sive increase. But even the per capita growth of raw materials remains huge. For 
bio-raw materials this increased by a factor of 2.8 and for mineral and fossil sub-soil 
assets by, respectively, 13 and 12. These figures also show the extent to which 
claims on natural capital, measured as volume of raw materials, has become more 
international. For example imports of fossil raw materials rose between 1850 and 
2010 from 18% to an impressive 69%, while exports rose from 1% to 47%. The 
other raw materials also reveal a growing integration with the global economy.
The increase in the total number of raw materials is not evenly distributed over 
the entire period (Graph 2.1). It fluctuates over time due to the two world wars and 
the economic depression in the thirties. However, a clear break in the trend can be 
seen around 1960. Between 1850 and 1960, annual growth averaged about 2.5%. In 
the period 1960–1975 it increased by 5.1% annually and then weakened to an aver-
age of 1.0% between 1975 and 2010 (see also Table 22.1).
Table 2.4 Raw materials in the Netherlands 1850 versus 2010
1850 2010 Ratio 1850:2010
Bio-raw materials:
  Gross available 5260 kton 67,020 kton 1:13
  Bio/capita 1.7 ton/capita 4.0 ton/capita 1:2.4
  % import 11% 31% 1:2.8
  % export 6% 23% 1:3.8
Mineral sub-soil assets:
  Gross available 1350 kton 95,570 kton 1:71
  Mineral/capita 0.45 ton/capita 5.8 ton/capita 1:13
  % import 11% 58% 1:5.3
  % export 2% 17% 1:8.5
Fossil sub-soil assets:
  Gross available 3060 kton 199,630 kton 1:65
  Fossil/capita 1.0 ton/capita 12.0 ton/capita 1:12
  % import 18% 69% 1:3.8
  % export 1% 47% 1:47
Total raw materials:
  Gross available 9670 kton 372,220 kton 1:37
  Raw materials/capita 3.1 ton/capita 21.9 ton/capita 1:7
  % import 13% 59% 1:4.5
  % export 4% 35% 1:8.8
Remark: Gross available = domestic production + imports
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016)
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2.7  The Great Transformation, the Tradeoff 
and the Fundamental Questions
The fifties and sixties of the twentieth century are also a special period for the 
development of economics, well-being and sustainability. Graph 2.2 shows the rela-
tionship between the growth of GDP per capita and the quality of life after 1850.31 
These figures show that economic growth and the development of well-being do not 
always go hand in hand. In the period from 1850 up to 1880 we see that well-being 
lags a little behind economic growth. After that time until the sixties of the twenti-
eth century, however, the expansion of the quality of life is stronger than one might 
expect on the basis of economic growth. After that we see that economic growth has 
been accompanied by ever smaller increases in welfare. How can we explain 
these differences? Which factors determine the extent to which growth in GDP 
translates into increases in welfare or not? The relationship between growth in 
31 Technical explanation: Figure 2.1 compares the growth of GDP with an unweighted average of 
indicators for the quality of life ‘here and now.’ All the time series data are standardized, so that 
they all have the same bandwidth, preventing series that can increase without limit (like consump-
tive expenditure) from exerting more influence than series that by their nature move within a more 
limited bandwitdth (as for example average life-expectancy, being constrained by demographic 
limits). Due to this standardization technique, the graph exhibits deviations within a limited 
bandwidth.
Graph 2.1 Total use of raw materials in the Netherlands, 1850–2010 (kton)
Note: Use = domestic production + import
Source: See note 10 of Chap. 24
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GDP and increases in well-being appears to be very complex. In the rest of this 
volume the nature of this relationship will be investigated from period to period.
In addition to an examination of the development of well-being we are also inter-
ested in this study whether the increase in quality of life has been accompanied by 
overexploitation or even depletion of Dutch or foreign resources. From a present- 
day perspective the greenhouse gas problem is one of the greatest sustainability 
challenges.
In an economic system largely based on the exploitation of fossil fuels, every 
form of economic development is accompanied by CO2 emissions. Still, important 
differences among the various periods can be ascertained. For example after 1850 
economic growth is clearly associated with an increase in energy consumption 
(Graph 2.3). After the Second World War, however, energy consumption increases 
more than ever before. The same applies to greenhouse gas emissions, which means 
that the sustainability norm for CO2 emissions around 1970 is exceeded (see also 
Graph 22.3).32 How can this sudden turnabout be explained? Which economic activ-
ities were responsible?
Next to these general tradeoffs we also focus on more specific tradeoffs, for 
example that between biodiversity and efforts to achieve nutritional security or that 
between the quality of water, soil and air and the processes of upscaling and increas-
32 J.P. Smits, ‘De omvang en oorsprong van de milieuschade 1910–1995’, in: R. van der Bie en 
P. Dehing, red., Nationaal goed. Feiten en cijfers over onze samenleving (ca) 1800–1999 (Den 
Haag-Heerlen 1999), 235–254. Zie: https://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/8EC09284-EF4A-4C0A-
8FA3-CA95AB7ED4B1/0/nationaalgoed.pdf
Graph 2.2 Well-being effects of economic growth in the Netherlands, 1850–2010 (compressed 
and composite index 1850 = 100)
Technical explanation: See note 5 of Chap. 22
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ing consumption of energy. Issues like these are central to the upcoming chapters of 
this volume. We continue to focus on the choices historical actors made in solving 
their sustainability problems, on the technologies that they employed and above all 
on the institutional context that helped or perhaps hindered them in finding 
solutions.
2.8  The Structure of This Book
In this volume we distinguish three periods: 1850–1910, 1910–1970, and 1970–
2010. Periodisation is of great importance because the relationship between eco-
nomic growth and the development of well-being and sustainability is not linear. It 
always involves complex relationships that have to be studied in their specific insti-
tutional context.
This choice of periods has to do with the availability of data for the years 1850, 
1910, 1970 and 2010. In addition, these years are seen as important watersheds in 
the social-economic literature.33 An economic and technological perspective also 
justifies the choice for these periods.34
33 See for example: A. Maddison, Dynamic forces in capitalist development. A long-run compara-
tive view (Oxford 1991). Maddison uses 1850, 1913 en 1973 as turning points.
34 J.P. Smits, H. de Jong en B. van ark, ‘Three phases of Dutch economic growth and technological 
change, 1815–1997’, Groningen Growth and development Centre Research Memorandum GD 42 
































































Graph 2.3 Total energy consumption in the Netherlands, 1850–2010 (PJ)
Source: H. Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the Netherlands: Sustainability challenges in a histori-
cal and comparative perspective (Groningen 2016), 11–12 and B. Gales and H. Hölsgens,‘Energy 
consumption in the Netherlands (1800–2012), in: H.  Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the 
Netherlands: Sustainability challenges in a historical and comparative perspective (Groningen 
2016), appendix I
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The period 1850–1910, certainly for the Netherlands, counts as that of the clas-
sical first industrial revolution with steam, textiles and the factory system as impor-
tant features. The period 1910–1970 may at first sight appear to be anything but 
homogeneous. From a political perspective this is certainly the case; the period was 
characterized by a major economic depression in the interwar period and by two 
world wars. From a technological and economic perspective, however, it can be 
seen as a single period, shaped, among others, by a second industrial revolution 
rooted in electricity, chemistry and large-scale industrial enterprises.35
The first years of the 1970s can be seen as a turning point in many respects. 
Technologically speaking, the system of the second industrial revolution had by 
then all but exhausted its potential.36 By the 1980s the contours of a new techno- 
economic regime could be discerned, a regime that emphasized information and 
communication technology, services and small and medium sized businesses.37 
Finally, at the outset of the 1970s it was becoming apparent that in an ecological 
sense we were reaching the ‘limits to growth.’ More and more attention was paid to 
the problem of the inordinate claims of economic growth on natural resources.38
For each period we review the results of the well-being monitor and present 
detailed data about natural capital. We consistently analyze developments in terms 
of the analytical quadrants of political and economic institutions, the societal ‘mid-
field,’ and the knowledge infrastructure.
To start off with, however, we shall examine in greater detail the situation around 
the middle of the nineteenth century, aiming to sketch an adequate frame of refer-
ence for subsequent periods. How did the Netherlands exploit its natural capital? 
How should we understand the quality of life around 1850? What were the most 
important issues in regard to well-being and sustainability from a present-day and a 
contemporary perspective?
We conclude the book with a summary of the historical development and a pre-
view of 2050. Can we learn from history with a view to a sustainable future?
35 R.J. Gordon, ‘US economic growth since 1870: one big wave?’, American Economic Review 89 
(2) 1999, 123–128. Gordon argues that this ‘one big wave’ was impelled forward by, among other 
things, a second industrial revolution.
36 J.P. Smits, ‘Technology, productivity, and welfare’, in: J. Schot, A. Rip and H. Lintsen, eds., 
Technology and the making of the Netherlands. The age of contested modernization, 1890–1970 
(Zutphen 2010), 454–455.
37 Smits, Technology, productivity, and welfare, 455–456.
38 The birth of this modern environmental consciousness is marked by among other things Rachel 
Carson’s study of the DDT crisis and the way in which poisonous substances can penetrate deeply 
into ecosystems in a short span of time: Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Harmondsworth 1962). 
Extremely influential in the early 1970s was the Report of the Club of Rome, ‘limits to growth’: 
Meadows et al., The limits to growth: a global challenge (n.p. 1972).
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Chapter 3
Natural Capital, Material Flows, 
the Landscape and the Economy
Harry Lintsen
Abstract In this study, natural capital occupies a special place. After all, the way 
natural capital is exploited is crucial for issues of well-being and sustainability. This 
chapter analyses the exploitation of natural capital in the Netherlands around 1850. 
It deals with three categories of resources produced by natural capital.
First, organic resources (including grains, potatoes, cattle and milk) and the asso-
ciated supply chains in agriculture and foods (farming systems, food production and 
food consumption).
Second, mineral subsoil resources (in particular sand, clay and gravel) and the 
associated supply chains in construction (housing construction, water management, 
and infrastructure).
This chapter is written by Harry Lintsen with contributions by Fred Lambert, Rick Hölsgens and 
Ben Gales.
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Finally, fossil subsoil resources (in particular turf and coal) and the associated 
energy supply chains (industry and households).
The exploitation of natural capital took place in a variegated landscape possess-
ing great biodiversity and an agricultural economy that provided plenty of room for 
population growth.
Keywords Natural capital · Agriculture · Foods · Construction · Energy · 
Biodiversity · Economy
3.1  Recalcitrant Sand Grounds
It was always hard work on the Dutch sand grounds. ‘The rooster is the alarm clock 
of the farming family’, as an official report on farm life puts it:
Work begins... in the early morning; crop farmers start in the summer at 4 and work until 8 
o’clock in the evening, in the winter from 4 in the morning to 6 or 7 o’clock in the evening; 
grass or dairy farmers begin work an hour later in the winter and are done an hour earlier.1
Making manure was the core of farm work on the sand grounds.2 This demanded 
heavy labour and was therefore men’s work: cutting peat sods on the heath, loading 
the wagon, mixing the peat with manure from the stable, mucking out the stable, 
transporting manure to the fields and spreading it out over the fields. Adequate 
fertilizing of the soil was the key to survival on the sand grounds. Tilling the soil as 
well as harvesting was also men’s work: ploughing, harrowing, delving, mowing, 
threshing the grain, etc. That was also the case for a variety of tasks like cutting 
wood, preparing flax and everything to do with the horse or the ox. Evenings were 
devoted to making brooms, repairing halters for the horses, knotting ropes for the 
cows, sharpening knives and so on.
Women’s work consisted of taking care of the cow, the calf, the pig and the 
chickens. The farmer’s wife was responsible for milking and processing the milk, in 
particular churning it into butter. She also helped with harvesting, maintained the 
vegetable patch and provided meals for her husband and the children. Making and 
repairing clothes was reserved for the evenings. In North-Brabant much of her time 
1 J. Zeehuisen, ‘Statistieke bijdrage tot de kennis van den stoffelijken en zedelijken toestand van de 
landbouwende klasse in het kwartier Salland, provincie Overijssel’, in: J.L. Van Zanden, ‘Den 
zedelijke en materiële toestand der arbeidende bevolking ten platten lande’. Een reeks rapporten 
uit 1851 (Historia Agriculturae XXI, Groningen 1991). Original source: Tijdschrift voor 
Staathuishoudkunde en Statistiek 6(1851), 380.
2 For a description of farming on the sand grounds see A.H. Crijns en F.W.J. Kriellaars, Gemengd 
landbouwbedrijf op de zandgronden in Noord-Brabant 1800–1885, (Tilburg 1987); J. Bieleman, 
Boeren op het Drentse zand 1600–1910. Een nieuwe visie op de ‘oude’ landbouw (Wageningen 
1987); J. Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland. Geschiedenis van de landbouw 1500–2000 (Amsterdam 
2008) en G. van den Brink, De grote overgang. Een lokaal onderzoek naar de modernisering van 
het bestaan. Woensel 1670–1920 (Nijmegen 1996).
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was taken up with preparing slops for the cattle: three times a day in the winter and 
twice in the summer.3 For the slops, the farmer’s wife used cut tuber greens and 
tubers, corn spurrey (greens, hay, chaff and husks), potatoes, carrots, rape siliqua, 
flax husks, clover, cut hay, chopped straw, sometimes buttermilk and when the 
mixture was cooked also ‘cake water’ (made from rape cakes soaked in water), 
while oat or rye flour was often also added to the brew. ‘Without fodder no good 
cattle, no good manure, no good harvest, no profit...’ thus was its importance 
described.
This important part of the enterprise rests largely on the woman, who from early morning 
to late evening toils for her cows and thus devotes little attention to her own home, because 
the time is needed in or for the stable: that is where she lives, there is her sole pride.4
Work was apportioned by sex but also by age. It was normal for children to be 
burdened with supporting tasks. From an early age they contributed by gathering 
wood, picking berries, digging up thistles and in some cases herding cattle in the 
fields. At the age of ten boys joined their fathers in helping to prepare the manure 
and work the land, while the girls helped the mother with her work.
On the bigger farms (on the sand grounds farms of more than 5 hectares) both the 
farmer and his wife had their hands full running their farm.5 Usually they had the 
help of one or more domestic farmhands and maids. That depended on the size of 
the farm and the number of eligible children. But the sand grounds were dominated 
by smallholders with farms of less than 5 hectares. Many owned only a small plot 
of land of a hectare or less on which they cultivated potatoes and some vegetables 
and kept a cow, pig, goat or a few chickens. This was often inadequate to make a 
living. So next to running their own little enterprise they worked on other farms or 
derived income from other activities. Threads were spun to order, textiles woven, 
mats braided etc. The whole family took part. A reporter from the province of 
Drenthe described the smallholder as follows:
He has very few needs and mostly a bit of land near his habitation and a Frisian sheep in the 
stable, sometimes a cow from Drenthe. He tills his soil in his free time, assisted by his wife 
and children; the sheep’s wool serves for clothing; the vest jacket and the five-shaft coat are 
usually woven in the village itself; he is used to heavy labour...6
The sand grounds belong to the natural capital of the Netherlands. Natural capital 
occupies a special position in this study. It is viewed as the basis for quality of life 
(see Chap. 1). It is clear that natural capital does not bestow its favours without a 
struggle. It has enormous potential in the Netherlands, but its exploitation demands 
3 Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland, 266.
4 Cited from: Van den Brink, De grote overgang, 125. Original source: W. van Iterson, Schets van 
de landhuishoudkunde der Meijerij (Groningen 1868), 85.
5 Crijns en Kriellaars, Gemengd landbouwbedrijf op de zandgronden in Noord-Brabant, 78 en 85.
6 P.W. Alstorphius Grevelink, ‘Zedelijke en materiële toestand der arbeidende bevoking ten platten 
lande. Nopens Drenthe (1850)’, in: J.L. Van Zanden, ‘Den zedelijke en materiële toestand der 
arbeidende bevolking ten platten lande’. Een reeks rapporten uit 1851 (Historia Agriculturae XXI, 
Groningen 1991). Original source: Verslag van het verhandelde op het vijfde Nederlandsche 
Landhuishoudkundig Congres, gehouden te Leiden van den 10den tot den 14den junij 1850 
(Leiden 1850), Appendix no 13, 111.
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tremendous efforts. This chapter develops the theme of natural capital. How can we 
characterize Dutch natural capital in the middle of the nineteenth century? What 
products did it help to produce and what services were provided? What were the 
consequences for nature? How did it contribute to economic growth? The next 
chapter examines the quality of life that was achieved in the Netherlands on the 
basis of that natural capital.
We begin with a characterization of natural capital and we do that in terms of 
colonised ecosystems. These are natural ecosystems that have been influenced by 
humans with the aim of producing products and services (see Chap. 1). We can 
characterize colonised ecosystems in the Netherlands in various ways, depending 
on the system boundaries we choose. Here we take water, air and soil as a point of 
departure. How was nature colonised around 1850? And to what degree were those 
systems sustainable?
3.2  Natural Capital: Water, Air and Soil
The Netherlands could (and can) be perceived as a large colonised water system, 
although with the reservation that in the nineteenth century the influence of the 
Dutch on that system was still limited. 110 billion cubic meters of fresh water 
annually flowed into the country, in part via the rivers and partly as precipitation.7 
Most of this (about 80%) left the country directly as it flowed into the sea. The rest 
evaporated (about 20%). Less than 1% was used in agriculture, by households and 
in industry. Even that miniscule percentage still represented a useful material flow 
of millions of tons of water. The Dutch population would have consumed something 
like 2.0 to 2.6 million tons of water annually (directly as well as indirectly as a con-
stituent of food).8
Water played a key role in the Netherlands in a number of ways. As in other 
countries it was an elixir of life for the population in the form of drinking water. In 
the nineteenth century there was much ado about its quality. We will return to this 
point. Moreover it was an essential factor of production in agriculture (including 
fisheries) and industry. In addition water in the Netherlands uniquely fulfilled two 
other roles, namely as a medium for transportation and trade and for territorial 
defence.9
7 De Bosatlas van Nederland waterland (Groningen 2010), 57. Figures refer to the present-day 
situation and will be of the same order of magnitude as in 1850. Only the percentage of water use 
in agriculture, households and industry has been adjusted from 4.5% at present to less than 1% at 
the earlier epoch. This seems realistic in view of the significantly smaller population and scope of 
economic activity.
8 Adults need at least 2 to 2.5 liters of water per day (including water in foods); children older than 
one year 1.5 to 2 liters per day. We assumed an average of 1.8 to 2.3 liters. For a population of 3.1 
million persons in the Netherlands around 1850 this amounts to 2.0 to 2.6 million tons of water 
(including water in foods).
9 See: C. Disco and H.W. Lintsen, ‘Het nijvere verbond’, in: J. Schot, H.W.Lintsen, A. Rip and 
A.A. Albert de la Bruhèze (eds.), Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw (Zutphen 1998–
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Since medieval times, inner waters, lakes and large natural waterways played an 
essential role in regional, interregional and even international trade. In the course of 
the seventeenth century a dense network of tow-canals came into existence on 
which tow-barges operating on accurate schedules maintained regular connections 
among important cities and smaller towns. In the first half of the nineteenth century 
a number of new canals like the Zuid-Willemsvaart and the North-Holland Canal 
(Noord-Hollandsch Kanaal) were added. From this perspective, water was the 
necessary condition for the riches gathered by, in particular, the province of Holland. 
Water was the most important means of transport for commodities. It was from 
water that the Netherlands, that is, the Republic of the Seven United Provinces, 
derived its power as a trading nation.
Water was also the ally that helped defend the commercial position and the accu-
mulated riches against foreign aggression. Various defensive water-lines were con-
structed in order to defend the economic and political heart of the Netherlands – namely 
the province of Holland and in particular Amsterdam.10 Water-lines operated on a 
simple principle: one opened the inundation sluices,11 flooding the polders and cre-
ating a treacherous undeep water surface with numerous invisible ditches. The 
enemy could advance only along the more elevated dikes and roads, but this was 
blocked by a system of strategically positioned forts and sconces.
It is nonetheless important to realize that the colonisation of nature regularly 
misfired and that nature could easily become counterproductive: the sea threatened 
the land with storm surges, the rivers regularly flooded broad swaths of countryside 
as they overtopped their levies, lakes, their surfaces whipped by heavy winds, could 
also cause flooding. The low-lying portion of the Netherlands struggled with a 
surfeit of water while the higher portion ran the risk of water shortages. Water was 
not only an ally but a water-wolf that had to be tamed.
In the first half of the nineteenth century colonised ecosystems were Janus-faced. 
That certainly applied to air as a source of life for humans, plants and animals. As a 
factor of production it played a crucial role in industrial heating and chemical 
processes. It was used in households to heat and cook. If we focus on the atmospheric 
and meteorological aspects of air, then we soon encounter weather and the extensive 
use of wind as a source of energy. Wind supplied the energy for thousands of 
windmills and sailing ships.
But air also had a problematic side. Cold and poor air quality caused flu, tuber-
culosis and other epidemic diseases. On calm days the windmills languished, in 
stormy weather ships perished, during extreme weather entire harvests were lost 
and human existence was hard.
2003), part I, 55–63; G.P. van de Ven (ed.), Leefbaar laagland. Geschiedenis van de waterbeheers-
ing en landaanwinning in Nederland (Utrecht 1993); A. Bosch and W. van der Ham, edited by 
H.W. Lintsen, Twee Eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat 1798–1998 (Zaltbommel 1998).
10 De oude Hollandse Waterlinie (1673), de Grebbelinie (1742), de nieuwe Hollandse Waterlinie 
(1815), de Stelling van Amsterdam (1880) en de IJssellinie (1951).
11 Sluices by means of which low-lying ground could be inundated to form a defensive perimeter.
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The soil and subsoil is the third element in our survey of colonised ecosystems. 
Underground we find resources like coal, oil, gas and salt, of which in the mid- 
nineteenth century only coal was known to exist. This was mined in modest amounts 
in South Limburg. The top layer of the Dutch delta exhibits a variegated structure. 
The usual dichotomy is between the high and the low Netherlands. The high 
Netherlands comprises the loess grounds in the south and the sand grounds in the 
south and east of the country. The low Netherlands derives its soil structure from 
complex interactions among a rising sea level, the course of the large rivers, the 
formation of thick packets of peat and of fossil beach ridges and dunes. The presence 
of sea clay, river clay, sand and peat makes for a rich variety in soil types. For any 
given location the type of soil, the situation and the elevation co-determine what 
kind of agricultural production is possible and what kinds of fuels and minerals can 
be extracted. This connects the useful material flows that characterize the Netherlands 
around 1850 with the structure of the ground. We now provide a brief sketch of the 
colonisation of the soil and subsoil.
3.3  Agriculture and Nutrition: Organic Raw Materials
3.3.1  Mixed Farming on the Sand Grounds
The exploitation of the Dutch soil led to a variety of modes of agricultural extrac-
tion.12 This was due not only to the variety of soil types and their relative fertility. 
Tradition was also an element, especially styles of commercialization. This led to 
the dominance of mixed farming on the sand grounds, with a central role for the 
crop field.13 Manure, cattle and crop-rotation were essential to maintain fertility.14 
Manure and cattle have already been mentioned (see the introduction to this chapter). 
A popular choice in crop rotation on the sand grounds was rye because it did well in 
poor soil. In Twente it was rotated with so-called catch crops like red clover, tubers 
and corn spurry (spergula arvensis) that were planted after the rye harvest and used 
as cattle fodder and to combat weeds. As ‘green manure’ these crops also 
12 See for agriculture in the Netherlands: J.L. van Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de 
Nederlandse landbouw in de negentiende eeuw 1800–1914 (dissertation Wageningen 1985); 
Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland; Crijns en Kriellaars, Gemengd landbouwbedrijf op de zandgron-
den in Noord-Brabant; Bieleman, Boeren op het Drentse zand.
13 It is important to note that mixed farms on the sand grounds did not comprise a single type of 
system, but that they differed across time and region in the Netherlands. Hence it was possible to 
invest more heavily in cattle husbandry and dairy farming. Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland, 
260–267.
14 Cattle could be pastured on stubble fields, grasslands and heather meadows. They could also be 
kept in stalls, like the deep-litter stalls of North Brabant and fed on hay, tubers, spurrey and other 
fodder. This practice became more common at the beginning of the nineteenth century and contrib-
uted to the increase of manure production and ultimately the size of the harvests. Van Zanden, De 
economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw, 179. Another factor in increasing the 
size of the harvests was improved tillage thanks to intensive weeding and the use of catch crops.
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contributed to the restoration of soil fertility. In the province of Drenthe the rotation 
consisted of, for example, winter and summer rye, but also included potatoes, flax, 
oats and barley. In other regions, for example in North Brabant, buckwheat often 
replaced summer rye in the system of rotation, but potatoes and oats were also 
planted. A well-planned crop rotation scheme could significantly reduce the acreage 
that lay fallow. The way in which soil fertility was maintained differed through time 
and from place to place. The soil and agricultural expert, Winand Staring, distin-
guished six different systems on the sand grounds in 1869.
Moors, grasslands and forests were generally reckoned to the common grounds. 
They served as sources of peat and firewood, as pastures for sheep and so forth. The 
danger was overuse and the spread of sand drifts.15 Adequate management was 
therefore of supreme importance. The common grounds were collectively owned or 
open to collective use. The owners were local farmers or, as in North Brabant and 
Limburg, the municipalities. Sometimes the national state was proprietor. Collective 
management was known by a variety of Dutch names such as marken, maalschappen, 
holtelingen, gemeenten, boerschappen, or buurschappen. They all enforced 
numerous proscriptions aimed at regulating overuse and ensuring survival of these 
vulnerable areas.16 It was stipulated who could use the common grounds and in what 
way they were to be used. A board of governors decided on releasing grounds for 
cultivation.
Farming on the sand grounds, which consisted largely of smallholdings, was in 
many cases primarily oriented to satisfying the direct needs of the farmer and his 
family.17 It was also essential for realizing a certain surplus in order to pay taxes. 
And in case there was anything left over it was possible to buy goods like salt, soap, 
vinegar and tobacco and to invest in land, cattle and agricultural tools. The surplus 
was realized by selling farm products or performing work for others. In this way the 
farm touched on the market economy, albeit in a very limited way. The first half of 
the nineteenth century nonetheless witnessed an increasing orientation to the 
national and even international market. The sand grounds in the eastern Netherlands 
pioneered this development.
15 After digging out the peat sods a sandy subsoil remained that could regain fertility after a time if 
not used too intensively. These limits were violated if peat extraction became excessive. Another 
excess was the pasturing of flocks of sheep, a practice that created tracks of trampled and denuded 
paths through the heather.
16 T. de Moor, The dilemma of the commoners. Understanding the use of common-pool resources 
in long-term perspective (Cambridge 2015). See also chapter 8 of our study.
17 See: Van Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw, 145–199; 
Bieleman, Boeren op het Drentse zand; Van den Brink, De grote overgang, 184–192. 
H. Knippenberg and B. de Pater, De eenwording van Nederland (Nijmegen 1990), 98–102.
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3.3.2  Grassland Farming in the Low-Lying Peat Marshes
Exploiting the Dutch soil demanded not only heavy labour, but also cautious inter-
ventions, much knowledge, careful procedures and sound management. That was 
not only the case for the sand grounds. In the low-lying peat marshes of the Western 
Netherlands, for example, grassland farming was developed.18 This specialized 
mode of farming centred on the grass and the cow. Worldwide, these areas had the 
highest density of cows per hectare. The quantity of milk per cow was among the 
highest in the world. This was due among other things to astute cattle breeding, the 
quality of winter fodder and the hygienic preparation of the dairy products. The 
growth of grass was fundamental to this type of farming and was in large measure 
dependent on the water level.
Managing water levels was thus a major priority and this was accomplished 
within the institutional framework of the polders. Authority lay with the landowners. 
Management was in the hands of a polder or water board council composed of 
polder masters or dike reeves (heemraden). Relationships, interests and procedures 
were laid down in regulations. By the twelfth century, cooperation among polders 
had already led to the formation of regional water boards. These were responsible 
for the construction and maintenance of hydraulic works that were shared by all the 
polders, for example a common drainage basin (boezem) or a sea-dike. These were 
often called hoogheemraadschappen.19
3.3.3  Regional Variaty
In this way every region had its own specific struggle with the soil and its specific 
institutions. The clay grounds in the central river zone were tough and nearly 
impermeable to water. The clay embankments were well-suited to crop farming, the 
low-lying grounds (so-called komgronden) by contrast, were unprofitable. Weed 
pollution was one of the big problems. There was the recurrent danger of dike 
breaches. Seepage water plagued farming in the lower lying fields. Water boards 
lacked the means to control the big rivers.
In the northern and southwestern coastal zones extensive dike-building had 
deprived the sea of its casual access to the land and had marked the start of a 
continual struggle between the sea and the inhabitants under the leadership of the 
water boards. Behind the dikes, the banks of former tidal creeks, mud flats and pools 
had changed into fields and grassland. New land was added to the old. Both old and 
new land regularly had to be surrendered to the sea again. Crop growing with a 
mixed farm was the dominant type, but this included all kinds of variations 
depending on the quality of the soil and the market conditions.
18 Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland, 210–234.
19 Van de Ven, Leefbaar Laagland, 69–70.
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3.3.4  Market Orientation
Market orientation also influenced how the soil was worked. Compared to farming 
in the eastern and southern provinces, farming in the coastal provinces (Zeeland, 
Holland, Friesland and Groningen) was strongly commercialized. Agriculture was 
therefore also more specialized. Grassland farming supplied Dutch cities and 
foreign countries with dairy products. North Holland was the prime cheese 
producing region; Friesland and South Holland were important centres of butter 
production.20 Making butter and cheese was the work of the farmers’ wives, their 
daughters and the maidservants on the farm. Merchants bought butter and cheese at 
the farms, traded large consignments at weekly markets in nearby cities where the 
farmers also sold their wares, and shipped large quantities abroad, in particular to 
England. At the outset of the nineteenth century a quarter of London’s butter and 
cheese market was in Dutch hands.
The mixed farm in the coastal provinces produced wheat, oats and potatoes, 
often destined for the market and not for use on the farm itself. The farm also 
produced industrial crops like rape, flax and barley. Madder was a popular industrial 
crop in Zeeland and South Holland.21 The roots provided a red dye used in dying 
and printing textiles. Extraction took place in small batches according to traditional 
practice in drying ovens called meestoven, usually the collective property of a 
number of farmers. The main elements of the process were the drying of the madder 
roots, their cleaning and finally pulverization. The powder was transported in large 
wooden barrels to the staple market in Rotterdam. Textile printers and dyers in 
England, the United States and Germany were important customers. Dutch madder 
was held in high regard and it was protected by a web of laws that, for example, 
specified the percentage of impurities that a certain quality of madder could contain.
Specialized, commercial agriculture also had consequences for the social struc-
ture of the countryside.22 An important difference with the sand grounds was the 
size of farms. Large farms (more than 20 hectares) with their hired hands and maid-
servants dominated in the sea clay regions in the provinces of Zeeland, Friesland 
and Groningen. These were also dominant in the river clay regions but less so. 
Smallholders were all but non-existent. Instead, there was a large population of 
landless farm workers and day-labourers, that was totally dependent on paid work. 
They earned most in the summer, less in winter, and only on days that they worked. 
In part they were seasonal migrant workers that relieved the shortage of farm labour 
at harvest and mowing time. In the provinces of Drenthe, Overijssel and North 
20 See for butter: M.S.C. Bakker, ‘Boter’, in: H.Lintsen et al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in 
Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), part I, 
103–133.
21 J.W. Schot and E. Homburg, ‘Meekrap en garacine’, in: H.Lintsen et al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van 
de techniek in Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), 
part IV, 222–239.
22 Bieleman, Boeren op het Drentse zand. Van Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de 
Nederlandse landbouw, 315–325
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Brabant they were in the minority. There the bulk of the rural population was com-
posed of smallholders with one or two horses and farmworkers/smallholders with-
out a horse but sometimes with a parcel of land and a few cows. Large agricultural 
enterprises with permanent farmhands also dominated in the peat marsh regions of 
the polders in North and South Holland with their specialized grassland farming. 
Inasmuch as this kind of farm was less subject to seasonal fluctuations in labour 
needs, these regions lacked a population of itinerant and occasional farmworkers.
Commercial farms also contracted more of their production out to specialized 
enterprises. Work formerly done by the farmers themselves, like spinning and 
weaving, were now undertaken by specialized businesses and persons. In 
consequence the commercial farming regions had a more differentiated occupa-
tional structure and a larger contingent of specialized craftsmen.
3.3.5  Food Supply
Dutch soil produced a cornucopia of agricultural products. These products were not 
subject to extensive processing.23 Potatoes and vegetables were pretty much cooked 
as is. Wheat had to be ground and bread had to be baked. Milk was drunk straight 
from the cow, utilized in porridge, churned and turned into butter and cheese. 
Consumption of dairy products was, however, limited. There was little variety in 
foodstuffs, at most a few hundred different products. The Dutch above all ate what 
was locally produced. Culinary culture differed according to social class, region, 
season and between town and country.
Food processing was done on a small-scale, traditional basis, largely in the 
household. Sources of energy were classic and consisted of muscle power (of 
humans, horses and dogs), wind energy throughout the country and water power in 
some areas, and warmth provided by peat, wood or coal. Tools were made of wood 
and metal, and simple enough that the local carpenter or smith could make, repair or 
imitate them. Craft knowledge was transmitted from father to son, from mother to 
daughter, from master to apprentice and was further developed in practice. The 
distance between producers and consumers was small. The Dutchman bought 
directly from the farmer or the baker, at day or week markets or in small speciality 
shops. Food supply was above all bound to the rules of the local occupational 
communities and the municipal governments.
In addition to agricultural products, the soil and especially the subsoil of the 
Netherlands also produced fuel and minerals. We will now turn to these.




3.4  Building Materials and Construction: Mineral Resources
Clay, sand and gravel were the voluminous building materials for hydraulic engi-
neering, road building and housing and building construction. But little could be 
done with only clay, sand and gravel. Many other building materials were necessary 
and these came in large part from abroad.24 Wood was an important building mate-
rial. Oak and pine were supplied from Germany via the Rhine. Scandinavia, the 
Baltic Sea harbours and Russia supplied softwoods like pitch pine and fir. Rocks 
were obtained from Germany (sandstone) and Belgium (basalt). Mortars were 
imported from the Belgian Meuse basin (chalk) and the German Eifel (trass cement). 
Fired shell chalk, another mortar, could be produced in the Netherlands itself by 
trawling for shells along the coast. With these and a few other materials like iron and 
asphalt, the Netherlands was able to carry on.
Many Dutchmen were in practice hydraulic engineers, because the local popula-
tion, especially the farmers, were responsible for the maintenance of dike sections, 
digging drainage ditches, building simple sluices and so forth. This was inadequate 
for larger infrastructural works (canals, river works, coastal defences and such).25 
Here so-called polder workers commonly did the heavy labour of digging and trans-
porting clay and sand. They came from the countryside and arrived en masse with 
their spades and wheelbarrows when a major work was set to start. Complex hydrau-
lic projects involved all kinds of trades and technical specialists like carpenters, 
masons and engineers.26
Road building also depended on the local population, and in particular on farm-
ers, workers and contractors. Local roads were simple and were made of clay, sand 
or peat. Sometimes they were surfaced with rubble or shells.27 In addition there 
were hardened roads generally built under central government supervision. First the 
24 W. van Leeuwen, ‘Woning- en utiliteitsbouw’, in: H. Lintsen et al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van de 
techniek in Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), 
part III, 197–198.
25 W. van Leeuwen, ‘Waterbouw’, in: H.  Lintsen et  al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in 
Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), part III, 
231–236.
26 Building shipping locks and sluices was above all work for carpenters and masons. Wood was 
much used because the lock was primarily a wooden construction with wood for the lock gates, the 
sills, the foundations, ‘eel planks’ (contiguous wooden pilings placed at right angles to the lock 
axis to prevent seepage of water under the sills), etc. The construction site also sported other trades 
like pile drivers, smiths, laborers, contractors and sometimes even an engineer. Every type of 
hydraulic infrastructure had its own specialists. In dike construction, for example, willow workers 
made fascine mattresses that served to protect shorelines under water. A fascine mattress was a 
rectangular grid of bundles of brushwood filled in with reeds or willow twigs. On completion, the 
mattress was towed to its destination, ballasted with heavy stones and sunk to the bottom.
27 A worn-in wagon track determined the profile of the road. The clay and peat roads were trans-
formed into impassable mud-mires in the winter and after periods of heavy rain in other seasons. 
The sand roads were reasonably passable in winter but became loose sand in the summer.
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existing ground was excavated and replaced by a layer of sand. On top of this a 
hardened road was built, usually composed of Dutch clinker bricks.28
Water management and infrastructure in the Netherlands were traditionally the 
responsibility of local interests (water boards and farmers) municipal and provincial 
governments and sometimes private investors. In the first half of the nineteenth 
century the national government, and in particular King William I, initiated the 
construction of comprehensive road and waterway networks and other infrastructural 
works. Provinces, municipal governments and water boards generally played a 
subsidiary role. The works contributed significantly to Dutch state formation.
In housing construction, new houses were built with a skeleton of brick load- 
bearing walls, wooden floors and beams, slate or baked roof tiles and forged iron 
wall anchors.29 These techniques were applied to a wide variety of housing ranging 
from workers’ homes, through middle-class homes, to mansions, urban villas and 
country estates. There was also a wide variety of non-residential buildings in the 
government sector (prisons, university buildings, covered markets, assembly halls), 
the private sector (among others warehouses, office buildings, workshops and 
hotels) and the semi-private sector (for example churches, theatres and exhibition 
halls). While these buildings were more or less complex  – some might even be 
considered daring – they were for the most part traditional stone and wood structures. 
Other materials were limited to chalk, glass, paint, forged iron and stone.
Carpenters and masons were the most important craftsmen. They were part of a 
rich palette of craftsmen that could be encountered at a construction site, such as 
painters, stone masons, glaziers, decorators and slate roofers. There were also 
unschooled workers like porters and pile drivers. Part of the construction work force 
was employed by suppliers of materials, like sawmills and brick factories. The 
organization of a construction project was in the hands of a contractor who had 
learned by doing, generally as a carpenter or mason. Big projects might be managed 
by an architect or engineer.
Housing for workers comprised the majority of buildings. They hardly deserved 
the name. In the cities they took the form of slums built of stone and wood. On the 
edges of cities, in the countryside and in smaller towns one found numerous huts 
and underground burrows.30 Walls were erected of lath, pine branches, and stones 
and filled in with clay, loam and horse manure. Roofs were covered with reeds. 
Burrows were dug in the ground. Huts were built of dried peat. The fireplace was a 
depression in the ground. Smoke escaped through a hole in the roof.
28 Rainwater could easily drain through the layer of sand and the hard bricks did not sink into the 
subsurface after rainfall. The total width of the road was 8 to 10 meters, of which about half was 
paved.
29 W. van Leeuwen, ‘Een complexe sector’, in: H. Lintsen et al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van de techniek 
in Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), part III, 192.
30 See among others: A. van der Woud, Koninkrijk vol sloppen. Achterbuurten en vuil in de negent-
iende eeuw (Amsterdam 2010), 82–84.
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3.5  Energy: Fossil Fuels
The extensive peat bogs that covered large parts of the Netherlands were a ready 
source of peat turf. Turf  - a dried form of peat – represented a revolution in the 
domain of energy that had taken place as early as the late middle ages. From that 
time the country burned its own ground in order to produce, to cook and to warm 
itself.31 The annual average temperature was 9 ° C and the winters were often bitterly 
cold. Turf was used in households for heating and cooking. Industry too was an 
important market. Beer breweries, chalk ovens, cotton printing mills, dye works, 
bleaching works and brick factories were the biggest users. Their fuel was turf and 
that would remain the case for centuries.
Dutch cities had a long history of dependency on turf.32 Originally it was easily 
accessible in nearby surrounding peat bogs.33 By the eighteenth century production 
had moved to the northeast.34 The scale at which this took place required so much 
capital and was fraught with such risks that companies (compagnieën) were formed. 
These were consortiums, partnerships, in which anyone could invest and become 
stockholder, participant, partner or associate. Because it took a considerable time 
before these investments returned a significant profit, the companies were domi-
nated by very wealthy investors from the province of Holland. Groningen was an 
exception. The city succeeded in retaining control over turf extraction in its region.
31 See for this among others: T. Stol, ‘Turfwinningslandschap’, in: S. Barends, Het Nederlandse 
Landschap. Een historisch-geografische benadering (tenth revised edition, Utrecht 2010), 
114–131.
32 Economic prosperity in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century was in part due to the pres-
ence of this cheap source of energy in the immediate surroundings. Without turf the Golden 
Century would have been a more difficult business. Many activities were able to flourish thanks to 
this brown gold. Alternative fuels were available abroad, but at a higher price. Turf survived the 
Golden Century. Historians are of divided opinions on the meaning of turf in the Golden Century. 
According to J.W. de Zeeuw, turf was essential for economic success. See: J.W. de Zeeuw, ‘Peat 
and the Dutch Golden Age. The historical meaning of energy attainability’, AAG Bijdragen 
21(1978), 3–32. J.L van Zanden takes a middle position. Other scenarios with less turf and more 
coal and firewood also led to a successful economic development. See: J.L. van Zanden, ‘Werd de 
Gouden Eeuw uit turf geboren. Over het energieverbruik in de Republiek in de zeventiende en 
achttiende eeuw’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 110 (1997), 484–499. Van Zanden writes not so 
much about a more difficult but rather about a different story for a Golden Century without turf.
33 Originally peat extraction took place above the level of groundwater, so-called dry extraction. 
Once this supply was used up, wet extraction had to be employed. Working from a boat or a plank, 
the peat was dug out of the water with a dredging hook and dumped in a boat. The peat was subse-
quently unloaded on a laying field or dam, spread out, compacted, dried in the open air, pressed 
into forms, piled up, dried some more and finally sold as turf. Wet extraction was practiced until 
the seventeenth century above all in South Holland and the western part of Utrecht, in addition to 
the northern provinces.
34 This displacement was part of the spread of the peat colonies. These began in Flanders and 
spread from there to northwest Brabant (thirteenth century), the Valley of Gelderland and Friesland 
(sixteenth century), Groningen (seventeenth century) and the Peel region (nineteenth century). 
Techniques and organization improved with each displacement.
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Extraction was systematically executed with main canals, locks and bridges and 
additional infrastructure in the form of parcels, ditches and so forth. The turf was 
extracted mainly ‘in the dry.’ The top layer, the bonkaarde or bolster, had little value 
as fuel, but was later mixed with the infertile sand ground that was a common 
by-product of turf extraction. The bonkaarde provided an improved soil structure 
with better hydrological properties. It was in fact the point of departure for the 
system of mixed farming, with cattle providing the manure. Urban waste also served 
as fertilizer. The turf ships transported this commodity as return freight.
Turf production reached its zenith in the nineteenth century. Expansion of turf 
extraction in the north eastern provinces of Drenthe and Overijssel was made 
possible by the digging of a new canal, the Dedemsvaart (1809). A bit later the Peel 
region spanning the border between the southern provinces of North Brabant and 
Limburg was likewise made accessible for turf extraction by a new canal called the 
Zuid-Willemsvaart (1826). Official statistics indicate that in 1850 the Netherlands 
burned 2.5 million tons of turf.35 This comes down to 750 kg of turf per capita. To 
this must be added the turf that residents of the countryside extracted for their own 
use from nearby peat bogs. Ultimately turf lost out as a fuel to ever-cheaper coal.
3.6  Natural Capital and Material Flows
Around 1850, the exploitation of the Dutch soil and subsoil produced an overseeable 
number of raw materials. Our point of departure is the three main categories of this 
study: bio-raw materials, subsoil fossil assets, and subsoil mineral assets. A recon-
struction on the basis of official statistics reveals the following pattern (see 
Table 3.1).36 The three categories together totalled an estimated 8390 kilotons in 1850 
(domestic production). Bio-raw materials accounted for 4.670 kton (56%), subsoil 
fossil assets for 2520 kton (30%), and subsoil mineral assets for 1200 kton (14%).
Within these categories, six products were especially prominent: cereals, pota-
toes and dairy products (bio-raw materials), turf (subsoil fossil assets) and clay and 
sand (subsoil mineral assets). The three agricultural products totalled 3430 kton 
(amounting to 41% of total domestic production). Turf totalled 2500 kton and 
accounted for 30% of the grand total. For clay and sand this amounted to 1150 kton 
35 See Table 3.1. The caloric value of 2,5 million tons of turf is somewhere between 15,000 and 
38,000 TJ. The caloric value of moist turf is 6 MJ/kg and of dry turf 15 MJ/kg. The caloric value 
(in other words the specific energy or energetic value) is a measure of the energy-content of a fuel. 
Hölsgens calculates an energy consumption of turf in 1850 of 22,000 TJ (five-year average). 
H. N.M. Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the Netherlands. Sustainability challenges in a historica 
land comparative perspective (Dissertation RU Groningen 2016), Appendix I, 213.
36 The table provides only a rough indication. The figures provide an order of magnitude that is 
estimated and checked in different ways. It is probable that a more accurate calculation of the fig-
ures will not result in remarkable shifts in most of the (sub)categories. This is not the case for some 
categories like vegetables from vegetable gardens and brushwood, because these are not officially 
registered. In subsequent analyses we shall have to keep such unofficial material flows in mind.
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and 14%. The remaining 15% consisted of a great number of other products: oil 
seeds, beans, wood, gravel and so on.
The Netherlands was for the most part self-sufficient. Of all the raw materials 
available to the Netherlands (domestic production plus import, totalling 9670 kton), 
only a small portion came from outside the country (1280 kton, 13%). In terms of 
weight this was above all coal (about 500 kton, or 6%), wood (about 300 kton, or 
3%) and cereals (about 200 kton, or 2%). Nevertheless, the fact remains that the 
Table 3.1 Raw materials in the Netherlands around 1850 in kilotons
Domestic 
production Import Export Available
Bio raw 
materials
Crops/market garden 2,040 290 200 2,130
  Potatoes 790 10 20 780
  Cereals 670 180  100 740
  Beans 80 <5 10 80
  Fodder beets etc. 60 <5 <5 60
  Oil seeds & oil 40 40 10 70
  Misc. Agr. Prod. 400 60 60 400
Cattle farming 2,220  10  80 2,150
  Milk 1,970 <5 <5 1970
  Living animals 250 10 80 180
  Eggs <5 <5 <5 <5
 Miscellaneous <5 <5 <5 <5
Fishing & hunting  210  <5  30  180
  Fish 130 <5 30 100
  Shells 80 <5 <5 80
Forestry  200 290  10  480
  Timber 150 290 10 430




Fossil sub-soil assets 2,520 540  30 3,040
  Turf 2,500 10 <5 2514






1,200 150  20 1,330
  Clay 650 20 10 660
  Sand 500 <5 <5 500
  Gravel 40 <5 <5 40
  Stone <5 80 <5 80
  Salt <5 40 <5 40
  Ore 10 <5 <5 10
Total 8,390 1,280 370 9,300
Remark: Sand for heightening ground and dike clay are not included in the table
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. in de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (research 
rapport Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016)
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Netherlands depended on other countries for its coal, while the foreign share of 
timber (for construction) and cereals (for food) was substantial.
This pool of raw materials gave rise to overseeable material flows.37 The Dutch 
population directly consumed an important part of the agricultural produce and that 
virtually all the fossil raw materials (turf and coal) were directly burned (in house-
holds and industry). That took place without much preliminary processing. A 
smaller portion of the agricultural produce was processed in the food industry by 
grain millers, bakers, butchers and other artisans, while shell-chalk ovens 
transformed shells into quicklime and sawmills processed wood for use in 
constructions and buildings. Only a small portion was used directly, for example as 
firewood. Direct end-use also applied to some extent to mineral raw materials (for 
example the use of sand in building construction). On the other hand, a significant 
portion of the clay was used by the brick industry to form and bake bricks. As far as 
export goes, agricultural and food products dominated: wheat, cattle, sugar, butter 
and cheese.
In addition to these major flows there were a great number of smaller material 
flows – not visible in the table and the figure – for example imports of coffee, tea and 
cane sugar from the colonies (especially the Dutch Indies). When these lesser flows 
are taken into account, domestic agriculture suddenly appears to deliver a greater 
variety of products, like hops and madder. Then too, there were raw materials that 
were never registered despite their importance. Sand for raising the ground level and 
clay for dikes represented a considerable mass in certain periods but were not regis-
tered in the statistics.38 These materials were usually obtained in the immediate 
vicinity and were, among other things, used to build railway embankments and 
37 See for the details of material flows in 1850 the open-access publication: F.  Lambert, 
Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrapport Technische 
Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016)., 11–17.
38 The most important infrastructural works around 1850 were:
 – Railways
1845 construction line Driebergen – Arnhem, Dutch Rhine Railway, 50 km
1847 construction line The Hague – Rotterdam, 25 km
1853 construction line Maastricht – Aachen, 40 km
1854 construction line Essen (B) – Zevenbergen/Etten Leur, 48 km
1855 construction line Utrecht – Rotterdam, 60 km
Railway construction: 23 km per year average
Embankments about 8 m wide – 1 m high: 184.000 m3 (sand to make elevation) * 1600 kg/m3 = ca. 
300 kton.
 – Reclamation Haarlem Lake (1840–1852):
Dikes Haarlem Lake – the encircling dikes (60 km) are completed in 1848 (7.5 km per year). 
7.5 km per year 15 m wide, 2.50 m high = ± 280,000 m3 (dike clay) * 1800 kg.m3 = ± 500 kton.
 – A conservative estimate for the period around 1850 comes out at about 800 kton of sand and 
dike clay.
 – Not included are:
Excavations due to differences in elevation (railways).
Expansion of cities and towns.
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canal dikes. Growing vegetables in one’s own vegetable patch and collecting brush 
wood for firewood were also not included in the statistics. Another such category 
was the domestic fabrication of clothing using wool or flax grown on the farm.
Two main flows dominated economic activity: first, agriculture-food-food con-
sumption and, second, mineral raw materials-mineral processing-construction. The 
most important points of production were the farm, the brick factory and the con-
struction site. These locations processed the bulk of raw materials. The farm pro-
duced above all potatoes, cereals, milk, butter and cheese. The brick factory 
delivered bricks. At construction sites building materials were transformed into 
houses, roads, dikes and other constructions. From this perspective, the Netherlands 
was above all an agricultural and building country.
Table 3.2 in part reflects this conclusion. The share of agriculture and foods in 
the GNP was 36% and in employment 44%. For construction and housing these 
percentages were respectively 8% and 7%. Trade, distribution and transport also 
constituted an important category with 30% of the GNP and 14% of the employment. 
Their economic contribution was however also realized to a large (but unknown) 
extent within the categories of agriculture, foods and construction. One would 
hardly expect textiles and clothing with their modest mass flow to be so prominent 
in the table with respectively 7% and 10%. Despite their relatively low weight, they 
scored high in the statistics in terms of money and expended labour.
In general the supply chains of raw material production, processing, use, export 
and transport were short. The statistics do not show the fact that the supply chains 
of bio-raw materials and mineral subsoil assets were predominantly closed cycles. 
At the end of the chain, agriculture and food produced animal and human faeces. 
These were collected, mixed with fireplace ashes and organic waste (derived from 
vegetables, fruit and vegetable patches), made into compost and sold to farmers as 
fertilizer. In this way urban manure contributed to the fertility of the soil. The 
collection of manure and faeces was unremarkable in a period in which many 
materials were re-used.39 Many Dutch people, for example, bought their clothes 
39 Lintsen et al. (ed.), Made in Holland (Zutphen 2005) 56–58. See also: A. Oudejans, Categorie 
één.. Dierlijke afvalverwerking door de eeuwen heen, 27–32.
Table 3.2 Contribution of economic clusters to GNP and employment rates in the Netherlands 
around 1850 (percentages)




Agriculture and foods 36 44
Construction and housing 8 7 (construction)






Source: J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden, Dutch GNP and its components, 1800–1913 
(Groningen 2000), Table 4.5 and Table B.1
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second-hand at the market. Once worn out, the clothing was used in the production 
of paper. Bones were collected to make glue. Building materials from demolished 
houses were used anew, while building rubble served as pavement material and to 
heighten building plots.
Matters were otherwise in the case of fossil subsoil assets.40 Here we find a 
predominantly linear supply chain. Turf and coal were transformed into heat upon 
combustion.41 Nowadays coal is reckoned to be a non-renewable resource. In this 
study we shall do the same for turf, even though the formation of peat as the basis 
for turf production is an immeasurably more rapid process than the formation of 
coal, namely several decades.42 The total energy consumption of the Netherlands 
for 1850 can be estimated at 88,500 Tera joule (TJ), including not only turf and 
coal, but also muscle power, wood, wind and water as sources of energy. 36,200 
TJ, or 41%, were supplied by turf and coal; the rest (52,300 TJ or 59%) from 
renewable sources. Discounting human muscle power, the share of renewable 
energy was 52%.43
The economy of the Netherlands in those days could justifiably be regarded as 
circular. To what extent was it also sustainable in terms of today’s concepts? We 
answer this question in Chap. 6, ‘Well-being and sustainability around 1850: the 
frame of reference.’
The natural capital of the Netherlands is described here in terms of the coloni-
sation of water, air and ground (soil and subsoil). On the one hand the colonisation 
had consequences for the country’s dead and living nature. This is the topic of the 
next section. On the other hand the colonised ecosystems produced raw materials 
and the material flows that derived from them. These were the foundations for 
economic development (see the concluding section) and the quality of life (see the 
next chapter).
40 H. Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the Netherlands. Sustainibility Challenges in a historical and 
comparative perspective (dissertation Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 2016), 5–13 and appendix I: 
Energy consumption in the Netherlands (1800—2012).
41 Ashes from burned turf were employed as an agricultural fertilizer. This can be seen as a form of 
recycling.
42 Turf production was much smaller than the total energy consumed. Contemporaries hence 
regarded turf as a non-sustainable energy source (i.e. as non-renewable). See Hölsgens (2016) 
forthcoming in Tijdschrift voor Economische Geschiedenis.
43 For 1850: total consumption (88,466 TJ), total human muscle power (12,661.9 TJ), total con-
sumption excluding human muscle power (75,803.9 TJ). This new total includes 36,162 TJ/48% 
turf and coal and 39,642 TJ/52% renewable. Information R. Hölsgens (see previous note).
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3.7  A Variegated Landscape
3.7.1  Biodiversity
In this study natural capital occupies a special position with respect to other forms 
of capital (economic, human, and social). It is the basis of production, consumption 
and well-being. Aside from this utilitarian function, natural capital also has an 
intrinsic value. This was referred to in the introduction as ecological well-being and 
is a measure of the quality of living and non-living nature. This intrinsic value does 
not depend on the contribution of natural capital to the well-being of humans. 
Nonetheless it is often associated with quality of life. Positive ecological well-being 
is considered good for fresh air, pure water, plant pollination, sustainable agricultural 
production, storage of CO2, et cetera.
What was the impact of the colonisation of nature on ecological well-being in the 
Netherlands? In the sustainability monitor, ecological well-being is reduced to 
biodiversity, expressed by the indicator ‘Mean Species Abundance’ (MSA). What 
does this indicator tell us? MSA starts with a natural ecosystem that has not yet been 
disturbed by human activity, and takes the species diversity in that situation as its 
point of reference.44 Intervention by humans causes a decline in biodiversity, that is, 
in the original variety of species. A region with an MSA of 100% means that biodi-
versity there is the same as the natural ecosystem. A region with an MSA of 0% is 
equivalent to a thoroughly colonised ecosystem, such that the original biodiversity 
has completely disappeared. The simplest method of calculation of an MSA is based 
on the land use of a given region. On this approach the transformation of a natural 
ecosystem into grassland reduces biodiversity by a factor of 0.3; into a field of crops 
by a factor of 0.7; and into an urban area by a factor of 0.95. More nuanced calcula-
tions are not possible for the nineteenth century due to a lack of data. It is however 
certainly remarkable that the heathlands, also known as the ‘wastelands,’ do not 
form a separate category in the method of calculation and are treated as a natural 
ecosystem.45 This despite the fact that in the Netherlands an agricultural landscape 
was created on the basis of grazing the wastelands and the use of peat sods to 
improve their sandy soils. In 1850 about a third of the country consisted of heath-
lands. In the conclusion we will return to this shortcoming.
44 J.L. Van Zanden et al., How was life? Global well-being since 1820 (OECD n.pl. 2014), 182. 
This source is based on: R. Alkemade, M. van Oorschot, L. Miles, C. Nellemann, M. Bakkenes and 
B. ten Brink, ‘GLOBIO3: a framework to investigate options for reducing global terrestrial biodi-
versity loss’, Ecosystems 12(2009), 374–390 and K. Goldewijk, ‘The HYDE 3.1 spatially explicit 
database of human-induced global land-use change over the past 12,000 years’, Global Ecology 
and Biogeography 20(2011), nr. 1, 73–86. Voor de definitie van MSA: Alkemade et al., ‘GLOBIO3’, 
375.
45 The terms ‘heather’ or ‘moorland’ (heide) do not appear in the publications cited in the previous 
note. The publication by Alkemade et  al. (2009 GLOBIO3, 379) attributes ‘scrublands’ (e.g. 
steppe, tundra or savannah) to the category of natural ecosystems. It may be the case that they also 
include heathlands or moorlands in this category. In some settings heathlands may be a natural 
ecosystem but that is not the case in the Netherlands.
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We can estimate the MSA for the Netherlands around 1850 at 73%. What does 
this figure mean? It would indicate that the Netherlands possessed 73% of the 
biodiversity that existed before human influence in the various parts of the country 
became noticeable. We will return to this at the end of this section. First we want to 
give an impression of the big changes in the ecosystems of the sand grounds and the 
maritime zones. The Dutch forests, at least what was left of them, will be treated 
separately.
3.7.2  The Sand Grounds
Agriculture had thoroughly transformed the landscape of the sand grounds.46 When 
human influence was still minimal – in the sixth and fifth millennium BC – the sand 
grounds were covered with extensive forests of, among other species, Scottish pine, 
birch, oak and alder.47 The agricultural landscape of 1850 revealed little of this. 
What remained were isolated bits of forest, especially in the stream valleys and in 
remote spots, bits whose survival was constantly threatened. They were thoroughly 
integrated into the farming system. Cattle were tended there. Their wood was gath-
ered and used for fuel (heating and cooking) or served as building material (furni-
ture, clogs, tools, machines, load bearing constructions for farm buildings, etc.)
Crop fields, heath, grazing pastures and hayfields had taken the place of the for-
ests. By today’s standards the agricultural system had a rich ecology.48 Heather and 
cross-leaved heath dominated the heath-fields. Birches and oaks were scattered here 
and there. Orchids, gentian and bog asphodel prospered, depending on local soil con-
ditions. Bluegrass (Cirsio dissecti-Molinietum), an unusually biodiverse kind of poor 
meadow and hay land that existed in the infertile damp meadows in the stream val-
leys, sported plants that are now extremely rare: plants like the devil’s bit, marsh 
violet, sundew and meadow thistle. The low-lying, saturated or wet stream dales were 
home especially to the forests, dominated by alder, willow and ash and in which one 
could find forest plants like the wood anemone, lily of the valley, and blueberry.
A characteristic element of the landscape was the wooded banks. They were built 
along paths, around fields and along pastures. As an enclosure the wooded bank was 
impermeable to cattle, as fencing it enabled the farmer to mark the extent of his 
46 The nature of the original Dutch landscape, that is the landscape before human influence made 
itself felt, is a matter of controversy. Was the Netherlands largely forested or was it an open land-
scape with large herds of grazing animals? In this section we assume a forested landscape. For the 
debate see: L. Kooijmans, ‘Holland op z’n wildst? De Vera-hypothese getoetst aan de prehistorie’, 
De Levende Natuur 113(2012), nr. 2, 62–66.
47 For an exhaustive description of the landscape of the sand grounds see: J.A.J.  Vloet, 
‘Zandlandschap’, in: S. Barends et al., Het Nederlandse Landschap. Een historisch-geografische 
benadering (tenth revised edition, Utrecht 2010), 132–161; Thijs Caspers, De hand van de mens in 
het landschap (Haaren 1992); Natuur in Noord-Brabant. Twee eeuwen plant en dier (Haaren 
1996).
48 For this see: Caspers, De hand van de mens, 49–56; Natuur in Noord-Brabant. Twee eeuwen 
plant en dier (Haaren 1996), 28–71.
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property and as means of production the bank supplied fruits, berries, firewood and 
wood for construction. A wooded bank consisted minimally of a deep ditch with a 
contiguous earthen bank on which grew trees, bushes, plants and herbs. Small 
mammals (mice, weasels and stoats) found forage there or used it as cover during 
their forays (the badger). Many birds found the wooded bank a congenial biotope 
because it provided cover, good nesting sites and a wealth of insects, fruits and 
berries. Wooded banks ran like green veins through the sand grounds and provided 
sharp contrasts in the landscape: the leafy environs of many villages and stream 
valleys over against the broad empty spaces of the heath meadows.
The heath meadow was a vulnerable component of the landscape.49 It was con-
stantly threatened by overexploitation. Heath meadows were once themselves the 
result of overexploitation. After forests had been felled and the land exhausted by 
farming, heather was one of the few species that could survive on the poor sand 
grounds that remained. The cutting of heather sods for the production of compost 
and manure exposed the bare sandy subsoil.50 Where things got out of control and 
the sand got the upper hand, sandstorms threatened fields and villages and sand 
deserts like those on the Veluwe and in Noord Brabant (the Loon and the Drunen 
Dunes).51 The question is to what extent the farming community lost its grip on the 
process. The danger lurked in growing population pressure and the consequent 
increase in cultivated acreage and more intensive use of the common lands, including 
the heath meadows. That was exactly the situation in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, with its rapid increase in rural population. At some places this did indeed 
cause problems. Nonetheless there are no indications that in general things took a 
dramatic turn for the worse.52
3.7.3  The Maritime Zones
Prior to the arrival of the first farmers in the fourth and third millennium BC, the 
northern and southwestern maritime zones bore a strong resemblance to the present 
day Wadden Sea and the parts of the Wadden islands now outside the dikes.53 The 
49 The heath meadows belonged to the so-called communal lands or the ‘commons’. This is the 
subject of an extensive literature, see: T. de Moor, The Dilemma of the Commoners: Understanding 
the Use of Common Pool Resources in Long-Term Perspective (Cambridge 2015).
50 Another form of excessive exploitation was the pasturing of sheep, a practice that left traces of 
trampled and denuded paths across the heather.
51 This was a troublesome phenomenon for the farmer. Crop fields and pastures were buried in sand 
drifts. Even buildings in the villages were threatened. To keep the advancing sands at bay, wood 
banks had to be raised, grey hair grass planted, ditches dug etc. Around 1850 the problem seemed 
to be reasonably under control. Caspers, De hand van de mens, 60–61.
52 J. Renes, Landschappen van Maas en Peel (Maastricht 1999), 203–204. See also Chap. 8 of our 
study.
53 For the following see: L.  Hacquebord, ‘Noordelijk zeekleilandschap’, in: S.  Barends, Het 
Nederlandse Landschap. Een historisch-geografische benadering (tenth revised edition, Utrecht 
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extensive tidal flats consisted of higher mud and sand ridges, tidal creeks, accreted 
silt from shore erosion, salt swamps and dunes. Species diversity was low because 
few plants could cope with the extreme conditions of the salty environment and the 
changing water levels. The tidal flats became the province of salt-tolerant plants 
common to brackish environments.54 Seaweed, glasswort, and herbaceous seepweed 
grew on the mudbanks (slikken, i.e. low-lying sediment ridges that were regularly 
flooded), while for example the salt meadows (schorren, or high sediment ridges 
that only flooded at spring tides or during storm surges) were the domain of sea poa 
and sea lavender. Large numbers of migratory, overwintering or resident birds like 
brent geese, waders, avocets and spoonbills found nourishment, rest, and breeding 
grounds here. Throughout most of the Middle Ages these maritime zones retained 
this characteristic landscape.
In the first half of the nineteenth century the sea-clay landscape must have been 
considerably more diverse than the formerly un-diked land due to the variation 
between wet and dry, salt and fresh, clay and sand, dike and polder. Mud banks and 
salt meadows, geese and avocets were still part of this landscape, but now joined to 
various other landscape elements. In addition to the fields and the meadows, for 
example, there were now also the brackish polders with their pools and watering 
holes.55 They were used as extensive grasslands and were home to salt-tolerant 
plants like wild celery and brackish dropwort as well as salt-intolerant plants like 
orchids and the greater yellow rattle.
The dikes also exhibited a variegated vegetation that was sometimes so profuse 
that they were called ‘flower dikes.’ This was due in part to grazing by itinerant 
flocks of sheep. Other important factors were the composition of the dike and the 
pitch of the slope that determined the position of the plants relative to the sun. 
Typical plants were, among others, wild marjoram, tuberous pea, wild onion and 
eryngo. Sometimes dikes were planted with willows and poplars.
Bramble hedges of hawthorn, blackthorn, dog rose, or blackberries were quite 
common. They served as fencing for fields and as a congenial biotope for insects, 
amphibians, birds and other animals. The hedges provided them with shelter, food 
and nesting sites. And then every region had its own characteristic elements like the 
numerous lakes in Friesland and the inlagen in Zeeland, small polders containing 
reed marshes and ponds that lay between the sea dike and a ‘secondary dike’ that 
had been created for the purpose of salt mining.
2010), 16–31 and A.P. de Klerk, ‘Zuidwestelijk zeekleilandschap’, in: S. Barends, Het Nederlandse 
Landschap. Een historisch-geografische benadering (tenth revised edition, Utrecht 2010), 32–45.
54 Additional information on flora and fauna can be found on different websites, among others: 
www.natuurinformatie.nl; www.natuurkennis.nl en www.zwinstreek.eu




3.7.4  The Lost Forest
A resource that the inhabitants of the delta had long since exhausted was the forest. 
Around 1850 forest acreage had been reduced to a minimum of 5% of the Dutch 
surface area. There was a time when large parts of the Netherlands had been covered 
with forests of many sorts: alluvial forests, swamp forests, heron forests, dune 
forests etc. In the course of time they fell prey to the expansion of agriculture, turf 
extraction, wars and storms. The forests that survived were constantly threatened by 
overexploitation. Forests produced fruits, served as pasture for cattle and were royal 
repositories of fuel and construction material. Certain species of trees had survived 
agricultural expansion better than others. On the sand grounds, for example, the 
summer oak’s thick bark had enabled it to survive the slash and burn tactics used to 
eliminate unwanted vegetation in preparation for making new farmland. The oak 
was also more tolerant for the decimation of the woods and the impoverishment of 
the soil. Moreover it was treated with circumspection because it produced strong 
timber as well as oak bark for tanning hides.56
Wood was a crucial and versatile material in pre-industrial times.57 The demand 
for wood was so great that ‘wood thievery and wood vandalism’ was considered a 
problem. It was one of the only concerns that a commission was able to voice about 
public morals in the North Brabant countryside in 1851.58 Poplar wood was used for 
clogs, oak for construction framing and furniture, pine for – among other things – 
shoring in mineshafts, wood from grienden (swampy fields planted with willows) 
for woven materials, etc. Further differentiations were made. Thin willow branches 
from the grienden were used as wicker to make baskets, chairs and fences; thicker 
branches were used to make fascine mattresses for hydraulic constructions. Thick 
branches were also used for broom handles and the new shoots for barrel hoops. 
Firewood, a generic term for waste wood, unusable wood and dead wood suitable 
for burning, was in a class by itself. For some types of wood the domestic supply 
was adequate to the national demand, for example poplar and willow. Not only for-
ests, but also wood banks and rows of trees along roads, fields and properties sup-
plied the necessary material. Firewood partly satisfied the need for fuel, especially 
in the countryside but less so in the cities. The Netherlands was itself largely able to 
56 The oak also supplied acorns, a favourite food of pigs, that played a role in all the agricultural 
systems.
57 See for the following: J. Radkau und I. Schäfer, Holz. Ein Naturstoff in der Technikgeschichte 
(Reinbek bei Hamburg 1987); J.  Buis, Historia Forestis. Nederlandse bosgeschiedenis 
(Dissertation, Wageningen 1985); H. van Zon, Duurzame ontwikkeling in historisch perspectief. 
Enkele verkenningen (Nijmegen 2002), 55–85.
58 See: Caspers, De hand van de mens…, 58. For the original text: A. Martini van Geffen, ‘Zedelijke 
en materiële toestand der arbeidende bevolking ten platten lande. I.  Nopens Noord-Braband’, 
Verslag van het verhandelde op het vijfde Nederlandsche Landhuishoudkundig Congres, gehouden 
te Leiden van den 10den tot den 14den junij 1850 (Leiden 1850), Appendix no. 12, 104. The report 
is included in: J.L. Van Zanden, ‘Den zedelijke en materiële toestand der arbeidende bevolking ten 
platten lande’. Een reeks rapporten uit 1851 (Historia Agriculturae XXI, Groningen 1991).
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compensate the shortage of fuel by extracting turf. The remainder was accounted for 
by the import of coal.
Timber for construction was another matter. In some regions it proved possible 
to re-use old timber or fell local trees, in particular, oaks. For the rest there was a 
centuries-old dependency on import. As early as the fourteenth century large 
quantities of wood were supplied via the Rhine. This Rhine trade peaked in the 
middle of the eighteenth century after which it rapidly declined. In the first half of 
the nineteenth century wood was imported above all from Norway and the Baltic 
Sea (Sweden, Finland, Estonia and the hinterlands of St. Petersburg): chiefly 
coniferous wood (pine and fir) and oak. The imported wood was used for constructing 
housing, public buildings, windmills, locks and bridges. Great quantities of logs 
were needed for pilings for among other things quays and buildings in peat soils. 
Shipbuilding was also a bulk consumer.
With the massive import of timber the Netherlands effectively relocated to for-
eign countries the problems it had with its own forests. The collapse of the Rhine 
timber trade was partly a consequence of the overexploitation of the forests along 
the upstream Rhine. Uncontrolled logging had transformed large parts of the Black 
Forest and other forested areas into lunar landscapes.59 The intensity of logging far 
outstripped the norm for natural recovery of the forest. Next to nothing was done 
about replanting. And it was not only the Netherlands that was consumed by wood 
hunger but also the German states. Great quantities of wood in the form of charcoal 
were burned there in blast furnaces in order to make iron.
3.7.5  Prosperous Farming Landscape
Since the onset of agriculture and the building of dikes every small corner of the 
Netherlands has repeatedly been torn down and built up again.60 On the sand grounds 
and in the coastal zones colonisation commenced far before the Christian era. In the 
peat bogs of the low Netherlands human intervention was delayed until around 
1000.61 In that epoch the peat packets still towered several meters above sea level. 
Reclamation and turf extraction caused soil subsidence and changed the landscape 
into marshes, pools, lakes but above all polders and reclaimed lakes. Did this imply 
a reduction in biodiversity? According to the MSA indicator, 73% of the original 
59 The role of other factors like increased consumption in Prussia and rising prices is unclear. It is 
also uncertain how big a problem the deforestation was. Van Zon speaks of a catastrophic decima-
tion of the German forests (Van Zon, Duurzame ontwikkeling, 85). Radkau and Schäfer are a bit 
more reticent: The deforestation was not so rigorous that recovery was impossible (Radkau and 
Schäfer, Holz, 139).
60 See for a history of the Dutch landscapes among others: S. Barends, Het Nederlandse Landschap. 
Een historisch-geografische benadering (tenth revised edition, Utrecht 2010), 114–131.
61 See for the history of the peat landscape among others: G.J. Borger, ‘Agrarisch veenlandschap’, 
in: S. Barends, Het Nederlandse Landschap. Een historisch-geografische benadering (tiende herz-
iene druk, Utrecht 2010), 62–79 and websites like www.geologievannederland.nl
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species diversity still existed in 1850. The question is whether this is an adequate 
picture of the actual biodiversity. Three objections may be raised.
First of all, the percentage seems a bit exaggerated for a country that had lost 
most of its original natural ecosystems. Here we are not counting the ‘wastelands’ 
(the heathlands) as original nature as per the MSA calculation. It may be the case 
that it was not so much the species diversity that declined but rather the population 
size of the individual species. Only a few species like the wolf, the brown bear, the 
elk and the beaver are known not to have survived the advent of humans with their 
penchant for hunting and transforming animal habitats. The high percentage then 
correctly expresses the modest decline in the original species diversity. Natural 
ecosystems were radically reduced in scope or nearly extinguished, but around 1850 
small parts of the Netherlands still consisted of nearly authentic peat bogs, marsh 
forests and dunes. In some instances one could even speak of a large-scale natural 
landscape like the tidal flats of the Wadden Sea.
In the second place, the MSA provides not a single clue about the appearance of 
new species. The introduction and spread of agriculture must have facilitated the 
proliferation of entirely new species. Around 1850 the Netherlands harboured a 
large number of agricultural systems. The agricultural expert Staring, cited above, 
was able to identify fourteen of them in addition to special sectors like tobacco, 
flower bulbs and fruit orchards. There must have been a considerable variety of 
colonised ecosystems, each with their specific flora and fauna. The resultant 
biodiversity is difficult to reconstruct, but the variety of ecosystems each with their 
specific species diversity must have increased. In addition to the original ecosystems, 
new ones had emerged: the agrarian sand, clay, peat, dune and loess landscapes and 
their further differentiation into for example northern, southern and river clay 
landscapes. They contained biotopes that burgeoned with life, like the wood banks, 
the bluegrass lands, the brackish polders and the bramble hedges. In these cases 
human intervention did not eventuate in degradation of nature but rather in another 
‘nature’ and presumably a more diverse one.
In the third place, the intensive exploitation of the available natural capital sub-
jected the ecosystems and their constituent species to constant pressure.62 Ecosystems 
disappeared, like the primeval forests; they were threatened, like the heath mead-
ows; or subject to irreversible processes, like the transformation of open water into 
fens.63 Overexploitation and exhaustion of the soil was an ever-present threat. ‘Wild’ 
animals were persistently pursued and killed for their fur, feathers or meat but also 
62 J.L. van Zanden en S.W. Verstegen, Groene geschiedenis van Nederland (Utrecht 1993), 17–31.
63 In general the agrarian systems of the time facilitated stable ecosystems, an important precondi-
tion for continuity in species diversity. That also held for a large-scale practice like the extraction 
of clay with a production of an estimated 650 kton in 1850, about 8% of the weight of all raw 
materials extracted from Dutch soil. This had a modest effect on the natural ecosystem. Extraction 
and processing into roof tiles and bricks took place in virtually every region where clay could be 
found. There was a concentration of factories in the floodplains of the rivers. Locally, extraction 
did disrupt the order of things. After a clay pit had been abandoned it frequently turned into a pond. 
At some sites along the river, thanks to sedimentation, these clay pits could be worked again after 
50 years.
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because they threatened harvests and spoiled the hunt. Every province awarded 
bounties for the killing of polecats, sparrow hawks, foxes and other ‘vermin.’ 
(Table 3.3)
3.8  A growing Economy, a Growing Population64
The colonisation of nature had produced a rich variety of ecosystems. But did it also 
bring wealth to the Dutch? The colonised ecosystems were the original source of the 
three material flows identified in this book: biomass, fossil, and mineral. These 
provided the population with agricultural products, fossil resources (in particular 
turf) and building materials (among which sand and clay). These were processed, 
sold, consumed, used and exported. This enabled the import of yet other raw 
materials and products. What did this contribute to the development of welfare in 
terms of economic growth? We also look among the totality of material flows for 
64 An analysis of economic development in the first half of the nineteenth century can be found 
in  J.L van Zanden and  A.  Van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914. Staat, instituties en economische 
ontwikkeling (Amsterdam 2000), 149–208). The following section is based on this book.
Table 3.3 Total number of governmental bounties for killed ‘harmfull animals’ 1852–1857













Remark: Names used in the sources are retained here
Source: J.L van Zanden and S.W. Verstegen, Groene Geschiedenis van Nederland (Green History 
of the Netherlands) (Utrecht 1993), 27. Original source: J.  Wttwaal, ‘Over het verlenen van 
premiën voor het dooden van wezels en ander zoogenoemd schadelijk gedierte’ (On the offering 




dominant industrial sectors. Which industrial sectors had the greatest impact on 
economic development? To find our way here we will first summarize economic 
developments prior to 1850.
By the outset of the nineteenth century the Dutch economy already passed 
through a long and difficult period of adjustment. The Dutch Golden Age with its 
glory days of economic prosperity between 1580 and 1670 was followed by a long 
period of decline of international competitiveness, loss of market share, and stagna-
tion. This economic malaise persisted through the collapse of the Republic of the 
Seven United Provinces in 1795 and hit bottom during the French annexation 
(1810–1813). International trade ground to a halt thanks to Napoleon’s economic 
blockade of England. In the province of Holland and the other maritime regions 
manufacturing all but collapsed. The national debt, already sizable by the end of the 
eighteenth century, had swollen out of all proportion due to the virtually permanent 
state of war during the Batavian and French period (1795–1813). The founding of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1813 was followed by a period of uneven eco-
nomic development. The two decades after 1820 comprised a period of structural 
growth in the Dutch economy, after which a new period of relative stagnation set in 
(see Table 3.4).
Initially, economic development after 1820 was shaped by conditions in the 
agricultural sector. Agriculture had to cope with the aftershocks of the Napoleonic 
period: steeply rising prices for agricultural produce immediately after the war 
followed by a dramatic decline. The price of wheat in Groningen, for example, 
declined from fl. 12.97 per hectoliter in 1817 to fl. 3.59 in 1823. The price of rye 
also declined by more than 70%. Prices for grain remained low in subsequent 
years. Prices for potatoes, dairy products and meat also declined, but less steeply. 
Farmers responded in various ways. For the dairy farmers in the provinces of 
Holland, Utrecht and Friesland these were favourable years and presumably better 
than the years after 1820. On the sea- clay soils in the coastal provinces farmers 
in part abandoned the tillage of wheat for that of potatoes and commercial crops 
like madder and flax. Meadowland was ‘torn’ and transformed into crop fields. 
Formerly mixed farms thus gradually assumed the character of specialized crop 
farms, a process that had been going on in the province of Zeeland for a time and 
that now gained momentum in the province of Groningen as well. Farmhands 
were fired to save on labour costs. Presumably the farmer, his family and other 
residents of the farm had to work harder. Potatoes and commercial crops required 
more intensive tillage (weeding, delving, sowing in rows, et cetera). On the sand 
grounds, mixed farms began to concentrate on growing potatoes, husbanding cat-
tle and producing butter. That was accompanied by intensification of crop farming 
and long work days.
The 1820s witnessed growth across the board in manufacturing and services. The 
recovery of the domestic market after the Napoleonic period stimulated a strong 
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expansion of the food sector, the construction industry, the clothing industry and 
turf extraction. In this decennium the food sector, comprising more than 60% of 
industrial production, exhibited the highest rates of growth for the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Growth in the service sector was above all attributable to 
international trade and international transport. This was due on the one hand to 
increasing trade with the Dutch East Indies and on the other hand to trade with the 
eastern neighbour, Prussia. Textiles formed the bulk of goods transported to Java, 
while sugar, coffee and other colonial products comprised the return trade. Rhine 
barges transported colonial wares to the Prussian hinterland and cereals and coals 
back to the Netherlands. The Dutch Trading Company (Nederlandse 
Handelsmaatschappij, NHM) coordinated these flows of commerce. The 
interdependence of shipping and the grain trade became evident in the years around 
1820 when grain prices fell sharply and Rhine shipping declined by about 60% and 
shipping to European harbours by 40%.
Economic development in the 1830s was directly affected by the Belgian 
secession of 1830. Military expenditures demanded new and higher levels of 







Agriculture 0.6 1.4 1.2
Industry, among which 2.7 2.4 0.5
  Construction 1.4 0.6 −0.2
  Clothing 3.2 −0.9 0.3
  Textiles 5.0 6.2 −1.5
  Foods 4.1 2.8 0.5
Services, among which 1.5 2.8 1.5
  Internat. trade 0.1 5.9 3.1
  Domestic trade 3.9 1.5 1.1
  Maritime shipping 4.5 9.8 2.4
  River shipping 1.0 5.8 0.7
  Inland navigation 0.6 2.5 0.9
Gross Domestic Product GDP 1.6 2.3 1.1
Population 1.2 0.9 0.7
GDP per capita 0.4 1.4 0.8
Labour productivity in 
manufacturinga
0.2 (1807–1830) 0.7 (1830–1842) −0.6 (1842–1860)
Remark: Value added and GDP in real prices
Source: J.L. van Zanden and A. van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914. Staat, instituties en economische 
ontwikkeling (The Netherlands 1780–1914. State, institutions and economic development) (n.p. 
2000), Table 4.2, 153 and Table 6.3, 248. The figures for 1840–1850 differ between the tables. 
Here the data from Table 6.3 are used. The tables are based on: J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van 
Zanden, Dutch GNP and its components, 1800–1913 (Groningen 2000)
aSource: J.P.  Smits, ‘The determinants of productivity growth in Dutch manufacturing, 1800–
1913’, European Review of Economic History, 4 (2000), pp. 223–246, graph 1
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taxation. In addition, there was a rise in prices of agricultural products and coal. 
This put an end to the rise of real income and the expansion of the domestic mar-
ket. The building sector exhibited almost zero growth, while clothing production 
shrank and growth in the food sector was only modest. The sources of economic 
growth became narrower and were increasingly rooted in the so-called ‘colonial 
complex.’ The NHM reorganized the flows of commerce to and from the Dutch 
East Indies. They forcefully expanded the Dutch textile industry to compensate 
for the loss of Belgian production capacity. This required, among other things, 
mobilizing the countryside of the Twente region, where home weavers were put 
to work to produce huge quantities of textiles for Java. Maritime shipping also 
got a boost with the construction of great numbers of ships for the trade with 
Java. Sea trade and international commerce flourished.
All the agricultural sectors experienced a decisive upturn, particularly after 1835. 
The farmers on the sea and river clay, in the peat and on the sand all profited from 
higher prices for agricultural produce (including dairy produce). Common lands on 
the sand grounds were reclaimed and their productivity increased by working more 
intensively and improving the quality of the cattle and the manure. The viability of 
smallholdings in certain regions like Twente improved thanks to NHM policy. 
Home-weaving formed a welcome supplement to farming income and spread the 
risk of insolvency.
The 1840s were marked by stagnation on three fronts: manufacturing, services 
and agriculture. Industrial development stagnated due to a crisis in the ‘colonial 
complex.’ Trade with Java declined precipitously and dragged textiles and shipping 
in the Netherlands along with it. At the same time the government’s gradual 
dismantling of protectionist measures confronted the NHM with increasing 
international competition. The ‘colonial complex’ settled into a long-term malaise. 
Agriculture, by contrast, initially performed well. The liberalisation of international 
trade at the outset of the 1840s provoked a further increase in the prices of agricultural 
produce. Agricultural productivity increased along with the prices. 1845 was the 
turning point for the agricultural sector. Potato blight caused several years of failed 
or strongly reduced potato harvests, while in 1846 the rye harvest failed as well. The 
domestic market stagnated. Stagnation in one sector was not compensated by 
improved performance in other sectors. Moreover labour productivity declined and 
real wages and purchasing power trailed behind.
Three complexes in large part shaped economic development in the first half of 
the nineteenth century: (1) agriculture and foods, (2) building materials and 
construction, (3) the colonial complex (including textiles and shipbuilding). The 
first two complexes were part of the three big material flows generated by the natural 
capital of the Netherlands. These interacted with the domestic market. Growing 
demand stimulated the supply of food and buildings. Increasing supply allowed for 
a greater demand. Increasing demand expressed itself in particular in a growing 
population. Natural capital (and the colonial complex) enabled a remarkable 
population growth in the first half of the nineteenth century.
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Economic development, albeit of a vacillating nature, was accompanied by a 
vigorous growth of the Dutch population in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
While in the entire eighteenth century the population grew by only 7%, in the 
45 year period from 1795–1840 it increased by no less than 38% (see Table 3.5). 
Population in the countryside grew significantly faster than that in the towns, namely 
44% compared to 28%. And the growth in the higher regions of the country was 
greater than in the low-lying portions. The agricultural system on the sand grounds 
appeared to have more than enough capacity to absorb population growth (in the 
province of Drenthe with a remarkable 81%). Peat marshes, heathlands, grasslands 
and forests continued to be reclaimed. Smallholders increased productivity by 
working the land more intensively or opted for more profitable alternatives like 
dairy produce. They also wove textiles at home for the fabrikeur, under the putting- 
out system.
In terms of the gross domestic product per capita, the Dutch economy grew 
throughout the entire period 1816–1850. The 1830s were the most advantageous 
(annual growth of ±1.4%) and the 1840s the least (annual growth of ±0.8%). That 
seems like a positive development. But what do these figures tell us about the qual-
ity of life of the population? This will be one of the topics of the next chapter.












Drenthe 83 81 86 72,484
Gelderland 55 46 82 345,762
Groningen 53 58 44 175,651
Utrecht 49 47 56 145,132
Overijssel 46 40 70 197,694
Noord-Brabant 45 44 50 378,437
Limburg 42 40 48 196,128
Friesland 41 43 35 227,859
Zuid-Holland 37 42 31 527,225
Zeeland 32 43 9 151,358
Noord-Holland 8 26 2 442,129
NETHERLANDS 38 44 28 2,859,859
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Chapter 4
Quality of Life: A Poor and Vulnerable 
People
Harry Lintsen
Abstract Well-being is achieved by means of four resources (that is, the four capi-
tals: natural, economic, human and social) of which natural capital is the basis. The 
previous chapter emphasised the natural capital of the Netherlands and the way this 
was exploited with the aid of the other capitals. This chapter asks what the outcome 
of this exploitation was in terms of well-being. What were the most important issues 
around well-being in the Netherlands at the middle of the nineteenth century? In 
terms of present-day norms for extreme poverty, around 21% of the population at 
that time lived in extreme poverty. From a present-day perspective, extreme poverty 
is among the most important issues in well-being around 1850.
A study of newspaper articles between 1830 and 1850 reveals that from a contempo-
rary perspective too, extreme poverty was one of the most important societal issues of 
the time. The poor led not only a meagre, but also a vulnerable, existence. The latter also 
applied to a large part of the Dutch population. It had to cope with the elements in their 
extreme forms: heat waves, bitter cold, violent storms, heavy rains and hailstorms.
A component of well-being specific to the Netherlands as a country located in 
the delta of multiple rivers was the struggle against water. This was waged along 
three main fronts: the management of inner (fresh) water, the struggle against the 
sea, and the interminable fight with the rivers.
This chapter is written by Harry Lintsen with contributions by Lilianne Laan, Önder Nomaler, 
Martijn Anthonissen and Ben Gales.
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Finally, by present-day lights, in the past all the cities in the Netherlands were 
filthy and polluted with organic waste, including human and animal faeces. This 
was in large part responsible for low life-expectancy and poor public health. From 
a present-day perspective this touched on an important aspect of well-being.
Keywords Poverty · Vulnerability · Water management · Hygiene
4.1  ‘How Can We Combat Pauperism?’
Pauperism is the sickness that eats at the heart of all contemporary societies; it is the most 
fearsome epidemic that assaults the nations, and for which... appropriate means are lacking 
to heal the sickness once and for all…1
This was the opinion advanced in 1849 in a lead article by the editors of the Arhemse 
Courant as part of a short but heated debate on the causes of poverty. The provoca-
tion was an article in Het Dagblad van’s-Gravenhage titled ‘How can pauperism be 
combated?’2 Its author was Augustus Elink Sterk jr., son of a Lutheran minister, 
senior official in the Ministry of Finances and elected member of the Provincial 
Estates of South Holland. He was a well-known in Hague circles and published on 
a wide range of topics.
According to Elink Sterk, poverty was for ‘… nine tenths the victim’s own 
fault… whether due to sluggishness or neglect, intemperance and dissolute behav-
ior, rushing into unconsidered marriages without hope of means of support…’ In 
short, because of ‘chaotic living and lack of reflection.’ The editors of the Arnhemsche 
Courant protested this portrayal.
It is a grave untruth… One has to dig deeper if one wants to discover the source of the evil. 
Suppressing the means of exchange between nations and peoples, artificial industries kept 
alive only by main force and prohibitions, concentration of capitals in few hands, a produc-
tion that consistently exceeds the needs of the users and in consequence too many hands and 
too little work – behold some of the causes … of pauperism that has only become evident 
nowadays.3
Here in a nutshell are summarized the standpoints and arguments of contemporaries 
regarding the question of poverty.
Pauperism refers to quality of life, a concept that occupies a central position in 
this study with broad implications that relate, among other things, to health, domes-
tic life, existential security and safety. Welfare is the core and has to do with the 
degree to which the population is able to meet its needs with scarce means, while 
well-being indicates how people perceive their quality of life. Well-being is realized 
with four resources (in other words the four capitals: natural, economic, human and 
social) of which natural capital is the foundation. The previous chapter dealt with 
natural capital in the Netherlands, its exploitation, the consequences for nature and 
1 Hoe is het pauperismus te stuiten’, Arnhemsche Courant 28-08-1849.
2 Hoe is het pauperismus te stuiten’, Dagblad van ‘s-Gravenhage 13-08-1849.
3 Arnhemsche Courant 28-08-1849.
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the yields in terms of gross domestic income. The question for this chapter is: what 
is the well-being of inhabitants of the Netherlands in the mid-nineteenth century? 
Does pauperism belong to the ‘most fearsome epidemic’ of the Netherlands and 
with that to the most important problem of well-being and sustainability?
4.2  Poverty in the Netherlands
4.2.1  The Scope of Poverty4
From a present-day perspective, poverty ranks among the most important problems 
of the mid-nineteenth century. The historian Allen has developed a method to evalu-
ate the living standard of the lowest classes in the past.5 He starts with the disposable 
income that a person absolutely needs to survive. If he falls below this level then he 
will starve or die of cold. The cost of the minimum necessary consumption (Cmin) is 
based on a ‘basket,’ containing the minimum quantities of food and fuel (for heating 
and illumination) and the minimum sums for clothing and housing. The magnitude 
of the entire sum depends on place and time. The cost of living is different for 
example in 1850 and in 1750 and for London and Amsterdam. We estimate Cmin for 
the Netherlands in 1850 to amount to an average of 19 guilders per inhabitant per 
year (see Table 4.1).
In addition, Allen defines a basket that he somewhat euphemistically calls 
‘respectable.’ The disposable income is a bit bigger and the individual can enjoy a 
menu with more variety (bread instead of porridge, better beer and a modest quan-
tity of eggs, cheese and meat). He can also clothe himself better and enjoy more 
warmth and better housing. The ‘respectable’ basket serves to define the poverty 
line. Below this, people enter into the danger zone. They will often feel hungry, pos-
sibly have to dress in rags and in a moderately stringent winter will suffer bitter 
cold. The costs of living at the poverty line are Cline and these are estimated at 43 
guilders per inhabitant per year (Table 4.1). That roughly corresponds to the line 
that the World Bank nowadays defines for extreme poverty.6
In 1850, with its four capitals, the Netherlands was able to generate a gross 
domestic income of 659 million guilders (Table 4.1). Of that amount, fl. 466 million 
was spent on private consumption. Had consumer expenditure in 1850 been equally 
distributed across all inhabitants, then all would have lived far above the poverty 
line: Caverage, after all, amounted to 150 guilders/year. But because of social inequal-
ity the situation was entirely different. The gini – a measure of social inequality – in 
4 See for the calculations in this subsection: H. Lintsen, M. Anthonissen en B. Gales, Berekening 
omvang extreme armoede in  Nederland 1820–1913 (research report Eindhoven University 
of Technology, 2017).
5 R.C. Allen, Poverty lines in history, theory and current international practice (Oxford 2013).
6 The line of extreme poverty is set at $1.9 per day, i.e. $694 per person per year (constant prices 
2016).
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relation to the consumer expenditure is estimated at 0,40 (1 is maximum inequality 
and 0 is maximum equality). This means that about 21% of the Dutch population 
lived under the poverty line (Cline), i.e. about 650,000 inhabitants of the Netherlands 
suffered extreme poverty.
On the basis of estimates for poor relief in 1850 it appears that 14% of the popu-
lation was on the dole. This percentage does not, however, reveal how much was 
received in natura in the form of food and fuel. Moreover records of charitable 
organizations were sometimes missing. 1850 was not an especially problematic 
year. Quite the contrary. According to the papers, the number of the poor had 
decreased relative to previous years which were marked by the potato famine, high 
grain prices and cholera (Sect. 1.2). Our estimate of 21% poor therefore seems to 
accord with the magnitude of contemporary percentages (Table 4.2).
There are striking differences among the provinces. Drenthe, Overijssel and 
Gelderland scored low relative to the other provinces. Noord-Holland had the most 
poor in an absolute sense, more than 150,000 persons, while in a relative sense 
Friesland topped the list. There were also big differences between towns and the 
countryside: the number of the poor was higher in the city than in rural areas.7
7 See for example the table in: J.L. Van Zanden, Nederlandse landbouw in de negentiende eeuw 
1800–1914 (dissertation Wageningen 1985), 218 and J.L. Van Zanden, ‘Den zedelijke en materiële 
toestand der arbeidende bevolking ten platten lande’. Een reeks rapporten uit 1851 (Historia 
Agriculturae XXI, Groningen 1991), 36.
Table 4.1 Private consumer 
expenditure and magnitude of 
poverty 1850 (estimates)
1850
Total private consumer expenditure 466 mln gld
Total population 3,098,000
Caverage (consumer expenditure per 
capita)
150 gld/year
Cmin (costs consumption subsistence 
level)
19 gld/year
Cline (costs consumption poverty line) 43 gld/year
Gini in relation tot GDP 0.48
Gini in relation to consumer 
expenditure
0.41
Percentage of population under Cline 21%
Number Dutch under Cline 658,000
Remark: Consumer expenditure in constant 1913 
prices. Al levels of consumption are determined for an 
‘average’ inhabitant, taking account of the differences 
among men, women and children
Source: H.  Lintsen, M.  Anthonissen en B.  Gales, 
Berekening omvang extreme armoede in Nederland 




Could poverty, as the most important factor in well-being, already have been 
solved at that time? Could, in other words, the level of extreme poverty in 1850 
have been reduced to nearly nil? There were in principle three options. First, a fur-
ther decrease in social inequality. This option was the bugaboo of the bourgeoisie: 
the possibility that the poor would rise up, that revolution would be propagated and 
the social order be attacked.8 As noted above, extreme poverty would have disap-
peared in 1850 given an equal distribution of consumer expenditure (a gini of 1). 
Table Numbers of those on poor relief and living at homea as percentage of the population in 
1817, 1832 and 1850
Province 1817 1832 1850 1850 countryside
Drenthe 4.8 3.9 5.6 5
Overijssel 5.6 5.4 6.7 5
Gelderland 7.1 6.8 8.8 6
Noord-Brabant 10.2 6.5 11.9 10
Limburg – – 14.0 9
Groningen 5.2 5.9 9.0 7
Friesland 8.5 11.1 15.7 14
Zeeland 8.1 5.7 12.3 10
Utrecht 9.3 13.6 15.2 9
Zuid-Holland 11.3 10.6 15.7 10
Noord-Holland 21.9 15.3 23.0 –
NETHERLANDS 11.0 excl. Limburg 9.4 excl. Limburg 13.8
aPoor relief distinguished between those on the dole living at home, or the ‘outside poor’ and the 
‘inside poor.’ The inside poor were those on poor relief that were permanently or temporarily 
housed in institutions: an orphanage, a hospital, an old age home, a widows’ home and almhouse 
courts
8 M.H.D. van Leeuwen, Bijstand in Amsterdam ca. 1800–1850. Armenzorg als beheersings- en 
overlevingsstrategie (Zwolle 1992), 123–125.
Table 4.2 Number of people on dole in the Netherlands in 1850
Population On dole Percentage (%)
Drenthe 83,000 4896 5.9
Overijssel 216,000 16,206 7.5
Gelderland 365,000 34,844 9.5
Noord-Brabant 393,000 49,033 12.5
Limburg 204,000 32,589 16.0
Groningen 185,000 20,674 11.2
Friesland 248,000 47,982 19.4
Zeeland 160,000 22,330 13.9
Utrecht 153,000 25,263 16.5
Noord-Holland 472,000 90,740 19.2
NETHERLANDS (excl. Zuid-Holand) 2,513,000 344,557 13.7
Source: Nederlandsche Staatscourant 17-08-1851
4 Quality of Life: A Poor and Vulnerable People
86
But even at today’s degree of inequality (gini relative to consumer expenditure of 
0.30) poverty at the time would in our estimation have been considerably less 
(Table 4.3).
The second option consisted of creating such a degree of economic growth that 
even with social inequality at the same level almost all the poor would be lifted 
above the poverty line. At the time this option was referred to as encouraging ‘popu-
lar (or national) prosperity’ (volkswelvaart).9 In that case the total magnitude of 
consumer expenditure would have had to amount to 810 million guilders in 1850, or 
261 guilders per inhabitant. This means that the growth of the Gross Domestic 
Product over the period 1820–1850 would have had to amount to 3.3%. This level 
of growth seems impossible with the then existing natural capital and the contem-
porary (agricultural) technology. Agriculture in the 1830s grew by only 1.4%. This 
in combination with the growth of industry and trade produced an increase of 2.3% 
in the GDP.
There was a third option, namely the exploitation of natural capital and popula-
tions elsewhere in the world. This was one of the aims of colonial policy. That pol-
icy was beholden to reap benefits for the development of ‘national prosperity’ in the 
Netherlands.10 The construction of the ‘colonial complex’ certainly contributed to 
the decline in the level of poverty in the Netherlands, particularly in the 1830s, but 
not enough. This option would become a bone of contention after 1850.
9 See the following Chaps. 5 and 6.
10 J.L. Blussé, ‘Koning Willem I en de schepping van de koloniale staat’, in I. de Haan et al. (Eds.) 
Een nieuwe staat: Het begin van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Amsterdam 2013), 169. Blussé 
notes that the originator of the Cultivation System, Johannes van den Bosch, was also concerned 
with improving life for the native population.




In case of less social 
inequality
In case of greater economic 
growth 1820–1850
Cline (costs of consumption at 
poverty line)
43 gld/year 43 gld/year 43 gld/year
Portion of the population 
under Cline
21% <5% <5%
Gini in relation to GDP 0.48 0.35 0.48
Gini in relatie tot consumer 
expenditure
0.42 0.30 0.42
Growth of Gross Domestic 
Income 1820–1850
1.4% 1.4% 3.3%
Growth private consumer 
expenditure 1820–1850
1.2% 1.2% 3.1%
Source: H.  Lintsen, M.  Anthonissen en B.  Gales, Berekening omvang extreme armoede in 
Nederland 1820–1913 (research report Eindhoven University of Techology, 2017)
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4.2.2  The Perception of the Poverty Question
In the mid-nineteenth century, many inhabitants of the Netherlands lived beneath 
the poverty line. In 1850 some 650,000 inhabitants of the Netherlands were 
extremely poor and lived from day to day. Their budgets approached the absolute 
minimum for survival. Poverty must have been visible everywhere in the Netherlands.
From today’s perspective, the quality of life in those days – in terms of poverty – 
was one of the most important well-being and sustainability issues, if not the most 
important. The question is whether contemporaries also saw it this way. Was pov-
erty an important issue for them? The answer is important if we are to avoid an 
anachronistic approach to well-being and sustainability. The elaborate system of 
poor relief suggests that poverty was an important theme, but was it also a problem-
atic one? The system might have functioned so efficiently that contemporaries 
regarded the question as solved and felt themselves at liberty to turn their attention 
to other matters. What was the relationship of poverty to other societal issues?
One of the (few) ways to address this question is a systematic survey of newspa-
pers, journals, pamphlets or ego documents. We limit our investigation here to all 
newspapers in the Netherlands from 1830 to 1850 and use as indicator those news-
paper accounts in which ‘misery’ or a related concept appears. From a collection of 
more than 10,000 accounts we extracted an a-select sample (see Table 4.4).11
Poverty played a major role in accounts of ‘misery’ (29% of the articles). Much 
misery had to do with poverty and was often portrayed in heart-wrenching terms.
…There I saw the Father or Mother struggling with death; there I saw the despairing Man 
or Woman, now gazing on the dying, now at the poor uncared-for brood. There I saw in 
another family again children surrounding the poor deserted Mother, weeping with her for 
the death of the loved Father, and the last bit of bread, charily divided…12
Along with ‘Poverty,’ ‘Politics’ pertains to the biggest category of newspaper 
accounts containing the term ‘misery.’ These accounts announced debates in parlia-
ment, political decisions, lawmaking, import duties and suchlike. These issues were 
nearly always discussed in combination with ‘Poverty’ or one of the other 
categories.
‘Fate’ is such a category (15% of the accounts). These articles recounted fires, 
floods, epidemic diseases, hurricanes, harsh winters and other natural violence and 
calamities. Some of the accounts made a connection to poverty. In these accounts 
misery was a question of fate and fate could lead to poverty.
‘War’ and ‘insurrection’ were other categories (respectively 13% and 11% of the 
accounts). Europe was restless in the 1830s and 40s. Belgium seceded from the 
Netherlands. Civil war threatened in Spain. In Portugal there was a struggle for 
power. Russia had occupied Poland. Turkey was at war with Egypt. France fought 
in Algeria. Great Britain conquered the Falkland Islands, etc. Several accounts made 
11 L. Laan, Ö. Nomaler en H. Lintsen, Perceptie en kranten, 1830–1850 (research report Eindhoven 
University of Technology, 2017).
12 ‘St-Nicolaasfeest’, Rotterdamsche Courant 09-12-1848.
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a direct connection with poverty. War and insurrections brought misery, chaos and 
poverty. Poverty could be the cause of wars and insurrections.
For the rest, the newspapers were a well-trodden podium for moralistic narra-
tives; histories with a moral turn, a personal tragedy framed as a warning, an excit-
ing serial with moralistic overtones or strong condemnation of behavior like opium 
trading or alcoholism (11% of the articles). These articles containing the term ‘mis-
ery’ fall into the category of ‘morality.’ These accounts also regularly made a con-
nection to poverty. Poverty could be prevented by ‘…more frequent attendance at 
public religious services, quiet, stillness on Sunday evenings…’13 An elevated moral 
sensibility inspired the charity that combatted poverty.
Finally, there was a great number of articles containing the term ‘misery’ that 
dealt with a rich variety of subjects (the category ‘diverse’ with 24% of the accounts). 
They dealt with, for example, misery due to religious tensions, misery in prisons, 
the misery of vulnerable groups in the overseas colonies and emigration in conse-
quence of misery and need. Miscellaneous notices also fell into this category.
This analysis reveals poverty to have been the most important social question. 
Contemporaries saw it as a condition that brought much misery for individuals and 
social groups, both domestically and abroad. It had political aspects and was related 
to other social questions like morality and war. Poverty had to do with life’s risks. 
Anyone could be a victim of fate. Chaos was ever-threatening and put existential 
security on the line. Contemporaries could have proclaimed poverty and vulnerabil-
ity to be important, if not the most important, limits to well-being of their time.
To which contemporaries do we refer in this connection? Whose opinions were 
ventilated in the newspaper? Who was allowed to speak? Who read the paper? The 
newspaper was certainly not a ‘podium for the people.’ The newspaper was still for 
the most part the masculine domain of the upper middle class and the elite; the 
masses and the poor were not heard there. The authors were judges, writers and 
13 De Noord-Brabander 13-04-1844.
Table 4.4 Theme in newspaper accounts between 1830 and 1850 in which ‘misery’ (‘ellende’) or 
a similar term appears (n = 346)
Total Domestic Abroad
Poverty 101 (29%) 26 75
Politics 99 (29%) 31 68
Fate 52 (15%) 20 32
War 46 (13%) 19 27
Insurrection 38 (11%) 7 31
Morality 38 (11%) 20 18
Charity 36 (10%) 29 7
Miscellaneous 84 (24%) 35 49
Remark: The total exceeds the number of selected articles (n = 346) because a number of the arti-
cles was assigned to more than one category
Source: L. Laan, Ö. Nomaler en H. Lintsen, Perceptie en kranten, 1830–1850 (research report 
Eindhoven University of Techology, 2017)
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government officials. Newspaper readership was composed of the educated and the 
wealthy. These were the classes from which the officers of charitable organizations 
were recruited. They shaped the policies of and were responsible for poor relief. But 
to whom did they extend their helping hands? Who were the poor?
4.2.3  Poverty in the City and in the Countryside
In the city three categories of the poor could be distinguished.14 First were the aged, 
the sick and the invalids. Around 1850 they comprised a significant portion of the 
urban population.15 Depending on the institution, percentages ranged from 30% to 
60%. Living with old age, illness and invalidity was in any case a heavy burden in 
those days. For those lacking financial resources it was punishing.
The employable poor formed another category. This could be divided into a 
group of workers holding often temporary jobs at the lowest wages and the group of 
minor craftsmen, small shopkeepers and the lowest-ranking civil servants.16 The 
lowest-paid workers were referred to as day labourers, labourers or helpers or more 
specifically with, for example, porters, wagon loaders, barrow-men, and bag load-
ers. The lowest-paid female workers were called maids or more specifically washer-
women and cleaning ladies. Every city had a large class of unschooled and low-paid 
workers, who had a good chance of falling under the poverty line because of ‘the … 
difficulty, not to say the impossibility, for many heads of households to earn their 
keep by means of their labour…’17 Having a trade, shop or job as civil servant was 
no guarantee of being able to avoid the trap of poverty. Tailors, seamstresses, pin- 
makers, spinners, vegetable sellers, teachers etc. often found it extremely difficult to 
keep their heads above water. Winter was an especially hard time. Business was 
slow, while the costs of heating and clothing increased.
14 P. de Rooy, ‘De armen hebt gij altijd met u: armenzorg en onderwijs’, in: I. de Haan, P den Hoed 
and H. te Velde, Een nieuwe staat. Het begin van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Amsterdam 
2013), 221–222.
15 See among others: Van Leeuwen, Bijstand in Amsterdam ca. 1800–1850; M. Prak, ‘Overvloed of 
onbehagen. Armoede, armen en armenzorg in ’s-Hertogenbosch, 1770–1850, in: J. van Oudheusden 
and G. Trienekens, Een pront wijf, een mager paard en een zoon op het seminarie: aanzetten tot 
een integrale geschiedenis van oostelijk Noord-Brabant 1770–1914 (’s-Hertogenbosch 1993), 
B.P.A. Gales, L.H.M. Kreukels, J.J.G. Lujten and F.H.M. Roebroeks, Het Burgerlijk Armbestuur. 
Twee eeuwen zorg voor armen, zieken en ouderen te Maastricht, 1796–1996 (Maastricht 1997), 
band 1 en 2. On poverty in earlier periods: H. Gras, op de grens van het bestaan. Armen en armen-
zorg in Drenthe 1700–1800 (Zuidwolde 1989) and H.F.J.M. van den Eerenbeemt, In het span-
ningsveld der armoede. Agressief pauperisme en reactie in Staats-Brabant (Tilburg 1968). See 
also: C. Lis and H. Soly, Armoede & kapitalisme in pre-industrieel Europa (Amsterdam 1980) and 
A. de Swaan, Zorg en de staat. Welzijn, onderwijs en gezondheidszorg in Europa en de Verenigde 
Staten in de nieuwe tijd (Amsterdam 2004).
16 Van Leeuwen, Bijstand in Amsterdam ca. 1800–1850, 30.
17 Van Leeuwen, Bijstand in Amsterdam ca. 1800–1850, 189–190 and Prak, ‘Overvloed of onbeha-
gen’, 26–34.
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The third category of the poor were the social outcasts who were all but excluded 
from the labor process: beggars, drifters, paupers. They were most to be pitied. They 
were beyond the pale of poor-relief and were often chased away or locked op in 
workhouses.
For women, life was more difficult than for men and relatively speaking they 
turned more often to poor relief. They typically encountered difficulties when their 
husbands died or absconded and they were left to fend for themselves. Women 
earned less than men, even for similar work. Income from simple labour was far 
from adequate to maintain a family with children. In addition, women also typically 
had to run a household.
The category of the elderly and the sick and that of the beggars, drifters and pau-
pers were also well-represented in the countryside. The category of the employable 
poor consisted of three groups: day-labourers, maids and hired hands, and small-
holders. Day-labourers in 1850 were to be pitied.18 In Zeeland there was a large 
population of such temporary labourers, an estimated 2/3 of the agrarian population. 
Their situation was lamentable: they barely had an income, were in poor health, and 
were poorly clothed and housed:
When we see our eyes drawn to so many pale faces and emaciated bodies, and one sees the 
masses of weak and sickly beings… then assuredly we must admit that the material condi-
tion of the labouring class demands an investigation…19
Similar reports came from other provinces, describing day-labourers ‘whose exis-
tence...is extremely uncertain, and most grievous, if illness prevents them from 
working.’20 They often lived in shacks with a ‘great number of children who, like 
little cave-dwellers, emerge half-naked from the ground.’21
18 Van Zanden, ‘Den zedelijke en materiële toestand der arbeidende bevolking ten platten lande’. 
See for the analysis and discussion of sources: H. Lintsen, De schraalheid van het bestaan, een 
reeks rapporten uit 1850 (research report Eindhoven University of Technology, 2017).
19 ‘[Zeeland] Rapport naar aanleiding van een ingesteld onderzoek omtrent den zedelijken en 
materiëlen toestand der arbeidende en dienstbare bevolking ten platten lande’, in van Zanden, ‘Den 
zedelijke en materiële toestand der arbeidende bevolking ten platten lande’. Originally published 
as a report to the annual meeting of the Zeeuwse Maatschappij van Landbouw (Zeeland Agricultural 
Association) at Tholen on June 7, 1849 (Middelburg 1849), 12.
20 A. Martini van Geffen (1991), ‘Zedelijke en materiële toestand der arbeidende bevolking ten 
platten lande. I. Nopens Noord-Brabant’, in van Zanden, ‘Den zedelijke en materiële toestand der 
arbeidende bevolking ten platten lande’. Original source: Verslag van het verhandelde op het 
vijfde Nederlandsche Landhuishoudkundig Congres, gehouden te Leiden van den 10den tot den 
14den junij 1850 (Leiden 1850), Appendix no 12, 101.
21 B.W.A.E. Sloet tot Oldhuis (1991), ‘Statistieke beschouwing van den toestand der geringe plat-
telands bevolking op de Veluwe langs de Zuiderzee, (gemeenten Putten, Ermelo, Elspeet, 
Harderwijk, (Hierden), Doornspijk, Oldenbroek, Heerde en Epe)’, in van Zanden, ‘Den zedelijke 
en materiële toestand der arbeidende bevolking ten platten lande’. Original source: Tijdschrift 
voor Staathuishoudkunde en Statistiek 9(1853), 291.
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Hired hands and maidservants earned about the same as day-labourers. If that 
was all they could count on, they were condemned to an abject life.22 But they 
enjoyed various advantages. They had more security because they were a permanent 
part of the farm. They were housed in the farm and could piggy-back on the farmer 
during prosperous times.23
Other inhabitants of the countryside that found it hard to make ends meet were 
the smallholders. Their small farms gave them a bit of security, but they had to exert 
themselves to the utmost to keep their heads above water. Discipline and frugality 
were the necessary ingredients; ‘were this not the case, many farmers would soon 
sink into the estate of day-labourers or that of poverty.’24
Regional differences in rural poverty were large in 1850 and varied with the 
nature of the farm and the orientation to the market. Misery was no stranger, for 
example, to the clay-grounds in Zeeland. The mixed large farms there faced hard 
times. The wheat farmers suffered. The potato farmers were hard hit by the potato 
blight. This in the wake of a crisis in madder production due to strong competition 
from French madder. Farmers had to cut back on the high costs of wages and other 
expenditures like those for the blacksmith and the shopkeeper. Hence it was not 
only the farmers, their workers and the day-labourers who suffered from the agricul-
tural malaise.
The livestock farms in Holland, by contrast, did rather well. There were fewer 
day-labourers. The farmers on the large farms generally employed permanent per-
sonnel for the regular work and had recourse to migrant labour during peak times in 
the summer.
On the sand grounds the smallholders were less dependent on the market, more 
self-reliant, less specialized and more flexible. If the market allowed, they could 
work their land more intensively or switch to other products. Moreover these small 
farmers were able to earn income from sources other than agriculture. That was 
enough to clothe themselves and to eke out an existence, albeit on an extremely 
sober footing.
The differences among the regions did not, however, hide the fact that hired 
hands, maidservants and smallholders lived around the poverty line and that day- 
22 M. van Geffen, ‘Noord-Brabant’ Bijlage no 12, 101–102. According to the Brabant report, there 
was an annual surplus of about five guilders with which to clothe a family of five children, meet 
miscellaneous household expenses, buy firewood, pay school fees etc.
23 A report on Zeeland noted that maids and hired hands were well housed - on the farm or in the 
village – and that from the farmer ‘they could obtain…at reasonable prices...grains, while most of 
them were granted a small plot of land for a modest rent on which to grow potatoes…’ [Zeeland]…’ 
13.
24 J. Zeehuisen (1991), ‘Statistieke bijdrage tot de kennis van den stoffelijken en zedelijken toes-
tand van de landbouwende klasse in het kwartier Salland, provincie Overijssel’, in van Zanden, 
‘Den zedelijke en materiële toestand der arbeidende bevolking ten platten lande’. Original source: 
Tijdschrift voor Staathuishoudkunde en Statistiek 6(1851), 380.
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labourers regularly fell below it. ‘Over against the other members of society they are 
slaves…’ as one investigator summarized the existence of agricultural workers 
(hired hands and maidservants, smallholders and day-labourers):
‘…slaves in body and spirit, labouring, if they have work, from early morning to the eve-
ning to earn a meagre bit of bread for themselves and theirs...having almost no hope of ever 
raising themselves to the status of independent citizens in society…’25
The poor had not only a meagre, but also a vulnerable existence. The smallest set-
back led to big problems and immersed them in a bitter struggle for survival. But not 
only the poor were vulnerable. Other large groups of the population were in the 
same boat. Prosperity, property, well-being and health could be threatened in numer-
ous ways. Economic development was one of the factors that made life in the city 
and the countryside unpredictable and vulnerable. We discussed the fickle economic 
circumstances in Chap. 3. Here we will focus on factors associated with natural 
capital: life with natural forces, the struggle against the waters, and living in a delta. 
Natural capital was (in combination with human and economic capital) the most 
important source of subsistence. At the same time it was the source of an existential 
uncertainty that also played a part in shaping the quality of life.
4.3  Cold, Heat and Storm26
Well-being was heavily influenced by weather and the seasons. Every season 
brought its own problems. In the winter the theme was the ‘cold.’ Harsh winters 
were a common and regular occurrence in the Netherlands from the fifteenth up to 
and including the nineteenth century – a period also known as the little ice age. 
25 J.H.  Beucker Andrea, ‘Rapport ingediend voor het vijfde, Landhuishoudjundig Congres te 
Leyden, 11, 12, 13 junij 1850, betreffende een onderzoek naar den zedelijken en materiëlen toes-
tand der arbeidende bevolking ten platten lande en van den middelen om dien zoveel mogelijk te 
verbeteren. [Friesland]’, in van Zanden, ‘Den zedelijke en materiële toestand der arbeidende bev-
olking ten platten lande’. Original source: Tijdschrift voor Staathuishoudkunde en Statistiek 
6(1851), 166.
26 An exhaustive investigation into the history of the weather in the Netherlands has been under-
taken by J. Buisman. This has resulted in a fascinating series with numerous data, observations, 
anecdotes, announcements etc. At the  time of  writing of  the  present volume, five volumes 
of Buisman’s study have been published, covering the period from about 800 to 1750. J. Buisman, 
Duizend jaar weer, wind en water in de lage landen (Franeker 1995–2006), volumes 1 t/m 5. Mr. 
Buisman has generously provided us with the manuscripts for the years 1800–1850. Page refer-
ences refer to the manuscript. Thanks to the chronological references, when the time comes cita-
tions and data will be easily traceable in the volumes to published.
In the first volume Buisman provides a description of the threats that natural forces presented 
to the survival of the Dutch in the middle ages, see: J. Buisman, Duizend jaar weer, wind en water 
in de lage landen (Franeker 1995) Vol. 1, to 1300, 97–100. We presume that up to 1850 not much 
had changed. Buisman’s research does not in any case suggest that we should assume that the situ-




People were always wondering how harsh the winter would be and how long it 
would last. Did one have sufficient turf or wood to survive these months? Would 
food supplies be spoiled by the frost? The long and harsh winter of 1830 had already 
set in by the end of the previous November. On February 3 a farmer from Wirdum 
wrote that.
… the former bitter frost, ever-increasing up to now, is accompanied by a stiff east wind and 
clear skies. The frost has penetrated into the houses all the way to their hearths… This 
condition of frost and bitter cold will greatly deepen the misery of numerous people, in 
view of the general lack of turf and fuel, the need for food and shelter especially among the 
common folk. Potatoes that many still have in storage, and up to now have kept from the 
frost, will no longer be able to be saved from it…27
If during the winter months the supply of fuel was insufficient, a search for brush-
wood was undertaken or the few pieces of furniture were burned. There was no 
money to buy extra, expensive fuel. Commercial and industrial activity came to a 
standstill and unemployment rose precipitously. Appeals to poor relief were already 
frequent in normal winters, in harsh winters even more so: ‘During harsh winters 
the worn out day-labourers, and those burdened by a large family and without work, 
are supported by the poor relief.’28
The coming of spring was joyously celebrated. At last there was light and mild 
weather. Nature came alive again and economic activities began to resume. What 
remained was the danger of frost. Now it was not the danger of freezing to death, 
but damage to crops for the farmer in the countryside and for the city dweller with 
his vegetable patch. Moreover if the frost held on too long, peat extraction was 
delayed which gave the turf too little time to dry, diminishing the quality.29 The 
period of the so-called Ice Saints (saints with name days between 11 and 15 May) 
was taken to mark the definitive transition to summer; folk wisdom held that ‘It can 
freeze until May, with the Ice-Saints it goes away.’ But spring might hold another 
unpleasant surprise, namely long and heavy periods of rain. In such extremities, the 
windmills in the low Netherlands could no longer pump all the water away, espe-
cially when the rain was accompanied by a long windless period. Polders became 
swampy fields or were flooded. Farms were cut off from the world. Cows had to 
remain in the barn. Summer grain was lost. Sowing had to be postponed.30
27 J. Buisman, Duizend jaar weer, wind en water in de lage landen, manuscript, 571 (to be pub-
lished, presumably volume 7, 1825–1875.
28 F.H.C. Drieling, ‘Verslag over den toestand der arbeidende klasse, vooral ten plattelande, in de 
provincie Utrecht, en over de middelen tot verbetering van hunne zedelijke en stoffelijke welvaart’, 
in van Zanden, ‘Den zedelijke en materiële toestand der arbeidende bevolking ten platten lande’. 
Original source: Tijdschrift voor Staathuishoudkunde en Statistiek 8(1853), 28.
29 Hölsgens (2016), forthcoming.
30 In the worst cases the dikes were breached. ‘… Much damage was done on May 14, 15 and 16 
[of 1844] by the hard wind. In the new polder named Eijerland the summer barley and also a great 
quantity of oats have been beaten down by the hard wind and there are more places in Holland 
where much damage has been done. Due to the floodwaters on Kamper Island the houses were 
submerged to the attic and on Ameland hundreds of hay-wagons floated away…’ Buisman, 
Duizend jaar weer, wind en water…, manuscript, 557, (to be published, presumably volume 7, 
1825–1875).
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The summer too had threats in store. Heavy thunderstorms or heat could destroy 
harvests. That led to food shortages in a matter of months. If these were not capably 
managed, famine ensued. Dry periods also affected cattle:
Due to the extreme drought, moisture escapes not only from the earth, but also to such an 
extent from ditches and pools that they dry up, and if this continues, the animals can no 
longer be maintained on the land. Among farmers there is no greater burden than cattle 
wandering aimlessly over the fields.31
Shortages of water, grass and hay could lead to massive starvation of cattle.32 
Sometimes in dry summers farmers were confronted with plagues of mice that 
destroyed supplies of hay and grain. Friesland had such a summer in 1832. The 
plague was so bad that children on one farm caught 230 mice in a few days.33
The fall was among other things the period of the autumn-storms. These could 
wreak havoc in the countryside: crops that were lost; chimneys that came down; 
roof tiles that flew through the air; roofs that were lifted up; houses that collapsed; 
runaway windmills that caught fire from the heat of friction; polders that flooded 
(because now there was too much wind for the windmills). The first November 
storm of the nineteenth century set the tone. In Woensel (Noord Brabant) the church 
tower blew over and in Haren 43 of the 60 houses were damaged. Crop failure was 
a regular occurrence. In addition to bad weather, crop diseases were also to blame, 
such as the infamous potato blight of 1845.
4.4  The Vulnerable Dutch Delta34
The Dutch struggled heroically to survive in their delta. Nature’s elements had to be 
resisted in their most extreme forms: heat waves, bitter cold, extreme storms, heavy 
and prolonged rainfall and hailstorms. The clothing and housing of large parts of the 
31 Buisman, Duizend jaar weer, wind en water…, manuscript, 557, (to be published, presumably 
volume 7, 1825–1875).
32 An example, although from the eighteenth century: In the second half of July in 1750 a heat wave 
occurred that was ‘…so unbearably hot that many people and animals very quickly died from the 
heat. The animals in the fields suffered so much from this heat that throughout our entire fatherland 
they produced half as much milk as usual … and the fish in the water died by the thousands of 
pounds…it seemed as though the water was everywhere strewn with dead fish.
Cited in: J. Buisman, Duizend jaar weer, wind en water in de lage landen, (Franeker 2006), Vol. 
5, 1675–1750, 833.
33 Buisman, Duizend jaar weer, wind en water…, manuscript, 557, (to be published, presumably 
volume 7, 1825–1875).
34 This section is based on: G.P. van de Ven, Leefbaar laagland. Geschiedenis van de waterbeheers-
ing en landaanwinning in Nederland (Utrecht 1993); A. Bosch and W. van der Ham, edited by 
H.W. Lintsen, Twee Eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat 1798–1998 (Zaltbommel 1998); A. Bosch, Om de 
macht over het water. De nationale waterstaatsdienst tussen staat en samenleving 1798–1849 
(Zaltbommel 2000, dissertation); A. van Heezik, Strijd om de rivieren. Tweehonderd jaar rivieren-
beleid in Nederland of de opkomst en ondergang van het streven naar de normale rivier (disserta-
tion TUDelft 2007); H.W. Lintsen and N. Disco, ‘Het nijvere verbond’, in: H.W. Lintsen et al., 
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population were ill-suited to the struggle. Bodies had a hard time of it. Moreover 
there was the perpetual war against the waters. This was fought on three fronts: 
management of ‘inner water,’ the fight against the sea and the incessant struggles 
with the rivers. The plodding toil in the Dutch mud was a war of attrition, one that 
repeatedly came to a premature and inglorious end.
The management of inner water entailed two kinds of risks, namely the risk of 
soil subsidence and that associated with lakes and ponds. Extraction of peat by 
drainage initiated an unintended process of soil subsidence that could not be 
stopped. Hydraulic engineering projects like polder drainage and reclamations 
accelerated the process. Increased habitation and continuing investments behind the 
dikes and in the polders exacerbated the consequences and risks of calamities. Lakes 
and ponds, of which there were hundreds at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
were the second problem in managing inner water.35 Especially problematic were 
large bodies of inner water, like the Haarlemmermeer, where the wind could blow 
unhindered for long distances. But for all that there were few fatalities and material 
losses were not dramatic.
The risks in these two cases did not in the first place concern a lack of safety. The 
big problem was an excess of water. This came home to farmers when business as 
usual (e.g. sowing in spring) became impossible. Sometimes, however, too much 
water became catastrophic. Extremely heavy rainfall, exceedingly high ‘outer 
water’ or long periods of no wind preventing the windmills from draining enough 
water could all, separately or in combination, cause damage to crops or cattle.36
Made in Holland. Een techniekgeschiedenis van Nederland [1800–2000] (Zutphen 2005), 75–93; 
H.W.  Lintsen and  A. van Heezik, ‘In gevecht met de rivieren’, in  H.W.  Lintsen et  al., Made 
in Holland. Een techniekgeschiedenis van Nederland [1800–2000] (Zutphen 2005), 95–113.
35 A brief and lucid description of the problems of polders and reclamations can be found in T. Stol. 
Wassend water, dalend land. Geschiedenis van Nederland en het water (Amsterdam 1993), par-
ticularly 21–58; 73–98.
36 ‘Danger’ was not the motivation for the many reclamations. It was all about acquiring new land. 
The reclaimed land consisted for the most part of fertile clay. Investments could be attractive 
because the reclamations subsequently produced cereals, vegetables, meat and dairy products. 
Cereal and ground prices of course had to be favorable. Hence there was a clear relationship 
between the prices of cereal crops and the number of new reclamations. Initially private parties 
risked the investments. By the end of the eighteenth century governments were also taking 
initiatives.
King William I turned the reclamation of the Haarlemmermeer into a state project. The gigantic 
enterprise, he argued, provided work for thousands of families both in the short term (reclamation 
and the creation of an agricultural infrastructure) as well as in the long term (agriculture). It also 
produced an enormous amount of agricultural acreage to feed the kingdom and grow export prod-
ucts. The reclamation could also be financed from the sale of land. Public safety and loss of land 
due to erosion by waves were certainly important arguments for the reclamation. But they were not 
decisive in the deliberations. It was more the case that society no longer accepted the risks of flood-
ing in the political and economic heart of the Netherlands and the destruction of agricultural prod-
ucts, capital goods and infrastructure. There was also opposition to the reclamation of the 
Haarlemmermeer. The lake was an important drainage catchment for the Rijnland Water Board, 
into which excess water from nearby polders could be pumped, whence it would gradually make 
its way to the sea. Where would that water be stored in the future? Similar problems with the 
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Danger from the sea was an especially impressive feature of Dutch history 
due to the storms accompanied by storm surges and claiming thousands of vic-
tims like the Saint Elisabeth Flood of 1421 and the All-Saints flood of 1570.37 In 
1825 there was another serious storm surge. Large parts of Groningen, Friesland 
and Overijssel were submerged. 380 people died.38 The brackish water presum-
ably caused additional indirect casualties. The following summer malaria 
erupted. In the Frisian countryside mortality exceeded normal levels by 4000 
deaths.39
Storm surges were rare. Storms, on the other hand, occurred with great regular-
ity. Damage was mostly local and the number of casualties small, but over the years 
losses could be significant and the number of deaths add up to hundreds. Acute loss 
of land did not occur on a large scale, but was a piecemeal affair. The old village of 
Egmond aan Zee, for example, gradually disappeared into the sea, church and all, 
between 1700 and 1850.
In general, invocations of the ‘waterwolf’ are assumed to refer to the struggle 
against the sea. But nature’s elements could also wreak havoc in the region of the 
large rivers and cause heavy flooding.40 These were above all a result of harsh win-
ters, frozen rivers, sudden thaws and ice floes. Under these conditions, large masses 
of ice blocked the flow of water. In the eighteenth century river floods occurred with 
great frequency: 1726, 1740, 1751, 1757, 1781, 1784, 1799. In the first half of the 
management of drainage catchments was expected for other reclamations. They required extra 
facilities. S.J. Fockema Andrea, ‘Wat er aan de droogmaking van de Haarlemmermeer voorafging’, 
in Med. Der Kon. Ned. Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, 18 (1955), 379–428; 
H.W. Lintsen, R.A. Lombaerts and R. Moerenhout, ‘De droogmaking van het Haarlemmermeer: 
Wind of stoom’, in: M.L. ten Horn-van Nispen, H.W. Lintsen and A. J. Veenendaal: Nederlandse 
ingenieurs en hun kunstwerken. Tweehonderd jaar civiele techniek (Zutphen 1994).
37 Surprisingly, the last big storm surge before 1850 took place in 1717. The northern part of the 
country was hardest hit. In Groningen 2200 died and 37,000 head of cattle were lost. In the entire 
coastal area of the Netherlands, Germany and Scandinavia, 14,000 dead were mourned. Then for 
more than a century it remains ‘quiet’ on the coast. The storm surge of 1825 was regarded as a 
serious one. But precisely what was a period of ‘quiet’ with no storm surges? A heavy storm like 
that in January 1808 didn’t make it into the history books. The epicenter was in Zeeland. The island 
of Walcheren suffered greatly. The Westkappele sea-dike was damaged. Near Domburg part of the 
dunes were blown away. Vlissingen and Middleburg were partly flooded. People died in Vlissingen, 
including a number of children. Household attributes, clothing and goods floated everywhere. 
Houses collapsed. Quays disintegrated. Walls were dislocated. Similar scenes were enacted in 
Zeeuws Flanders and other islands. More than 50 people died. Cattle were lost. And of course the 
storm tormented ships at sea in the coastal waters. Buisman, Duizend jaar weer, wind en water…, 
manuscript, 431 en 469, (to be published, presumably vol. 6, 1750–1825)
38 Buisman, Duizend jaar weer, wind en water…, manuscript, 431 en 469, (to be published, pre-
sumably vol. 6, 1750–1825).
39 Buisman, Duizend jaar weer, wind en water…, manuscript, 431 en 469, (to be published, pre-
sumably vol. 6, 1750–1825).
40 See for the following: Lintsen and Van Heezik, ‘In gevecht met de rivieren’, 97–100; Van Heezik, 
Strijd om de rivieren, 44–52; Van de Ven (ed.), Leefbaar laagland, 227–232; Bosch and Van der 
Ham, Twee Eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat, 55–58; Bosch, Om de macht over het water, 177–184.
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nineteenth century similar dramas occurred in 1805, 1809, 1820, 1827 and 1850. 
Before 1850 river floods were never absent from the collective memory. They were 
frequent occurrences.
That said, it is quite surprising how few deadly casualties there were. The river 
flood of 1809 was the most catastrophic ever and caused 275 deaths. The Dutch 
were in part able to defend themselves against these disasters. They generally inhab-
ited the higher portions of the landscape. It was also the case that due to the many 
dikes the polders flooded one after the other in a gradual process. The inhabitants 
had time to get themselves and their cattle to safety. Moreover every farm had a 
rowboat that could be used to save people and cattle in case of a flooded polder.41
Inner water, the sea and the rivers all harbored specific risks for living in a delta. 
Water was also a problem in another respect. Life in the subsiding low portion of the 
Netherlands was increasingly confronted with saline water and the deterioration of 
water quality. Agriculture suffered. Drinking water supply became problematic. 
This makes water quality another important theme. The theme was broader than just 
increasing salinity. Water polluted by feces and organic waste was also part of the 
problem.
4.5  Organic Waste As the Biggest Environmental Problem42
As we now know, water is an important medium of contamination for infectious 
diseases. Bacteria and viruses flourish in water. Most of them are hardly a problem 
for humans. But among them are notorious perpetrators of disease. Some are 
responsible for innocent-sounding infections like diarrhea. But well into the twenti-
eth century they were life-threatening for many inhabitants of the Netherlands, 
especially those with a poor condition. Other infectious diseases have never lost 
their fearsome auras, for example cholera and paratyphus. All these infectious dis-
eases are transmitted in large part by drinking polluted water. But spoiled or con-
taminated food is also an important source of infection. The same goes for bathing 
or washing in polluted water. This knowledge was all but lacking in the first half of 
the nineteenth century. Only a small vanguard  – a new generation of medical 
41 P. van Dam, De amfibische cultuur: een visie op watersnoodrampen (VU Amsterdam 2010, 
inaugural lecture).
42 H. van Zon, ‘Openbare hygiëne’, in: H.  Lintsen et  al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van de techniek 
in Nederland: De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), volume II, 
49–55. Further: H. van Zon, Een zeer onfrisse geschiedenis: Studies over niet-industriële vervuil-
ing in Nederland, 1850–1920 (dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 1986); A. van der Woud, 
Koninkrijk vol sloppen: Achterbuurten en vuil in  de negentiende eeuw (Amsterdam 2010); 
H. Buiter and H. Lintsen, ‘De stad, de stank en het water’, in: H. Lintsen et al., Made in Holland. 
Een techniekgeschiedenis van Nederland [1800–2000] (Zutphen 2005), 55–73.
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doctors, engineers and architects: the ‘hygienists’ as they would later be called – 
were aware of the problem.43 Their activities had as yet little impact. The problems 
were most visible in the cities.
By today’s standards all Dutch cities in the past were nothing short of filthy. 
Various studies have provided us with graphic images of the stench and the filth. 
Markets, squares and streets were strewn with vegetable waste, meat and cadavers 
and the feces of cows and pigs. Hide tanners were infamous for the harmfulness of 
their ‘fumes and effluents.’ Paints and other substances spread foul odors in the 
open air. In general, waste products of home-workers and workshops polluted many 
locations in the city.
That was also true of household garbage. Almost all households dumped their 
garbage in the street, on the city ramparts, or in the canals. Domestic sewers led 
directly to the street or the nearest water. Cesspools were often poorly maintained 
and rarely emptied. City dwellers dumped their feces in gutters and canals. The situ-
ation was most abysmal in alleyways and slums. Not only because of the massive 
‘impurity and filth’ but also because of the dampness of the dwellings and the ‘dif-
ferent households living in very close proximity.’44
Though all cities were dirty, there was still an important distinction. In many cit-
ies in the low-Netherlands the situation was worse than in the high-Netherlands. 
And that had everything to do with water management. Water was a defining aspect 
of the Dutch situation. By today’s standards, the low-lying Netherlands of the nine-
teenth century was a gruesome world: soggy polders, sluggish flows of water, 
crowded slums, a glut of organic waste and heavily polluted surface and ground 
water.
In the 1850s the western part of the country (North and South Holland, Zeeland 
and Utrecht) had the highest mortality rates.45 Whether we look at large or small 
cities, town or countryside, men, women or infants – in all cases death was a more 
immanent presence in this region. It is noteworthy that in the west there was hardly 
any difference between the city and the countryside. Apparently the problem of 
water quality  – closely associated with increasing salinity  – pervaded the entire 
region and influenced rates of mortality everywhere.
In the rest of the country there was a clear difference between town and country. 
Organic wastes and polluted water (in combination with food quality) contributed 
to higher mortality rates in the city due to diarrhea, cholera and other diseases of the 
digestive tract. Moreover, mortality due to tuberculosis, flu, measles, whooping 
43 E.S. Houwaart, ‘Medische statistiek’, in: H. Lintsen et al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in 
Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), Vol. II, 19–45.
44 Quotes from: Verzameling van stukken, betrekkelijk de aanstelling eener Commissie van 
Geneeskundig toevoorzicht te Amsterdam en daarin opgenomen een serie Rapporten (Amsterdam 
1797). For a commentary on these reports see: van Zon, ‘Openbare hygiëne’, 49–55. Further: van 
Zon, Een zeer onfrisse geschiedenis. Studies over niet-industriële vervuiling in Nederland, 1850–
1920, 29–32.
45 See for the following, F.W.A.  Poppel, Stad en platteland in demografisch perspectief: de 
Nederlandse situatie in de periode 1850–1960 (Voorburg 1984) internal report nr.19, ch. 2, 
Sterfteverschillen tussen stad en platteland, 7–21.
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cough etc. was significantly higher in the city. These respiratory diseases could 
spread more easily in the cities due to the high population density.
From today’s perspective, the contamination of the environment with organic 
waste presents itself as the biggest environmental problem of society in the past. 
Whether contemporaries also saw things this way is another matter to which we 
shall return.
4.6  Poverty, Vulnerability and Sustainability
The quality of life in the Netherlands was the problem of well-being and sustain-
ability in the mid-nineteenth century and that for two reasons. In the first place a 
considerable part of the population lived around and under the poverty line (an 
estimated 21%). In the second place existence was vulnerable due to the open econ-
omy, natural forces, the risks of the delta and epidemic diseases. All inhabitants of 
the Netherlands shared in this vulnerability but the rich were better able to protect 
themselves than the poor. They could attempt to escape from epidemics, flee the city 
and closet themselves in their country estates. But they could not escape altogether. 
That is evident from the differences in life-expectancy.
The average life-expectancy at birth in the period 1840–1851 was 37 years (men 
36.1 year and women 38.5 years). A sample of the Dutch population in the period 
1840–1859 distinguished among the life expectancies of different social classes. It 
is striking that the upper-bourgeoisie had the lowest life expectancy (about 30 years), 
while farmers possessed the highest (about 43), followed by the small-bourgeoisie 
(with about 39  years), skilled workers (with 38  years) and unskilled workers 
(36  years). The differences in life expectancy disappeared by the age of 15. 
Presumably the low figure for the upper classes had to do with breast feeding. Upper 
class babies received less breast feeding than other babies, were fed more often with 
porridge and milk, looked blooming and healthy, but had significantly less resis-
tance to diseases.
Rich and poor did not differ so much in the struggle for existence, in which the 
poor would inevitably get the worst of it, but in the struggle for the basic necessities 
of life, which the rich could acquire more easily and more amply. In these respects 
they did not face big uncertainties, did not have to occupy themselves with scraping 
an existence together, were well-clothed and lived in relative comfort. Their quality 
of life was in those respects considerably higher than that of the poor.
Poverty and vulnerability had many faces in the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. They differed per period, per region and per season. They had another face in 
the city than in the countryside. They were experienced differently by smallholders 
than by day-labourers and skilled workers. Much of the differences nevertheless 
disappeared in the catch-all category of ‘pauperism.’ That was how the elite and the 
middle classes referred to it. They recognized it as a problem and asked themselves 
how to deal with it.
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Chapter 5
Stagnation and Dynamism in Three Supply 
Chains: Agriculture and Foods, Building 
Materials and Construction, Energy
Harry Lintsen
Abstract At the time, extreme poverty could be fought by, among other things, 
economic growth. That demanded another approach to the exploitation of natural 
capital and accordingly to innovation in the three main supply chains.
In the agriculture and foods supply chain (one of the three main chains in this 
study, based on organic raw materials) experimentation with new techniques did 
take place (among other things the use of guano as artificial fertilizer) but this did 
not lead to practical innovations.
In the supply chain of building materials and construction (the second main 
chain based on mineral subsoil resources) the construction of a national road system 
amounted to an important innovation in road infrastructure. Hardly any innovations 
were undertaken in the fields of water management and housing construction. It is 
remarkable that little was done about the social problem of organic wastes, includ-
ing human and animal faeces. Public hygiene was not one of the most important 
societal issues of the time.
In the energy supply chain (the third main supply chain based on fossil subsoil 
resources) innovations were equally lacking, in particular applications of steam 
power. Up to 1850 the Netherlands did not industrialise on the basis of steam and coal.
Keywords Innovation · Agriculture · Foods · Construction · Water management · 
Infrastructure · Hygiene · Energy · Industrialisation · Steam technology
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5.1  The Conspiracy1
On January 31 1827 Lodewijk Cantillon submitted a request to King William I for 
permission to build a steam-powered gristmill in Amsterdam, the first in the 
Northern Netherlands. Cantillon was a grain merchant from Hasselt, which town at 
the time belonged to the Southern Netherlands. The procedure required consultation 
with the surrounding neighbors. These were dead set against the project because of 
the danger of ‘explosion of the boiler, the danger of fire and other unpredictable 
disasters…’ They also feared that the value of their real estate would plummet due 
to the ‘thick clouds of coal smoke, the bad smell, the noise of the machine, even the 
multiplication of rats and other vermin attracted by the grain…’2
The wind-powered grist-millers also objected. They feared ‘the total ruin’ of 
Amsterdam’s wind-powered milling industry, that counted 34 windmills and fed 
170 households. The steam gristmill would have ‘unhappy consequences’ for the 
millers with their ‘so dearly bought buildings,’ but also for the government because 
the windmill industry paid significant taxes and these could then no longer be 
levied.3
The city of Amsterdam also opposed the plan. It observed that the ‘location 
where the construction is requested is the most beautiful and prestigious part of that 
quarter of the city.’4 Steam engines did not belong in the girdle of canals but in lesser 
neighbourhoods. The city also supported the grievance of the millers. Amsterdam 
did not need competition for the existing milling industry. Let Cantillon apply his 
energy and inventiveness in a better way, was the city’s final word.
But King William, proponent of a liberal economy that he was, granted Cantillon’s 
request, albeit after Cantillon had found a new location and submitted a new request. 
To attract customers, Cantillon tried to cut his milling rates to an absolute minimum. 
The going rate in Amsterdam was about 39 eurocent for milling one hectoliter of 
wheat and almost 38 eurocent for an hectoliter of rye. Cantillon asked about 33 
eurocents and 23 eurocents, respectively. The windmillers retaliated at once. They 
began to undercut Cantillon’s prices. The bakers were loyal to the windmillers and 
refused to let Cantillon grind their grain. Cantillon tried to turn the tide and to come 
1 See for the Cantillon episode: H. Lintsen et al., Made in Holland: Een techniekgeschiedenis van 
Nederland [1800–2000] (Zutphen 2005), 33–36; H. Lintsen and M. Bakker, ‘Meel’, in: H. Lintsen 
et al. (Eds.), ‘Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenlev-
ing 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), Part 1, 70–101, in particular 81–84; J.L van Zanden and A. Van 
Riel, Nederland 1780–1914: Staat, instituties en economische ontwikkeling (Amsterdam 2000), 
178–185.
2 Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Archief Secretarie-Afdeling Financiën, 1827, nr. 725, Brief van 17 
eigenaren aan de burgemeester van de stad Amsterdam (Letter of 17 proprietors to the mayor of 
Amsterdam), 13 March 1827.
3 Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Archief Secretarie-Afdeling Financiën, 1827, nr. 1119, Brief van 
zeven molenaars aan de Koning (Letter of seven millers to the King).
4 Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Archief Secretarie-Afdeling Financiën, 1827, nr. 927, brief van de 
commissaris over de publieke werken aan de wethouder van financiën, 28 maart 1827 (Letter of the 
commissioner of public works to the alderman of finances, 28 March, 1827).
H. Lintsen
105
to terms with the windmillers. But to no avail, they flatly refused. After this, the 
steam gristmill drops out of sight. Cantillon had failed.
In retrospect Cantillon’s failure was a misfortune for the people of Amsterdam. 
His innovation would have lowered prices for flour and bread. That would have 
stimulated the consumption of bread as a staple food and improved the physical 
condition of the poor. About 30  years later the reformist Amsterdam physician 
Samuel Sarphati did succeed in decreasing the price of bread by 30%. To do this he 
had to found the first (steam-powered) bread and flour factory (see Chap. 8). This 
had far-reaching consequences for the quality of life of the poor or, in terms of this 
book, for well-being in the Netherlands. Why did Cantillon fail?
With his innovative application of steam power Cantillon was in a good position 
to compete with the windmillers. He could grind grain considerably cheaper, but 
only if he succeeded in working at full capacity. If he fell much below this, his fixed 
costs began to prevail and to raise the unit milling costs. The Amsterdam windmill-
ers knew exactly how to exploit this Achilles heel of large-scale production. Since 
time immemorial the millers had formed a mighty cartel, first in the form of a guild 
and after the abolition of guilds in 1798 in the form of a cooperative association. 
This cartel disposed over large sums of money that it employed to wage a price-war 
with Cantillon (and later with other steam-powered gristmills). The windmillers (in 
coalition with the bakers) were able to hold out long enough to run the steam grist-
mills out of business.
Cantillon’s initiative signified a disturbance of the existing agricultural and food 
supply chain. That supply chain fulfilled a crucial function in the development of 
popular welfare for it shaped the production and consumption of primary food-
stuffs, in particular porridge, bread and potatoes. In that supply chain the exploita-
tion of the soil (natural capital), the processing of agricultural produce and the 
consumption of foodstuffs all had specific characteristics. The windmillers, for 
example – at least that is what Cantillon’s case suggests – were dominant actors in 
the grain, flour and bread chain, who influenced the price and therefore the distribu-
tion of food. In so doing they also influenced the quality of life. The analysis of 
these supply chains is the business of this chapter. The focus is on poverty and vul-
nerability as the most important issues in well-being and sustainability around 1850.
Supply chains are a sequence of successive activities at specific locations and 
within certain organizations. They refer to the institutional framework of natural 
capital and their derivative material flows. We have divided the material flows into 
three main categories:
 1. Biomass (agriculture and foods). The broad variety of supply chains and material 
flows in this category pertained mostly to foods (potatoes, grain, sugar beets, oil 
seeds, beans etc.) and additionally to industrial products (like wool, madder, 
leather and starch). We will elaborate on the food chain.
 2. Mineral assets (building materials and construction). The supply chain for build-
ing materials was rooted in the exploitation of mineral raw materials like clay, 
sand, gravel and ores of iron, tin and zinc. Processing of mineral raw materials 
took place in the earthenware industry, in mining, in the metalworking industry 
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and in construction. These products were used primarily in construction and for 
machines. We focus here on construction.
 3. Fossil sub-soil assets (energy). The supply chains up to 1850 were limited to 
those for turf and coal. Here we concentrate on the coal supply chain.
We take these three categories as a point of departure for a brief analysis of stagna-
tion and dynamism in the supply chains before 1850. How could changes in the 
supply chains of production and consumption have supported sustainable develop-
ment in the Netherlands. Which interventions in natural capital and the derivative 
material flows could have improved the quality of life of especially the poor? To 
what extent did innovations by contemporaries lead to transitions in the three supply 
chains?
5.2  Agriculture and Foods: More of the Same
In the first half of the nineteenth century, well-being was primarily a matter of qual-
ity of life and poverty. Food was a crucial element in the problematic situation, 
affecting especially the poor. Would they have access to enough food of sufficient 
quality throughout the year and in subsequent years? The poor were exceedingly 
vulnerable and faced a daily struggle to scrape a meagre meal together. A graph of 
food consumption confirms this image.
The average number of calories available to the Dutch in the period 1815–1850 
was about 2400 kcal per capita per day (see Graph 5.1). We can add a margin of 
about 10% for the calories contained in beverages, in particular beer that was con-
sumed on a regular basis. Taken together, this exceeds the norm of 2000–2100 kcal/
day, that is universally taken to be the absolute minimum necessary to stay alive.5 
The graph shows that the poor had a hard time of it. They ate no (or nearly no) meat. 
They fed themselves chiefly with potatoes, grain and dairy products. In the period 
under consideration, these foodstuffs delivered on average 2200 kcal per day. But 
there were large fluctuations in the first half of the nineteenth century. There were 
years with less than 2000 kcal/day. What the graph also hides is the unequal distri-
bution of food. This makes the condition of the poor in certain periods even more 
problematic.
The first years of the century were a time of misery. This had everything to do 
with the political situation.6 The Napoleonic wars and the continental system 
wreaked havoc with food production and the food trade. In the 1820s and 1830s 
there was on average sufficient food available for the Dutch population. Nonetheless, 
5 R.C. Allen, Poverty lines in history, theory, and current international practice (Oxford 2013), 
discussion paper series ISSN 1471-0498, 3.
6 For this see: M.T. Knibbe, ‘De hoofdelijke beschikbaarheid van voedsel en de levensstandaard in 




within this period there was at least one notoriously bad year, in which masses of the 
poor went hungry. 1845, 1846 and 1847 were again dramatic. Agricultural produc-
tion declined in these years due to failed potato and rye harvests. Trade and industry 
stagnated. Under these circumstances the Dutch population was vulnerable. Food 
shortages ensued. The poor went hungry. For the first time that century the death 
rate outstripped the birth rate. The population declined.
But it was not only wars and crop failures that depressed food consumption. 
Between 1800 and 1850 the population increased by roughly 50% (from 2,120,000 
to 3,012,000 persons). The Netherlands faced the challenge of feeding all these 
mouths. International trade also affected the food situation. Increasing foreign 
demand, especially from industrialising England, did not go unnoticed. Domestic 
food patterns changed to suit. The Dutch enjoyed fewer dairy goods because butter 
and cheese were increasingly exported.
But at the same time, trade also provided a certain degree of food security. The 
Netherlands was self-sufficient only with respect to potatoes. Grain, particularly 
wheat and rye, had always been imported. When the domestic harvests of these 
bread grains failed, imports increased.7
Nutrition was an important factor in the physical and mental condition of the 
Dutch population. While exact criteria for quantity and quality are hard to provide, 
data on length and weight in the nineteenth century suggest that by today’s stan-
7 Knibbe, ‘De hoofdelijke beschikbaarheid…’, 87.
Graph 5.1 Daily amount of available kilocalories per capita including and excluding meat, 
1807–1850
Source: Knibbe 2007
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dards large parts of the population were insufficiently and poorly fed.8 And not only 
the poor, but also workers, carpenters, petty tradesmen, hired hands, in short ‘the 
people,’ the ‘masses,’ ‘the working population – in other words, the ‘third estate.’
The food supply could have been improved by certain structural changes in the 
food supply chain. Changes in the food supply chain were in any case endemic. 
Markets, scarcity and price influenced the choices of farmers, entrepreneurs, trades-
men and consumers. The purchasing power of the population determined the com-
position of the daily menu and in this way influenced the supply chain. By means of 
taxation and legislation the government influenced the production, sale and con-
sumption of food. Many changes had a temporary character. We focus here on the 
structural changes in the food supply chain and take as our point of departure inno-
vations in food production and consumption. To what extent can we speak of inno-
vations in the agricultural sector, food processing industry and food consumption?
The Netherlands had a difficult time feeding its own population with the natural 
capital at hand. Agricultural productivity did not keep pace with population growth 
as is clear from Table 5.1. Even in years of high grain prices, such as 1817, grain 
production increased inadequately. In other words, there was little elasticity in the 
grain supply. Agricultural production responded only marginally to changes in 
demand and the development of agricultural prices.
Why did crop farming respond so feebly to the increasing demand?9 An impor-
tant factor was the surface area of the available agricultural land. This increased 
inadequately. It is true that the Netherlands possessed extensive heath moors – the 
‘wastelands’ – but these already played an important role in the agricultural system, 
namely the production of fertilizer and this was a crucial bottleneck. Reclamation 
and transformation into crop fields and grassland was possible. But then this bottle-
neck first had to be solved. That proved impossible before 1850. The consequence 
8 See for the relationship between nutrition and length/weight: J.J.A. de Beer, Voeding, gezondheid 
en arbeid in Nederland tijdens de negentiende eeuw. Een bijdrage tot de antropometrische 
geschiedschrijving (Utrecht 2001).
9 See for the following: J.L. van Zanden, ‘Mest en ploeg’, in: H. Lintsen et al. (ed.), ‘Geschiedenis 
van de techniek in Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 
1993), Part 1, 52–61.
Table 5.1 Average annual 
growth of agricultural 




Production per hectare 0.4
Total population 0.8
Source: J.L. van Zanden, ‘Mest 
en ploeg’, in: H.  Lintsen et  al. 
(ed.), ‘Geschiedenis van de tech-
niek in Nederland. De wording 
va een moderne samenleving 




was that agricultural production could only be augmented by increasing the produc-
tivity per hectare (farming lands plus ‘wastelands’). That in fact took place and 
suggests the development of new farming techniques. To trace this we look at inno-
vations in crop farming.
Inspired by reform movements in England and France in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the Netherlands had launched an offensive to renew its agricul-
ture just after the turn of the century. The first ‘minister of agriculture’ (1805) and 
the founding of provincial Agricultural Commissions were intended to promote 
‘scientific’ agriculture. These initiatives had little effect. A second offensive in the 
1830s and 40s was more successful. It included the founding of a number of provin-
cial agricultural societies, the first Dutch Agricultural Congress (1846), experimen-
tation with new farming methods and the publication of periodicals like Vriend van 
de Landbouw (Friend of Agriculture) including descriptions of experiments.
A characteristic of the movement was the dominance of local elites of lawyers, 
politicians, large landowners, and farming gentry. Smallholders did not participate 
in the agricultural societies. In 1850 the members of all the agricultural societies 
together totalled some 10,000, while the number of dirt-farmers and smallholders 
was many times greater. The movement, in pursuit of a ‘scientific’ agriculture, 
searched among other things for alternatives to the traditional method of fertilizing 
the soil: cattle manure supplemented by peat sods from the moors, urban waste and 
industrial waste products, including earth-foam (aphrite) from the genever distill-
eries, bone-meal, and fish waste).10 In the 1840s a new fertilizer became available: 
guano. This was dried sea-bird manure found in meters-thick layers off the coast of 
Peru. Two years after successful experiments in England a number of farmers and 
large landowners in the Netherlands followed suit. The results were published in 
agricultural reports and in a journal like the Tijdschrift ter bevordering van nijver-
heid (Journal for the promotion of industry).
Not long after, practical experiments with guano became more widespread. The 
advantage of the new fertilizer was the concentration of active ingredients. Relatively 
small amounts (compared to classic fertilizers) of guano were already effective. 
That also meant lower transport costs and less work to fertilize the land. The prob-
lem was that results were mixed and that the debate did not resolve the question of 
the advantages of guano. Fundamental insight into the workings of fertilizer was 
lacking. Justus von Liebig had only just published his Die organische Chemie in 
ihrer Anwendung auf Agricultur und Physiologie (Organic Chemistry in its 
Application to Agriculture and Physiology) (1840). His theories still wanted diffu-
sion and widespread acceptance. Moreover, developments in the price and quality 
of guano left much to be desired. Prices climbed while quality declined due to 
10 ‘Scientific’ agriculture for example also embraced the idea that farming had to be industrialised. 
This included among other things a shift toward mechanisation, steam technology and large-scale 
enterprises. This is the context in which J.P. Amersfoordt, lawyer and gentleman farmer at the 
Badhoeve in the Haarlemmermeer Polder, experimented with a steam plow in the 1860s. It became 
crystal clear that the plow, mounted on a steam locomobile managed by three men and three boys, 
was not an option for a farmer with only a few hectares of land.
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import of inferior guano from other regions and to malversations. Large landowners 
working on an experimental basis and gentry-farmers could deal with these disad-
vantages, but for the small farmers the new alternative was hardly appealing. They 
had few reserves and were not in a position to take risks. The diffusion of guano 
remained limited, even after 1850.
Moreover, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the smallholders on the sand 
grounds had been able to increase the yield per hectare. Among other things, they 
succeeded in fighting weeds more effectively and in improving the manure produc-
tion of their cows. Their reform strategy consisted of incremental innovation. 
Though this strategy demanded more labour, that was the one thing in plentiful sup-
ply. A growing population and increased employment went hand in hand.
In addition to innovation in agriculture, innovation in the food-processing indus-
try could also have improved popular nutrition. Various initiatives had been taken in 
other countries.11 Steam power had penetrated into various production processes as 
a substitute for classical sources of energy (wind, water, and horse). It was applied 
in grain milling, bread baking and beer brewing. Moreover, different industries 
exhibited all kinds of branch-specific innovations.
In the grain milling industry, for example, in addition to implementing new mill-
ing methods, entrepreneurs also devised new installations for purifying the grain 
and for cooling the flour as well as transport mechanisms for moving the grain and 
intermediate products from one stage to another. Equipped with these innovations a 
grain mill assumed the character of a flour factory. A number of these factories 
already functioned in France, England, the United States and Austria; some in com-
bination with a mechanized bread bakery so that one could speak of a bread and 
flour factory.12
There were certainly efforts to innovate, as the example of Cantillon and the 
steam grain mill shows, but the majority failed. Innovations in the food processing 
industry were limited to a small number of branches among which sugar refining. In 
the 1830s this branch of industry was still in thrall to small-scale traditional manu-
facture; by the 1860s large-scale industrial production had become the norm.13 
Frontrunners invested in new purification methods, steam-heating and vacuum ket-
tles. Steam engines were used to power the pumps. The big investments in expen-
sive machines and building returned a profit only if huge amounts of raw sugar 
could be processed. The Nederlandse Handel-Maatschappij (Dutch Trading 
Company) was responsible for the supply from the Dutch East Indies and also 
extended large credits to entrepreneurs.
11 See for an extensive treatment of innovations in the food processing sector: ‘Landbouw en voed-
ing’, H. Lintsen et  al. (ed.), ‘Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland. De wording van een 
moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1992), Part 1, 37–277  in particular the chapters 
‘Voeding in Nederland’ (by M. Bakker, 38–51), ‘Meel’ (by H. Lintsen and M. Bakker, 70–101), 
‘Boter’ (by M. Bakker, 102–133), ‘Bier’ (by H. Schippers, 170–213), ‘Suiker’ (by M. Bakker, 
214–251) and ‘Techniek en voeding in verandering’ (by M. Bakker, 252–277).
12 Small-scale craft enterprises survived this development by shifting to the fabrication of specialty 
products like candy.
13 Bakker, ‘Suiker’, 214–251.
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Despite the limited number of innovations in the food processing industry there 
must have been some productivity increases. The growth of the added value in the 
food processing industry was about 2.7% (1816–1850), while the work force in this 
sector grew by 1.9% (1807–1849)14 (Table 3.4). But an important part of the growth 
derived from simply adding more grain-millers, bakers, butchers etc. In this way the 
food processing industry easily succeeded in keeping up with population growth.
Were there changes in patterns of consumption? Food comprised the biggest por-
tion of the budget of an average Dutch household, 55–60%.15 This had remained 
constant for decades. The most important shift in consumption was a negative one. 
Butter and cheese appeared less and less frequently – as we noted above – on the 
Dutch ‘menu.’ These were shipped in huge quantities to foreign consumers. The 
food package therefore seemed to be getting more meagre. It is difficult to get this 
clearly in focus. It is true that potatoes and grain products (in particular bread) were 
the staples of the Dutch diet, but the latter varied throughout the country and 
depended strongly on the region and residence in the city or the countryside. Many 
people, moreover, had a vegetable patch in which they grew all kinds of vegetables. 
The quality of the diet will have been far from adequate, but it was not an issue at 
the time. The debate concerned the quantity. The social issue was not good food, but 
enough food for the population.
Structural changes were limited to a very few links in the food supply chain. 
There was no question of any kind of structural improvement in the food situation. 
In fact, the situation around 1850 looked quite gloomy – no novelty in the history of 
the Netherlands. The daily fare of the poor part of the population was meagre, of 
14 Table Growth of value added and of the workforce in agriculture and the food processing indus-
try in the first half of the nineteenth century.
Growth 1816–30 Growth 1830–40 Growth 1840–50
Growth first half 














Population 1.16 0.93 0.71 1.0 (1816–1850)
0.8 (1807–1849)
GDP per capita 0.42 1.41 0.81 0.8 (1816–1850)
GDP 1.58 2.34 1.52 1.8 (1816–1850)
Source: van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, table 4.2, 153
15 E.  Horlings and J-P.  Smits, ‘Private consumer expenditure in the Nethetlands, 1800–1913, 
Economic and Social History in the Netherlands 7(1995), Graph 3, 24.
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poor quality and from time to time insufficient. Initiatives to improve this sustain-
ability issue met with little success.
5.3  Building Materials and Construction: King and State
The supply chain of building materials was also directly related to the issue of pov-
erty. The chain also touched on other themes of well-being and sustainability. The 
building materials supply chain can be divided into three categories: housing con-
struction, hydraulic engineering and the construction of infrastructural works. 
Housing construction (including commercial and public buildings) concerns a broad 
range of buildings, including public housing for the poor. How problematic was the 
housing situation of the poor? Were there initiatives to improve their lot? And hous-
ing construction raises the issue of hygiene. Poor public health was closely associ-
ated – as we saw – with poor hygiene in houses and cities. What happened in this 
domain around 1850? Hydraulic engineering was concerned with the vulnerable 
delta, the struggle against water. What policies were developed in order to deal with 
this important sustainability issue? The construction of infrastructural works (roads, 
waterways and railroads) has a direct relationship with the sustainability issue. 
These infrastructures were important for trade and the economy. Did they lay a 
foundation for prosperity robust enough to solve the issues of poverty and vulnera-
bility? We arrive at the following overview.
5.3.1  Public Housing and Public Health
About the housing of the poor and the hygienic measures we can be brief. By today’s 
standards housing and hygiene were very problematic. This conviction was not 
shared by the contemporaries of 1850, with the exception of the hygienists, a small 
intellectual elite of engineers, architects and physicians.16 The hygienists developed 
a judicious program to improve housing. But in the years around 1850 this came to 
nothing.
Typical for the time is the fate of an 1854 report by the Royal Institute of 
Engineers, Report to the King, on the requirements and design of workers’ hous-
16 For the vanguard role of hygienists, engineers and architects, see: H. van Zon, ‘Openbare 
hygiëne’, in: H. Lintsen et al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland. De wording van 
een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), Part II, 57; E.S.  Houwaart, ‘Medische 
statistiek’, in: H. Lintsen et al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland. De wording van 
een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), Part II, 27–28. For the perception of con-
temporaries see the results of research in the internet newspaper archive Delpher in H. Lintsen and 




ing.17 It was written by a commission consisting of three architects, a physician and 
an engineer of the national Public Works Agency (Rijkswaterstaat). It is not clear 
what prompted the report, but possibly the members of the commission had been 
inspired by the British Society for Improving the Condition of the Labouring 
Classes, founded in 1844, and by the London World Fair of 1851, at which Prince 
Albert’s Model-homes were on exhibit.18
Be that as it may, the commission’s work was the first effort to arrive at an assess-
ment of workers’ housing, or more broadly, the ‘less fortuned estate’, in short, the 
poor. Though it was based on a sample of neighbourhoods in six cities (Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, Arnhem and Delft) the conclusions, in view of 
what subsequent investigations revealed, will not have been much different for other 
cities. The picture they painted was, in a word, shocking.
The poor lived packed into small, primitive quarters with little light and fresh air 
and with holes in roofs and floors. The rooms were inevitably damp, drafty, filthy 
and full of smoke. They were sometimes half buried in the ground and were acces-
sible only from narrow alleyways, into which sunlight barely penetrated, where 
mounds of garbage lay strewn about and the faeces of the residents remained for 
days on end. The poor lived like animals:
Alas! The burrows of the people – and no other name suits the homes of many in the less 
fortuned estate – are not seldom inferior to the places reserved for the housing of animals: 
the primary requirements for life and health are absent; everything seems arranged to main-
tain the moral life led in those burrows at the animal level, and hence those burrows, as 
inexhaustible sources of depravity, inhibit all mental and above all moral development, and 
stand in the way of the progress of an important class of society…19
The poor city-dweller was a caveman. Other sources reveal that the condition of the 
rural poor was not much different, except that his home was not built of bricks and 
wood, but of clay, peat, or loam with a roof of reeds or branches. It is estimated that 
at least 130,000 houses in the Netherlands (of a total of about 620,000) answered to 
this description in whole or in part.20
17 ‘Verslag aan den Koning, over de vereischten en inrigting van arbeiderswoningen, door eene 
commissie uit het Koninklijk Instituut van Ingenieurs’, Het Tijdschrift van het Koninklijk Instituut 
van Ingenieurs, 1854–1855, 50–75, with 15 illustrations.
18 A. van der Woud, Koninkrijk vol sloppen: Achterbuurten en vuil in de negentiende eeuw 
(Amsterdam 2010); H. Buiter and H.W. Lintsen, ‘De stad, de stank en het water’, in: H.W. Lintsen 
(Ed.), Made in Holland: Een techniekgeschiedenis van Nederland [1800–2000] (Zutphen 2005), 
90.
19 ‘Verslag aan den Koning, over de vereischten en inrigting van arbeiderswoningen’, 4.
20 Hole, shack, hovel and slum are qualitative terms. Around 1850 the government did little or noth-
ing in the way of investigating housing quality. Such investigations are of a later date. Dwellings 
that did not meet specific criteria could be endowed with such labels. Criteria shifted in the course 
of time. Having a privy in or near the dwelling, being connected to a public water supply, or having 
heating could be criteria, just like light, air and space as the traditional indicators of quality. These 
norms could be set ambitiously or be light as a feather. In the latter case hovels were dwellings that 
should actually already have been demolished; in short, dwellings that later appeared on the list of 
uninhabitable buildings and where the uninhabitability was no longer at issue. It was also possible 
to opt for a stringent norm which left the better part of the available housing beyond the pale. It 
goes without saying that the figures pertinent to each approach would differ wildly.
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It is notable that the commission for the first time introduced norms to which 
workers’ housing was to conform: sufficient space, sufficient light and fresh air with 
potable water and sanitary facilities. This was translated into a series of designs. It 
is typical of the period that nothing was done with them. King William II was not 
the kind of person to be concerned about these kinds of issues. The problem was 
moreover not the business of the central state, but of the municipalities. What is 
even more telling is that the bourgeoisie was anything but concerned about housing 
the poor. The same held for poor relief. A room and roof above one’s head were 
considered enough.
The investigation into workers’ housing can also be seen as a new approach to 
the problem of hygiene. This too was of little interest to the bourgeoisie.21 It viewed 
hygiene from the classic vantage point of cleanliness: a clean home, a spotless 
kitchen, a scrubbed sidewalk, clean clothes, clear water. Hygiene also included a 
‘calm cheerful disposition …’ and ‘a firm trust in God’s Providence.’ Much atten-
tion was paid to pure air and smelly fumes because according to the miasma theory 
infectious diseases were communicated chiefly through the air. Rotting substances, 
spoiled food and stagnant water had to be avoided. Homes needed to be ventilated, 
canals flushed and garbage cleaned up. Hygiene in public spaces was subject to 
stringent regulations but these were quite ineffective. Local governments lacked the 
wherewithal to monitor their observance. The bourgeoisie had an inadequate sense 
of public hygiene as a serious social problem and treated the issue ‘… in general in 
an inattentive, imprecise, careless, yes, reckless fashion…’ as an inventor of ino-
We derive an estimate of the number of hovels around 1850 from the following calculation:
 – In 1856–1857, 362,159 dwellings and 12,160 warehouses were taxed. 257,706 dwellings were 
not taxed. Total: 632,025 dwellings and warehouses. The tax officials counted 619,865 dwell-
ings. Of these, 42% was not taxed and 58% was taxed.
 – Using other sources, Duyndam calculated: 680,000 dwellings in the Netherlands. This is a dif-
ference of about 60,000 dwellings, or ±9%.
 – Points of departure in this study:
Number of dwellings: 619,865
Number of inhabitants in the Netherlands 3,115,421
Average number of persons per dwelling: 5
Non-taxed dwellings are in large part qualitatively inferior dwellings.
 – Non-taxed means a rent-value below fl. 18/year for 257,706 dwellings, or 42%
Around 1850 about 7% is paid for rent.
Maximum annual income for residents of non-taxed dwellings: fl. 257 per dwelling
 – Maximum annual income per capita in non-taxed housing fl. 51
 – 42% of the inhabitants has on average an annual income less than fl. 51.
 – 21% of the inhabitants of the Netherlands lives below the poverty line of fl. 43/year consump-
tive expenditures. This amounts to 658,000 inhabitants in 131,600 dwellings (on average 5 
persons per dwelling). We assume that these are certainly qualitatively poor dwellings.
 – Conclusion: at least 130,000 and at most 260,000 dwellings are of poor quality.
21 See H. Lintsen and T. Lintsen, Opvattingen over hygiëne 1830–1850 (research report Eindhoven 
University of Technology, 2017).
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dores (non-smelling privies) and urinoirs complained.22 To be sure there were com-
plaints about smells, but more in terms of nuisance than as a threat to health. 
Something similar applied to drinking water from wells, canals and rivers. It was 
considered to be of poor quality and the population therefore drank plenty of beer. 
The complaints were mostly about the smell and the taste. The citizens were little 
concerned about public health. Cholera was one of the few diseases that frightened 
governments and citizens and got them thinking about radical changes. The disease 
broke out in 1848, but after a few years the unrest had passed.
The new approach advocated by the hygienists put a high value on scientific 
research.23 They were the first to gather medical statistics. They stressed the salience 
of drinking water and fecal wastes. Proposed solutions were piped water and sani-
tary facilities in the home and public hygienic facilities on the street. Government 
should assume responsibility for hygiene and provide the necessary means and per-
sonnel. The commission appointed by the Royal Institute of Engineers was an expo-
nent of a new generation of the bourgeoisie that would begin to exert influence only 
after the mid-nineteenth century.
5.3.2  Water Management
Hydraulic engineering faced an entirely different challenge. It had to respond to the 
risks associated with living in a delta. Storms and river floods regularly threatened 
chattels and goods of the Dutch. New impulses for dealing with this sustainability 
problem emerged in the wake of new relationships in the domain of water 
management.
For centuries water management had been the business of water boards, local 
government and provinces. During the Batavian and French period (1795–1813) the 
contours of a unified state were forged and the central state acquired supervisory 
authority over the entire domain of water management as well as direct  responsibility 
for a number of sea and river works of national importance.24 This introduced a new 
actor into the sphere of water management. Between 1813 and 1840 this coincided 
with the person of King William I. The Rijkswaterstaat was his executive agency. 
Major projects required enormous amounts of tax money, persuasive power and 
credibility. These the King could deliver. The Rijkswaterstaat was able to mobilise 
and organise knowledge, large quantities of materials and masses of labourers.
22 De Noord-Brabanter: staat- en letterkundig dagblad 07-07-1949.
23 E.S.  Houwaart, ‘Professionalisering en staatsvorming’, in: H.W.  Lintsen et  al. (Eds.), 
Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland: De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–
1890 (Zutphen 1993), Part II, 82–85.
24 H.W. Lintsen, Ingenieurs in Nederland in de negentiende eeuw: Een streven naar erkenning en 
macht (proefschrift Technische Universiteit Eindhoven 1980), 45–64; A. Bosch and W. van der 
Ham, onder redactie van H.W. Lintsen, Twee eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat 1798–1998 (Zaltbommel 
1998, eerste druk), 33–41.
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Perennial floods, as we have seen, were among the biggest problems of the 
period. In fact these had been one of the main reasons for founding the Rijkswaterstaat 
in 1798. But however urgent the problem might have been, solutions were not forth-
coming. The main impediment was a shortage of river mouths. Close to the sea the 
river system formed a kind of bottleneck that encouraged enormous obstructions 
when the rivers were high and clogged with ice floes. But the construction of new 
river mouths was a gigantic enterprise which even the King and the Rijkswaterstaat 
refused to risk undertaking.25
Another impediment was the nature of the river. The Dutch river was a so-called 
‘green river,’ a river with islands, sandbanks, brushwood, reeds, swamp forests, and 
other vegetation along the river banks. It did not possess a single channel, but a 
braided system of channels. The narrow channels frustrated a rapid discharge at 
high water and encouraged the formation of ice blockages and ice dams when ice 
floes clogged the rivers. Possible solutions were the subject of chronic debates.26
Some hydraulic engineers looked to lateral diversions using overbank floodways. 
These consisted of a number of dike sections that had been lowered to allow the 
river at high stages to spill into a floodway. This created artificial floods and directed 
the excess water to another river or to a downstream section of the same river. In 
other words, the system of channels was temporarily expanded.
Other engineers regarded the preservation and elaboration of the ‘classical green 
river’ as a thorn in their sides. They viewed the lateral diversions as a ‘soothing 
plaster on a filthy stinking wound.’ According to them the problem was only being 
displaced, while a fundamental approach was needed, namely ‘normalization’ of 
the rivers. A ‘normalized’ river no longer flowed through a system of channels, but 
through one continuous channel maintained at fixed dimensions and in itself able to 
discharge the necessary water and ice into the sea.
The two governmental commissions appointed by William I could not arrive at a 
consensus. Added to this was the fact that the King did not prioritize the rivers and 
preferred to spend money on canals and other plans. After the war with Belgium 
between 1830 and 1838 funds for hydraulic projects were in any case lacking.
A big project backed by the King that did succeed was the reclamation of the 
Haarlemmermeer. Public safety, the continual loss of land and the destruction of 
goods were important arguments for the reclamation. Nonetheless these were not of 
overriding importance for the definitive decision to eliminate the threat constituted 
by the lake. More to the point was the fact that the reclamation enacted the politics 
of welfare-promotion pursued by William I. The gigantic enterprise provided work 
for thousands of families. It also delivered an enormous expanse of new farming 
land with which to feed the realm and grow export products. In 1837 the King 
appointed a governmental commission to deliberate on the reclamation. In 1839 a 
25 H.W. Lintsen and A. van Heezik, ‘In gevecht met de rivieren’, in: H.W. Lintsen et al., Made in 
Holland: Een techniekgeschiedenis van Nederland [1800–2000] (Zutphen 2005), 98.
26 Zie voor het navolgende: A. van Heezik, Strijd om de rivieren: Tweehonderd jaar rivierenbeleid 




law was adopted mandating a reclamation by the state. Thousands of workers con-
structed the encircling dike and the accompanying drainage canal – also intended as 
a waterway for inland navigation. Three enormous steam engines (the most power-
ful in the world at that time) – the Cruquius, the Lijnden and the Leeghwater – 
pumped the lake dry. The job was completed by 1853.
5.3.3  Infrastructure27
King William’s big ambition was to improve the welfare of his people. The theme 
recurred in all his King’s speeches. The state represented the public good and was 
beholden to pursue the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The impover-
ished Netherlands had to be revived with diligence and industry and with useful 
knowledge and projects. The development of infrastructure was a crucial feature of 
his politics. This was essential for prosperity, but also for unity. Prosperity demanded 
unification of the country, politically, economically and culturally. Decent infra-
structure was one of the preconditions. The King went to work with a will.
It is true that thanks to its extensive network of waterways the Netherlands 
already had one of the best transport infrastructures in the world, but that was true 
only for the western part of the country. The eastern Netherlands were poorly inte-
grated. Moreover, other countries like England and Belgium were busy improving 
their infrastructures with roads and canals. And then there were also the railways as 
revolutionary means of transport. The harbours of Amsterdam and Rotterdam were 
threatened with the loss of their unique position due among other things to competi-
tion from Antwerp and Hamburg.
During the reign of William I, for the first time, a coherent network of roads with 
international connections came into being. Initially the national state had instigated 
the project. Provinces, municipalities and private capital followed with refinements 
to the network, that ultimately connected all regions of the country.28
William I also invested in the construction of canals. This did not eventuate in a 
coherent network. Every canal had its own purpose. The North-Holland Canal and 
the Voornse Canal, for example, were dug to improve access to the maritime har-
bours of, respectively, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The Dedemsvaart and the 
Willemsvaart were constructed to facilitate the transport of turf. The Zuid- 
Willemsvaart served to incorporate the eastern part of North Brabant and a part of 
Limburg into the rest of the waterways system. Canal construction was above all an 
extension of William I’s economic politics with its high priority for international 
trade followed by the promotion of agriculture, industry and jobs.29
27 Zie voor deze paragraaf: G. Mom and R. Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit: De transport-
revolutie [1800–1900] (Zutphen 2008).
28 William I’s policy extended initiatives already started in the French and Batavian period (1795–
1813). Mom and Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit, 108.
29 Mom and Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit 112–115, 123.
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Only two railways were built under William I.  One between Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam and the so-called Rhine Railway. The first was intended as an attractive 
alternative for the existing goods and passenger transport between the two harbours. 
The second, intended to connect Amsterdam with the German hinterland, was the 
anxious answer to the railway line between Antwerp and Cologne.
Many projects encountered resistance and engendered heated debates. The con-
struction of a road, canal or railway disrupted the status quo. The choice of a route 
threatened local interests, strained property rights and disturbed long-standing prac-
tices. The route could also be contested because it literally bypassed municipalities 
and deprived them of the benefits of the new infrastructure. Some actors had prob-
lems with new technologies. Many of the above issues came to the fore with the 
construction of the railway between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Opponents consid-
ered the railway completely superfluous. Existing infrastructure was more than 
adequate. They could not imagine that the population had any need for this modern 
mode of transport. The railways would barely show a profit. Quite the contrary, the 
railways would seriously harm local interests.
Stable owners, barge haulers, shipping agencies, certifiers, delivery services, ships’ carpen-
ters, shipbuilders would naturally suffer a large and important loss. And then we do not even 
speak of stage-coach entrepreneurs and everything associated therewith.30
The choice of a route had to take the interests of national defense into account; own-
ers of land needed for the right of way bargained with the railway company for extra 
stations, etc. It was only royal will-power that endowed the Netherlands with two 
railways before the middle of the century.31
Did all these infrastructural projects augment national welfare, as the King so 
ardently desired? The question is difficult to answer. Some doubts can, however, be 
raised.32 Economically speaking, the maritime canals were a failure. Canals like the 
North Holland Canal, the Marken Canal and the Zederikkanaal were barely used 
and provided far too little revenue to justify the costs of construction. On the other 
hand, turf canals like the Dedemsvaart and regional access canals like the Zuid- 
Willemsvaart did have the desired social and economic effects. The railways also 
exhibited a similar dualism. The railway between Amsterdam and Rotterdam was a 
success from the very start, while the Rhine Railway became a drama and finan-
cially speaking a bottomless pit.33
The impact of new roads leads to some interesting speculations. The main roads 
in the region bounded by Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht were sufficiently prof-
itable from a socio-economic point of view. But what about the situation in the 
peripheries? It is noteworthy that road transport in the (relatively sparsely settled) 
provinces of Gelderland, Overijssel and Drenthe increased significantly.34 The same 
30 Quoted in: Mom and Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit 129.
31 Mom and Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit, 149.
32 Mom and Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit, 381–383.
33 Mom and Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit 361–378 in particular 373–378.
34 J.L. van Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw in de negentiende 
eeuw, 1800–1914 (dissertation Universiteit Wageningen 1985), 148–149.
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held for North Brabant and Limburg. In Drenthe, for example, the number of farm- 
wagons and carts increased from about 2880 in 1818 to 9400 in 1854. Transport 
costs declined by 50% to possibly 75%. Small farmers were able to earn extra 
money in the transport business. Markets were more accessible. Agricultural prod-
ucts found markets over larger areas. The cottage textile industry flourished. Earlier 
we concluded that after 1820 poverty in the Netherlands declined precipitously and 
proposed as cause de-urbanization and the rise of the country-provinces, in particu-
lar on the sand grounds. The prerequisite would then be the improved accessibility 
of those regions thanks to the construction of a rural road system.
If this analysis holds water, then the development of infrastructure did stimulate 
national welfare, but in a different way than imagined by William I. It was not the 
powerful cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam that contributed to national welfare 
but the countryside and the small cities on the sand grounds.35 Economic growth 
was rooted not in industrialization and large-scale production on the English model, 
but in a commercializing agriculture and cottage industry in the former periphery. 
That said, it remains the case that William I’s efforts did lay the groundwork for a 
transport revolution in the following period, a revolution that also affected national 
welfare.
Around 1850 housing construction, water management and infrastructure were 
the three relevant themes of the building materials supply chain in relation to 
 sustainability. It was only in the domain of infrastructure that dramatic changes took 
place. These had an unexpected effect on the question of poverty.
To conclude, we examine the third supply chain, that of the fossil raw materials. 
What changes took place here?
35 Using a gravity model, J. de Vries analysed the historical structure of the Dutch ‘Randstad’ 
(urban agglomeration in the western Netherlands). He applied this to the passenger traffic serviced 
by the Hollandsche Yzeren Spoorweg Maatschappij (Holland Iron Railway Company) in 1857–
1861 and contrasted this pattern with that of the tow-barges of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The balanced urban system of the Golden Century  - in reality a collection of highly 
autonomous cities and towns - had disappeared. Amsterdam was originally dominant but stagnated 
as far as passenger traffic was concerned. That made room for other cities. Passenger traffic on the 
railroad showed that Rotterdam and subsequently The Hague were secondary centers and that they 
moreover bound relatively many smaller cities to themselves. In 1855 Amsterdam had only one 
satellite city, Haarlem, while Rotterdam had four. This development had roots reaching back to the 
period before 1800. The period 1700–1750 was that of the (Holland) urban system in decline. The 
period 1750–1800 that of the dual city system, the rise of rivals to Amsterdam. J. de Vries, ‘Barges 
and capitalism: Passenger transportation in the Dutch economy, 1632–1839’, in: A.A.G. Bijdragen 
21 (1978), 252–351.
5 Stagnation and Dynamism in Three Supply Chains: Agriculture and Foods…
120
5.4  Energy: Coal and Steam36
The promotion of national well-being could be pursued along different paths. There 
were three options, as we showed in the previous chapter: diminution of social 
inequality, economic growth with the aid of domestic natural capital and economic 
growth with the aid of natural capital elsewhere, in particular in the Dutch East 
Indies. William I’s infrastructural policy, in particular on the point of roads, enabled 
a combination of the three options. The sand grounds and the high moors – previ-
ously relegated to the periphery – could now develop and be integrated into the 
national economy and the colonial complex. The rapidly growing population in 
those regions experienced less social inequality than the urban population.
Economic growth with the aid of natural capital could take place in the first half 
of the nineteenth century in yet another way, namely by radical changes in the sup-
ply chain of fossil raw materials. The output of an economy is in its most elementary 
form reducible to a function of capital and labour.37 Both capital and labour require 
inputs of energy to realise an output. For labour (human and animal force) the 
source of energy is food. In an agricultural economy the production of food is lim-
ited by the availability of fertile ground and the transformation of sunlight into 
agricultural produce. For capital, sources of energy are the sun, the wind, water and 
fossil and nuclear raw materials. These can, in principle, break the bonds of an 
economy based on labour and land. Wind, water and turf already do this in the pre- 
industrial phase. For centuries, the Netherlands had already been exploiting wind 
power and turf on a large scale – to great economic effect. The breakthrough of the 
nineteenth century is the use of the fossil fuel coal in combination with the steam 
engine.38
Prominent contemporaries in the first half of the nineteenth century were already 
convinced of the crucial role of coal and steam. Anthony Hendrik van der Boon 
Mesch, professor of chemistry and later president of the University of Leiden, put it 
like this in 1843:
The Government and the Nation, we see both...exerting their powers, to the end of recover-
ing as much as possible of what has been lost and to expansion into a field hitherto unex-
plored... The introduction of steam engines...breathes new life and importance into many 
manufactures. Much of what was considered to be possible only in England, is now happen-
ing here.39
36 See for  this section: H. Hölsgens, Energy transitions in  the Netherlands: Sustainability chal-
lenges in a historical and comparative perspective (dissertation Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 2016), 
chapter 1, 1–18 and chapter 2, 19–60; H.W. Lintsen, ‘Een land met stoom’, in: H. Lintsen et al. 
(ed.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in  Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving 
1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), Part VI, 191–209
37 Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the Netherlands, 4–6.
38 On the limitations of land and labour in relation to economic growth: E.A. Wrigley, Energy and 
the English Industrial Revolution (Cambridge 2010); Sieferle writes about the ‘subterranean for-
est’ when writing about fossil sources of energy: R. Sieferle, The subterranean forest: Energy 
systems and the Industrial Revolution (Cambridge 2001).
39 Quoted in: Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the Netherlands, 9.
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In the Netherlands, wind and turf had long-ago occasioned a breakthrough. The 
economic success of the Golden Century was in part due to the application of the 
Dutch windmill and the use of cheap turf. The future lay, according to Van der Boon 
Mesch, in imitation of England, in the steam engine and coal. In his time William I 
was certainly not alone in his efforts to modernise industry.
The total consumption of energy in the Netherlands in 1850 can be estimated at 
88,500 Tera joule (TJ) (Table 5.2). Humans and animals provided the most energy, 
33,500 TJ (or 38%), followed by turf with 21,900 (25%). Coal took third place with 
14,300 TJ (16%) even before wood as a source of energy (9800 TJ or 11%) and 
wind and water (9000 or 10%). But these statistics give a wrong impression of the 
role of coal. In that year coal was used not so much for steam production to power 
steam engines, but as a source of heat in households and production. This type of 
use did not occupy centre stage in the process of industrialization.
The number of steam engines in Dutch industry was quite modest in 1850, 290 
of a total of 5740 prime movers (5%). The rest consisted of windmills (53%) horse 
treadmills (34%) and a small percentage of water mills (8%) (Table 5.3). Why did 
Table 5.2 Energy use in the 
Netherlands per source of 
energy in 1850
TJ Percentage




Wind and water 9000 10
Total 88,500 100
Source: B.  Gales and H.  Hölsgens, ‘Energy 
consumption in the Netherlands (1800–2012)’, 
in: H.  Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the 
Netherlands. Sustainability challenges in a his-
torical and comparative perspective (disserta-
tion Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 2016), Table 
A.I.1, 211
Table 5.3 Number of prime 
movers in industry around 
1850 by type of prime mover
Number Percentage
Windmills 3050 53
Horse treadmills 1930 34
Watermills 470 8
Steam Engines 290 5
Total 5470 100
Source: H.  Lintsen, ‘Een land met stoom’, in: 
H. Lintsen et al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van de tech-
niek in Nederland. De wording van een moderne 
samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1995), vol. VI, 
Table 7.1, 192
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not the supply chain coal mining-coal burning-steam production-steam power 
develop? What are the reasons for the limited use of steam technology?
Economics provides part of the answer.40 For this we compare the steam engine 
to classical prime movers and regard them as completely interchangeable in the 
process of production (Table  5.4). In the first half of the nineteenth century the 
windmill and watermill were the cheapest, after that the steam engine (assuming an 
engine of about 12 hp) and finally the horse treadmill and the human body. Compared 
to the windmill and watermill the steam engine was an expensive source of power. 
Operating costs were high, among other things because of the cost of coal.41 A horse 
suffered from even higher operating costs especially because of the cost of food. 
But humans were dearest. Considering human food as fuel, and the fact that acquir-
ing this fuel consumed a large part of the worker’s wages, he easily became the most 
expensive prime mover. Nonetheless, humans were hard to replace. Human workers 
were also clever in utilizing tools and simple machines and could be employed at 
many places in the process of production. The horse’s position was considerably 
weaker. He would be the first to be ejected from the process of production and 
 managed to retain a position only in transport. It should also be noted that the costs 
of running steam engines depended strongly on the region. Due to the lack of decent 
waterways, coal was considerably more expensive in Twente than in Amsterdam. In 
Twente cottage industries long competed successfully with the textile factory.
The entrepreneur who introduced steam technology prior to 1850 was almost 
always ‘doomed’ to higher production.42 The steam engine demanded the presence 
or the creation of a sufficiently large market. In most cases this requirement was not 
met. That brings us to different kinds of reasons for the limited application of steam 
40 Lintsen, ‘Een land met stoom’, 195–198.
41 Taxes were levied on coal until 1863. That made coal more expensive than turf. It was true that 
the entrepreneur could be refunded but that required a long march through the tax bureaucracy. 
Even without taxes the fuel costs of steam engines were still considerable.
42 Lintsen, ‘Een land met stoom’, 199–202.
Table 5.4 Costs of depreciation, interest, maintenance, labour and fuel of different sources of 
energy in industry, 1825–1850










Period 1825–1850 1825–1850 1825–1850 1843 1825–1850
Depreciation, interest and 
maintenance
0.54 0.51 0.68 0.32
Wages 5.00 0.02 0.39 0.19 0.34
Fuel 0.33 0.79 2.00
Total 5.00 0.91 0.90 1.66 2.75
Source: H. Lintsen, ‘Een land met stoom’, in: H. Lintsen et al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van de techniek 




power in industry. In the countryside, poor transport infrastructure long hindered the 
expansion of local markets into regional or national markets. Urban markets were 
dominated by informal cartels of old crafts. The legal system was oriented to small- 
scale production and hindered large-scale production processes.
The economic structure is another explanatory factor. The Netherlands lacked 
economically exploitable raw materials like coal and iron ore. Significant mining 
was lacking, as opposed to England and Belgium. This branch of industry was a 
crucial domain of application for steam technology. Demand for steam engines to 
pump water, ventilate mine shafts and transport mine workers and ore stimulated 
the iron industry and machine engineering.
Mining, the iron industry, machine engineering and the textile industry (and in its 
wake the sulphur industry) were the dynamic sectors in the industrialization of 
England and Belgium. These had an enormous impact on the other industrial sec-
tors. The Netherlands lacked mining of any importance. The textile industry was 
based on cottage production. The metalworking sector was small in scope. Machine 
engineering consisted of a small nucleus of machine builders. Industrialisation had 
not started in 1850 and thus neither was the promotion of national welfare on the 
basis of industrialisation.
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Chapter 6
Well-being and Sustainability Around 
1850: The Frame of Reference
Harry Lintsen
Abstract The previous chapter reported a dearth of innovation regarding the 
exploitation of natural capital around 1850. This chapter deals with the dynamics of 
the institutional quadrants at the time (see Chap. 1). In a number of respects the 
1840s marked the start of a new phase. ‘Civil society’ awoke, mainly thanks to the 
contribution of younger generations of Netherlanders. Due to the abdication of King 
William I, the political institutions required a makeover. Economic institutions were 
under a great deal of pressure due to the emerging liberal climate and the liberalisa-
tion of the world market. In the domain of technology, new institutions blossomed 
with the emergence of civil and mechanical engineers and other professional groups. 
These developments had not yet led to fundamental social change. The Netherlands 
remained a mercantile capitalist, colonial and agricultural nation.
This is the context in which the well-being monitor for 1850 must be placed. This 
monitor is the ‘benchmark’ for this study, the standard against which the monitors 
for 1910, 1970 and 2010 are evaluated.
On the basis of the monitor and from both a contemporary and a present-day 
perspective, three important sustainability problems can be discerned: material wel-
fare (poverty), the institutional environment (political instability) and social capital 
(little trust in political institutions). In addition, from a present-day perspective a 
series of issues is problematic: poor public health, nutrition and lower-class housing 
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(the personal characteristics), insufficient innovations (economic capital), a lack of 
qualified labour (human capital) and the immoral “culture system” in the Dutch 
East Indies (trans border effects). The state of water management also gave cause 
for concern. Both from contemporary and present-day perspectives the Dutch delta 
was vulnerable.
Keywords Civil society · Politics · State · Economy · Technology · Engineers · 
Monitor
6.1  The Society of Benevolence1
Johannes van den Bosch returned from the Dutch East-Indies in 1812 a wealthy 
man. He had advanced rapidly in his military career and had supervised a planta-
tion. Back in the Netherlands after the fall of Napoleon he immediately applied for 
positions in the army and government. King William I promoted him after several 
years to the rank of major-general. Despite this he had very different, almost gran-
diose, ambitions. He was going to abolish poverty in the Netherlands. The ‘French 
period’ had impoverished the Netherlands. Trade had ground to a halt. To make 
matters worse, harvests in 1816 and 1817 had failed. Poverty was endemic.
Van den Bosch proposed a unique plan: a national organization for the poor. The 
urban poor would be put to work reclaiming the ‘wastelands’ in Drenthe and 
Overijssel; they would become farmers, produce food, become self-reliant and 
make a useful contribution to society. The idea of an organization for the poor was 
not new. It was often seen as an ideal and cheap solution for pauperism. The pauper 
would no longer be a burden on society, but would instead produce value that could 
be used to finance the organization. However, this solution generally proved illu-
sory. Subsidies were almost always necessary.2
Van den Bosch would have been aware of the doubtful economic viability of 
organizations for the poor. But he was convinced of his success, even if he did need 
money to buy land and dwellings for the ‘colonists.’ To this end he founded the 
Society for Benevolence in 1818. The bourgeoisie was enthusiastic. Thousands con-
1 See for this section: S. Jansen, Het pauperparadijs: Een familiegeschiedenis (Amsterdam 2008), 
39–46, 52–56. P. de Rooy, Ons stipje op de waereldkaart: De politieke cultuur van Nederland in de 
negentiende en twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam 2014), 63–69.
2 A. de Swaan, Zorg en de staat (Amsterdam 1989), 55–60.
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tributed. Local committees popped up everywhere. The King became patron and his 
son, Frederik, chairman of the board.
Initially things looked promising. The first colony, not coincidentally called 
Frederiksoord, was ready by 1818 to receive the first families. This was celebrated 
in verse:Brothers! Glad and awake
Singing to the field
Where labour awaits us.
In former times when in hovels,
We hid from the light...
Now it’s different.3
Van den Bosch optimistically announced that 6 weeks had been time enough to 
‘raise (the families) from their downcast state’ and decided to create another two 
colonies in addition to Frederiksoord, to be known as Willemsoord and 
Wilhelminaoord. These were reserved for the ‘decent’ poor. In addition he built two 
penal colonies, Ommerschans and Veenhuizen. Here abandoned children found a 
home, but also beggars, vagabonds and drifters – in short all the troublesome poor 
that were difficult to handle.4
Reality proved more complex. The land was poor and produced less than had 
been expected. The cities had a hard time convincing their poor to move to distant 
Drenthe. Police were called in to supervise forced emigration. The cities refused to 
surrender the occupants of their children’s homes. The colonists – amounting to 
some 11,000 in the early 1840s – chafed at the discipline. That was especially true 
of the ‘unregenerate’ paupers. But even the ‘decent’ poor could not get used to the 
rules made by the Society for Benevolence for living in a colonist’s dwelling and to 
the rhythm of labour on the land. Financially speaking, the initiative could only be 
kept afloat by artifice and improvisation. In 1859 the state assumed responsibility 
for the colonies.
Van den Bosch and his Society for Benevolence belonged to the domain of ‘civil 
society.’ Contemporaries were preoccupied with poverty and more generally the 
national welfare in many different ways. In the previous chapter we analysed the 
initiatives from the perspective of the three material flows: biomass (agriculture and 
foods), mineral substances (building materials and construction), fossil substances 
(energy). In this final chapter we focus on the institutional quadrants. In addition to 
the domain of ‘civil society’ these include the state, economy, and technology (see 
Chap. 1). This perspective brings cross-sections into relief. It enables us to evaluate 
the institutions relevant to all three material flows one by one. The evaluation of the 
institutions also provides insight into societal dynamics in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. In addition, the institutional environment is an important theme in the sustain-
ability monitor.
3 See for this and the following quote: Jansen, Het pauperparadijs, 46.
4 In 1822 Van den Bosch also founded the Society of Benevolence for the Southern Netherlands 
and under this flag founded the free colony of Wortel and the unfree colony of Merksplas.
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After that we return to the CBS sustainability monitor. By now we have collected 
sufficient information in this part of the book to be able to provide a summary of 
well-being and sustainability in the Netherlands around the middle of the nineteenth 
century.
6.2  Deficient Dynamism: Citizens, Government, 
Entrepreneurs and Researchers
6.2.1  ‘Civil Society’
‘Civil society’ was intensely involved with the issue of poverty and it had done this 
for centuries in the form of poor-relief. In contrast to Van den Bosch’s centrally 
organized project, poor-relief was traditionally decentralized and segmented. 
Estimates are that some five thousand local organizations implemented relief, 
mostly on a religious basis.5 Local governments exercised some surveillance over 
the churchly organizations or sometimes possessed their own public agencies. The 
national government was minimally involved. The upshot was an enormous variety 
in poor relief. Usually the organizations supplied sums of money and goods like 
bread, clothing, turf and other necessities. Some also provided medical aid, educa-
tion for the children, housing for the elderly and so on. The substance of poor relief 
differed from administration to administration.
Taking care of the poor was one of the churchly duties. It provided moral peace 
of mind or was exercised in the full conviction of brotherly love. It was also a bour-
geois strategy of control. Trade, industry and agriculture had need of an army of 
reserve labour. The size of the labour market fluctuated in the course of a year and 
across the years. A generous supply of cheap labour was a precondition for the 
Dutch mercantile capitalist agricultural economy. Poor relief was the means to this 
end. It also provided social stability. By providing minimal support in normal times 
and extra support in difficult years it prevented riots and revolt among the poor.
For the poor, the dole was part of their survival strategy. They were unable to 
make ends meet on the basis of labour alone. The winters were the worst. Old age 
and the child-rearing years (up to age seven) were difficult periods in the life cycle. 
Disaster struck with sickness and economic recessions. Charity never covered the 
costs of living. There was always need of supplementary sources of income from 
labour, loans, help from neighbours etc. Begging and vagrancy could also provide 
incomes but those sources were risky, including the risk of expulsion from poor 
relief. These activities were socially unacceptable, were a nuisance and were judged 
as criminal acts. Theft was of course completely beyond the pale.
5 P. de Rooy, ‘De armen hebt gij altijd met u: Armenzorg en onderwijs’, in: I. de Haan, P. den Hoed 




A big problem of poor relief was the levying of costs. The poor residing in a 
given municipality were the least problematic. They were supported by local orga-
nizations. Struggles about levying costs arose around the poor originating from 
other municipalities. Poor relief organizations and municipalities persistently tried 
to foist these costs off on other municipalities. Towns and cities wanted to rid them-
selves of the wandering poor as quickly as possible. Some municipalities, for exam-
ple, appointed waggoners who wasted little time in transporting vagrants and 
vagabonds beyond the municipal limits. A solution to these problems could have 
been found in a national approach, but the proprietary and churchly organizations 
had no faith in this option.
The institution of poor relief was stable. The organizations were conservative. 
Once in a while an effort was made to change things, as in the case of Van den 
Bosch. ‘Civil society’ was in any case characterized by a conservative bent. This 
extended to other societal issues like public health, education and industrialisation. 
After the turbulent periods of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution the 
impetus to social change weakened and the intensity of public debate declined.6 The 
dominant role of the state in the person of William I did not help matters. Citizens 
only became active in questions that threatened their own interests, as we saw with 
the first railways and the first steam grain-mills.7 Maintaining the status-quo was 
often the goal. Virtue aimed at economic recovery and a penchant for change within 
the existing frameworks were the prime characteristics of ‘civil society.’ Jan Rudolf 
Thorbecke, constitutional reformer and the first prime-minister after the ‘bourgeois 
revolution’ of 1848, characterized the period as follows:
In the swings and numerous changes that had afflicted our State since 1795, political zeal 
and political conviction were weakened, if not extinguished, even among the flower of the 
nation... Not participation but abstinence seemed to be the patriotic duty.8
It took until the 1840s before a new generation of Netherlanders were able to liber-
ate themselves from the scourge of political indifference and to propose initiatives 
that would reverberate in politics, policy and economy. Provincial agricultural com-
mittees initiated the first national Congress for Rural Economy (Landhuishoudkunde 
Congres) in 1846. A new occupational group, engineers, founded the Royal Institute 
of Engineers in 1847. In 1849, local medical associations founded the Dutch Society 
for the Promotion of Medicine.
6 R. Aerts, ‘Het ingetogen vaderland: huiselijkheid, maatschappelijke orde en publieke ruimte’, in: 
I. de Haan, P. den Hoed and H. te Velde, Een nieuwe staat: Het begin van het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden (Amsterdam 2013).
7 ‘Civil Society’ had a weekly opportunity to present its interests directly to the king. Every 
Wednesday there was an open invitation to all citizens to have an audience with the king. Many 
took advantage of this standing invitation. J.  Koch, Koning Willem I, 1772–1843 (Amsterdam 
2013), 294.
8 De Rooy, Ons stipje op de waereldkaart, 47.
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6.2.2  King and State
The nation belonged to the King, that is how William I regarded political relations.9 
The political elite and the bourgeoisie thought no differently. Popular sovereignty 
had failed miserably during the French Revolution. The King had been responsible 
for restoring order and stability. His authoritarian style of governance was firmly 
rooted in the Constitution of 1815 and was long tolerated.
William I was authoritarian, but also enlightened. He regarded himself as the 
creator of the modern Netherlands and worked on this ideal with irrepressible 
energy. He was to become known as the ‘merchant king’ because of his meritorious 
service to trade or the ‘canal king’ because of the construction of numerous canals 
with a total length of 500 km. He might with equal justification have been called the 
‘road king’ because during his reign a coherent network of roads was created; or the 
‘industrialist king’ because he envisioned the creation of a modern industry based 
on the incorporation of modern technology. Must we see his reign as an authoritar-
ian intermezzo between the Republic and the constitutional monarchy? From the 
perspective of modernisation his reign can be viewed as one big experiment.10
That experiment entailed promotion of the national welfare in addition to the 
development of the economy and the earning of money as the most important 
goals.11 These goals were synonymous with combatting poverty and justified infra-
structural projects and industrial subsidies. They were also part of the construction 
of the ‘colonial complex.’12 The Netherlands Trading Society (Nederlandsche 
Handel-Maatschappij, NHM) founded in 1824 at the King’s behest, played a crucial 
role. The Society was established to organize trade with the Dutch East-Indies. It 
would buy and trade preferably Dutch products that would be transported in prefer-
ably Dutch ships that had been built if at all possible in the Netherlands. The 
Cultivation System was also part of the complex. Van den Bosch, he of the poor- 
colonies in Drenthe, introduced in the Dutch East Indies that with which he had 
started in Drenthe: forced agricultural labour. In this case it concerned the Javanese 
farmer. The NHM organised the flow of goods that this system generated.
The aim of the ‘colonial complex’ was to generate income for the Dutch state and 
for the stockholders of the NHM.  Among the latter’s largest stockholders were 
William I and a small coterie of Amsterdam investors, along with many smaller 
ones. For William I, the NHM was also a vehicle for stimulating various industries, 
creating jobs and fighting poverty. The cotton industry in Twente, for example, flour-
ished thanks to the NHM. The Society founded weaving schools, acquired the most 
modern looms and put hundreds of smallholders, home weavers and their children 
to work. This policy, in combination with tariffs and the rural road network, was able 
9 Koch, Koning Willem I, 575.
10 Koch, Koning Willem I, 203. See above all: J.L van Zanden and A. van Riel, Nederland 1780–
1914: Staat, instituties en economische ontwikkeling (Amsterdam 2000), chapter 3, 109–148.
11 Koch, Koning Willem I, 572.
12 Koch, Koning Willem I, 43–48, 142–148.
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to resist competition from British mechanized cotton production. Even after the col-
lapse of the East Indies economy in the 1840s, the Twente textile industry managed 
to survive and in a later phase make the transition to factory production.
In the Dutch East-Indies the situation was different. The colony was seen by 
William I and the Dutch state as a source of profit. The ‘colonial complex’ produced 
immense incomes. Millions of Javanese farmers laboured to reduce the number of 
the poor in the Netherlands and augment the assets of the rich.13 Profits from the 
Indies were also used to finance part of the enormous national debt and to pay for 
much of the war with secessionist Belgium in 1830.
The reign of William I must have contributed substantially to public well-being 
in the Netherlands, directly due to the policy of the NHM and indirectly with the 
development of infrastructure that enabled agriculture in formerly peripheral regions 
to flourish. As far as we can tell, his policies helped to realize a sharp decline in the 
percentage of poor in the first half of the nineteenth century to about 21% in 1850. 
That was achieved at the cost of the Javanese farmers who worked under degrading 
and inhumane conditions comparable to slavery.14
Public well-being was not the only sustainability issue on which William I 
exerted a big influence. Another was the problem of water management. The strug-
gle against water could in his opinion be effectively conducted only by a strong state 
supported by a professional corps of hydraulic engineers. State formation, in other 
words, was the prerequisite for building a safe delta. But around 1850, with the 
exception of the reclamation of the Haarlemmermeer, the King, the state, and the 
corps of engineers could not yet claim any great successes. The large rivers and the 
sea remained persistent threats to safety.
William I’s reign ended dramatically in 1840 with government finances in total 
disarray. About 60% of the state’s income went to pay instalments and interest on 
the national debt.15 In the following decades he was much maligned and his remark-
able experiment ignored. The abdication of William I marked the start of a turbulent 
political period. The government and parliament initiated a program of reforms cul-
minating in 1848  in a peaceful revolution led by Thorbecke and marked by the 
introduction of new constitution. The failure of the King’s rule was due among other 
things to old economic institutions. These now demand our attention.
13 De Rooy writes about ten million Javanese who augment the welfare of two and a half million 
Netherlanders. He is then speaking of the beginning of the cultivation system. De Rooy, Ons stipje 
op de waereldkaart, 67. Termorshuizen speaks of an average of 60–75% of all Javanese small 
farmers in the period 1836–1860. T.  Termorshuizen, ‘Indentured labour in the Dutch colonial 
empire, 1800–1940’, in: G. Oostindie (ed.), Dutch colonialism, migration and cultural heritage 
(Leiden 2008), 266.
14 E. Hondius, ‘Het slavernijverleden achter de Hollandse horizon’, in: I. de Haan, P. den Hoed and 
H. te Velde, Een nieuwe staat: Het begin van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Amsterdam 2013), 
186.
15 Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 219.
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6.2.3  Economy and Trade16
William I’s experiment was first of all inspired by the unification of the Southern 
and Northern Netherlands in 1815. This would be an ideal synthesis between a 
South that was developing industrially and a North oriented to commerce. According 
to the King, in this configuration the Netherlands was now exceedingly well-placed 
to become a modern industrial-capitalist nation. However it quickly became clear 
that this was an uneasy combination. There were, for example, differences of opin-
ion about the introduction of a uniform tax system. The South wanted import and 
export rights in order to protect its domestic industry and as little taxation as possi-
ble on basic necessities in order to stimulate the domestic market. The preferences 
of the North, desiring as few obstacles to trade as possible, were diametrically 
opposed. These kinds of contradictions ultimately led to the secession of the 
Southern Netherlands and the founding of the Kingdom of Belgium in 1830.
Other efforts to modernize the economy ran into various kinds of opposition. It 
proved impossible to create a large domestic market. The Dutch market was strongly 
fragmented, among other things due to the autonomy of the cities, local excise taxes 
and the inter-provincial and local tolls. Local markets were moreover dominated by 
guild-like organizations in craft manufactures, retail trade, transport and fisheries. 
Groups of entrepreneurs and craftsmen chronically resisted changes that threatened 
their rights or competitive position. In this way the historical legacy remained firmly 
anchored in the institutions.
The historical legacy also caused trouble in other quarters. Amsterdam’s com-
mercial elite kept on claiming its former hegemonic position in international trade, 
despite the fact that the glory days of Amsterdam’s staple market had long since 
passed. In the wake of the Belgian secession the king was nolens volens forced to 
concentrate his policy on the Northern commercial elite, its international commerce 
in colonial products and associated industries like sugar refining, shipbuilding and 
textiles (largely based on cottage industry and not on the factory system). This was 
not an economy that could generate strong impulses in the direction of a modern 
industrialisation process. Another spanner in the works was the role of agriculture. 
Agriculture was traditionally a strong sector and had comparative advantages rela-
tive to other countries. This sector absorbed entrepreneurial initiatives and invest-
ments, while industrialisation demanded efforts to build up key sectors like 
machinery building.
William I had to tack among all kinds of interest groups: Southern industrialists, 
Northern commercial elites, organized trades, groups of entrepreneurs, provinces, 
municipalities etc. It often proved impossible for him to maintain his progressive 
momentum. He was also not always consistent in his politics. The destruction of old 
and rigid structures in different economic sectors therefore proved extremely diffi-
cult. Even after William I abdicated the throne in 1840, it would be another two 
16 See for this subsection: Van Zanden and Van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 115–121; 203–208.
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decades before industrialisation in the Netherlands took off. The institutions in the 
economy proved to be extremely resilient.
6.2.4  Technology and Science17
The traditional craft mode of production dominated within the institutional frame-
work of industry in the mid-nineteenth century. Production was modest in scale and 
was carried on in a workshop, shed or dwelling. Manual labour with hand tools 
dominated this mode of production. To the extent machines were used, these were 
invariably simple in nature, traditionally constructed of wood and wrought iron, 
driven by the workman himself, a horse, a windmill or a watermill. Fabrication 
consisted of unique products or small series. The craftsman or craftswoman was the 
central figure.
Small scales and traditional craft production also held for agriculture, trade and 
services. Knowledge was of a traditional craft nature. It was largely based on expe-
rience that was accumulated and transmitted in practice. For some trades, particu-
larly in construction and metalworking, there was supplementary schooling at 
drafting schools and drawing academies.
Besides the traditional craft knowledge infrastructure there was a modest infra-
structure of learned societies. The most important of these dated from the eighteenth 
century, like the Holland Society for Sciences (Hollandsche Maatschappij der 
Wetenschappen) of 1752, the Batavian Fellowship for Experimental Philosophy 
(Bataafsche Genootschap der Proefondervindelijke Wijsbegeerte) of 1769, and the 
Society for the Promotion of Industry (Maatschappij ter Bevordering van Nijverheid) 
of 1797. They were a meeting place for merchants, physicians, army officers, entre-
preneurs, scientists, hydraulic engineers and other groups within the bourgeoisie. 
The societies occupied themselves with scientific and technological topics, but reg-
ularly also with societal issues. They held competitions for treatises on poverty, 
national welfare, water management and industrialization.
The universities were independent of the societies. They were above all educa-
tional institutions for lawyers, physicians and ministers.18 The universities were 
17 See for this sub-section: H.W. Lintsen with contributions by M. Davids, ‘Een revolutie in ken-
nis’, in: H.W. Lintsen et al., Made in Holland: Een techniekgeschiedenis van Nederland [1800–
2000] (Zutphen 2005), 293–314 and G. Verbong, ‘Techniek, beroep en praktijk’, in: H.W. Lintsen 
et al. (ed.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland: De wording van een moderne samenleving 
1800–1890 (Zutphen 1993), part V.
18 A.  Maas, ‘Civil Scientists: Dutch Scientists between 1750 and 1875’. In: History of Science 
XIVIII (2010), pp. 75–103. The Organic Law (Organiek Besluit) of 1815 apportioned mathematics 
and the natural sciences to separate faculties. Research became a task of the universities, next to 
teaching. Initially it was not an obligation for professors, although it was highly encouraged. In the 
course of the century it would become a more prominent part of the academic job description and 
an important element in teaching. Scientists were less often seen as self-made researchers and 
more often as academically educated persons.
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socially oriented. Science had to produce knowledge useful for technology, indus-
try, seafaring and so forth. While this did not have to be immediately applicable 
knowledge, it certainly had to be knowledge possessing a clear link to socially use-
ful matters. Most professors at the beginning of the nineteenth century could be 
regarded as socially engaged scientists. They placed great value on social service 
and engaged in all kinds of social activities. For example, they gave lectures to non- 
academic publics like industrialists, farmers, pharmacists and teachers.19
In the first half of the nineteenth century new types of knowledge structures were 
developed in two domains. The first was the state domain of military defence and 
water management. To educate army officers and hydraulic engineers, the state 
founded military schools around 1800, that eventually crystallized in the Royal 
Military Academy at Breda in 1829. The program of studies for engineers for the 
national Department of Waterways and Public Works (Rijkswaterstaat) was trans-
ferred to the Royal Academy for Engineers in Delft. The professionalisation of the 
domain was further consolidated by the founding of the Royal Institute of Engineers 
in 1847.
In the second place a new kind of knowledge infrastructure developed in the 
industrial domain of machinery construction. The central figure here was the 
mechanical engineer. He was the quintessentially modern bearer of knowledge in 
the age of steam and iron. His profession was nonetheless rooted in craft practices. 
By dint of years of practice he acquired skills in milling, drilling, planing, riveting 
and other mechanical operations. But due to the technological dynamism of his 
domain, his practical preparation ultimately proved inadequate By means of courses, 
literature, lectures and study trips abroad he managed to acquire a basis with which 
to appropriate international developments.
A gradual transformation of the technological knowledge domain took place in 
the shadow of this traditional craft knowledge infrastructure.20 Knowledge became 
less subjective and personal. Craft knowledge became more objectified and was 
codified in books, journals and study materials. All kinds of practical knowledge 
was inventoried, investigated, described and internationally exchanged. Authors 
made efforts to explain technical phenomena and laws in technical processes. But 
while these changes had only a limited impact on contemporary issues in agricul-
ture, industry and other technical domains, they would eventually provide new 
impulses for industrialisation, public well-being and other social issues.
In many respects the 1840s marked the start of a new era. ‘Civil society’ woke 
up, partly thanks to the contributions of younger generations of Netherlanders. 
William I’s departure required renewal of existing political institutions. Venerable 
19 B. Theunissen, ‘Nut en nog eens nut’: Wetenschapsbeelden van Nederlandse natuuronderzoek-
ers, 1800–1900 (Hilversum 2000), 190–193.




economic institutions were challenged by the new liberal climate and the ongoing 
liberalisation of the global market. In the domain of technology new institutions 
flowered with the emergence of engineers, especially mechanical engineers, and 
other professional groups. These developments did not yet lead to fundamental 
social change. The Netherlands remained a mercantile capitalist, colonial and agri-
cultural nation.
At the same time, the 1840s brought a series of shocking calamities: failed har-
vests, epidemics and worst of all cholera. Poverty increased and showed its ugliest 
face. Disease was omnipresent and as in the case of cholera exhibited awful images 
of rapid decay. The popular mood was restless and at times downright grim. This is 
the context in which the sustainability monitor for 1850 must be placed.
6.3  The Monitor of 1850
The middle of the nineteenth century is the starting point for our investigation into 
well-being and sustainable development. To chart this dynamic relationship we 
make use of a measuring system developed at Statistics Netherlands, the sustain-
ability monitor. As explained in Chap. 1, this monitor has three dashboards: the 
well-being of a people in the ‘here and now,’ the resources preserved for future 
generations (‘later’) and the transboundary effects of domestic activities on other 
peoples (‘elsewhere’). Twenty-four indicators serve to track trends in the three 
dimensions. Every indicator is associated with an important theme and is assigned 
a value for each period. An historical ‘benchmark’ is an important feature of this 
approach. This is the frame of reference against which further developments can be 
set out. The ‘benchmark’ in this study will pertain to the period around 1850. Above, 
we argued that in order to interpret the results of such a measurement a context is 
necessary. The preceding chapters have provided this context. The ‘benchmark’ can 
now be briefly summarized (Table 6.1).
6.3.1  Well-being ‘Here and Now’
A proper interpretation requires distinguishing between a present-day perspective 
and that of contemporaries regarding the themes of well-being and sustainability. 
Without this distinction we would be hard pressed to acquire a proper understanding 
of the developments. As far as the dimension of well-being ‘here and now’ is con-
cerned the conclusion in regard to the situation around 1850 is clear from a present- 
day perspective: this was problematic in many respects (Table 6.1). The indicators 
reveal a situation in which a significant part of the population (21%) lived below the 
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Theme Indicator Unit 1850
















Income inequality, general Gini coefficient 0–1 0.48 + –





Satisfaction with life Score 0–10 ? ? ?
Personal
characteristics
Health Life expectancy year 37 + –
Nutrition Height (military conscripts) cm 165 –
Housing Housing quality % slums 30 á 50 + –
Public water supply m3/capita 0 + –
Physical Safety Victims of murder number per 100.000 
inhabitants.
0.8 + +
Labour Unemployment % workforce. 6.4 – –
Education Level of education years 3 O –
Free time Free time hours per week. ? + –
Natural
environment
Biodiversity MSA % original biodiversity 73 + +
Air quality SO2 kg SO2/capita 1.3 + +
Greenhouse gas emissions ton CO2/capita 1.2 + +
Water quality Public water supply m3/capita 0 + –
Institutional
environment










Table 6.1 Monitor well-being of 1850 from a contemporary and a present-day perspective
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Energy Energy consumption TJ /capita 0.03 + +
Non-fossil fuels Gross domestic consumption ton/capita 2.1 + +
Biodiversity MSA % original biodiversity 73 + +
Air quality SO2 emissions kg SO2/capita 1.3 + +
Greenhouse gas emissions ton CO2/capita 1.2 + +
Water Public water supply m3/capita 0 + –
Economic
Capital:
Physical capital Economic capital
stock/capita
index (1850=100) 100 O –
Financial
capital
Gross national debt % gdp 194 – –
Knowledge Stock knowledge capital Index (2010=100) – + –
Human
Capital:
Health Life expectancy years 37 + –
Labour Unemployment % workforce 6.4 – –
Educational
level
Schooling years 3 O –
Social Capital:

















Development aid % GDP – + –
Natural
capital
Natural capital Import of raw materials ton/capita 0.4 + ?
Legend
+ Not problematic or not problematized
– Generally acknowledged as problematic  
Under discussion: different opinions about the scale and nature of the problems
? Unknown
O
Note: The signs − and 〇 in the column of 1850 are the then important themes. The column of the 
contemporary perspective indicates with the sign − which current themes would now be regarded 
as problematic. For the justification of the evaluation in the table, see the main text
Table 6.1 (continued)
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poverty line. The poor found it immensely difficult to provide themselves with the 
basic necessities of life. They were poorly housed or forced into vagrancy. They 
were ill-clothed and could barely protect themselves against rain and dampness. 
Their food was meagre and lacked variation. They were able to consume just suffi-
cient calories to maintain their physical bodies and to supply a bit of labour. The 
poor and their children were susceptible to all kinds of diseases due to the poor 
hygienic circumstances in which they lived. They were extremely vulnerable. They 
frequently suffered hunger and cold. Many could not survive without aid. Their life 
expectancy was low. These general characteristics hide the fact that there were large 
differences in poverty between town and country, between the low and high 
Netherlands and among different regions. Such differences have been described in 
this section of the book.
Contemporaries saw poverty as one of the most important issues, but they set 
their norms for poverty considerably lower than we would nowadays. They made 
few demands in regard to the quality of housing for the poor, the quality of their 
food or their hygienic circumstances. These themes were barely problematized by 
contemporaries and certainly not in terms that we would recognize. This is hardly 
surprising considering the available knowledge, the changed context and the 
changed attitudes with respect to housing, nutrition, hygiene and health. For con-
temporaries, the struggle against poverty aimed at survival for the poor and not at 
improving their quality of life. It was sufficient to provide for a minimum of basic 
necessities. The shifting norms in regard to poverty after 1850 appear to have had a 
great impact on the sustainable development of the Netherlands.
Another aspect of quality of life is the natural environment of the Dutch (and not 
just of the poor). From a present-day perspective, one aspect of the situation around 
1850 was extremely problematic: the pollution of the human environment with 
organic waste, especially organic pollution of surface water and the lack of good 
drinking water. This extensive environmental (or hygienic) problem was understood 
only by a small and little-influential vanguard of professionals (especially physi-
cians and engineers: the hygienists) as a social problem that required political action.
From a present-day perspective, the situation in other respects (biodiversity, 
greenhouse gas emissions, air quality) was at worst only mildly problematic. For 
example the CO2 level at that time was far below the norm that we now try to 
achieve (Fig. 22.3). It will come as no surprise that at the time such issues were 
neither problematized nor on the political agenda.
An aspect that was problematic both from a present-day and contemporary per-
spective was the institutional context. It is true that this aspect has not been elabo-
rated on in the preceding text and was only mentioned in relation to poverty, 
nonetheless the thesis seems defensible. After the departure of William I, who ruled 
as an enlightened despot, the constitutional order had to be established anew. That 
process engendered much disquiet and was still not brought to closure around 1850. 
Also under William I there were few social movements in ‘civil society’ that 
engaged with important social issues. An active and powerful ‘societal midfield’ 
able to provide a political counterweight to the king on important issues like hous-
ing, nutrition and health, was lacking.
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An important theme for which indicators are lacking in the sustainability moni-
tor is hydraulic safety. The Dutch delta was perennially threatened by the ‘water 
wolf.’ The problematic rivers were high on the agenda. From a present-day perspec-
tive that was certainly justified. The rivers of those days were not designed for a safe 
discharge of floodwaters and large quantities of ice. Life in the region of the big 
rivers was full of risks.
6.3.2  Well-being ‘Later’
The resources for future generations – the dashboard for ‘later’ – is split into natu-
ral, economic, human and social capital. To what extent does the present-day per-
spective on these resources differ from that of the mid-nineteenth century?
In our eyes, natural capital around 1850 – in terms of depletion and environ-
ment – is a nuanced story. Various indicators like greenhouse gas emissions and 
energy consumption are (far) under the present-day norm. Moreover, 50% of the 
energy was provided by a variety of renewable resources like wind, water, muscle 
power and wood. The degree of biodiversity is hard to ascertain but as far as we can 
tell, it must have been high. These were in any case concerns that did not arise in 
those days.
At the same time, it is true that turf and to a lesser extent coal, were used in great 
quantities. Both belong to the class of finite and exhaustible resources. Nowadays 
this would give us pause. There were some in those days who were likewise con-
cerned. They were worried about the rate at which turf was extracted and warned of 
the ‘ultimate disappearance of our fens.’ Some toyed with schemes for growing 
timber to head off a possible future fuel shortage. Others were less worried and 
pointed to the immense reserves of coal, especially in England.21
Natural capital was vulnerable, among other things for flooding, sand drifts and 
exhaustion of the soil. Contemporaries acknowledged this vulnerability. Another 
big problem was the widespread water and air pollution due to organic wastes. 
Contemporaries barely or only incidentally saw this as a problem. The bourgeoisie 
often complained of garbage and stench, but framed this above all in terms of a 
nuisance. Only a small and as yet uninfluential group of hygienists framed the issue 
as a social problem that demanded political action.
For contemporaries, economic capital that provided the wherewithal to exploit 
natural capital was an extremely important theme, though any kind of consensus 
about the nature of the issue was lacking. From a present-day perspective it is clear 
that modernisation of the economy and transport was a bitter necessity for popular 
well-being and the fight against poverty. In other countries major transformations 
were underway. The future of the country was at stake. But differences of opinion 
and contradictory interests dominated the debate. Contemporaries debated on the 
improvement of the rivers, the construction of railways, the introduction of the 
21 Zie Hölsgens (2016), forthcoming in Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis.
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steam engine and the use of new kinds of fertilizer. Initiatives to improve industry 
and infrastructure regularly met with opposition. In addition a solution had to be 
found for the enormous national debt. Well-being for future generations was on the 
public and political agenda, but there were serious differences of opinion on the way 
this might be achieved.
Human capital was not a big issue in those days. The condition of the paupers 
and poor workers was worrisome, but the concerns did not go beyond maintaining 
the poor as available labour power. Upgrading human capital by investing in hous-
ing, hygiene, better nutrition and health care was – barring scattered initiatives – not 
an option often considered. Upgrading schooling was in discussion. With the wis-
dom of hindsight such investments should have had a high priority. Moreover it 
would have been wise to invest in new forms of knowledge like mechanical engi-
neering and the professionalization of existing domains of knowledgeable expertise 
like hydraulic engineering.
To conclude with social capital. This was problematic both from a contemporary 
mid-nineteenth century perspective as well as from a present-day perspective. Trust 
in political institutions had to be regained and ‘civil society’ to be empowered. The 
sustainability monitor neglects one theme that is an important component of social 
capital: namely social inequality. We have shown that social inequality has a major 
impact on popular welfare and the prevalence of poverty. Around 1850 contempo-
raries did next to nothing about inequality in terms of consumptive expenditures. 
From a present-day perspective it was imperative to renew social relationships in 
addition to relationships concerned with economic and human capital.
6.3.3  Well-being ‘Elsewhere’
This important dimension – the transboundary effect – is underrepresented both in 
the sustainability monitor and in historical research. The monitor for 1850 provides 
just one indicator: the import of goods from abroad. Subsequent investigation 
should have systematically inventoried the effects on popular welfare in the affected 
countries. Alas, we shall have to content ourselves with an impression.
Imports consisted chiefly of four types of goods: grain from the Baltic, wood 
from the Baltic and the Rhinelands, coal from England and colonial goods from the 
Dutch East Indies. It is not known what effects the grain trade with the Netherlands 
had on the exporting countries. It is possible that for countries like Finland and 
Estonia the trade may in some periods have contributed to serious shortages and 
famine. This has not yet been looked into. It is known that the wood trade with the 
Netherlands contributed to the decline of tree populations in the Black Forest. The 
situation in other countries is unknown. It is unclear whether the ‘scientific forestry’ 
that was then emerging had achieved new equilibria in the ecosystems. Of the 
English coal mines it is known that by present-day standards they were notoriously 
unsafe and that every year they claimed hundreds of victims. The cultivation system 
in the Dutch East Indies was unacceptable by today’s standards because of forced 
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labour, the impositions on the population and the monopoly of the Netherlands 
Trading Company (NHM). But from today’s perspective this can also be relativised. 
Pressure on foreign natural capital in terms of quantities of imported raw materials 
by weight was in fact quite modest by today’s standards. Moreover the cultivation 
system initially bestowed various benefits on Java like a money economy, a kind of 
property register and a certain increase in welfare.22
But from the perspective of those days all these concerns were not at issue. 
Foreign trade was not problematised in the Netherlands in terms of popular welfare 
elsewhere or excessive demands made on foreign natural capital.
The evaluation of transboundary effects should also be approached from another 
angle. As we have seen, exports abroad had negative effects on the situation in the 
Netherlands. Exports of butter and cheese were an example. They were responsible 
for an impoverishment of the Dutch diet, particularly among the poor.
To summarize, on the basis of the monitor we can distinguish three important 
sustainability issues from both contemporary and present-day perspectives: mate-
rial welfare (poverty), the institutional environment (political instability) and social 
capital (marginal trust in political institutions). There is, however, the caveat that the 
two temporal perspectives exhibit big differences in how the issues are interpreted. 
In addition, from a present-day perspective the situation in 1850 is problematic in 
yet other ways: the personal characteristics (among other things the poor health, 
diets and housing of a significant part of the population), economic capital (a dearth 
of innovations), human capital (a lack of high-quality labour power) and the trans-
boundary effects (among others the unethical cultivation system in the colonies). 
The monitor ignores an important sustainability problem, namely the water man-
agement situation. Both from a contemporary and present-day perspective the 
Dutch delta was vulnerable.
What shifts does the sustainability monitor show for the second half of the nine-
teenth century?
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Chapter 7
The Point of Departure Around 1850: 
The Turn of the Tide
Harry Lintsen
Abstract Fundamental changes in politics, economy, technology and ‘civil soci-
ety’ took place in the Netherlands in the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
eminent politician Thorbecke guided the nation through the constitutional reforms 
around 1850. A new constitution put an end to the power of the king and shifted 
political power to parliament. The Dutch economy modernised thanks to the liber-
alisation of trade, an entrepreneurial spirit and other new economic conditions. It 
was moreover embedded in a new culture that regarded technological innovations 
almost by definition as social progress. A dynamic ‘civil society’ was populated by 
emergent professionals, including engineers and hygienists.
In this chapter, with the help of the well-being monitor, we explore the changes in 
quality of life ‘here and now,’ ‘later,’ and ‘elsewhere’ for the period 1850–1910. 
Extreme poverty began to decline significantly, while the burden on natural capital 
and the natural environment increased. The question is whether this increased burden 
was problematic and whether it was in fact problematized. We subsequently focus on 
natural capital, that in this study is seen as the basis of well-being. We make an inven-
tory of some of the important shifts in the production of raw materials and the deriva-
tive material flows in the period between 1850 and 1910. This overview isolates the 
main themes that are worked out in greater detail in the following chapters.
This chapter is written by Harry Lintsen with contributions by Fred Lambert, Jan-Pieter Smits and 
Martijn Anthonissen.
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7.1  Interpreter of Freedom
‘While the notables regale themselves with partridges, snipes, hares, ducks etc. etc. 
that are all non-taxed…’, according to the newspaper Interpreter of Freedom in 
1840, ‘…the working man, as a consumer of meat and bacon, has to pay heavy 
taxes…bread is also heavily taxed due to the law on milling and this, as is the plan, 
will also be increased by ten percent…’.1
The chief editor of the paper was Eillert Meeter of Groningen.2 As son of a bar-
ber he belonged to the petit bourgeoisie. He had attempted to make a career in the 
army. His failure in that endeavour he ascribed to his lowly origins. ‘The hierarchi-
cal chain of society, which has to be climbed by everyone in normal times, is a 
hindrance to me.’ His radical pronouncements, in which he took the side of day- 
labourers and workers, regularly got him into trouble. In 1841 the High Court con-
demned him to 4 years in prison and he fled to Paris. This meant the end of the 
Interpreter of Freedom.
Articles from the inflammatory paper were regularly reported in the national 
press. These were restless years in the Netherlands. William I had abdicated the 
throne and had left for Berlin to be married to his Catholic sweetheart  – to the 
accompaniment of a torrent of scorn from the protestant part of the populace.3 
William II, his son and successor, was beside himself because his silver wedding 
anniversary was disrupted. The Amsterdam elite was also furious about the financial 
chaos that William I had left behind. The people were angry and accused the former 
king of enriching himself and leading a dissolute life with his lady friend. The com-
mon man threatened to become the victim of tax increases on food and other daily 
products that were already heavily taxed and that kept the cost of living high.
The state was all but bankrupt. Successive budget cutbacks by governments had 
brought little relief. Finally in 1843 the state finances were brought to heel thanks to 
interventions by the Minister of Finance, Floris van Hall. As a member of 
Amsterdam’s elite he was able to pressure that city’s financial and banking estab-
lishment into tendering a ‘voluntary’ loan under favourable conditions. This signifi-
cantly reduced the interest payments on the national debt.
1 Tolk der Vrijheid’, Arnhemsche Courant, 28-11-840.
2 M.J.F.  Robijns, ‘Meter, Eillert’, Biografisch Woordenboek van het Socialisme en de 
Arbeidersbeweging in Nederland 3(1988), 132–135. Latest edition: 26-08-2002.
http://hdl.handle.net/10622/40FE3915-C651-4BEC-95EF-9E8C802406D4 (externe link)
3 J. Koch, Koning Willem I, 1772–1843 (Amsterdam 2013), 548.
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Nonetheless, this did not suffice to quell societal unrest. Quite the contrary, dis-
satisfaction increased throughout the 1840s with the potato famine and rising food 
prices. Political unrest in foreign countries also played into the hand of the political 
opposition. The time was ripe for radical reforms. The constitutional order would be 
revised, the tax system revamped and economic life would be regulated. With this, 
issues of well-being acquired an entirely different context.
7.2  The Reforms4
7.2.1  Thorbecke
In 1848 King William II bowed to popular pressure and appointed a commission to 
propose a new constitution. The commission commenced its labours on March 17th, 
under the chairmanship of the lawyer Thorbecke. Ten days later a proposal was 
ready. Five months after that, parliament saw fit to ratify the new constitution. This 
provided for direct elections, ministerial responsibility and more parliamentary 
powers. It was in any case enough to quell disquiet in the country. The political elite, 
that up to then had turned a pragmatic blind eye to the radical opposition, now aban-
doned the populist leaders and suppressed an uprising in Amsterdam.5
Thorbecke would also preside over the first cabinet to be formed under the new 
constitution. As Minister of Internal Affairs he successfully shaped a new political 
landscape. The Provincial Law of 1850 put an end to the ancient estate-based repre-
sentation in the Provincial Estates. The Law on Municipalities of 1851 put an end to 
the autonomy of cities and towns that up to then had enjoyed numerous rights, 
among them the right to veto vital infrastructural projects and thereby strongly 
influence decision-making by the provinces and the central state. In the newly estab-
lished framework, the state delegated societal tasks to the provinces and cities. 
These acquired incomes via a system of earmarked transfers from the public funds. 
Municipal taxes were formally abolished in 1865. Up to then they had functioned to 
protect the local markets. Their abolition meant the end of impediments to free 
market exchange among the cities and between the cities and the countryside. This 
measure also reduced the cost of living in the cities.
A series of national taxes were also eliminated, including excise taxes on the 
slaughtering of pigs and sheep (1852), excise taxes on milling (1855) and excise 
4 This section is based on: J.L. van Zanden and A. van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914: Staat, institu-
ties en economische ontwikkeling (Amsterdam 2000), ‘Chapter 5. Het liberale offensief, 1840–
1870’, 209–235.
5 P. de Rooy, Ons stipje op de waereldkaart: De politieke cultuur van Nederland in de negentiende 
en twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam 2014), 86–89.
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taxes on turf and coal (1865). These had been a burden on the day-to-day existence 
of particularly the poor and the workers. They also inhibited the modernisation of 
production. As we shall see, the tax system included numerous regulations to 
 prevent fraud. These measures were the source of considerable bureaucratic red 
tape. They were aimed in part at small businesses and small-scale production and 
hindered the coming of the factory and mass-production. The tax reforms put an end 
to this situation.
These years also witnessed a radical liberalisation of international trade. Under 
British leadership, a long period of international protectionism was ushered out the 
back door. The elimination and simplification of various import duties and laws in 
Great Britain led among other things to the liberalisation of shipping and the import 
of agricultural produce. Germany eased restrictions on the import of cattle and other 
products. France abolished measures that strongly protected its industry. The 
Netherlands participated in the international movement, lowered its import duties to 
an absolute minimum and put an end to transit and shipping duties at almost all the 
Rhine and IJssel tolls. The complete freedom of Rhine navigation – blocked for 
decades by the Dutch state, much to the exasperation of Germany – had finally been 
achieved.
In the 1840s and 1850s government finances had been put in order. National 
bankruptcy had just been avoided. The interest burden, especially the interest on the 
national debt, declined as a percentage of state expenditures from more than 60% in 
1840 to less than 40% in 1860. This provided an opportunity for the state to lower 
taxes, assume new duties and initiate new projects. Starting in the 1850s, river 
floods were tackled with great zeal. Budgets for education increased significantly 
after the 1860s. Transport infrastructure was stimulated by the Railway Law (1860). 
A legal arrangement in 1860 determined that the state would construct the New 
Waterway (to the harbour of Rotterdam) and private initiative the North Sea Canal 
(to the harbour of Amsterdam).
The stabilisation of the state finances was possible thanks to the colonial profits 
from the Cultivation System and the activities of the Dutch Trading Company 
(NHM). At the outset of the 1840s the so-called credit balance (batig slot) of the 
colonial Cultivation System that accrued to the Dutch state had decreased to a record 
low. This was followed by a period of recovery. During the 1840s, 39% of the state’s 
tax income came from the colonial credit balance. During the 1850s that rose to 
53%.6 The Dutch East Indies, and in particular Java, paid for a large part of the Dutch 
state budget. The Dutch railway network, for example, was financed in large part by 
colonial profits.7 This had considerable adverse effects. The creation of more profits 
led to increased pressure on the Javanese population and the neglect of rice cultiva-
6 Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, tabel 5.1, 223.




tion. In the early 1840s it had already contributed to the outbreak of a famine. The 
failure of the rice crop in 1849 and 1850 again caused serious food shortages on Java.
7.2.2  Looking for a New Political Culture
The political revolution of the 1840s released a lot of social energy. According to the 
prestigious literary journal De Gids, Dutch society had now ‘broken for good with 
that epoch of feebleness and slackness, of lack of ambition…[of a] Netherlands 
sunken into a deathlike slumber…’8 De Gids was not referring to William I, who 
with his inexhaustible energy had initiated countless projects, but to the effete polit-
ical culture that prevailed during his reign. His autocratic rule had done anything but 
encourage public debate on social issues. Though both public and politicians were 
now mobilized, it was still unclear how the new energy should be channelled.
For example, while the constitution guaranteed freedom of religion, the Pope’s 
official declaration of the Netherlands as a church province initiated a shadowy 
political process.9 In 1853, under Thorbecke’s leadership, the government took a 
principled stance and allowed the declaration. King William III, who had no consti-
tutional say in this question, nonetheless used the occasion to support the opposi-
tion. 200,000 Netherlanders (out of a total of 3 million!) had been prepared to sign 
a petition against the ‘conspiracy of Rome’ and had found in the King a willing ear. 
In response, the government asked, and was granted, permission to step down, but 
unrest remained. Due to the acerbic debates and political turbulence in this period, 
popular trust in political institutions was at a low ebb.
This in itself is hardly surprising, because with the new constitution a number of 
fundamental questions had to be answered. It was true that parliament now occupied 
a key position in the new democracy and that the parliamentarian was the chosen 
representative of a district. But who or what did parliament represent? It was in any 
case elected by only a small part of the population (initially by some 80,000 male 
citizens); but even then the question remained whether the parliamentarian had a 
mandate from his district or whether he was a delegate who represented the interests 
of the district. Did all the nuances of opinion have to be present in parliament? Or 
were parliamentarians the advocates of interests? Did something like the ‘common 
interest’ exist? A derivative question was who represented the poor and how the 
interests of the workers, of public health and of public housing were to be repre-
sented in parliament.
8 ‘Staatkundige beschouwingen’, de Gids 13(1849) II, 487. Cited in: A. van der Woud, Een nieuwe 
wereld: Het ontstaan van het moderne Nederland (Amsterdam 2006), 15.
9 De Rooy, Ons stipje op de waereldkaart, 75–77.
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7.2.3  The Promise of Technology
The new political culture provided new chances for young professionals, including 
engineers, physicians and agronomists. An ambitious generation of engineers, for 
example, strained at the leash in their impatience to tackle great works in the interest 
of the Netherlands and popular well-being. ‘A newly born nation,’ as they described 
the situation around 1850.10 The plans for the North Sea Canal, the railway network 
and the reclamation of the Zuiderzee were all ready and would put the Netherlands 
on the map again. Plans for river improvements could be carried out forthwith and 
would guarantee a safe delta. For years the engineers had been forced to wait 
patiently. The sorry state of the public finances prohibited the execution of large 
projects. One of the few large projects carried out in this period, the reclamation of 
the Haarlemmermeer, had not brought civil engineers the recognition they had 
hoped for.11 In view of the constitutional reforms, the engineers hoped to acquire a 
more central social position.
The time also seemed ripe for a greater role for the professional. Technology and 
science held great promise: ‘…everything has become possible for our descen-
dants…’, wrote the Haarlem instrument maker and aficionado of technological 
innovation, W.M. Logeman in 1854.12 His enthusiasm was rooted in a process that 
had the entire western world in its grip.
The first World Exposition held in London in 1851 embodied the belief in prog-
ress and exhibited its promise to a public of millions that descended on London 
from far and near.13 The main exhibition hall was in itself already an imposing 
example of technological prowess. It had been built in less than a year from iron and 
glass and was so transparent that it was justly named the ‘Crystal Palace.’ It was 
filled with impressive machines and installations for flour mills, sugar refineries, the 
machinery industry, breweries and many other branches of industry. The powerful 
ambiance of mechanical engineering was combined with the more refined radiance 
of the industrial arts. These exalted crafts exhibited an unbelievable collection of ten 
thousand luxurious items including cabinets inlaid with mother of pearl, exquisite 
fabrics, artistic rugs and decorated pianos. Many countries were represented, but it 
10 E. Berkers, Technocraten en bureaucraten: Ontwikkeling van organisatie en personeel van de 
Rijkswaterstaat, 1848–1930 (Zaltbommel 2002), 37–38.
11 H.W. Lintsen, R.A. Lombaerts and R. Moerenhout, ‘De droogmaking van het Haarlemmermeer: 
Wind of stoom’, in: M.L. ten Horn-van Nispen, H.W. Lintsen and A. J. Veenendaal, Nederlandse 
ingenieurs en hun kunstwerken: Tweehonderd jaar civiele techniek (Zutphen 1994). The govern-
ment civil engineers employed by the Rijkswaterstaat had played only a marginal role in the deci-
sion-making on the reclamation of the Haarlem Lake, were passed over when it came to leading 
and executing the project and made no contribution to the British design of the steam engines and 
pumps for the reclamation (at the time the largest steam engines in the world).
12 Ln [W.M. Logeman], ‘Eeuwigdurende beweging’, Praktisch Volks-Almanak 1(1854), 164–167. 
Cited in: A. van der Woud, Een nieuwe wereld, 15.
13 M. Bakker, ‘De geest van Crystal Palace’, in: H.W. Lintsen et al. (Eds.), Geschiedenis van de 




was above all England that could now demonstrate to the world that it was the 
planet’s leading nation.
The spirit of the Crystal Palace also haunted the Netherlands. The country 
adopted the culture that accompanied the belief in progress. Two rather modest 
expositions in 1847 and 1849 were followed by a whole series of national and 
regional expositions. In part they exhibited a broad selection of technological and 
industrial novelties. Sometimes they were also thematically oriented to, for exam-
ple, agricultural machines, gas engines, or colonial products. The Palace for Popular 
Diligence [Paleis voor Volksvlijt] an imposing exposition hall built in 1864  in 
Amsterdam, became the Dutch ode to progress. The expositions also stimulated a 
culture of congresses. All kinds of organisations seized the opportunity to meet 
foreign colleagues and launch new initiatives. A Dutch journalist wrote in response 
to the founding of the International Workers Association during the World Exposition 
of 1862: ‘We not only expect that its civilised culture will penetrate into all corners 
of the world, but also that this will give rise to useful cosmopolitan institutions, that 
must improve the material and moral condition of the European countries…’14
The new culture also included a variety of periodicals that kept professionals and 
the public at large informed about developments in the Netherlands and especially 
in foreign countries.15 The general public was served by magazines like the Practical 
Peoples’ Almanac (1854), Treasure of Health (1858), Contemporary Questions 
(1875) and Nature (1881). A professional readership had its own periodicals. 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Engineers (1848) were aimed at engineers and 
other technical experts. The Economist (1851) aimed to reach all those interested in 
domestic and foreign economics. The Observer (1866) was directed to ‘architects, 
engineers, manufacturers, contractors and foremen.’ Gas (1881) was the periodical 
of the directors of gasworks. The trade journals were the expression of the emer-
gence of a professional mid-field that had begun to organize itself around academic 
curricula and professional associations.
The modernisation of the Dutch economy that took place in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, was not only the result of the liberalisation of trade, free 
enterprise and other economic variables, but most certainly also of a culture that 
viewed technical innovations almost by definition as social progress.16 But technol-
ogy and science promised more than merely modernisation and economic develop-
ment.17 In the course of centuries they had professed their ability to abolish poverty, 
end hunger and bring welfare for the masses.
14 J.W. del Campo a.k.a. Camp, Verslag der Wereldtentoonstelling te Londen in 1862 (’s Gravenhage 
1864), 436. Cited in: Bakker, ‘De geest van Crystal Palace’, 19.
15 Van der Woud, Een nieuwe wereld, 16.
16 See also: D. van Lente, Techniek en ideologie: Opvattingen over de maatschappelijke betekenis 
van technische vernieuwingen in Nederland, 1850–1920 (Groningen 1988). The minimal resis-
tance to technology in Dutch politics and society is striking.
17 See, among others: H.W. Lintsen, Made in Holland: Een techniekgeschiedenis van Nederland 
[1800–2000] (Zutphen 2005), 15–17.
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Was this a reasonable claim? Using the monitor for well-being we first explore 
the changes in quality of life for the period 1850–1910. We then change our focus 
to the natural capital that is viewed as the basis for well-being in this study. We 
make an inventory of several important shifts in the production of raw materials for 
the period 1850–1910 and of the derivative material flows. The overview provides 
the main themes that will be worked out in the rest of this book section.
7.3  Well-being ‘Here and Now’: Less Extreme Poverty, 1850 
Versus 1910
The Dutch population nearly doubled between 1850 and 1910, increasing from 3.1 
million to 5,9 million inhabitants. It may be considered a remarkable achievement 
that despite this growth well-being also increased (Table 7.1). In 1910, on average, 
every Netherlander had twice as much to spend as in 1850. Nevertheless it was not 
the case that extreme poverty – at the time the most important issue in well-being – 
had disappeared. It is estimated that about 6% of the Netherlanders still lived in 
bitter poverty. As a percentage this represented a significant decline relative to 1850 
(21%). In absolute terms it still included about 350,000 fellow countrymen. Extreme 
poverty must have remained quite visible on the streets.
The decline of extreme poverty did not – as far as we can tell – occur gradually. 
Graph 7.1 uses estimates to chart the trend between 1850 and 1913. In the mid- 
nineteenth century poverty had increased again after a period of decline, in conse-
quence of among other things the crisis of the colonial complex, the potato crisis, 
failed harvests and foreign wars (Chap. 3). But after these crises poverty continued 
to increase. The tide turned only in the 1860s after which extreme poverty continued 
to decline until 1890. The initial increase after the crises and the subsequent decline 
demand an explanation. As we noted earlier, two factors played an important role in 
extreme poverty: economic growth and income inequality. Economic growth cre-
ates an increase in consumptive expenditures and less inequality a more equitable 
distribution of the latter among the population. Both factors will demand our atten-
tion in the following chapters.
On the basis of various indicators we can conclude that with increasing eco-
nomic welfare the situation of the Dutch in the areas of health, nutrition, hygiene 
and education also improved. In one respect the personal situation had worsened, 
namely housing. At the outset of the twentieth century, many Netherlanders – esti-
mates suggest some 60% – lived under poor conditions and occupied dwellings that 
by today’s standards were too small. After 1850, public housing would become a 
prominent item in the debate on well-being.
From today’s perspective the indicators for 1850 exhibit a negative trend relative 
to those for 1910 in regard to the natural environment and natural capital: a lower 
value for MSA (the indicator of biodiversity), higher values for SO2 and greenhouse 
gas emissions (the indicators for air quality) and a higher consumption of energy 
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Theme Indicator Unit ±1850 ±1910 Corresponding
CBS methods
Population Size million inhabitants 3.1 5.9





index (1850=100) 100 200
General income inequality Gini coefficient 0–1 0.48 0.47
Gendered income
inequality





Satisfaction with life score 0–10 ? ? ?
Personal characteristics
Health Life expectancy years 37 55
Nutrition Height cm 165 173
Housing Housing quality % slums 30 á 50 60
Public water supply m3/capita 0 19
Physical safety Murder victims number per 100.000
inhabitants
0.8 0.4
Labour Unemployment % workforce 6.4 2.0
Education Educational level years 3 5.8
Free time Free time hours / week ? ?
Natural environment
Biodiversity MSA % original biodiversity 73 54
Air quality SO2 kg SO2/ capita 1.3 4.6
Greenhouse gas emissions ton CO2/capita 1.2 3.8
Water quality Public water supply m3/capita 0 19
Institutional context





Democracy democracy-index 0–100 0.3 9.5





? Unknown or irrelevant
Source: See note 23 of Chap. 2
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and raw materials (the indicators for the exploitation of natural capital) (Tables 7.1 
and 7.2). The monitor here shows that trade-offs are inherent to changes in well- 
being. The increase in well-being here was based on more forceful exploitation of 
natural capital. In 1913 the Netherlands had access to almost four times more raw 
materials than in 1850, partly from domestic and partly from foreign sources. This 
enabled the Dutch to feed themselves better, to produce more, to clothe themselves 
better, to increase trade, achieve better water management etc. This was accompa-
nied by a decrease in biodiversity and in air quality. The question is to what extent 
this is problematic. How must the ‘gains’ and ‘losses’ be weighed according to 
present-day norms? But the contemporary perspective is also of importance: what 
did contemporaries think of the trade-offs that took place? These questions guide 
the research informing this book section.
7.4  Well-being ‘Later’: An Economy Under Steam, 1850 
Versus 1910
The quality of life for future generations depends on the resources left them by 
preceding generations. Resources are included in the monitor under four types of 
capital: natural, economic, human and social capitals. Natural capital has a special 
position. Its exploitation with the aid of the other three capitals is the basis for a 
given quality of life. Natural capital has already been briefly discussed. The other 
three capitals – as the monitor shows – are in much better shape in 1910 than they 
were in 1850.
The stock of economic capital per Netherlander was twice as high in 1910 as it 
was in 1850, the national debt had shrunk by more than half and measures had been 
taken to get a modern knowledge infrastructure off the ground. The monitor uses 
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the population living under 





modern knowledge capital. Its extent is unknown. However, in 1850 there were 
hardly any private or semi-governmental laboratories; around 1910 at least 40 could 
be counted.18 According to the monitor, the volume of human capital had also 
increased in 1910 relative to 1850.
The condition of the Dutch population had improved, educational levels had 
increased and there was a surfeit of work. In terms of political participation, social 
capital was more robust in 1910 than in 1850. Trust in political institutions will have 
to be estimated qualitatively. In our estimation this was not particularly high in 
18 J. Hutter, ‘Nederlandse laboratoria 1860–1940, een kwantitatief overzicht’, Tijdschrift voor de 
Geschiedenis der Geneeskunde, Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Techniek 9(1986), nr.54, 
150–174, graph 1.
Theme Indicator Unit ±1850 ±1910 Corresponding
CBS methods
Natural Capital






Biodiversity MSA % original biodiversity 73 54
Air quality SO2 emissions kg SO2/capita 1.2 3.8
Greenhouse gas emissions ton CO2/capita 0 19
Water quality Public water supply m3/capita 1.3 4.6
Economic capital:
Physical capital Economic capital
stock/capita
index (1850=100) 100 141
Financial
capital
Gross national debt % gdp 194 71
Knowledge Stock knowledge capital index (2010=100) – <0.5
Human capital:
Health Life expectancy years 37 55
Labour Unemployment % workforce 6.4 2.0
Level of
education
Schooling years 3 5.8
Social Capital:





Democracy democracy index 0–100 0.3 9.5





? Unknown or irrelevant
Source: See note 23 of Chap. 2
7 The Point of Departure Around 1850: The Turn of the Tide
158
1850, but around the turn of the century there was also much political turbulence, as 
we shall see.
The question here is to what extent investments in the three capitals by succes-
sive generations between 1850 and 1910 led to an improvement in the quality of life 
of each generation itself and to a better point of departure for the next generation. 
Around 1850 the Netherlands still had, in various respects, a classical economy 
dominated by agriculture, craft production and by trade in colonial and domestic 
products. A central question of this section is: How did the modernisation of the 
economy and the indices of well-being develop in successive decades?
7.5  Well-being ‘Elsewhere’: Colonial Profit, 1850 
Versus 1910
What claims did the Netherlands stake to natural capital elsewhere in the world? To 
answer this question, the monitor provides only one usable indicator for this period, 
namely imports of raw materials. This indicator, however, reveals much. In 1913 the 
Netherlands imported 8 á 9 times more raw materials per capita than in 1850. Of all 
the raw materials (in kilotons) that were at the disposal of the Netherlands at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, about half was imported! In 1850 that was only 
13%.19 The Netherlands had become considerably more dependent on foreign raw 
materials, especially stone (100%, primarily limestone to make cement), coal 
(88%), gravel 67%) and grain (68%) (Table 7.5). The same dependency held for a 
series of industrial products like metal products (86%), artificial fertiliser (81%), 
cokes (64%) and wooden planks (61%). Dependence made the Netherlands vulner-
able. Did that worry contemporaries? That was one side of the coin. The other side 
was the influence of these imports on well-being elsewhere.
In this connection the relationship to the colonies once again demands our atten-
tion. Above we noted the dependence of the state finances around 1850 on the colo-
nial credit balance. We also pointed out the effects on the lives of the Javanese 
population. In the same period the Cultivation System came under increasingly 
heavy fire. In 1860 the writer Multatuli (pseudonym for Eduard Douwes Dekker) 
would publish the Max Havelaar, an indictment of the Cultivation System, forced 
labour and the corrupt government in the Dutch East Indies. To what extent did this 
kind of opposition lead to reforms? (Table 7.3)
19 The total weight of available raw materials in 1850 (bio, mineral and fossil) was 9700 kton, of 
which 1300  kton was imported. For 1913 these figures were respectively 40.000  kton and 
20.400 kton (see appendix 2.1).
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7.6  Natural Capital and Material Flows, 1850 Versus 1910
Natural capital is the basis of the quality of life, that is the presupposition of this 
study. Three varieties of natural capital can be distinguished: bio-raw materials, 
mineral subsoil resources and fossil subsoil resources. These are the origin of three 
material flows, that can be roughly denoted as agriculture and foods, construction 
and building materials and energy. Along these lines, the link with the most impor-
tant problems of quality of life in the second half of the nineteenth century can be 
directly laid. The material flow ‘agriculture and foods’ was decisive for the food 
situation of the Dutch population: famine, malnutrition, food quality, food distribu-
tion and food security. The material flow ‘construction and building materials’ was 
decisive for public health (the construction of public hygienic facilities), public 
housing (the construction of dwellings for the poor and workers) and the mainte-
nance of a safe delta (the struggle against the sea, inner water and the rivers). The 
material flow ‘energy’ was decisive for providing heat to the households of the poor 
and workers in preparing meals and fighting the cold. In addition, the same time the 
three material flows were part of an economic system that generated surplus value 
and economic growth that enabled the achievement of a higher level of well-being, 
in particular for the poor and the workers. At the same time natural capital is part of 
a process of trade-offs. From a present-day perspective, more intensive exploitation 
means increasing depletion of natural resources.
What changes did natural capital and the material flows in the period 1850–1910 
undergo? We can identify four. First of all, we noted above that at the outset of the 
twentieth century the Netherlands commanded significantly more raw materials 
than in 1850, about four times as much. This came down to twice as much per capita 





Development aid % gdp – – ?
Natural capital
Natural capital Import of raw materials ton/capita 0.4 3.4





? Unknown or irrelevant
Source: See note 23 of Chap. 2
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(Table  7.4). Mineral and fossil subsoil resources in particular were much more 
intensively exploited, their use increasing by a factor of five or six. In the second 
place, the Netherlands were ever more tightly integrated into an international econ-
omy. Imports of raw materials increased by nearly 400% and exports by a factor of 
five. Imports of processed goods also increased substantially (Tables 7.4 and 7.7). 
In the third place, industrial processing of raw materials more and more became the 
norm: In 1850 26% of the bio-raw materials were industrially processed as opposed 
to 51% in 1913; for mineral raw materials the figures were respectively 54% against 
60%. Finally, in terms of volume, entirely different raw materials and products 
dominated the Dutch economy in 1913 in comparison with 1850 (Tables 7.5 and 
7.8).
This last shift illustrates the modernisation of the economy that took place in this 
period. Coal replaced turf as the most important fossil subsoil resource. Metal prod-
ucts and machinery had joined the top-ten list of manufactured goods. Both devel-
opments thus represented the mechanisation of production. Gravel and stone (marl) 
had conquered a place among the top ten raw materials and concrete products filled 
a slot in the top ten processed goods. This reflects the rise of concrete technology 
Table 7.4 Raw materials in the Netherlands, 1850 versus 1913 in kilotons
1850 1913 Ratio 1850:1913
Bio raw materials:
Gross available 5260 kton 14,740 kton 1:2.8
Bio/capita 1.7 ton/capita   2.4 ton/capita 1:1.4
% import 11%   22% 1:2.0
% export 6%   14% 1:2.3
Mineral subsoil resources:
Gross available 1350 kton 8040 kton 1:6.0
Mineral/capita 0.45 ton/capita   1.3 ton/capita 1:2.9
% import 11%   33% 1:3.0
% export 2%   8% 1:4.0
Fossil subsoil resources:
Gross available 3060 kton 17,430 kton 1:5.7
Fossil/capita 1.0 ton/capita   2.8 ton/capita 1:2.8
% import 18%   81% 1:4.5
% export 1%   32% 1:32
Total raw materials:
Gross available 9670 kton 40,210 kton 1:4.2
Raw materials/capita 3.1 ton/capita 6.5 ton/capita 1:2.1
% import 13% 50% 1:3.8
% export 4% 21% 1:5.3
Remark: Gross available = domestic production + imports
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016).
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and of concrete as new building material. As far as agriculture and foods are con-
cerned, various raw materials (like cattle and fish) and processed products (like 
beverages and meat) disappeared from the top ten. They were replaced only by 
sugar beets. This is illustrative of the slow but certain decline of the relative impor-
tance of agriculture and foods in the Dutch economy. To be sure, this sector also 
modernised, as illustrated by the arrival of artificial fertiliser and sugar beets (in 
support of a new industry, the beetroot sugar industry) in the top ten.
In 1850 the Netherlands faced a major challenge. As the monitor 1850–1910 
shows, much remained to be done in the area of well-being. Extreme poverty was 
widespread and had become the most important issue of well-being in all of Dutch 
history. The satisfaction of primary needs exhibited serious shortcomings. At the 
same time the population continued to grow and to dwell in an unsafe delta.
Table 7.5 Ten most prominent raw materials (in kton) and the percentage imported, 1850 versus 
1913









5,260 14,740 11 22
  Milk   1,970   3,210   0   0
  Grain   840   2,830   21   68
  Potatoes   800   2,650   2   2
  Lumber   440   66
  Living 
cattle
  260   3
  Fish   130   2
  Sugar 
beets






1,350 8,040 11 33
  Clay   670   3,450 2   2
  Sand   500   1,750 0   9
  Gravel   1,200   67





3,060 17,430 18 80
  Turf   2,510   1,600   1   6
  Coal   550   15,610   97   88
Total 9,670 40,210 15 50
  8,670   35,090   12   45
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016)
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The Netherlands sought a solution for these issues in a new mode of exploitation 
of natural capital, ‘here’ in the Netherlands and ‘elsewhere.’ Changes in material 
flows point to this. The question is to what extent this brought new problems to the 
fore. The monitor suggests these might be found in the domain of the natural envi-
ronment and natural capital. The question in this context is then: in what way are the 
dynamics of the material flows related to changes in well-being and sustainability. 
In this analysis we take bio-materials (agriculture and foods), mineral materials 
(construction and building materials) and fossil materials (energy) as our point of 
departure (Tables 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8).
Table 7.6 Percentage of raw materials and subsoil resources industrially processed, 1850 versus 
1913
1850 1913
Industrial processing of raw 
materials and subsoil resources
Industrial processing of raw 
materials and subsoil resources







Remark 1: ‘Industry’ excludes extraction of mineral and fossil subsoil resources
Remark 2: Mineral resources such as clay and sand directly used in building activities (in for 
example dikes) are not treated as processed materials
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016)
Table 7.7 Import and export of processed products in kton and percentages, 1850 versus 1913
1850 1913
Total import 1480 kton 26,000 kton
Import processed products 190 kton 6060 kton
Import processed products (% of total) 13% 23%
Total export 570 kton 11,420 kton
Export processed products 170 kton 3110 kton
Export processed products (% of total) 30% 27%
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
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Chapter 8
Agriculture and Nutrition: The Food 
Revolution
Harry Lintsen
Abstract The chapter analyses the fundamental changes in the agriculture and 
foods supply chain between 1850 and 1910 and investigates the consequences for 
the food supply, in particular for the poor.
Initially, agriculture profited from the liberalisation of international trade. The 
mixed crop tillage farms in the region of the large rivers and on the sand grounds 
commercialised and specialised themselves. After 1880, cheap, especially American, 
grain imports cast Dutch agriculture into a profound crisis. In part because of this 
crisis a number of innovations were introduced, like the use of artificial fertiliser 
and the founding of agricultural cooperatives. In addition, common lands were to 
disappear and large tracts of heathland were to be reclaimed.
The 1860s proved a turning point for the food processing industry. The revival of 
the domestic market in these years was a key factor. Also, a number of sectors ori-
ented to foreign markets like the potato starch and the sugar beet industry flour-
ished. The steam engine gained ground at the cost of horse-mills and windmills. 
Moreover new sectors like the margarine and the dairy-processing industry were 
established.
The modernisation of agriculture and the food processing sector had contributed 
to the improvement of the food situation. That also resulted from changes in the tax 
structure, whereby taxes on food were lowered and from increased welfare. 
Contents
8.1  The First Flour and Bread Factory  166
8.2  The Modernisation of Agriculture  168
8.2.1  Prosperity, Crisis and Innovations  168
8.2.2  Artificial Fertiliser and the End of the Closed Chain  170
8.2.3  The Landscape and the End of the ‘Common’ Lands  172
8.2.4  Small Farms and the Cooperative Movement  174
8.3  The Modernisation of the Food Processing Industry  176
8.4  Food Quantity and Food Quality  179
 Literature ..................................................................................................................................  181
166
Quantitatively there was sufficient food at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
also for the poor. Potatoes and grain were still the main menu of the majority of the 
populace. The problem now shifted to food quality.
Keywords Innovation · Modernisation · Agriculture · Artificial fertiliser · 
Cooperatives · Commons · Agricultural crissis · Foods
8.1  The First Flour and Bread Factory1
In 1851 the Amsterdammer Samuel Sarphati left for a study trip to Brussels, Paris 
and London.2 As physician to the poor he had seen much poverty and misery at first 
hand and with this trip he wanted among other things to acquaint himself with the 
magnitude of poverty in those cities, their public hygiene, education, public health 
care and their struggles against poverty. In this endeavour he was supported by 
Thorbecke. Sarphati was an admirer of Thorbecke. Thorbecke, for his part, had 
great sympathy for the ideas and forcefulness of this kindred spirit. In London, 
Sarphati visited the first World Exposition and was deeply impressed by all those 
robust machines and technical innovations from foreign countries. He was particu-
larly interested in the set of machines for milling grain and baking bread: steam 
engines, grain purifiers, bucket conveyors, air-cooled millstones, kneading 
machines, baking ovens etc. Upon his return he joined forces with the Delft profes-
sor S.A. Bleekrode and the agronomist W.C.H. Staring to found the ‘Association for 
Public Diligence’ in order to stimulate national industry and improve popular 
well-being.
During one of the meetings, Sarphati proposed to set up what would be the first 
flour and bread factory in the Netherlands. The goal was to bring good and cheap 
bread to market and hence to improve the nutrition of the poor and the workers. 
Amsterdam’s philanthropists and industrialists found common ground in a new 
joint stock company. In 1857 the factory with steampower began production. By 
means of this and other projects, Sarphati mounted the social ladder from his origins 
in an obscure Portuguese-Jewish family to a place among the social elite of the capi-
1 For this see: H.W.  Lintsen et  al., Made in  Holland: Een techniekgeschiedenis van Nederland 
[1800–2000] (Zutphen 2005), 33–35. The case is based on: H.W. Lintsen and M.S.C. Bakker, 
‘Meel’, in: H.W. Lintsen et al. (eds.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland: De wording van 
een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1992), part I, 71–101; J.L van Zanden and A. van 
Riel, Nederland 1780–1914: Staat, instituties en economische ontwikkeling (Amsterdam 2000), 
178–185.




tal. Amsterdam still honours Sarphati with a Sarphati Street, a Sarphati Square and 
a Sarphati Park, the latter containing an imposing bust of the man himself.
Amsterdam’s example was quickly followed. Eight years later, in 1865, there 
were already ten mechanized flour mills and eleven flour and bread factories in the 
Netherlands. This sector was clearly booming business. Whence this sudden 
upsurge? Was Sarphati the first Dutchman to make acquaintance with the industrial 
fabrication of flour and bread? That would seem a serious underestimation of the 
entrepreneurs of the time. Many travelled around the world and had seen similar 
factories in France, England, America and various other countries. Grain merchants, 
above all, had been particularly interested but had made no use of their knowledge. 
The situation was even more curious in view of the fact that the flour and bread fac-
tory, as an innovation, was by then about a century old. The origins of the idea lay 
in Paris in 1760. How was it possible that Dutch industrialists only picked up on the 
idea after such a long period?
The opening of the first Dutch flour and bread factory had everything to do with 
a change in the tax laws: in 1855 the Law on Milling was rescinded. History shows 
that technical development and legislation are closely related. This is certainly a 
case in point. The Law on Milling regulated taxation of flour. This was an ancient 
tax, originally in the form of local ordinances. After the founding of the kingdom of 
the Netherlands in 1813 these were succeeded by national legislation. Every kilo of 
rye or wheat flour was taxed at the grain mill and the government saw to it that 
nobody milled without permission.
Of course millers did everything in their power to avoid paying these taxes. The 
government was therefore compelled to take strict precautions and to maintain a 
small army of tax officials. Millers were required to submit a detailed floorplan of 
their mills, sheds, storage facilities and dwellings. In the course of a possible search 
these would aid the tax official in locating secret storage spaces and possible smug-
gling routes for grain on which no taxes had been paid. These tax laws not only 
affected the peace of mind of the miller, but had consequences for the entire conduct 
of the business.
Large-scale production was impossible, because the law demanded that every 
sack of grain in every mill had to be traceable. Grain was in fact milled sack by sack. 
Flour could not be purified, not re-milled for more delicate kinds of bread, not 
traded by the miller and so on. In short, the stringent milling law was adapted to 
traditional small-scale production, frustrating for the miller, but equally so for any-
one who wanted to start a flour and bread factory. This was openly acknowledged 
even by the government and parliament.
The law drew criticism for another reason as well: it taxed a staple element of the 
popular diet. But the tax income was hardly trivial for a national government strug-
gling with big debts and budget deficits. Only after the government succeeded in 
getting its financial house in order, did it become possible to rescind the law, a deci-
sion taken in 1855.
The elimination of the Milling Law in any case affords an explanation for the 
sudden rise of industrial-scale flour and baking companies: Sarphati had seen and 
seized the opportunities offered by a liberalising market and had been followed by 
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others in short order. What remains to be explained is the spectacular growth of this 
sector in the subsequent decade. We will come back to this below.
The flour and bread factory illustrates the transformation of the Netherlands in 
the 1840s and 50s. The innovation was the initiative of an emergent midfield of 
active and socially engaged citizens who had great faith in technology. It was also 
made possible by a government that was re-inventing itself and that wanted to create 
conditions for the modernisation of economy and technology.
The new societal context would influence the entire supply chain of agriculture 
and foods. This supply chain belonged to the core of the Dutch economy. Agriculture 
had just experienced two decades of reasonable prosperity, but saw itself confronted 
around 1850 with the potato disease and failed harvests. The food processing indus-
try was to a great extent locally organised and based on a craft system of production. 
Consumption consisted chiefly of potatoes and cereals and was, for a large part of 
the population, just adequate to remain alive.
Sarphati’s innovation was one of the many innovations that transformed the food 
supply chain between 1850 and 1910. These would fundamentally alter the food 
situation. What did these changes mean for the nutrition of the population, in par-
ticular for the poor and the workers? The example of Sarphati suggests that this 
would have improved. Is that so? We shall deal separately with the various links in 
the supply chain (agriculture, the food-processing industry and food consumption).
8.2  The Modernisation of Agriculture
8.2.1  Prosperity, Crisis and Innovations3
Between 1840 and 1870 agriculture profited abundantly from the liberalisation of 
international trade. Dutch agriculture had clear comparative advantages over that of 
other countries. Grassland farming had long enjoyed a high level of productivity. 
Nowhere was milk production per cow as high as in the provinces of Holland and 
Friesland. This manifested itself in a flourishing export trade especially to industri-
alising England with its almost inexhaustible demand for ‘luxury’ foods like butter, 
cheese and meat. In addition, Dutch agriculture produced several other successful 
export products like the dyestuff madder.
Trade liberalisation caused the crop farming sector in the area of the big rivers 
and on the sand grounds to change and become commercialized. The price of grain 
remained under that of dairy products. It became more attractive to increase the 
amount of livestock and to transform crop fields into pastures. Up to then, cattle 
3 See for  this subsection: Van Zanden and  van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 248–256; J.L. van 
Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw in  de negentiende eeuw 
1800–1914 (dissertation Wageningen 1985), 246–252; J.L. van Zanden, ‘Mest en ploeg’, in: 
H. Lintsen et al. (eds.),Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland. De wording van een moderne 
samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1992), part I, 53–69.
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husbandry had been part of a circular production process, subservient to the produc-
tion of manure and grain. Now, crop farming increasingly came to serve cattle hus-
bandry and the production of butter and livestock. Cattle husbandry hence 
increasingly became part of a linear chain of production and consumption. Cattle 
fodder was imported in large quantities and imports of grain partly fed to livestock, 
while the more expensive dairy products were exported. Initially the manure was 
destined to improve soil fertility, but in the twentieth century the increase in live-
stock in combination with the introduction of artificial fertiliser would lead to the 
conundrum of manure surpluses.
Agriculture’s international success also had consequences for the domestic mar-
ket. Agricultural products became more expensive and the domestic demand stag-
nated. The cost of living in the cities increased. The introduction of flour and bread 
factories in the 1860s could not reverse this trend. Moreover, not everyone in the 
countryside profited equally from the agricultural prosperity. Employment increased 
thanks to the intensification of agricultural production, but it consisted above all of an 
increase in the number of hired hands, maids, day-labourers and the increasing recruit-
ment of the families of smallholders.4 These workers were barely able to pick the 
fruits of the increased prosperity and lived around or under the poverty line. The large 
farmers profited first and foremost. Income inequality in the countryside increased. It 
was one of the causes of increasing poverty in the Netherlands in the 1850s and 1860s.
The large farmers invested the accumulated wealth partly in innovations. On the 
clay-grounds the Arend-plough was introduced, a new kind of plough that reduced 
the necessary traction and thus economised on horses. In a number of polders steam- 
powered pumping replaced wind-powered pumping, a change that improved the 
manageability of groundwater levels. Other mechanical innovations, originating 
chiefly in Great Britain and the United States, included sowing and mowing 
machines, hay bailers and mechanical churns. They spread slowly, but did contrib-
ute to the increase of production per labourer and per hectare.
Around 1880 the agricultural prosperity came to an abrupt end only to terminate 
in a crisis that would last about two decades. It started with crop farming. Cheap 
cereals flooded the Netherlands and Europe. The United States had opened up vast 
tracts of agricultural land in its interior on which it cultivated wheat and corn. The 
costs of production were low because the land was in fact being over-exploited. 
Railways and steamships assured competitive transport. The railways connected the 
agricultural regions with the coast and steamships transported the grain to Europe. 
Similar developments took place in Russia and Argentina.
Dairy farming also ran into trouble. Dutch butter increasingly faced international 
competition from Denmark, France and Germany as did cheese from American sup-
pliers. Moreover, butter began to be replaced by a cheaper substitute, margarine. 
Thanks to improvements in refrigeration technologies, trade in meat was able to 
replace trade in living cattle. The Netherlands played only a modest role in this 
international market.
4 Van Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw, 331–332. Van Zanden 
refers to the increasing proletarianisation of the countryside and the increasing economic distance 
between farmer and labourer.
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The crisis also had its positive sides. Foodstuffs became cheaper. Domestic 
demand increased. The cost of living declined. These developments contributed to the 
decline of poverty in the Netherlands. That said, this is not a sufficient explanation, 
because the decline had already set in at the end of the 1860s and not in the 1880s.
Another effect of the crisis was to accelerate the modernisation of agriculture. 
We will illustrate three aspects of this modernisation: the use of artificial fertiliser 
because it played a crucial role in this period – but also in the twentieth century – in 
the development of agriculture; the enclosure of the ‘commons’ because as a 
centuries- old corporative institution it was of essential importance for the manage-
ment of the communal grounds and therefore of a large part of the Dutch landscape; 
and the emergence of the cooperative movement, because this was essential for the 
well-being of the small farmer and the smallholder.
8.2.2  Artificial Fertiliser and the End of the Closed Chain
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, foreign chemists and agronomists had 
discovered that nitrogen (N), potassium (K) and phosphor (P) were essential ele-
ments for plant growth. In 1840, Justus von Liebig, the ‘father’ of the artificial fer-
tiliser industry, had summarized this knowledge, together with the results of his own 
investigations, in his book Agricultur-Chemie.5 His insights rapidly diffused in agri-
cultural circles throughout Europe and stimulated dedicated efforts to develop fer-
tilisers that would enable plants to absorb these elements with ease.
Up to then, Dutch farmers used manure from stables, if possible, augmented with 
urban waste, urban night soil (human and animal faeces) and waste materials like 
slaughterhouse waste, rotten fish and ground bones. In the 1840s this was supple-
mented by a lively trade in Guano, dried manure from sea-birds that was especially 
rich in nitrogen.6 After that things moved quickly in regard to the application of new 
fertilisers. There were various options.7 ‘Super Phosphate’ contained phosphates 
and nitrogen compounds and was based on treating bone with sulphuric acid. It was 
imported chiefly from Belgium, England and Germany. Chili Saltpetre was a South 
American raw material composed among other things of the nitrogen compound 
sodium nitrate. Thomas slag powder, imported from Germany and Belgium, was a 
phosphate-rich artificial fertiliser made from finely ground blast furnace slag derived 
from iron ore and raw iron with a high phosphate content. Potassium Salt was mined 
in Germany. The fertiliser ammonium nitrate was a component of ammonium sul-
phate, derived from the wastewater of municipal gasworks.
For a long time, the Netherlands was highly dependent on foreign suppliers for 
its artificial fertiliser. The domestic fertiliser industry consisted in part of suppliers 
who mixed fertilisers produced elsewhere. It also included factories that produced 
5 E. Homburg, Groeien door kunstmest. DSM Agro 1929–2004 (Hilversum 2004), 25–27.
6 Van Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw, 252–254.
7 Homburg, Groeien door kunstmest, 25–44, passim.
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fertilisers using foreign raw materials, for example the super phosphate factories. 
Finally there were also small enterprises that fabricated fertilisers from domestic 
raw materials. Gasworks, for example, processed ammonia water into ammonium 
sulphate. Beet sugar factories used their earth foam and potassium to produce potas-
sium salts. At the outset of the twentieth century, there were six super phosphate 
factories in the Netherlands that were able to produce at large scales against inter-
nationally competitive prices. In addition, there were another ten to twenty small 
miscellaneous fertiliser factories.8
Initially, the use of artificial fertiliser spread slowly in the Netherlands. After 
1880 things accelerated. Around 1900 lead users applied between 100 and 170 kg 
per ha, but the Dutch average was much lower. The Belgians were the most ener-
getic fertilisers, followed by Germany and the Netherlands. In the 1920s the Dutch 
would seize the lead and become by far the biggest users of artificial fertilisers (see 
Table 13.2).
At the outset, four factors played a role in the adoption of artificial fertilisers: the 
price of the fertilisers, the farmers’ ability to bear the costs, the knowledge he had 
at his disposal and the type of agricultural zone.9 Artificial fertilisers were expensive 
and it was long uncertain what the profit was. The pioneers were above all the large 
wealthy farmers able to bear greater risks and embedded in networks that gave them 
ready access to information. Some of them even performed elaborate experiments 
on test fields. The lead users also tended to be located in the fen-colonies in 
Groningen and Drenthe. These regions had a tradition of employing alternative fer-
tilisers, particularly urban wastes. Regions like eastern Zeeuws Vlaanderen and the 
island of Goeree-Overflakkee were big users of urban waste. Farmers there culti-
vated sugar beets, a crop that required intensive fertilisation.
The sand grounds would eventually follow, even though there, because of the 
nature and the intensive cultivation of the soil, the issue of soil fertility was extremely 
urgent. In these regions, the declining cost of artificial fertilisers was an important 
incentive to adoption. The founding of cooperative purchasing associations was a 
contributing factor. Smallholders and dirt farmers first waited for the market to 
recover so that they could free up the necessary funds. They were further supported 
by so-called ‘walking teachers’ that educated them about the use of fertilisers. 
These teachers were part of a knowledge infrastructure that the government had 
been putting together since the onset of the agricultural crisis. Agricultural educa-
tion was modernised. Every province was provided with teachers of agronomy that 
organised winter courses and provided farmers with information. Moreover, the 
government set up three additional experimental stations, in addition to the existing 
one at Wageningen. Among other things these institutes monitored the quality of 
fertilisers and experimented with them.
Artificial fertilisers did more than just increase the yield per hectare. Their use 
also meant the end of a production cycle, that is to say, a largely closed cycle of 
production and consumption. Agricultural products were formerly produced with 
8 Homburg, Groeien door kunstmest, 35.
9 Van Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw, 255–262.
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organic fertilisers derived from animals and humans, who after consumption 
 contributed their organic wastes, or faeces, to agricultural production. Sunlight was 
the most important source of exogenous energy feeding the cycle. The adoption of 
artificial fertiliser stimulated the development of a linear chain, in which mineral and 
fossil raw materials – generally imported from abroad – were the beginning and in 
which the organic metabolic products produced at the end were only organic waste.
8.2.3  The Landscape and the End of the ‘Common’ Lands10
Another theme that was discussed throughout much of the nineteenth century in 
agricultural circles was the management of the ‘commons’ or the communal lands. 
At the outset of the nineteenth century, associations of owners managed at least a 
third of the national territory. They were known variously as commons, marken, 
holtelingen and buurschappen. They consisted mostly of heaths and moors, but also 
of lakes, swamps, meadows and woods. Most communal lands were on the sand 
grounds, but some also in the regions of river-clay and the high moors.
There were differences of opinion about the role of the common lands. Was the 
land more optimally exploited under collective or individual property rights? 
Proponents pointed to the functions fulfilled by the common lands. They served as 
a source of turf and firewood and to graze sheep, cows and pigs. Sometimes parcels 
of common land were cultivated. The common lands also provided heath sods for 
the production of manure compost. Agriculture could not exist without the common 
lands. Smallholders and dirt farmers with a small plot of land were extremely 
dependent on the commons.
Those pursuing the modernisation of agriculture spoke of a regressive remnant 
of the past that was maintained by ‘short-sightedness, prejudice, blind egoism and 
the most egregious ignorance…’11 According to them this was a far from optimal 
use of the lands:
‘…Everywhere you can … see the skinny cows of Pharao walking about, separated from 
the fat ones by a single drainage ditch: the first as representatives of the common pasture, 
the other as those of particular ownership.’12
10 See for  this subsection: T. de Moor, The dilemma of  the  commoners: Understanding the use 
of common-pool resources in long-term perspective (Cambridge 2015); A. van der Woud, Het lege 
land: De ruimtelijke orde van Nederland 1798–1848 (Amsterdam 1998), 205–208, 213–237; van 
Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw,152–165; Van Zanden 
and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 158–162.
11 Cited in van der Woud, Het lege land, 207. Original source: ‘De landbouw op de Nederlandsche 
Zandgronden’, Mededeelingen en Handelingen van de Geldersche Maatschappij van Landbouw 
III(1848), 10. Van der Woud endorses this standpoint. He speaks of a ‘remarkable relic from the 
early Middle Ages’ (206).
12 Cited in van der Woud, Het lege land, 206. Original source: ‘De landbouw op de Nederlandsche 




The opponents spoke of the ‘wastelands,’ lands that were barely profitable or had 
degenerated into bad lands due to poor management. That system had to be demol-
ished and the marken organisations to be dismantled. The common lands had to be 
sold, so that farmers could get to work efficiently reclaiming them to the benefit of 
society.
In the twentieth century this theme would reappear on the political agenda in the 
guise of the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ The common lands were a metaphor for the 
problem of over-exploitation. Under a regime of common ownership farmers would 
above all pursue their own interests. Every farmer would cut as much heath sod as 
possible for his own fertiliser production or allow as many cows as possible to graze 
for his own milk production. If all farmers pursued this course, than over-cutting 
and over-grazing would be the consequence and the utility of the land would accord-
ingly be seriously compromised. Similar phenomena occur at present with the over-
fishing of the oceans and the pollution of the atmosphere by exhaust gases.
A recent study shows that the this metaphor is based on incorrect presupposi-
tions. The collective management of the common lands was rather meticulous and 
provided a certain flexibility, for example if population pressure increased in the 
region, harvests failed and market demand fluctuated.13 Three principles under-
pinned the management: utility, fairness and appropriateness. Utility referred to the 
degree to which the use of the common lands was sufficient for the owners. Fairness 
was related to the degree to which the owners participated in the economic use and 
the management of the lands. The third principle, appropriateness, referred to an 
ecological optimum: the ratio between the yields and the future exploitation of the 
lands. The application of the three principles led in many cases to long periods of 
sustainable management.14
Despite this the common lands would disappear in the nineteenth century. A 
regulation dating from 1810 that envisioned the dissolution of the mark associa-
tions, had little effect. An edict by William I in 1837 that attempted to breathe new 
life into this regulation was effective especially in those marks where large land-
owners and large farmers were in charge. Where small-scale farmers had more 
influence, the dismantling occurred later.15 In the end, a law passed in 1886 would 
seal the fate of the common lands. In the background other factors played a role in 
arriving at this decision. Reclamation of the wastelands was the immediate goal, but 
that demanded the solution of the fertiliser problem, the elaboration of infrastruc-
tures, the improvement of water management and adequate legal registration.16 By 
the end of the century private parties could enroll the services of the Nederlandse 
Heidemaatschappij (a professional reclamation firm) to advise them while in 1899 
the government set up Staatsbosbeheer (State Forest Management) to reclaim state- 
owned lands.
13 De Moor, The dilemma of the commoners, 110–120.
14 De Moor, The dilemma of the commoners, 143–148.
15 Van Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw,162–163; Van Zanden 
en Van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 161.
16 Van der Woud, Het lege land, 229.
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Between 1833 and 1913 a bit less than 400,000 ha of ‘wastelands,’ some 12% of 
the Dutch territory, disappeared. That provided (including the reclamation of the 
Haarlemmermeer and other reclamations) 290,000 ha of extra farmland and 89,000 ha 
of extra forest. Planting forests was a long-term investment. The forest could be 
felled after 20 or 30 years and would leave an improved humus-rich soil behind. In 
many parts of the Netherlands the landscape acquired a rather different aspect. That 
caused little consternation at the time. Not so in the twentieth century when decisions 
on the remaining ‘wastelands,’ still some 515,000 ha, had to be taken (Table 8.1).
8.2.4  Small Farms and the Cooperative Movement
For a while it seemed as if the smallholder and dirt-farmer would become victims of 
the disappearance of the common lands. But in the end the opposite appeared to be 
the case. At the outset of the twentieth century the small farm and in particular the 
family farm was the dominant form of agricultural entrepreneurship. These small 
farms were moreover apparently in most cases capable of providing a reasonable 
existence – above the poverty line – for the family.17 Oddly enough, the elimination 
of the mark organisation contributed to this. Smallholders and dirt-farmers were 
namely recompensed for the loss of their use of the common lands with small par-
cels of ‘wasteland’ or had become able to lease extra land. However that was still 
inadequate to build up a decent existence, in particular on the sand grounds in the 
east and south of the Netherlands,. We focus here on those regions.
An important cause of the relative prosperity of the smallholders was the com-
mercialisation and specialisation of their farms. Thanks to improvements in infra-
17 Exact figures are hard to come by. Van Zanden and others speak of de-proletarianisation of the 
countryside and an improvement in the situation of the smallholder and dirt-farmer. For the rural 
village Woensel (near Eindhoven) van den Brink was able to establish that the farmers (and a small 
upper stratum) were able to avoid the dynamics of structural poverty in this municipality in the 
period 1850–1920. G. van den Brink, De grote overgang: Een lokaal onderzoek naar de moderni-
sering van het bestaan. Woensel 1670–1920 (Amsterdam 1996), 110.
Table 8.1 Land-use in the Netherlands, 1833–1913 (×1000 ha)
1833 1913 Increase/decrease
Farmland 1895 2185 + 290
‘Wastelands’ 907 515 − 392
Forest 169 258 + 89
Roads and Railways 11 53 + 42
Built up 25 48 + 23
Total 3007 3059 + 52
Remark: Due to (minimal) differences in the definition of various kinds of land-use the figures are 
not completely comparable with each other




structure, farming on the sand grounds had become completely integrated into 
national and international trade. The emphasis was no longer on self-sufficiency.18 
Flax, hemp, barley and other products that formerly supplied the wants of the farm 
itself were no longer cultivated; flax and wool were no longer spun and woven for 
direct use on the farm. Activities that produced less income, for example timber 
production, were terminated. Emphasis was placed on cattle husbandry. Pastures 
were extended and improved. Parcels that supplied cattle fodder required less tillage 
because of cheap foreign fodder and the use of artificial fertiliser. Butter production 
was delegated to the dairy factory. Work focused on taking care of the milk cows, 
the pigs and the chickens. The most important raw materials were bought on the 
market, which is also where almost the entire produce was destined.19
An extremely important factor was also the rise of the cooperative movement at 
the end of the nineteenth century.20 This institutional innovation commenced with 
the collective purchase of cattle fodder, artificial fertiliser, seeds and other raw 
materials. That not only meant considerable savings for smallholders, but also more 
control over quality. The communal use of machinery also provided economies of 
scale. Purchasing a steam-powered threshing machine was hardly attractive for a 
smallholder, but became profitable as a collective possession. The cooperatives 
expanded their scope of operations to also include the processing and sale of prod-
ucts. Cooperative auctions came into existence to sell and establish prices for prod-
ucts and transport cooperatives were set up to get the produce to export markets. 
Farmers established cooperative sugar factories to process sugar beets and coopera-
tive dairies to process milk. In this way farmers attempted to avoid obstacles in the 
markets: the dealer as part of a cartel that demanded excessively high prices for raw 
materials, the monopolistic factory owner who underpaid for agricultural produce, 
the local store owner who exploited the farmer with compulsory purchases, etc.
Cooperatives developed later on the sand grounds than in the rest of the 
Netherlands. After 1890, however, in those regions too their popularity soared. The 
founding of the farmers’ loan banks can be seen as the keystone of the movement. 
Access to credit was a major obstacle for farmers on the sand grounds, an impedi-
ment that hindered the modernisation of their enterprises. The cooperative banks 
accumulated the savings of the rural population in order to satisfy demands for 
credit. They turned out to be able to extend credit on favourable conditions, while 
keeping banking costs low, limiting the risks and offering a reasonable interest on 
savings.21 The driving force behind the founding of the banks was the Catholic elite. 
18 Van Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw, 283–284.
19 Small enterprises also survived because real wages in Netherlands rose and labour became an 
ever more scarce commodity. Large farmers encountered difficulties because the increasing wages 
of hired hands and maids threatened to make their enterprises insolvable. Small enterprises, in 
contrast, had the possibility of doing without hired labour. Van Zanden, De economische ontwik-
keling van de Nederlandse landbouw, 335.
20 See for the cooperative movement in agriculture: Van Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van 
de Nederlandse landbouw, 273–281; Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 365–376.
21 However, H. Denweth, O. Gelderblom en J. Jonker doubt whether the mode of financing contrib-
uted much to the development of the small enterprises (including the smallholder), see: J. Jonker, 
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They were concerned not only with economic motives, ‘…to fight usury, support the 
farmer in his need…,’ but also with Christian values, ‘… to promote thrift, brotherly 
love, industriousness and temperance…’22
At the beginning of the twentieth century Dutch agriculture was characterized by 
dense networks.23 More than 50% of the farmers owning more than 1 ha of land was 
associated with a cooperative. In 1884 the provincial agricultural societies, long the 
association of choice for large landowners, large farmers and rural elites, had founded 
the Netherlands Agricultural Committee as a national umbrella organisation. The 
founding of the Netherlands Farmers’ Union in 1896 led to Catholic farmers’ unions 
in every province and to a rapid increase in the level of agricultural organisation. By 
1913 the Netherlands Agricultural Committee, that by then had subsumed the 
Netherlands Farmers’ Union, counted 130,000 members, some 65% of all farmers.
At the same time the government was also beginning to intervene in the sector. 
Up to the agricultural crisis it had remained passive. The 1886 report of the State 
Commission regarding the condition of agriculture changed all that. The govern-
ment began investments in the agricultural sector with the creation of a knowledge 
infrastructure. This would mark the beginning of the well-known OVO-triptych in 
the twentieth century, the infrastructure for Education, Extension and Research for 
the agricultural sector.
Farmers’ organisations became interwoven with the governmental apparatus, 
which laid the basis for a powerful agricultural lobby in the twentieth century.
The modernisation of agriculture was by no means a catastrophe for the small-
holder and dirt farmer. He certainly had to work hard and employ his entire family 
to keep the farm going, but at the outset of the twentieth century the modernised 
sector was able to support the farming family at a level above the poverty line. 
Favourable economic circumstances also lent a helping hand. The agricultural cri-
sis, meanwhile, had been bested.
What effects can we attribute to the modernisation of the food processing indus-
try, the second link in the food supply chain?
8.3  The Modernisation of the Food Processing Industry
While agriculture flourished in the 1850s, the food processing industry fell on hard 
times. The cost of living had risen due to the liberalisation of international trade, 
which caused stagnation of demand in domestic markets.24 Netherlanders ate less 
‘Welbegrepen Eigenbelang. Ontstaan en Werkwijze van Boerenleenbanken in Noord-Brabant, 
1900–1920’, Jaarboek voor de Geschiedenis van Bedrijf en Techniek 5(1988), 188–206; 
H. Deneweth, O. Gelderblom, J. Jonker, ‘Micro-finance and the Decline of Poverty: Evidence from 
the Nineteenth-Century Netherlands’, Journal of Economic Development 39(2014), no 1, 79–110. 
O. Gelderblom, Waar hebben we de financiële sector eigenlijk voor nodig? (Inaugural Lecture 
Universiteit Utrecht, 2015), TPEdigitaal 9 (2015), no 1, 45–46.
22 Cited in: Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 375.
23 Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 369–371.
24 Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 282.
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meat, resulting in less work for the slaughterhouses. More rye bread was consumed 
instead of the more expensive wheat bread, a shift that had consequences for bakers, 
millers and bread and flour factories. Beer brewers had to cope with declining beer 
consumption. The foods sector was also not very innovative. We can point to the 
small number of steam engines (270) over against the many windmills (2390) and 
horse treadmills (1450) in 1860 (Table 8.2). In this respect, the founding of the first 
bread and flour factory by Sarphati in this period was a ray of light. That was also 
the case for the first beetroot sugar factory in 1858, the start of an entirely new 
branch of industry.
The 1860s were a watershed for the food processing industry. The recovery of 
the domestic market was an important factor. In addition, a number of sectors ori-
ented to the foreign market, like the potato starch and beetroot sugar industries, 
began to flourish. After this, the modernisation of the food processing sector pro-
ceeded apace. The steam engine gained terrain, first at the cost of the horse tread-
mills and from the 1880s on at the cost of the windmills. In addition, new branches 
of industry developed, like the margarine and the dairy industries.
An important characteristic of the modernisation of the food processing industry 
was the application of steam technology and associated modern apparatus like 
kneading machines, milk centrifuges and refrigerators. In some cases legal stric-
tures had impeded the introduction of new production technologies, as we saw in 
the case of Sarphati’s bread and flour factory. But other factors also played a role. 
The operating costs of the new process technologies were lower than those of the 
classic ones. Sarphati, for example, was able to sell his wheat bread in 1865 at an 
impressive 30% lower price than the bakers.
It did, however, mean that the entrepreneur was forced to realize a larger output. 
The new mode of production demanded the existence or creation of a sufficiently 
large market. We can again take Sarphati’s factory as an illustration. The Amsterdam 
market was in principle sufficiently large, but it was dominated by the cartel of 
windmill operators and bakers that had successfully opposed earlier novelties. For 
centuries these two groups had been able to ply their trades under a benevolent 
providence, originally as part of the guild system, later in the form of cartels in 
protected urban markets. But the old corporatist institute lost the competitive strug-
gle with the steam engine and disappeared from the Amsterdam scene.
Table 8.2 Number of power sources in the food processing industry, 1850–1890
1850 1860 1880 1890
Steam engines 100 270 850 1310
Windmills 2150 2390 2280 1210
Horse mills 1640 1450 780 470
Water mills 290 290 90 60
Total 4180 4400 4000 3050
Remark: Figures rounded off to tens
Source: H. Lintsen, ‘Een land met stoom’, in: H. Lintsen et al. (eds.), Geschiedenis van de techniek 
in Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving (Zutphen 1995), part VI, table 7.9, 269–
279
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The need for a large market applied not only to an industrialist who invested in 
large steam engines, but more particularly also to the entrepreneur with a small 
steam engine. This is why small-scale steam-powered enterprises were all but lack-
ing in the countryside until well into the nineteenth century. Here windmills contin-
ued to produce for the local market. Their scale of production suited these 
circumstances. Due to limited transportation infrastructure, there was little threat of 
competition from outside. With the construction of a tramway network from the 
1880s on, the countryside became accessible and the many remaining windmills 
quickly disappeared.
An entrepreneur could also create a larger market by creating a new product with 
the new process technology or by transforming a luxury commodity into a mass 
commodity. Again, Sarphati’s factory can serve as an example. The demand for his 
white bread increased explosively. That was not only because of the low price. 
Wheat and white bread counted as a luxury, a sign of prosperity. Up to then it had 
graced the tables of the poor only on high holidays. On weekdays coarse breads and 
porridges were the common fare. But now finer bread came within the reach of the 
masses and they embraced the opportunity. White bread became a ‘hype’ in 
Amsterdam in the 1860s.25
At the end of the nineteenth century the biggest steam boilers could be found in 
the sugar refineries, the beet sugar factories, the bread and flour factories and the 
potato flour factories (Table 8.3)26 Smaller steam installations were found in the 
beer, margarine and dairy industries. Steam technology was not reserved to new 
branches of industry or to classical industries producing at a larger scale. The clas-
sical small enterprises modernised as well. Many grain mills, hulling mills, roasting 
houses and distilleries invested in steam apparatus, but of course of limited size. The 
consequence was that at the end of the nineteenth century far and away the majority 
of steam engines were to be found in the food processing industry, but with a modest 
average horsepower (10.6 hp) that lay below the national average of 13 hp (Chap. 
10, Table 10.6).
The introduction of steam provides a first impression of modernisation, but inno-
vations in the food processing industry reached further than the steam engine and the 
machines connected to it.27 New processes, for example the pasteurisation of milk to 
increase its shelf life, and new methods, for example the thorough and hygienic 
25 In other places too, but not everywhere in the Netherlands. In some regions like the provinces of 
Drenthe and Overijssel, white bread counted as something for ‘fine folk’ or for the ill and popular 
opinion favoured firm dark rye bread.
26 M.S.C.  Bakker, ‘Voeding’, in: H.W.  Lintsen et  al. (eds.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in 
Nederland: De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1992), volume I, 
48–51. See for innovations in the production of flour, butter, margarine, beer and sugar, various 
chapters in: H.W. Lintsen et al. (eds.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland: De wording van 
een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 1992), volume I.
27 M.S.C. Bakker, ‘Techniek en voeding in verandering’, in: H.W. Lintsen et al. (eds.), Geschiedenis 
van de techniek in Nederland: De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890 (Zutphen 
1992), volume I, 253–264.
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cleansing of apparatus, were introduced. New instruments, among others the intro-
duction of the thermometer, improved the reliability of production processes.
But the question is whether the nutrition of the lowest classes of the population 
improved as a result of the emergence of new process industries, large-scale modes 
of production and countless innovations.
8.4  Food Quantity and Food Quality
It is estimated that around 1900 Netherlanders consumed about one and a half times 
as much potato and grain as in the middle of the nineteenth century.28 The moderni-
sation of agriculture certainly was a contributing factor, particularly as regards the 
cultivation of potatoes. The Netherlands was self-sufficient in this staple and its 
28 The inventory of material flows in our investigation (see appendix 2.1) shows that the domestic 
supply of potatoes in 1913 was 1.4 times that in 1850, and of grain 1.7 times. Bakker, ‘Voeding,’ 
Table 1.1, shows that for the period 1897–1901, 1.8 times as many potatoes were consumed as in 
the period 1852–1856 (including cattle fodder), 3.0 times as much wheat and 1.1 times as much 
rye (including cattle fodder). M.T. Knibbe paints a somewhat different picture in his ‘De hoofdeli-
jke beschikbaarheid van voedsel en de levensstandaard in Nederland, 1807–1913,’ Tijdschrift voor 
Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis, 4 (2007), nr. 4, graph 3. There, the availability of calories 
from the consumption of potatoes grosso modo remains the same between 1850 and 1890 and but 
that from bread cereals (wheat and rye) doubles.
Table 8.3 Most important users of steam in the food processing industry, 1890
Average size of the steam 




Total size of the steam 
boilers, rounded off to 
100 (m2)
Flour factories, bread 
factories, flour and bread 
factories
±590 ±100 59,000
Beet sugar factories, sugar 
refineries
±522 ±36 18,800
Potato flour factories 100 28 2800
Margarine factories ±52 ±50 2600
Beer breweries ±42 ±105 4400
Butter factories, cheese 
factories, dairies
±28 ±50 1400




Hulling mills ±8 ±150 1200
Source: table based on table 1.4 in: M.S.C. Bakker, ‘Voeding in Nederland’, in: H. Lintsen et al. 
(eds.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving 
(Zutphen 1992), part I, 49
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yield per hectare had been greatly increased.29 It is notable that the contribution of 
the modernisation of the food processing industry to the improvement of popular 
nutrition remained limited to the bread and flour factories.30 In a number of cities 
these contributed to the decline in bread prices, though lower grain prices in the 
United States were probably the most important factor. Potatoes and cereals 
remained the staple foods of the largest part of the population. Sugar was a luxury; 
butter remained expensive and was first and foremost exported to England. Even 
margarine, introduced as a cheap substitute for butter, was mainly destined for 
export. Sugar, butter, margarine and meat did appear more often on the tables of the 
‘lesser classes’, but they remained limited to a few grams per day.31
The modernisation of the agricultural and foods sector contributed in a largely 
indirect fashion to the improvement of the ‘popular diet.’ It improved the interna-
tional competitive position of the Dutch economy. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the production and export of foodstuffs were still the most important sec-
tors of the Dutch economy. The food processing industry had the biggest share in 
the added value of industry.32 In this way, agriculture and foods made an important 
contribution to the growth of the gross domestic product and of the consumptive 
expenditures per Netherlander. Among other things, the decrease in food prices 
meant that the relative share of foods in household budgets slowly but surely 
declined. It decreased from about 60% around 1850 to 50% around 1910.33
After 1860 and up to the First World War, famines no longer occurred. Hunger 
stalked the poor from time to time, but ever less frequently and at increasingly 
smaller scales. Social movements were still active in supplying food to the poor. 
Amsterdam, for example, opened a People’s and Children’s Kitchen in 1887, where 
families could enjoy nutritious noonday meals for the price of 7 cents. The improved 
food situation was the most important cause of improvements in public health. 
Average height increased from 165 cm in 1850 to 173 cm in 1910 and the life expec-
tancy of the Dutch from 37 to 55 years. That was an impressive accomplishment.
However the improvement in the food situation was above all a quantitative 
accomplishment. Food quality was another matter. Around 1900, politicians, physi-
29 Van Zanden, De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw, table 5.7. The yield 
per hectare in the period 1913–1918 is approximately two times higher than in the period 
1854–1862.
30 Bakker, ‘Voeding in Nederland’, 50.
31 Bakker speaks of a few grams per day. Estimates on the basis of our research into material flows 
(appendix 2.1) gives the following result: sugar consumption per Netherlander per day 16 grams in 
1850 and 25 grams in 1913 (by comparison: 47 grams in 2010), butter and cheese 31 grams in 1850 
and 30 grams in 1913 (by comparison: 47 grams in 2010), margarine 0 grams in 1850 and 18 grams 
in 1913 (by comparison: 28 grams in 2010), meat 93 grams in 1850 and 113 grams in 1913 (by 
comparison: 221 grams in 2010).
32 Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, table 8.9. See also tables 6.7 and 8.1.
33 E. Horlings and J.P. Smits, ‘Private consumer expenditure in the Netherlands’, Economic and 
social history in the Netherlands 7 (1996), 15–40, graph 3. A.H. van Otterloo refers to a decline of 
70% in 1850 to 50% in 1890. A.H. van Otterloo, ‘Voeding’. in: J. Schot, H.W. Lintsen, A. Rip and 
A.A. de la Bruhèze (eds.), Techniek in Nederland in de Twintigste Eeuw III (Zutphen 2000), 241.
H. Lintsen
181
cians, nutritional experts and citizens engaged in heated debates on this issue.34 The 
diets of the poor and workers was too one-sided, exhibited shortages of essential 
foodstuffs and contained too few calories. Knowledge about healthy nutrition, 
spoilage, proteins, fats, and carbohydrates was not widely disseminated. Exhibitions 
about nutrition were organised. Cooking teachers gave demonstrations for bour-
geois ladies, servants, female workers and their daughters. These sorts of initiatives 
would result after the First World War in the adoption of nutrition as part of home 
economics curricula, food research at universities and research institutes, food 
counselling by expert bureaus and in 1953 the publication of the standardised food 
protocol, ‘the disk of five.’
A separate question was that of the spoilage and adulteration of food. The sale of 
for example spoiled meat was not unusual, nor was illicit fiddling with food. Milk 
could be diluted with dirty water, flour mixed with alum, bread baked with poison-
ous copper sulphate, and candies doped with red lead to give them a cheerful red 
colour. This kind of fiddling was perennial, but it increased with the changes in the 
food supply chains. The scale of food production increased, it was distributed across 
numerous links and it became more anonymous. Producers attempted to generate 
trust in their products by introducing brand names that were supposed to represent 
quality. City governments intervened with inspectors and the establishment of food 
inspectorates, the first in Rotterdam in 1893. In 1919 the national government rati-
fied the Law on Commodities.35
At the start of the twentieth century one important aspect of the issue of ‘public 
nutrition’ had been solved. Quantitatively there was enough food, for the poor as 
well. The problem had now shifted to food quality. Nonetheless, the First World War 
would confront the Netherlands with another problem, namely that of food security. 
Was the food supply sufficiently robust to withstand serious shocks such as a war?
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Chapter 9
Building Materials and Construction: 
The Four Building Challenges
Harry Lintsen
Abstract The chapter analyses the radical changes in the supply chain of building 
materials and construction between 1850 and 1910. It investigates the consequences 
for the four building challenges in this period: public hygiene, public housing, the 
struggle against water and the development of road infrastructure.
The hygienists succeeded in getting the issue of urban pollution due to faeces 
and other organic waste on the societal agenda. Despite this, the effect of the move-
ment on the health of the poor and workers in this period was still minimal. Realising 
the hygienist program demanded firm municipal policy and large investments. 
Moreover there was exuberant debate on the nature of the measures to be taken.
Public housing too became a significant political issue thanks to the efforts of the 
progressive bourgeoisie and socially conscious entrepreneurs. The most important 
result was the passing of the Housing Law of 1901, that provided the future frame-
work for the condemnation, dispossession and improvement of dwellings.
In the field of water management, the government public works agency 
(Rijkswaterstaat), intensified its struggle against regularly recurring river floods. An 
impressive program of river normalisation was carried out under its leadership.
Successive governments would devote much attention to infrastructure with the 
aim of improving welfare, reinforcing the position of the maritime harbours and 
improving the accessibility of remote regions. The construction of a network of 
canals and railways guaranteed the spatial integration of the Netherlands and had 
far-reaching consequences for the modernisation of the economy.
Keywords Construction · Hygienists · Public hygiene · Public housing · Housing 
Law · River improvements · Infrastructure · Railways
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9.1  The Filthy Hole1
In 1864 Jacob van Niftrik, raised in the Ooipolder near Nijmegen, moved to 
Amsterdam. He went to work there as an engineer in the municipal Public Works 
Department. The first thing that struck him was how filthy the capital city was. The 
streets were muddy and the gutters clogged. Garbage accumulated around waste 
bins. The canals were repositories of waste. During walks taken to acquaint himself 
with the city he noticed ‘in many neighbourhoods how pestilential the emanations 
from that garbage were.’ It smelled in alleyways and side-streets, the canals reeked 
abominably and those approaching the many cellar dwellings and houses on inner 
courtyards were greeted by sour-smelling rotten air. In the course of an inspection, 
the effusion from ‘The Hole’ between the Nieuwe Zijds Voorburgwal and the 
Kalverstraat literally robbed him of consciousness. The neophyte municipal engi-
neer was overwhelmed by the rotten air that drifted out of the dwellings and had to 
be taken to the broad canal behind the houses to be revived by his colleagues.
Amsterdam was no exception. The other Dutch cities also smelled and were 
filthy. But there was a difference between the cities in the low Netherlands, where 
due to the nature of the water the situation was worse, and the cities in the high 
Netherlands. (see Chap. 4). The issue of the filthy city has two interesting aspects. 
First, the conditions giving rise to the complaints were as old as the hills. Cities in 
the past had always been dirty, at least by present-day standards. Contemporaries 
once in a while complained and when even by contemporary standards things got 
out of hand, measures were sometime taken. But why did the number of complaints 
increase in the second half of the nineteenth century? In the second place it is strik-
ing that the cities were barely capable of improving the sanitary situation. Despite a 
permanent stream of alarming publications and chronic debate, for a long time after 
1850 little seemed to improve. Was the issue so complicated? Where was the 
opposition?
From a contemporary perspective public health long remained an unimportant 
aspect of quality of life, though it certainly became so in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. It thus became incorporated in the great building challenges in 
the context of well-being. In our broad definition of well-being, health and human 
capital are important aspects of the quality of life and sustainable development. A 
hygienic city is a contributing factor to both. This is connected to another important 
building challenge, namely public housing. Public health demands sanitary facili-
ties in dwellings. At the time, the dwellings of the poor and workers were not ame-
nable to such facilities. A large part of the population lived in slums, sheds and 
hovels, that not only failed to satisfy the new hygienic norms, but also violated any 
number of other new emerging norms.
1 The introduction is based on: H.W.  Lintsen, Made in  Holland: Een techniekgeschiedenis van 
Nederland [1800–2000] (Zutphen 2005), 55–56; H. Buiter, Riool, rails en asfalt: 80 jaar straatru-
moer in vier Nederlandse steden, (dissertation Technical University Eindhoven 2005), 153–155; 




In earlier chapters we noted two other large building challenges from the per-
spective of well-being: the struggle against water and the improvement of infra-
structure. The Dutch delta was a vulnerable region. The land was threatened from 
all sides by water: the sea, enclosed waters and the rivers. In the struggle against 
water the rivers appeared to be the most immanent threat at the time. River floods 
had afflicted successive generations prior to 1850. In the 1850s and subsequent 
decades the issue would be joined and dealt with. Whence this sudden vigour and 
ambition and with what consequences? Improving infrastructure had already been a 
government priority under King William I. And under liberal domination the gov-
ernment continued to concern itself intensively with infrastructure. Proper infra-
structure was seen to be essential to transportation, trade and national welfare. To 
what did this basic orientation lead?
In this chapter the four building challenges– in relation to the issue of poverty – 
provide a framework for further analysis.
9.2  Working on a Hygienic City2
In the first half of the nineteenth century, various reports had put the issues of public 
hygiene and health on the agenda, but only in an incidental way. It was the hygien-
ists who after 1850 were the first to bring this issue to the attention of the public and 
who regularly succeeded in getting the problem onto the political agendas of munic-
ipalities and the national state. They were young physicians generally employed at 
a medical service for the poor, run by a municipality or one of the many churches.3 
They earned little and worked hard. Their work was barely acknowledged. In any 
case, the status of physicians was not in general very high. Cholera epidemics only 
made things worse. In the face of this disease, the profession appeared powerless. It 
is hardly surprising that the hygienists were in search of a new orientation for the 
profession of physician.4
2 This section is based on: E.  Houwaart, ‘Medische statistiek’, in: H.W.  Lintsen, et  al. (eds.), 
Geschiedenis van de techniek in de negentiende eeuw (Zutphen 1993), volume 3, 19–45; H. van 
Zon, ‘Openbare hygiëne’, in: H.W.  Lintsen, et  al. (eds.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in  de 
negentiende eeuw (Zutphen 1993), volume 3, 47–79; E. Houwaart, ‘Professionalisering en staats-
vorming’, in: H.W. Lintsen, et al. (eds.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in de negentiende eeuw 
(Zutphen 1993), volume 3, 81–92; H. Buiter, Riool, rails en asfalt: 80 jaar straatrumoer in vier 
Nederlandse steden (dissertation Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, 2005); E.  Houwaart, De 
hygiënisten: Artsen, staat en volksgezondheid in Nederland, 1840–1890 (dissertation Groningen 
1991); H.W. Lintsen, Wat is techniek? Een geschiedenis van menselijke secreten en discrete tech-
nieken (Inaugural lecture TUE, 1992); H. van Zon, Een zeer onfrisse geschiedenis: Studies over 
niet-industriële vervuiling in Nederland, 1850–1920 (dissertation Groningen 1986).
3 Houwaart, ‘Medische statistiek’, 27–30.
4 Physicians (including the hygienists) wanted not only to define a new practice for the profession 
of medicine but also to improve its position. With the aid of the Netherlands Society for the 
Promotion of Medicine (1849), for example, they succeeded in reducing the number of physicians 
per 100,000 inhabitants from 79  in 1850 to 41  in 1890 and thereby improving their financial 
position.
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They derived inspiration from abroad. Progressive physicians in France, England 
and Germany saw themselves as the ‘advocates of the poor.’ It was their task to 
accurately chart and analyse abuses. They felt compelled to search for correlations 
among the number of ill, the spread of diseases, anatomical pathologies and the 
chemical composition of water, soil and air. Public health had to be expressed in 
figures describing age, sex, birth, death, illness, height, weight, nutrition etc. A sci-
entific, statistical approach would be the basis of a new science, namely the science 
of public health, and of a new perspective on health, namely the maintenance of 
public health. Substandard hygienic circumstances were the evil genius of poor 
public health. The solution for hygienic problems lay in sewer systems, pure drink-
ing water and other new technologies. In addition, it was important that the govern-
ment, in particular the municipalities, acknowledged public hygiene as a 
governmental task, for which means and personnel had to be made available.
The constitutional reforms of 1848 gave the hygienists the chance to manifest 
themselves.5 Physicians acquired voting rights. They became involved in elections 
for parliament, the provincial estates and the municipal councils. Some of them 
entered local and national politics. The hygienists also took steps to set up health 
boards that began to concern themselves with municipal governance. At the same 
time the hygienic program of this emancipated group of physicians began to enjoy 
increasing support. The movement became broader and began to include citizens, 
politicians, entrepreneurs and engineers. During and after the 1870s the issue 
became part of a more encompassing problem, the so-called ‘social question,’ that 
also included poverty, public housing and the question of labour.
That said, the effect of the hygienic movement on the health of the poor and the 
workers remained negligible in the nineteenth century.6 The hygienic program 
required bold municipal policy and big investments. For this reason support for 
these policies among the bourgeoisie, politicians and administrators long remained 
far from sufficient. Municipal finances were inadequate. Consciousness of a public 
health problem and public health policy was limited. Two additional factors also 
played a role.7
First, for a long time there was no consensus among politicians and administra-
tors about the exact causes of poor public health and of epidemic diseases, for 
example the cholera that caused so much commotion in 1848, 1853, 1859 and 
1866.8 Were these contagious diseases, that is to say, diseases spread by contacts 
from person to person? This perspective led to quarantine measures, the isolation of 
the ill and the disinfecting of dwellings. Were epidemics associated with so-called 
miasmas? This referred to particles in the air that made people sick. The mal’aria, 
literally bad air, that prevailed in the low Netherlands, was attributed to this cause. 
5 Houwaart, ‘Professionalisering en staatsvorming’, 84–85 and Houwaart, ‘Medische statistiek’, 
28.
6 Van Zon, ‘Openbare hygiëne’, 47–49.
7 Lintsen, Made in Holland, 58–64.
8 Houwaart, ‘Medische statistiek’, 25–26.
H. Lintsen
187
This perspective emphasized the necessity of fresh air, sunlight and much space. 
Others, again, pointed to causes like spoiled food, polluted soil or a profligate life-
style. Drinking water too counted as a potential source of infection. Research in 
London during the cholera epidemic of 1853 had pointed to infected drinking water 
as the most important vehicle for the spread of the disease. Investigations like these 
influenced the debate in the Netherlands. The hygienists pointed to practices with 
faeces and polluted water as important (but not sole) causes of poor public health. 
Confusion reigned.
A second factor was that there was no consensus – in particular within the broad 
hygienist movement  – about the solution for the problem. The hygienists were 
united in emphasising the importance of a supply of reliable and pure drinking 
water. They supported plans for drilling new and modern wells that became the 
dominant practice in the 1860s and they advocated the construction of piped water 
systems whose numbers increased rapidly from the 1880s on.9 They also concurred 
in supporting plans to set up sanitation departments, to flush urban canals, fill in 
ditches and lay underground sewers. But they were quite at odds about the proper 
approach to the disposal of faeces.
There were three options: the barrel system, the Liernur system and the flushing 
system with a water closet.10 The barrel system, introduced for example in Delft in 
1871, consisted of the placing of toilet barrels in dwellings. A (municipal or private) 
enterprise regularly collected the barrels and processed the faeces into manure to 
sell to farmers. The Liernur system – invented by a Dutch officer of the army engi-
neer corps, C. Liernur, was based on the transport of faeces from dwellings to large 
underground tanks through vacuum pipes. Manure was collected from the tanks and 
transported to farmers and garden farmers by small boats. The vacuum was pro-
duced with steam engines. Leiden (1871), Dordrecht (1873) and Amsterdam (1879) 
performed large-scale experiments with this system. The flushing system with water 
closets consisted of a system of sewers that was coupled to the public drinking water 
supply. For a long time the hygienic movement was unable to settle on the one best 
solution among these alternatives.
9 Modern wells were drilled with a new method developed by the American Norton during the 
American Civil War. He drilled for potable water with an extensible telescopic tube fitted with a 
steel point with openings. This technology made it possible to drill to great depth at low costs. In 
the Hague, the city government together with the Association for the Improvement of the Health 
Situation in The Hague, a local association of hygienists, used this machine to install more than 25 
public pumps that delivered water that was much more trustworthy than that in other wells. Lintsen, 
Made in Holland, 63.
10 Van Zon, ‘Openbare hygiëne’, 62–77.
9 Building Materials and Construction: The Four Building Challenges
188
9.3  Striving for Public Housing11
As we saw above, in 1854 a commission of the Royal Institute of Engineers was 
among the first to address the issue of the housing of the poor and the workers. After 
that the Institute preserved a long silence on this point despite the miserable situa-
tion in the slums that the commission had reported. The Institute would develop into 
a conservative, liberal fortress that barely addressed the social question and that 
oriented itself above all to technology and the applied sciences. Despite this, the 
engineering world would be confronted with public housing by another route, 
namely via the municipal Public Works Departments, that employed engineers, 
architects and other technical professionals. Niftrik was one of them and also one of 
the engineers that developed ambitious plans. But one thing they did not do was to 
improve public housing.
Big cities, namely Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht faced the 
challenge of accommodating their rapidly growing populations (Graph 9.1). Public 
works had a crucial role to play. They produced plans for urban development. 
Municipalities were in principle empowered to steer this development. Legislation 
was certainly inadequate, but they could get a lot done on the basis of building 
codes, land-use ordinances, the granting of concessions and the Public Nuisance 
Act.12 Despite this, little was accomplished on this front. The question was whether 
11 This section is based on: L. de Klerk, De modernisering van de stad: De opkomst van de plan-
matige ontwikkeling in Nederland 1850–1914 (Rotterdam 2008); A. van der Woud, Koninkrijk vol 
sloppen. Achterbuurten en vuil in de negentiende eeuw (Amsterdam 2010); Buiter, Riool, rails en 
asphalt.
12 De Klerk, De modernisering van de stad, 168.
Graph 9.1 Growth of the big cities in the Netherlands, 1795–1900
Remark: Cities with a population greater than 30,000 in the year 1900 count as ‘big’ cities
Sources: Statistisch Jaarboek, various years. F.W. van Voorden. Schakels in stedebouw; een model 
voor analyse van de ontwikkeling van de ruimtelijke kwaliteiten van de 19de- eeuwsestadsuitbreidingen 
op grond van een onderzoek in Gelderse steden (Zutphen 1983)
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urban development should be determined by the market or by government.13 The 
former approach was dominant until the end of the nineteenth century. And munici-
pal finances also played a role. Municipalities had lost important sources of revenue 
due to the abolition of local taxes. At the same time they acquired new responsibili-
ties, among other things in the area of education. Expenditures for Public Works that 
increased strongly after 1870, were continuously under pressure (Table 9.1).
The ambitious plans produced by departments of Public Works supplied much 
fuel for debates in municipal councils and among the broad public. They were regu-
larly voted down or radically altered. The consequence was a fragmented policy.14 
The projects that survived were related to infrastructure (adaptation of water man-
agement, building new roads, connecting up to the railway network, building har-
bours) and public hygiene (laying down sewers, flushing the canals, filling in 
drainage ditches).15 Building houses was considered to be a task for the market. An 
answer to the question of public housing thus had to be provided by private 
initiative.
One of the responses of private initiative was the so-called ‘revolution’ building, 
made possible by a new ‘revolutionary’ method of market oriented financing.16 In 
this approach a land-developer bought up land in a particular area of a city and 
divided it up into parcels. He then sold the parcels to housing contractors, who took 
out a loan at a mortgage bank with as security the ground and the building plans. 
The bank provided the loan in installments after each phase of the building process 
(delivery of the land, driving of the first pile, etc.). That meant fast-paced construc-
tion due to the cost of interest and the fact that various parties needed to be paid – 
which also meant that the building materials became a kind of afterthought. The 
13 De Klerk, De modernisering van de stad, 269.
14 De Klerk speaks of chaotic planning. De Klerk, De modernisering van de stad, 194.
15 Buiter, Riool, rails en asfalt, 43–60; 106–119; 145–167.
16 De Klerk, De modernisering van de stad, 238–239.
Table 9.1 Municipal expenditures in guilders per capita of population, 1862–1907 (three year 
running average)
1862 1877 1892 1907 1907 Cities 1907 Countryside
General Administration 1.50 1.23 1.44 1.97 2.72 1.44
Public Safety 1.07 1.77 1.77 3.27 0.72
Public Works 1.95 3.44 3.17 8.70 17.17 2.69
Education 1.00 2.38 3.78 5.14 7.71 2.69
Poor relief 0.98 0.97 1.22 1.69 2.74 0.94
Interest and amortisation 0.83 2.33 3.39 4.06 8.16 1.16
Investments 0.65 0.28 1.68 3.29 0.54
Other 0.75 0.21 0.48 0.66 1.22 0.26
Unknown 0.65
TOTAL 7.57 12.27 15.43 25.64 46.27 10.81
Source: H. Knippenberg and B. de Pater, De eenwording van Nederland (Nijmegen 1988), 162 and 
164
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approach provided a record number of dwellings in a brief period of time for cities 
that were bursting at the seams, like Amsterdam (the Pijp and the Kinker- 
neighbourhoods), The Hague (the Schilderswijk) and Rotterdam (the Oude Westen). 
But the soundness of the buildings often left much to be desired. Building materials 
and construction were sometimes of inferior quality even to the extent that buildings 
sometimes collapsed. Even though the quality might not differ very much in com-
parison with the existing housing of the poor and workers, the dwellings drew heavy 
fire from hygienists and health commissions. The houses were too close together, 
lacked an adequate drainage system for faeces and often consisted of only one 
room, in which the occupants also cooked and slept.
That things could be otherwise was demonstrated by several socially engaged 
entrepreneurs. Gerard Adriaan Heineken, for example, had a series of dwellings 
built for his workers in the Pijp that had separate kitchens and small gardens. They 
were designed by the architect Gosschalk. Both men were members of ‘Citizen’s 
Duty’ (Burgerplicht), a progressive-liberal political party in Amsterdam. Similar 
entrepreneurial initiatives were seen in other parts of the country as well. A famous 
example was the Agneten Park in Delft, built in the 1880s at the behest of Jacob 
Cornelis van Marken, director of the Dutch Yeast and Methylated Spirits Factory 
(Nederlandsche Gist- en Spiritusfabriek).17 A number of his workers and higher 
personnel lived there. The firm also boasted a number of other social projects like a 
system of profit-sharing, an association building and an employee’s council for con-
sultation. In this way the entrepreneurs sought to encourage loyalty among their 
employees, to exhibit their involvement in the social question, and to project an 
image of themselves as progressive, modern businessmen.18
An entirely different kind of initiative was undertaken by socially responsible 
members of the upper classes. An example was the Jordaan Building Company Inc., 
set up in 1896 by social-liberals like the architect Jan van der Pek and the writer 
Helena Mercier. The company was an experiment intended to investigate whether 
the construction of affordable workers’ housing on the basis of hygienic norms was 
possible. The experiment concerned one-room dwellings with sufficient daylight, a 
separate kitchen and a toilet. A housing inspector, inevitably female, collected the 
rent and checked to see if the occupants obeyed the rent contract, didn’t hang the 
washing up in the room and kept the house clean. In practice it turned out that the 
homes were too expensive for many of the working-class families.
17 E. Nijhof and A. van den Berg, Het menselijk kapitaal: Sociaal ondernemersbeleid in Nederland 
(Amsterdam 2012), 121.
18 This section is based on: A. Bosch and G.P. van de Ven, ‘Rivierverbetering’, in: H.W. Lintsen 
et al. (eds.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland: De wording van een moderne samenlev-
ing (Zutphen 1993), volume II, 95–102; A. van Heezik, Strijd om de rivieren: Tweehonderd jaar 
rivierenbeleid in Nederland (dissertation Technische Universiteit Delft 2005); G.P. van de Ven 
(ed.), Leefbaar laagland: Geschiedenis van de waterbeheersing en landaanwinning in Nederland 
(Utrecht 2003); A. Bosch and W. van der Ham, with H.W. Lintsen, Twee eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat, 
1798–1998 (Zaltbommel 1998); A. Bosch, Om de macht over het water: De nationale waterstaats-




The experiment in the Jordaan deeply influenced the debate on public housing in 
the 1890s. Socially responsible housing construction appeared to be possible only 
when supported by subsidies and legislation. The debate acquired momentum after 
a report on this issue by the Society for the Common Good (Maatschappij tot Nut 
van ‘t Algemeen), written by the social-liberal and lawyer Jan Kruseman, one of the 
founders of the Jordaan Building Company Inc. Inspired by this report, the 
progressive- liberal cabinet Pierson (1897–1901) submitted a proposal for a 
Habitation Act that was ratified by parliament in 1901. The act provided a frame-
work for condemning dwellings and for dispossessing and improving them. It 
defined the role of municipalities in public housing and established the basic rules 
for providing subsidies for socially responsible housing construction. The issue of 
public housing had acquired entirely new dynamics.
9.4  The Improvement of the Rivers19
In the twentieth century, public hygiene and public housing would become one of 
the administrative tasks of municipalities. Municipal governments had already had 
some experience in the area of public hygiene. This had yet to happen in the case of 
public housing. The crucial importance of a tradition of policy-making and imple-
mentation of governmental tasks can be appreciated in the case of another building 
challenge for well-being in the second half of the nineteenth century: the problem 
of the rivers.
The Dutch lived in a vulnerable delta. They experienced that particularly in the 
polders, where flooding and high water were regular occurrences, in the coastal 
zones that were from time to time harassed by storm surges and in the regions of the 
big rivers where successive generations experienced serious flooding. The struggle 
against water in the polders and against storm surges was above all a task for the 
water boards and especially the large regionally consolidated water boards 
(hoogheemraadschappen). They were able to manage high water thanks to the 
introduction of steam-powered pumping stations that enabled them to exercise 
much better control of water levels in the polders. They combatted storm surges by 
building dikes, a strategy that in the nineteenth century was codified into a well- 
organized body of knowledge and resulted in a complete system of defensive 
works.20 The rivers were the responsibility of the water boards and the national 
government. The scale of the problem was such that it had even been fundamental 
for the process of state formation and the founding of the Rijkswaterstaat, the 
national hydraulic and public works agency, in 1798.
19 This section is based on: Bosch and van de Ven, ‘Rivierverbetering’, 95–102; van Heezik, Strijd 
om de rivieren; van de Ven, Leefbaar laagland; Bosch and van der Ham, with Lintsen (ed.), Twee 
eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat 1798–1998; Bosch, Om de macht over het water and  Lintsen, Made 
in Holland, 95–101.
20 Van de Ven (ed.), Leefbaar Laagland, 210.
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The national government thus had a long tradition in caring for the rivers. This 
governmental task was uncontroversial. However, there was a problem: prior to 
1850 the government and the Rijkswaterstaat had been singularly unsuccessful in 
combatting river floods. A certain indecisiveness caused in part by a controversy 
about how to come to grips with the problem lay at the bottom of this malaise. This 
came to an end in the 1850s.
In 1850 the leadership of the Rijkswaterstaat published a short and lucid report 
proposing a strategy for river improvement.21 They rejected the concept of flood-
ways, which could draw off an excess of river water along temporary alternative 
channels, and argued for the regulation and normalisation of the rivers, that is, the 
creation of a river with a bedding as straight as possible, of normalised dimensions 
and with a sizable opening to the sea. The report was a synthesis of ideas and foreign 
experiences accumulated over the preceding period. It came at a point in time that, 
thanks to the victory of the liberals in 1848, a new wind was blowing through the 
political landscape. And after the national treasury had also found its feet again, the 
government and parliament provided large sums of money. This made it possible to 
work on river improvements continually over a long period of time. For years there 
had been great pressure from an industrialising Germany that wanted better access 
to the sea. In Germany itself, massive efforts had already significantly improved the 
navigability of rivers. The Germans now demanded action from the Dutch.
A gigantic program was launched, one in which the Netherlands would invest 
hundreds of millions of guilders of tax revenues and to which successive genera-
tions of engineers, foremen, contractors, polder workers and other labourers would 
contribute. Rijkswaterstaat was in charge and occupied itself chiefly with the river 
beds. The water boards continued to concern themselves with the dikes, as they had 
done for centuries. In the end the entire river region would be transformed. Shores 
were rebuilt and consolidated with groynes and longitudinal embankments, mean-
ders straightened and the river beddings widened. Secondary channels were elimi-
nated by joining islands and sandbanks to the shores. New river mouths were 
created. Dikes were heightened, their width increased and their slopes rendered less 
steep, the outside faces reinforced with basalt and the floodplains cleared.
At the end of the this period hundreds of groynes and lateral dams had been con-
structed along the Waal, Nether-Rhine and Lek. At a number of places, meanders 
had been eliminated, the one at Wijk bij Duurstede taking 6  years. The New 
Merwede, a new Rhine river opening to the Hollands Diep had been in the works for 
35  years and still the river was of inadequate depth. In 1896, after 33  years, 
Rotterdam had a new opening to the sea of the required dimensions, the New 
Waterway. The Meuse and the Waal (main branch of the Rhine in the Netherlands) 
had been separated and the Meuse provided with its own mouth, the Bergsche Maas 
(1883–1904). Extensive dredging was carried out, in particular after 1875. All this 
was possible only for a state that had the necessary organisational and financial 
prowess. Modern technology also played a crucial, if not decisive, role. Dredging 
machines, sand suction dredgers and bucket-excavators, all powered by steam, had 
made the large-scale works possible.
21 Bosch and van de Ven, ‘Rivierverbetering’, 122–123.
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Originally, safety had been the motivation for the river works. The rivers had first 
and foremost to be able to handle large volumes of water and ice. Subsequently 
attention shifted to navigability: achieving and maintaining a certain depth in the 
rivers and estuaries. In time it became normal usage to speak of the rivers as ‘ship-
ping channels.’ Hence, the river works contributed in two ways to the positive devel-
opment of well-being. The Netherlands would be considerably less vulnerable to ice 
jams and high water, while the rivers, as natural capital, functioned more effectively 
in transport and the economy.
9.5  The Infrastructural Revolution22
The development of infrastructure was also an age-old governmental responsibility. 
King William I had invested heavily in this domain. This continued under the new 
constitutional regime. Successive cabinets would devote considerable attention to 
infrastructure. And just as had been the case during William I’s reign, the most 
important arguments for state intervention were the advancement of national wel-
fare, the consolidation of the position of the maritime harbours and the improve-
ment of access to cities and the countryside. But there was an important difference. 
Decision-making on the large projects took considerably more time after 1850 than 
in the previous period (Table 9.2).
In regard to infrastructural projects, the government and politicians were as usual 
approached by countless lobbyists: farmers’ organisations, chambers of commerce, 
water boards, cities, private individuals and a diversity of interest groups. But King 
William I usually came to quick decisions, while governments and parliaments 
within the democratic order were busy evaluating interests, achieving compromises 
and coming to decisions. In this period some of the plans never made it across the 
finish line, or if they did, only after lengthy debates. For example, in 1849 an engi-
neer of the Rijkswaterstaat published a two-volume work in which he proposed to 
drain and reclaim the Zuiderzee, the Frisian Wadden Sea and the Lauwerszee. He 
regarded the ‘present point in time’ eminently suited to realise his plans because of 
the ‘new political life’ and ‘the simplified state administration.’23 This idea would be 
followed by numerous plans for the total or partial reclamation of the Zuiderzee. 
Governments and parliament regularly returned to this question. Still, it would take 
until 1918 – after serious flooding in North Holland in 1916 – before a law mandat-
ing the closure and partial reclamation was adopted.
22 This section is based on: G. Mom and R. Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit: De transport-
revolutie [1800–1900] (Zutphen 2008); A.J. Veenendaal, ‘Spoorwegen’, in: H.W. Lintsen et al. 
(eds.), Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland: De wording van een moderne samenleving 
(Zutphen 1993), volume II, 129–163 and Lintsen, Made in Holland, 193–212.
23 B.P.G. van Diggelen, De Zuiderzee, de Friesche Wadden en de Lauwerszee, hare bedijking en 
droogmaking (Zwolle 1849).
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The national government was the decisive factor in the development of a national 
infrastructure after 1850.24 After 1860 it took the construction of a national railway 
network to hand, after private initiative had failed to do so. In 1863 it committed 
itself to major works to improve maritime access to Rotterdam and Amsterdam: the 
execution by the state of the New Waterway and its subsidising of the North Sea 
Canal. In addition a number of other important canals were dug. From 1894 on, the 
national government also developed a subsidy system for a nationwide network of 
local narrow-gauge steam tramways.
An important factor was also that the state could count on popular support.25 To 
be sure, there were heated discussions about the role of the state, the contribution of 
private enterprise, the design of the networks, the losers in policy making and so 
forth; nonetheless users, local administrators, chambers of commerce, the press and 
public opinion all in principle favoured a good national infrastructure. Transport 
companies eagerly used the new roads, canals, railways and tramways. Travellers 
were enthusiastic and chose the means of transport that promised the shortest travel 
24 Mom and Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit, 403–404.
25 Mom and Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit, 404–405.
Table 9.2 Lead times 
(excluding execution) of large 
projects, 1813–1918 (in 
years)
Project Law Lead time
Period 1813–1815
Great North Holland Canal 1819 7
Keulse Waterway 1821 4
Zuid-Willems Waterway 1822 7
Canal Brugge-Oostende 1822 5
Zederik canal 1824 6
Canal Gent-Terneuzen 1825 8
Reclamation Haarlemmermeer 1837 2
Period 1850–1918
North Sea Canal 1863 14
New Waterway 1863 10
Merwede Canal 1881 14
Relocation Meuse mouth 1883 23
Closure Zuiderzee/Polders 1918 50
Remark: Lead time is the time from the moment that the 
responsible administration adds the project to its agenda 
to the start of the actual execution. The year indicates the 
point in time that the project is mandated by law. In that 
same year (or soon thereafter) the actual work is gener-
ally started
Source: H.W.  Lintsen and M.L. ten Horn-van Nispen, 
‘Grote infrastructuurprojecten als belangenstrijd: niets 
nieuws onder de zon?’, in: Grote infrastructuurprojec-
ten: inzichten en aandachtspunten, achtergrondstudies 
ten behoeve van de Tijdelijke Commissie 
Infrastructuurprojecten (Den Haag 2004), 36–45
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time. Passenger transport had increased in speed and decreased in cost (Table 9.3). 
The costs of freight transport had also declined (Table 9.4).
9.6  The Balance
From a present-day perspective on well-being, the Netherlands faced four building 
challenges: public hygiene, public housing, water management and transportation 
infrastructure. At the time, the latter two were also acknowledged to be important 
building challenges and had been the responsibility of the state since the founding 
of the Kingdom (in 1815). The two former challenges were manoeuvred onto the 
political agenda by the ‘societal midfield’ (in particular the hygienists) and increas-
ingly came to be seen as construction agendas for municipalities. Results were 
mixed.
Public Works departments of municipalities, particularly in the low Netherlands, 
regularly initiated construction of hygienic facilities (sewers, flushing of canals) and 
entrepreneurs were active in public housing (‘revolution’ building). But municipali-
Table 9.3 Passenger transport. Development of speed and transport costs, 1850–1900
Means of transport
Speed (km/hour) Transport costs (cents/km)
1850 1890–1900 1850 1890–1900
Tow barge 7 – 2.5
Stage coach/omnibus on paved road 10–12 ? 7.2–8.6 3.6–7.5
Steamship 10–15 10–15 2.3–3.0 1.0–1.5
Steam Railway 30–35 45–55 2.4–2.6 1.7–1.9
Steam Tram 12–14 1.75–3.0
Source: R.  Filarski and G.  Mom, Van transport naar mobiliteit. De transportrevolutie [1800–
1900] (Zutphen 2008), 402
Table 9.4 Freight transport: Development of speed and transport costs, 1850–1900
Means of transport Type of transport
Transport costs (cent/tonxkm)
1850 1890–1900
Maritime shipping 0.4–1.0 0.1–0.4
Inland shipping Domestic shipping 1–4 0.4–1.0
Rhine upstream 4.6 0.6–1.3
Rhine downstream 2.0 0.3–0.5
Small rivers in eastern Netherlands 9–14
Horse and wagon Unpaved road 28–35
Paved road 12–19
Steam railway 6.3 1.8–1.9
Tram ca.5
Source: R. Filarski and G. Mom, Van transport naar mobiliteit. De transportrevolutie [1800–1900] 
(Zutphen 2008), 403
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ties were incapable of formulating coherent policy in these areas. After the Law on 
Municipalities of 1851, they had to reinvent themselves before they could assume 
tasks in the domain of public hygiene, urban development and public housing and 
before they could provide the necessary means. Municipal governments were 
goaded into action by public opinion, social movements and a rapidly growing 
urban population. The financial situation proved an impediment. Many municipali-
ties attempted to surmount their financial limitations by establishing a municipal 
gasworks (instead of granting concessions to a private firm) in order to generate 
extra income. A crucial factor was also that the national government created a legal 
framework for public health and public housing in order to legitimate, record and 
support municipal action.
The national government had a better track record with its building challenges 
than the municipalities. Its struggle against water had made the region of the large 
rivers much safer. Flooding as a result of ice jams ravaged the river region one more 
time in the nineteenth century, but that was in 1861when the normalisation project 
had only just been initiated. In the twentieth century, high river stages due to exces-
sive rainfall and melting snow would once again overtax the rivers. For the first time 
in 1926 with extensive flooding as a consequence and – after a long period of rela-
tive calm – in 1993 when large parts of Limburg were flooded and in 1995 with a 
mass-evacuation of population from the river region as levees threatened to break. 
The national state also realised major works in the area of transport infrastructure 
and under its leadership coherent networks were created. This had two kinds of 
effects in relationship to well-being.
In the nineteenth century the Netherlands long remained ‘an archipelago of 
regions and societies.’ Until the 1860s large parts of the Netherlands were poorly 
accessible, barely opened up and inhabited by isolated and autonomous social com-
munities. To be sure, the country was formally a unified state with a national legal 
system, but by no means a country characterised by a certain degree of economic, 
mental and cultural unification.26 Every region had its own dialect, costume, prod-
ucts, dishes and local time.
In the first place, the transportation infrastructures enabled spatial integration 
and were an important prerequisite for the state formation of the Netherlands. Travel 
times, for example, decreased dramatically between 1850 and 1920. With the excep-
tion of Zeeuws Vlaanderen, the entire country could be reached from Utrecht within 
5 h (Fig. 9.1). People and goods could circulate faster, ideas spread more quickly 
and social networks extend over greater distances. This was of course also abetted 
by the rise of newspapers, the telegraph and the telephone. New ideas about poverty, 
health, housing and labour penetrated more quickly into the furthest corners of the 
Netherlands. The activities of political parties, unions, health commissions acquired 
a broader reach. It was easier to mobilise social and occupational groups. Health 
became public health and housing became public housing. Both became a problem 
for the nation and hence also of the state.
26 H. Knippenberg and B. de Pater, De eenwording van Nederland (Nijmegen 1990).
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In the second place, spatial integration had far-reaching consequences for the 
modernisation of the economy. The modern economy was heavily dependent on 
scale, mass and speed. A key technology like steam could only develop on the basis 
of larger-scale production than was customary with existing technologies; it 
demanded a faster supply of raw materials and required larger markets. The opening 
up of the countryside, providing access to urban markets and making connections 
Fig. 9.1 Area in the Netherlands in 1850, 1870 and 1920 accessible from Utrecht within a given 
time
Source: A.J. Thurkow, J.D.H. Harten, H. Knippenberg et al., ‘Bewoningsgeschiedenis’, Atlas van 
Nederland (Den Haag 1984), part 2. See also: H. Knippenberg and B. de Pater, De eenwording van 
Nederland (Nijmegen 1990), 57
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with foreign regions were important factors in this connection. Roads, canals, riv-
ers, railways and local light rail made them possible.
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Abstract The chapter analyses the radical changes in the supply chain of fossil 
fuels between 1850 and 1910. It does this in relationship to the development of 
industry and investigates the consequences for the factory system, the environment 
and class relations.
The modernisation of the economy was an important precondition for the 
increase in welfare and the decline of extreme poverty. It involved agriculture and 
nutrition, infrastructure and transportation, industry and steam technology. 
Agriculture, foods, infrastructure and transportation were discussed in previous 
chapters. Industry and steam technology are the focus of this chapter.
The transition to coal and steam was accomplished in this period. It was typical 
of the Netherlands that the development of steam technology did not in the first 
place lead to the establishment of factories, but to the modernisation of workshops 
and small firms. Craft production remained dominant. To be sure, labour relations 
became more business-like due to liberalisation and sharp competition, especially in 
the cities, but it never came to social disruption or class conflict.
The emergence of steam technology raised questions about the safety of the 
vicinity and the nuisance inflicted on residents. A Steam Law and a Steam 
Inspectorate were relied on to minimise the risks of possible explosions. The nui-
sance law was intended to prevent irritating smoke, smell and vibrations as far as 
possible. However complaints about nuisance were almost never sufficient cause to 
refuse a permit. In most cases the interests of industry prevailed.
Harry Lintsen with contributions from Rick Hölsgens and Ben Gales.
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10.1  36 h Lugging Warm Stearin Around1
An odd gathering assembled on Monday, January 10, 1887 in one of the meeting 
rooms of the second chamber of parliament. On one side of the table sat a reputable 
commission of eight persons. Chairman was the former lawyer Herman Verniers 
van der Loeff. As parliamentarian he stood out as a conservative liberal, vehemently 
opposed to suffrage for workers, among other things. On the other side of the table 
sat four women, uncomfortable, shy and poorly clothed. They were workers at the 
Royal Factory of Wax Candles in Amsterdam.
The four women were being questioned by a parliamentary board of enquiry that 
was investigating the well-being of workers in factories and workshops in the 
Netherlands. In the course of earlier sessions it had already become clear that 
Verniers van der Loeff played the leading role and that he did that with great zeal 
and manifest expertise. In this case he had to mobilize all his resources to put the 
women at ease and to get them to talk frankly about their situation. He succeeded 
only in part. But a number of issues did surface. as the following fragments from the 
transcript reveal2:
Chairman: … How long then do you work at a stretch?
Hendrika Kamphuizen: 36 hours
Chairman: Did that happen recently?
Henrika K.: About four weeks ago.
…
Chairman: What did you have to do during those 36 hours, tell us that. Walk around with 
warm stearin?
Hendrika K.: Yes
Chairman: And transfer that to the trays?
Hendrika K.: Yes. in the machines.
Chairman: The machines. by this you mean the forms containing the candles?
Hendrika K.: Yes
Chairman: So you have to pour the vessels with stearin over into the forms and cut off the 
candles. That is your work during the 36 hours. You were never able to sit?
Hendrika K.: No. sir.
1 The introduction is based on: H.W. Lintsen et al., Made in Holland: Een techniekgeschiedenis van 
Nederland [1800–2000] (Zutphen 2005), 155–157.
2 De arbeidsenquête van 1887: Een kwaad leven. (Nijmegen 1981), Part 1 Amsterdam, p. 220–222. 
The publication is a reprint of the labour enquiry of 1887 with an introduction by J. Giele.
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Chairman: At night you were not given an hour to rest?
Hendrika K.: from 12 to 1.
Chairman: And during this time you could lie on the floor a bit?
Hendrika K.: Yes. I would look around for a soft plank.
…
Chairman: … Now is this good or bad for adolescent girls and women?
Hendrika K.: Almost nobody can take the night work. The next day most are ill and com-
plain about pain in the legs, in the head, in the lower back…
The publication of the hearings and the report of the commission caused a wave of 
indignation. The public responded with complete disbelief. That such things were 
possible in the Netherlands. In hearing after hearing, one abuse followed the other: 
women who worked outrageously long hours, children that were beaten, workers 
subject to capricious bosses, low wages, unhealthy working conditions, dangerous 
machines and on and on.
Up to that time in the Netherlands, the debate on the factory system had been 
rather ‘academic.’ If authors (especially in academic circles) referred to concrete 
abuses, they usually cited reports from England, sometimes Belgium or another 
country. A very few were acquainted with the factory on the basis of actual observa-
tion. But the parliamentary enquiry of 1887 put a face on the Dutch factory system. 
About 150 people were interviewed. The ‘bare’ verbatim transcript of questions and 
answers made the introduction to factory labour almost a personal experience.
There is something remarkable about the parliamentary enquiries of 1887 and 
1890. They loosened tongues about the factory system. But on closer reading it is 
obvious that more is at issue, as witness the following fragment from the enquiry, in 
which the home-working tailor Petrus Schröder is questioned:
Petrus S.: Then it happens – our trade is unpleasant on this point –that we have to work 
through the night, especially on Friday and Saturday nights; then all too often it happens 
that the children, no less than the father, if they are up to it, sleep for only an hour or work 
at one stretch until Sunday morning 10 o’clock…
Chairman: How old are the children of whom you now speak?
Petrus S.: They sometimes begin at age 9 or 10. Such children often have to help out 
between school time and until 11 or 12 o’clock in the evening…3
The description did not diverge very much from that given of the factory. It was 
even questionable whether craft labour as performed at home or in workshops was 
a better option than factory labour. Here too child labour, women’s labour, acci-
dents, unhealthy situations, occupational diseases, capriciousness, long working 
hours, monotony etc. were the rule. Craft work, as it was described, had suffered 
such conditions for centuries, but never had these abuses led to public indignation. 
Apparently, more was at issue in regard to the social debate on labour. It was not 
only a response to the emergence of the factory system, but also motivated by 
changed attitudes among the bourgeoisie to the well-being of the worker. The 
factory as a new phenomenon was a stimulus to think about the production factor 
3 De arbeidsenquête van 1887: Een kwaad leven, 220–222.
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‘labour’ in general and to formulate new values and norms for quality of life. In 
other words, in addition to a structural change in the economy, one could also speak 
of a cultural revolution in society.
The factory was one of the most important technical-organisational innovations 
of the modern economy. It was characterised by a concentration of labour and capi-
tal (in the form of machines and apparatus). The modernisation of the economy was 
a broad phenomenon that affected agriculture and nutrition, infrastructure and trans-
port, industry and the factory. Agriculture, nutrition, infrastructure and transport 
have been discussed in preceding chapters. In this chapter industry and the factory 
are in the limelight with a focus on coal as the energy source and the steam engine 
as prime mover. We start with the changes in industry but will certainly come back 
to the issue of labour. And the persistence of poverty will also draw our attention. 
Did the changes in industry contribute to the mitigation of poverty?
10.2  Finally an Industrial Nation and a Decline of Extreme 
Poverty4
The liberalisation of international trade since the 1840s had meant booming busi-
ness for agriculture, but not for Dutch industry. Agricultural prosperity depended in 
the first place on the international competitive advantage of the Netherlands in the 
area of cattle husbandry, allowing trade in agricultural produce like butter, cheese 
and cattle to flourish. It was thus more attractive to invest in agriculture than in 
industry. In addition, domestic prices for foodstuffs rose to British levels and the 
cost of living increased.5 That had far-reaching consequences for the domestic mar-
ket and a series of economic sectors. The growth of the entire food processing 
industry, that counted for the bulk of industrial production, stagnated. The same was 
true of the construction, clothing and leather industries.
Finally, there were big problems in the ‘colonial complex,’ in which the 
Netherlands Trade Society (NHM) monopolised the most important flows of trade 
between the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands.6 It began with a crisis on Java 
at the beginning of the 1840s. Trade in calico all but collapsed and the NHM strug-
gled with serious overcapacity. Even more problematic was the fact that the indus-
trial sectors closely connected to the ‘colonial complex’ were not prepared for the 
liberalised international market. For years the NHM had protected the Dutch cotton, 
shipbuilding and maritime shipping sectors against foreign competition. It had 
moreover all but failed to invest in the modernisation of these sectors. Cotton, ship-
building and maritime shipping found themselves adrift in heavy seas. The cotton 
4 For the first part of this section see: J.L van Zanden and A. van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914: Staat, 
instituties en economische ontwikkeling (Amsterdam 2000), 277–288.
5 Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 282.
6 Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 278–281.
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industry was the first to extricate itself from the legacy of the NHM. After the 1860s, 
the transition to factory production enabled cotton manufacturers to confront inter-
national competition. It took considerably longer for shipbuilding and maritime 
shipping. They regained an international presence only in the 1890s with the transi-
tion to steam and iron.
It seemed that it was only in the long term that Dutch industry began to profit 
from the liberalisation of economic life and the integration of domestic and 
 international markets.7 Its recrudescence began in the 1860s. Among the first signs 
were the establishment of bread and flour factories. The industrial renaissance was 
characterised by, among other things, specialisation – for example by a number of 
new agricultural industries like beetroot sugar fabrication and the margarine 
industry. The emergence of a shoe-making industry in the Langstraat (North 
Brabant) also fit this pattern. Dutch industry also became internationally more 
competitive. Wages lagged behind those of other countries, the cost of foreign 
coal had declined and the cost of imported raw materials and fabricated products 
had developed favourably. Modernisation proceeded across a broad front and 
industry began to assume a central place in economic development. The size of the 
industrial workforce began to exceed that of the agricultural workforce 
(Table 10.1). At the start of the twentieth century about an equal number of work-
ers were employed in industry and in the service sector (each about 35% of the 
workforce).
Liberalisation and industrialisation exerted considerable influence on the devel-
opment of extreme poverty in the Netherlands. The country was in a sorry state from 
the end of the 1840s up to the end of the 1860s (Graph 7.1).8 Population growth and 
the growth of the gross domestic product declined in the 1840s and 1850s 
(Table  10.2). Even on a per capita basis, the GDP declined. To be sure, some 
branches of agriculture and trade flourished, but the profits accrued to only a small 
elite of farmers and merchants. The recession in industry and in other parts of the 
economy in connection with increasing inequality led to an increase in extreme 
7 Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 283–287. Some branches of industry flourished 
thanks to chance circumstances. The printing industry, for example, fared well thanks to the 
rescinding of the newspaper seal (a tax measure) in 1871 that made newspapers considerably 
cheaper and increased the demand for them.
8 See appendix 4.1 for a quantitative analysis of poverty in the nineteenth century.
Table 10.1 The distribution of the workforce across agriculture, industry and services (in percent)
1850 1890 1910
Agriculture 40 36 30
Industry 31 32 34
Services 29 32 36
100 100 100
Source: J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden, Dutch GNP and its components, 1800–1913 
(Groningen 2000), Table C.1, 115–117
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poverty. It is estimated that 30–40% of the Dutch population around 1860 lived 
under the poverty line. In some years that amounted to more than a million 
Netherlanders. The magnitude of extreme poverty would decline in the course of the 
1860s. After 1870 that happened quite rapidly. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century about 6% of the Dutch population continued to be extremely poor.
From the 1870s on the Dutch population increased by more than 1% per annum 
and from the 1880s the GDP by as much as 2%. Industry, along with trade, was the 
chief engine of the economy (Table 10.2). This is not to say that that agriculture no 
longer played a role. Quite the contrary, agriculture, the food processing industry 
and the trade in food products were still the building block of most important com-
plex in the Dutch economy.
10.3  Steam for Big and Small9
A crucial factor in the industrialisation process was the development of energy tech-
nology. From a technological perspective, energy is transformed into useful effects 
in the economy by the application of capital and labour. Labour’s contribution is 
limited, namely by the amount of food that a worker or an animal can consume. For 
this reason a human can deliver continuously about 0.1 hp and a horse about 0.5 hp 
in the course of a day.10 Mechanical prime movers break through these limits. With 
the technology of the time, windmills could deliver a maximum of 30 hp, but only 
9 See for  this section: H.W.  Lintsen, ‘Een land met stoom’, in: H.W.  Lintsen et  al. (eds.), 
Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving (Zutphen 
1995), volume VI, 191–216 and Lintsen et al., Made in Holland, 133–154.
10 For the horsepower of different prime movers, see: Lintsen, ‘Een land met stoom’, notes 3–7 in 
chapter 7, 294–295.
Table 10.2 Contribution of agriculture, industry and services (in per cent of total) to the growth 
of the gross domestic product (GDP), 1840–1913
1840–1850 1850–1860 1860–1870 1870–1880 1880–1895 1895–1913
Population growth 0.71 0.65 0.87 1.12 1.17 1.40
Growth GDP 1.11 0.59 2.38 1.74 2.10 2.37
Growth GDP per 
capita
0.40 −0.07 1.51 0.62 0.93 0.97
Contribution to growth of GDP
Agriculture 34.3 −0.7 24.9 −6.6 11.6 2.6
Industry 8.1 −6.1 32.1 68.3 34.2 37.0
Services 57.6 106.8 43.0 38.3 54.3 60.4
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: J.L. van Zanden and A. van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914. Staat. instituties en economische 
ontwikkeling (Amsterdam 2000), table 4.2. 152 and table 8.1. 345
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Table 10.3 The average growth of labour productivity in industry. 1807–1913 (in percent)






Remark: The growth of labour productivity in the period 1860–1890 is above all concentrated in 
the years 1860–1875. After this it even declines a bit. See: Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 
1780–1914, Graph 6.3 on p. 245
Source: J.P. Smits. ‘The determinants of productivity growth in Dutch manufacturing, 1800–1913’ 
(Paper presented at the workshop National Accounts, Utrecht 1992), Graph 1
Table 10.4 The number of prime movers in industry by type, 1850–1890
±1850 ±1860 ±1880 ±1890
Horse mills 1930 1710 910 570
Windmills 3050 3400 3120 1790
Water mills 470 500 250 160
Steam engines 290 820 2740 3930
Gas engines 10 20
Total 5740 6430 7030 6470
Remark: The figures are rounded off to the nearest ten
Source: H. Lintsen, ‘Een land met stoom,’ in: H. Lintsen et al. (eds.).Geschiedenis van de techniek 
in Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving (Zutphen 1995), part VI, table 7.1. 192
when the windmill was really big and there was a stiff breeze blowing. The average 
power of a windmill throughout the year was considerably lower, about 6 hp. Water 
mills in the Netherlands with their very modest hydraulic heads usually delivered no 
more than 10 hp. The production ceiling that the Netherlands was able to achieve 
with the classic technologies was once again shattered by steam technology. But 
first the country had to develop into a ‘steam society,’ that is to say into a society in 
which infrastructure, institutions, legislation, entrepreneurial behaviour and produc-
tion processes were adapted to steam technology. That process was accomplished in 
the nineteenth century and in particular after 1850.
In the nineteenth century industrial labour productivity tripled. That increase was 
achieved almost entirely in the period 1860–1890 with an annual growth in labour 
productivity of 4.8% (Table 10.3). This growth was realised above all with steam 
engines and their associated production technologies. The number of steam engines 
increased rapidly after 1860 at the expense of wind, horse and water mills 
(Table 10.4). The transition to steam technology seemed an inevitable process. But 
for the entrepreneurs of the day it was anything but that.
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Between 1860 and 1890 manufacturers were confronted with a variety of options 
for their production processes and with numerous uncertainties in decision-making. 
Prior to 1860 steam could not, under prevailing conditions, compete with wind and 
water. After 1890 there were still limited possibilities for the classic means of pro-
duction. During the transitional phase, entrepreneurs had a choice of different pos-
sibly successful manufacturing strategies: continuing with the mill and cottage 
industry, combining mills and steam engines, adopting small steam engines or 
large-scale use of steam technology. The situation was made even more complex by 
a ceaseless stream of innovations. The changing prices of raw materials, new but 
unclear market expectations and changing social needs. The upshot was that entre-
preneurs were not facing anything like a clear set of choices, but more often a con-
fusing muddle. As much as possible, therefore, they adopted a course of gradualism 
as a strategy of coping with the possibilities and impossibilities of steam.
While the transition to steam followed a tortuous path, one could still speak of 
the inevitable advance of the steam engine. Three structural developments underlay 
this dynamic. In the first place, the running costs of steam engines continually 
declined, especially for small steam engines of up to about 20 hp. Steam engines 
became cheaper. The costs of repair and maintenance declined. Coal became 
cheaper, in part because of the elimination of excise taxes on coals in 1863. All told, 
running costs declined in the second half of the nineteenth century by roughly 
50%.11
Further, steam engines were increasingly coupled to new and dedicated machin-
ery, for example rollers instead of millstones in the grain mills, hydraulic presses 
instead of hammers in the oil mills, and churns instead of centrifuges in the dairy 
industry. It did not take long before the multiplication of production by means of a 
steam engine became both possible and necessary in order to compete with ‘classic’ 
means of production.
In the third place, opportunities for steam technology increased along with the 
size of markets. The entrepreneur opting for steam was in almost all cases ‘doomed’ 
to increased production and bigger markets. That not only applied to manufacturers 
with large steam engines, but also and especially to the entrepreneur with a small 
steam engine. Institutional barriers that hobbled large-scale production had to be 
eliminated, among other things urban autonomy, guilds and specific laws like the 
Milling Law. Various factors provided fertile soil for the upscaling of production. 
The construction of the railway network after 1860 and of tramways after 1880 
provided access to local markets and laid the basis for national markets. The pur-
chasing power of the population increased from the 1860s on. Producing for large 
and distant markets was a stimulus for steam, as the production of butter, margarine, 
paper, sugar and textiles showed.
Despite all this, the adoption of steam technology would not initially lead to the 
emergence of the factory with its large-scale production. Steam engines were first 
and foremost installed in small enterprises. The average power was low, around 
13  hp. (Table  10.5). Only in the textiles and chemicals sectors did the average 
11 Lintsen, ‘Een land met stoom’, volume VI, table 7.7, 198.
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exceed 20 hp. These sectors had many large mechanised enterprises. The average 
size of industrial firms changed slowly. Around 1890 only 20% of the population 
worked in enterprises with 10 or more employees. Only after that time did middle 
and large-sized enterprises begin to appear. In 1909 as much as 40% of the work-
force was employed in middle and large-sized firms. By the early twentieth century 
the factory began to dominate the industrial landscape of the Netherlands.
Energy consumption in the nineteenth century changed dramatically with the 
advent of steam technology. Total energy consumption in that century is estimated 
to have become five times as high, while the population increased by about two and 
a half times (Graph 10.1). Energy consumption increased at the same rate as the 
GDP (Graph 10.2). Around 1850, 84% of the energy was derived from the tradi-
Table 10.5 The number of steam engines in industry by sector. 1890
Sector Number % of total Average power in hp
Food Processing 1308 33 10.6
Construction 467 12 15.9
Textiles 451 11 21.0
Ceramics 274 7 10.5
Shipbuilding/vehicles 265 7 3.4
Lumber 265 7 16.6
Chemicals 227 6 21.8
Metal 204 5 8.7
Misc. 464 12
Total 3925 100% 13.0
Source: Lintsen, ‘Een land met stoom’, volume VI, table 7.6 and table on p. 270
Graph 10.1 Consumption of different energy sources, 1800–1900
Source: B.  Gales and H.  Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the Netherlands: Sustainability chal-
lenges in a historical and comparative perspective (Groningen 2016), 11 and appendix 1
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tional sources: humans, animals, wind, water and turf. By the turn of the century 
that percentage had decreased to 34%. Coal became far and away the dominant 
source of energy.
On the eve of the First World War 88% of Dutch coal was being imported from 
abroad. That made Dutch energy supplies vulnerable. Some were quite concerned 
and advocated the exploitation of coal layers in the province of South Limburg (see 
Chap. 15). Others trusted to international law, that made it difficult to proclaim 
export restrictions and blockades against neutral countries in time of war. Such 
countries could take it for granted that their trade flows would not dry up.
What were the consequences for the natural environment of this transition to an 
economy based largely on fossil energy sources? Climate change and greenhouse 
gas emissions were non-issues in those days. But even from a present-day perspec-
tive the transition was still hardly a problem. Energy consumption and the associ-
ated greenhouse gas emissions were low by present-day standards and lay far 
beneath the norms that are now being pursued for the Netherlands (Table 10.6). 
Matters were quite different, however, as far as safety was concerned and nuisances 
from smells, soot and smoke.
Graph 10.2 Economic growth and energy consumption, 1820–1920 (1860 = 100)
Source: B. Gales, A. Kander, P. Malanima and M. del Mar Rubio Varas, ‘North versus South: 
Energy transition and energy intensity in Europe over 200 years’, European Review of Economic 
History 11 (2007), no. 2, 219–253
Table 10.6 Energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in the Netherlands in 1910 and 
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10.4  Coal and Steam as Nuisance12
The increasing use of coal and steam had palpable consequences for the immediate 
surroundings. Safety was the first issue to attract government intervention. As early 
as 1824, King William I ruled that boilers should be inspected to prevent explosions. 
This decision was the basis of additional legislation, ultimately leading to the Steam 
Law of 1869.13 In the meantime the government had delegated boiler inspection to 
the Steam Service (Stoomwezen). This service enjoyed an outstanding reputation 
and was held to be quite conscientious. Steam boilers had to be fitted with a number 
of devices such as two safety valves and an alarm system in case they ran out of 
water. Boiler manufacturers provided these devices as standard equipment. The 
regular inspections could not prevent the occurrence of occasional explosions. They 
were not frequent – as far as we can tell only four of them in the 1880s – but in some 
cases at the cost of human life.
The owner of a steam installation also had to deal with legislation that now falls 
under what we know as the Nuisance Law (Hinderwet). He always needed a permit 
and the surrounding residents could protest the installation of a steam engine. The 
12 See for this section: Lintsen, ‘Stoom in ontwikkeling’.
13 Nineteenth-century regulations concerning the safety of boilers included the following decisions 
and laws:
The ‘Decision containing the specification of temporary safety measures on the use of steam 
engines’ (‘Besluit houdende daarstelling van voorloopige veiligheidsmaatregelen bij het aan-
wenden van stoomwerktuigen’, 6-5-1824, Staatsblad nr. 32).
The ‘Decision concerning changes in the earlier legislated safety regulations on the use of steam 
engines’ (‘Besluit houdende wijziging der vroeger voorgeschrevene veiligheids-maatregelen 
bij het aanwenden van stoomwerktuigen’, 26-9-1833, Staatsblad nr. 58).
The ‘Decision concerning specifications in regard to the inspection of the steam engines noted 
therein and the supervision of their use’ (‘Besluit houdende bepalingen nopens het onderzoek 
der daarbij vermelde stoomwerktuigen en het toezigt op hun gebruik’, 24-5-1855, Staatsblad 
nr. 40).
The ‘Law regulating supervision of the use of steam apparatus’ (‘Wet regelende het toezigt op het 
gebruik van stoomtoestellen’, 28-5-1869, Staatsblad nr. 97).
The ‘Decision to implement the law of May 28 1869, regulating the supervision of the use of steam 
apparatus’ (Besluit tot uitvoering der wet van 28 mei 1869, regelende het toezigt op het gebruik 
van stoomtoestellen, 4-9-1869, Staatsblad nr. 154).
The ‘Law concerning regulation of the supervision of the use of steam apparatus’ (‘Wet houdende 
regeling van het toezicht op het gebruik van stoomtoestellen’, 15-4-1896, Staatsblad nr. 69).
The ‘Decision to implement the Steam Law (Law of 15 April 1896), (‘Besluit tot uitvoering der 
Stoomwet (wet van 15 april 1896)’, 19-10-1896, Staatsblad nr. 163).
The ‘Decision concerning the establishment of a protocol for civil servants, as stipulated in article 
7 of the Steam Law (Law of 15 April 1896), (Besluit tot vaststelling van eene instructie voor de 
ambtenaren, bedoeld in art. 7 der Stoomwet (wet van 15 april 1896), 14-1-1897, Staatsblad nr. 
45).
In 1855 the government entrusted supervision to a separate agency, the Steam Service. Prior to 
that the government contracted the services of experts that performed inspections as an adjunct to 
their main occupations.
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number of objections is unknown, but there were regular complaints.14 An engineer 
sent to investigate conditions in the city of Zutphen heard from house painters work-
ing near a steam mill that ‘windows painted two days ago were once again speckled 
with black particles.’ He also reported that laundry hung out to dry appeared to be 
covered with black dust. Houses located downwind of the steam engine were unable 
to open their windows ‘…without breathing in choking fumes instead of fresh air.’ 
Also, at some houses ‘…the gutters and courtyards were full of dust and everywhere 
in the neighbourhood the windows were apparently dirty and glazed with smoke.’ 
Finally, the engineer examined the rainwater destined for consumption and found it 
to be ‘completely black.’15
Nearby residents sometimes also had problems with the boiler and the steam 
engine themselves. A certain Mr. Wouters of Nijmegen was one of them and pro-
tested the construction of a steam grain mill in the shed next to his home. The shed 
and the dwelling were separated by a brick wall ‘partly with a thickness of one brick 
and also a half brick.’ To make matters worse, Wouter’s box bed was positioned next 
to the shed, ‘surrounded only by a half-brick thick wall and only 60 inches (=0,6 m – 
HL) distant from the sheathing of the boiler.’ Wouters expected to sleep poorly. It 
was claimed that: ‘Because of the situation of the boiler and chimney, so close to the 
box bed and separating wall, his house will become unbearably hot, which in addi-
tion to the noise and the vibration of the engine, the threat of fire and explosion of 
the boiler will make the inhabitation and in general the renting of a portion of the 
house impossible…’16 The workshops equipped with steam engines were more 
often than not located in the narrow streets of the city centres, surrounded by houses 
in which people lived and worked and ‘difficult to access in case of fire and danger-
ous for the entire neighbourhood.’ But factories on the edges of towns could also be 
dangerous and a nuisance.
Complaints about emissions and other nuisances were only rarely considered 
sufficient cause to refuse a permit. The interests of industry were usually allowed to 
prevail. Still, the laws did have some effect on steam technology. Where the govern-
ment considered the complaints grounded, conditions were imposed, for example 
increasing the height of a chimney, the construction of a free-standing foundation 
and the installation of spark arresters in the chimney. Tolerance for smells, soot and 
smoke would change in the twentieth century. That not only had to do with the 
increase of coal consumption. Changed attitudes toward smells, soot and smoke 
also played a role. The city-dweller of the nineteenth century was pretty case- 
hardened regarding smells and trash in the streets, canals and creeks. But, 
14 For the history of the Nuisance Law and its predecessors: J. Lintsen Sr., ‘De werking van de 
hinderwet tijdens de industrialisatie van Nederland (1890–1910)’, Jaarboek voor de Geschiedenis 
van Bedrijf en Techniek JBGBT 4(1987), 190–209.
15 Report by J. van Ortt, hoofdingenieur, 27 juli 1863, no. 1561, Rijksarchief in Gelderland, 
G.S. Nijverheid inv.nr. 25.05112/2.
16 Cited in: Lintsen, ‘Stoom in ontwikkeling’, 128.
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 increasingly, smells would be experienced as intolerable stenches and trash as waste 
and pollution.17
10.5  A Velvet Revolution18
The modernisation of the economy in England had aroused mixed feelings in the 
Netherlands. Many had looked with awe at the economic power that the country had 
developed. But many had also regarded the consolidation of a class society with 
trepidation and recoiled from the social tensions that that brought with it. Steam 
technology had been an important catalyst in bringing things to this pass. In England 
it had led to mechanisation, large-scale production and the emergence of the factory. 
With the factory system a new group of entrepreneurs had emerged that became the 
core of a bourgeois middle-class. Simultaneously, factory workers became a new 
group in the working class. In striking contrast to the luxury of the ‘nouveau riche’ 
stood the poverty of the factory proletariat. It created the fertile soil for an unprec-
edented class struggle.
Despite this, violent class conflicts would barely occur in the Netherlands in the 
nineteenth century and steam technology would be enthusiastically embraced. An 
important cause was the way in which steam technology in the Netherlands had 
been implemented in the first phase of industrialisation. Industrialisation proceeded 
across a broad front and spread throughout the entire country. A significant number 
of steam engines could be found in the food processing industry, the most important 
industrial sector and additionally in almost every branch of industry. One also found 
steam engines in both the coastal provinces and in the interior. To be sure, there was 
a visible concentration of steam engines in the provinces of South and North Holland 
and somewhat also along the large rivers, but large agglomerations of factories char-
acteristic of industrialisation in regions like Lancashire, the Borinage, Lorraine, and 
the Ruhr region did not exist in the Netherlands.19
The Netherlands was unique in that the application of steam technology did not 
in the first instance lead to a factory system, but rather to the modernisation of work-
shops and small manufacturing enterprises. Craft production remained dominant. 
To be sure, labour relations in the large cities and elsewhere became more formal 
due to liberalisation and sharper competition, but these developments did not lead 
17 See for example: A. Corbin, Pestdamp en bloesemgeur: Een geschiedenis van de reuk (Nijmegen 
1986). Also: Lintsen et al., Made in Holland, 56–58.
18 See for  this section among others: H.W.  Lintsen, Een revolutie naar eigen aard: Technische 
ontwikkeling en maatschappelijke verandering (inaugural lecture Delft, 1990) and Lintsen et al., 
Made in Holland, 142–143.
19 E. Nijhof and A. van den Berg, Het menselijk kapitaal: Sociaal ondernemersbeleid in Nederland 
(Amsterdam 2012), 45.
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to a breakdown of the old social order.20 The informal relations characterising 
 economic life persisted. The owner of small workshops continued to work alongside 
his employees and was barely distinguishable from them. Above all, he did not 
become part of a new bourgeois elite.
It is remarkable how much attention was given after 1870 to appropriate technol-
ogy for small businesses in circles of tradesmen, industrialists, engineers and politi-
cians, despite the fact that they by no means distanced themselves from large-scale 
industry. A wealth of publications appeared on the use of small engines and 
machines. The zenith of this propaganda offensive was the exposition of craft 
machinery in 1907. According to some, modern technology made the rationalisation 
of small firms possible and thus contributed to the strengthening of the crafts. ‘If 
mechanical power has truly come to serve the craftsman and to facilitate the devel-
opment of his independence,’ according to the director of the Trade School in the 
Hague in 1890, ‘then we can foresee a new period of the flowering of small industry 
and prosperity for its practitioners.’21 The dominant ideological currents shared the 
enthusiasm for steam technology and mechanisation. Liberals, confessionals and 
socialists ranged themselves solidly behind technical progress.22
Though the Netherlands was spared a disruptive class struggle, this did not mean 
that there were no heated debates on industrialisation. The parliamentary enquiries 
of 1887 and 1890 had put the labour issue squarely on the political agenda. Though 
there the question of poverty played an important role, the issue had assumed a dif-
ferent character. It had shifted from extreme poverty to the ‘social question.’
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Chapter 11
From Extreme Poverty to the Social 
Question. Well-being and Sustainability 
Around 1910
Harry Lintsen
Abstract The dynamics of the resource-production-consumption chains as anal-
ysed in the three previous chapters were interrelated with the dynamics of societal 
institutions. The strategies of professional groups and political parties eventuated in 
a corporatist state structure, with a societal midfield solidly anchored in a political 
system and in a state bureaucracy at local, provincial and national levels. New 
notions about extreme poverty and well-being acquired a legal framework around 
1900, within which governments, entrepreneurs, citizens and workers could con-
tinue to work on the solution of different issues. The legal framework was also the 
origin of the welfare state as it would develop in the course of the twentieth century. 
The modernising economy was also characterized by the emergence of new profes-
sional groups and a modern knowledge infrastructure.
This is the context in which we must place the well-being monitor for 1910. 
Well-being and sustainability around 1910 are viewed from three perspectives. 
Judged by the societal agenda of 1850 much progress had been made, especially in 
regard to extreme poverty. But the societal agenda of 1910 shows that opinions 
about poverty have shifted and that in this period the qualities of the food supply, of 
public health facilities, of public housing and of work are the core issues. The 
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present- day perspective on well-being differs little from that of 1910. But in regard 
to the issue of sustainability there are big differences.
Keywords Corporatism · Social question · Knowledge infrastructure · Monitor · 
Public health · Public housing · Labour
11.1  ‘The Material and Spiritual Side of the Social Question’
The general condition of the people in many respects compels us to be thankful. However, 
we should not ignore the fact that, both on the spiritual and material levels, a change in 
circumstances has come about that requires the government, more than hitherto, to give 
leadership and provide support … Not less does the material side of the social question 
continue to draw My attention.1
The Queen’s speech to parliament, delivered by Queen Wilhelmina in 1901 from a 
text provided by the confessional government of prime minister Abraham Kuyper, 
outlined the new role that the national government had taken upon itself in the 
development of well-being. “More than hitherto’ the national government decidedly 
saw a role for itself.
The Netherlands had just experienced two decades of prosperity. The growth 
indicators of the GDP were among the highest in the century. The magnitude of 
extreme poverty had shrunk to a historic low point. It was surely one of the reasons 
why Kuyper was satisfied with the ‘general condition of the people.’ The ‘change’ 
that was mentioned in the Queen’s speech had to do with the Christian nature of the 
cabinet. Protestant Anti-Revolutionaries and Catholics had won the elections. 
Kuyper’s cabinet took office after a period of three liberal cabinets.
What details did the Queen’s speech provide for the ‘spiritual and material’ side 
of the social question? The ‘material side’ was a mixture of labour and poverty- 
related measures. The cabinet wanted to stop the emiseration of the vulnerable 
members of society by means of mandatory insurance against the consequences of 
illness, invalidity and old-age. They wanted to combat fraud with food supplies in 
order to protect the population against malnutrition. Mandatory insurance against 
industrial accidents served to protect vulnerable workers. New apprenticeship regu-
lations sought to improve popular education. On the ‘spiritual side’ Kuyper’s gov-
ernment wanted to uplift ‘the moral character of public life’ in particular to rein in 
‘addictions to games and drink.’ And then of course there was the issue of special 
education that had already occupied politicians and the churches for years. The 
confessional parties wanted to have religiously-based schools subsidised by the 
government, in addition to the regular non-denominational public schools.




Quite striking is the attention paid to the ‘lesser welfare of the native population 
on Java.’ The cabinet would take action on this issue and, among other things, 
closely monitor obedience to the regulations designed to protect native coolies.
But parliamentary opposition prevented the cabinet from making good on its 
ambitious social programme. To make matters worse, the big Railway Strike of 
1903 seriously dented its image. Kuyper collided with striking railway workers and 
stevedores, whom he accused of ‘criminal agitation.’ Three laws were adopted – 
‘strangulation laws’ according to the socialists – that prohibited civil servants and 
workers in key sectors (like the railways) from striking. This broke the strike. It was 
only in the area of colonial politics that the cabinet was able to cash in on its prom-
ises, particularly the introduction of the ‘ethical policy’ that aimed to promote the 
political and economic independence of the colonial population.
Poverty dominated the issue of well-being throughout the nineteenth century. A 
low quality of life was passed on through successive generations of the poor. 
Contemporaries acknowledged the seriousness of the issue, even as it took on a dif-
ferent guise in the course of the century. Around 1850 poverty was associated with 
extreme poverty. An important segment of the population had to make do without 
the minimal basic necessities like food, drink, clothing, warmth and housing. The 
struggle against poverty was initially aimed at providing for these minimal needs.
But in the course of time the issue became broader. Foreign reports about slums 
in the growing cities, about the miserable conditions in factories and about the 
exploitation of the proletariat on the one hand horrified the Dutch bourgeoisie and 
on the other hand incited fear of uprisings and revolution. When the first ‘modern’ 
strikes took place in 1869 – albeit on a modest scale – they stimulated a wide range 
of responses. One of them was the founding of the ‘Committee for deliberating the 
Social Question’ in 1870. The term ‘Social Question’ would become the dominant 
referent for a wide range of problems around poverty, extreme poverty, public 
health, public housing, popular culture and labour issues.2
At the time this also included qualitative aspects: the emphasis was no longer 
solely on the bare the survival of the poor, but rather on a life that was as healthy as 
possible; not only on sufficient food, but also on healthy food; not only on a roof 
over one’s head, but just as much on a dwelling with hygienic facilities; not just on 
work, but also on skilled work under good working conditions. It was, finally, felt 
that the poor should not be obsequious, but above all ‘civilized.’
After that things moved quickly. The Netherlands were faced with an increasing 
number of slums in rapidly growing cities. The modernisation of the economy made 
labour relations more distant and formal. The factory system began to penetrate into 
regions like Twente and North Brabant. The increase in the number of voters was 
also an important development. The constitutional reform of 1887 endowed many 
more citizens with voting rights. In 1880 12.3% of the male population could vote. 
2 See among others: J.L van Zanden and A. van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914: Staat, instituties en 
economische ontwikkeling (Amsterdam 2000), 314–317; E.  Nijhof and A. van den Berg, Het 
menselijk kapitaal: Sociaal ondernemersbeleid in Nederland (Amsterdam 2012), 47–52.
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In 1890 that had increased to 26.8%.3 New social groups joined in the political pro-
cess and hence acquired potential access to state power. Numerous organisations 
profiled themselves as protagonists of specific interests. Many claimed to be able to 
offer solutions to the social question. This issue would occupy a prominent place on 
the societal agenda around 1900.
In preceding chapters these shifts have been briefly noted. In this chapter we will 
summarize them and elaborate further. Who were the bearers of the new perspec-
tives on poverty and quality of life? How and under what circumstances did they 
succeed in turning this into a political item? Why did this debate lead to an active 
role for a government that had formerly been passive in social matters?
The scope of extreme poverty declined in the nineteenth century. This develop-
ment was embedded in trade-off processes. To what extent was the increase in qual-
ity of life paid for by the natural environment and the exploitation of natural capital? 
To what extent was depletion of resources elsewhere part of the picture? How sus-
tainable was the new situation? The chapter closes with an evaluation of the situa-
tion at the outset of the twentieth century based on the monitor for well-being.
11.2  Building a New Corporatism: Citizens, Government, 
Entrepreneurs and Researchers
11.2.1  A New, Dynamic, Civil Society
After a period of near dormancy under King William I, the civil society came into 
its own in the second half of the nineteenth century. Farmers’ organisations had 
organised themselves nationally. Workers first organised locally, then nationally. 
Associations of manufacturers followed in their wake. The rise of the labour move-
ment led to the founding of the Netherlands Workers’ Union in 1869 as the Dutch 
branch of the First International. The first modern political party was the Anti- 
Revolutionary party founded in 1879. The socialists followed suit with the Social- 
Democratic Federation in 1881, the liberals with the Liberal Union in 1886 and the 
Catholics with the Roman Catholic State Party in 1896. Then there were the profes-
sional organisations of physicians, engineers and economists and long-existing or 
newly founded associations with idealistic aims like the Society for the General 
Good of 1784 and the Peoples Federation against Alcohol Abuse of 1875.4
3 Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 314–315. Van Zanden and van Riel see the 
striving for the political and socio-cultural integration of new voters as one of the most important 
processes behind the rise of the social question, the struggle around special (religious) education, 
and the civilizing offensive after 1870. For figures, see table 7.1, 315.
4 The People’s Union against Alcohol Abuse (Volksbond tegen Drankmisbruik) was founded in 
1875 under the name of Multapatior’s Union against Intoxicating Spirits. In 1882 the name was 
changed to People’s Union, Association against Alcohol Abuse, later referred to more briefly as 
People’s Union against Alcohol Abuse.
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Civil society certainly flourished, but did it also develop into a force able to influ-
ence the government in regard to the social question? Organisations could pursue 
their programs in three main ways: via societal action, via governmental organisa-
tions or via a political party. For workers, strikes were the weapon of choice. Up to 
the end of the 1880s the number of strikes was limited, with a peak of 33 strikes in 
1872. After that the number of strikes would increase rapidly up to the First World 
War, with a peak of 400 strikes in 1913. Most strikes were spontaneous and barely 
affected government policy in any direct sense. The railway strike of 1903 was a 
watershed. After that, a large part of the workers’ movement opted for a mode of 
unionization based on solid and nationally organised unions capable of being a 
force in Dutch politics.5
Professionals opted for another strategy. The example of the hygienists – a new 
generation of young and progressive physicians – shows how successful they could 
be.6 The hygienists formed a solid national network, that was anchored in  local 
medical associations and the national Society for the Promotion of Medicine (1849). 
They used this network to collect, exchange and tabulate statistics on diseases. They 
also created national standards for research protocols and the definition of diseases. 
This made the hygienists the most important suppliers of medical knowledge. 
Around 1870 their method of operation had been adopted by the government that in 
turn had assured itself of the cooperation of municipalities, citizens and 
physicians.
The hygienists also worked together with other groups on an hygienic pro-
gramme that over the years came to include more than sanitary facilities. The qual-
ity of foodstuffs, public housing, working conditions and the establishment of new 
factories and workshops all came under their purview. An important role in this 
programme was played by the so-called health commissions, that had been set up in 
the 1850s and 1860s in a large number of municipalities and whose membership 
consisted of physicians, lawyers, scientists and engineers. A national breakthrough 
occurred in 1865 when a law was passed creating a State Medical Inspectorate. 
Almost all the hygienists became paid or unpaid staff of this State Inspectorate. In 
addition, every hygienist was member of a health commission or an association for 
promoting public health, often one they set up themselves. Sometimes they were 
members of city councils or became aldermen their cities. The medical community, 
and in particular the hygienists, thus acquired local influence on municipal health 
policy and national influence on emergent public health policy.
The third strategy  – that of the political party  – was initially developed by 
Abraham Kuyper.7 On the one hand Kuyper worked on a number of civil organisa-
5 S. van der Velden, Stakingen in Nederland: Arbeidersstrijd 1830–1995 (second revised edition, 
Amsterdam 2009). For figures see the website of the International Institute for Social History, table 
with the number of strikes and shutouts per year, https://socialhistory.org/sites/default/files/docs/
overzicht-aantallen-stakingen.pdf
6 See for the below analysis: E. Houwaart, ‘Medische statistiek’, in: H.W. Lintsen et  al. (eds.), 
Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland: De wording van een moderne samenleving (Zutphen 
1993), volume II, 19–45.
7 See for the role of Abraham Kuyper in Dutch politics: P. de Rooy, Ons stipje op de waereldkaart: 
De politieke cultuur van modern Nederland (Amsterdam 2014), 126–133.
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tions to organize his protestant constituency and on the other on a political party that 
would maintain control over the civil initiatives and that would introduce protestant 
issues into parliament. Thus in 1869 he mobilised the existing Association for 
Christian National Schooling to start taking political action, in 1872 he was co- 
founder and founding chief editor of the journal The Standard, in 1878 he was 
instrumental in establishing the Free University in Amsterdam, and in 1886 he was 
the leader of the so-called Doleantie, a Calvinist current within the Dutch Reformed 
Church (Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk) that led to a schism and to the founding of 
the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands (Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland). 
Finally he founded the Anti-Revolutionary Party on the basis of ‘Our Program.’
It signified a revolution in political culture. Up to then, voters chose their repre-
sentatives on the basis of their personal qualities. Ideally, parliamentarians were 
seated in parliament as independent persons and debated issues on the basis of their 
expertise and their interpretation of the general interest. A political party that defined 
the relevant political issues and stipulated who voters should choose as their repre-
sentatives in parliament – as Kuyper was proposing – was anathema.
Other societal movements came to adopt Kuypers’ strategy. This led at the outset 
of the twentieth century to a ‘pillarised’ social structure. Especially the confession-
als and the socialists attempted to bring all the aspects of the lives of their constitu-
encies – family, upbringing, education, habitation, work and leisure – within the 
sphere of influence of their own pillar. This consisted of a network of educational 
organisations, health care organisations, cooperative housing associations, sport 
associations, newspaper publishers, labour unions, farmers’ organisations, employ-
ers’ organisations and – in the case of a confessional pillar -churchly institutions.
Professional and party-political strategies led to the building of a new corporat-
ism.8 In the course of the nineteenth century the remnants of an old kind of corporat-
ism consisting of guilds, marks and other kinds of corporatist organisation in 
autonomously functioning cities, had been dismantled. In its place a corporatist 
state structure emerged that was characterised by a societal midfield that had lodged 
itself firmly in a political system and a governmental bureaucracy at local, provin-
cial and national levels.
11.2.2  The Birth of the Welfare State
Political debate in the second half of the nineteenth century consisted to an impor-
tant degree of issue that would later become the ‘social question’ and in particular 
addressed the role that the government should play. Thorbecke had already seen to 
it that the constitution included poor relief as a governmental responsibility. He 
stated that ‘a civilized nation … is duty bound to ensure as far as possible that its 
8 The thesis was proposed first by J. van Zanden and A. van Riel, see the section ‘Collectieve actie 
en de opbouw van een nieuw corporatisme’ in: Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 
322–329. Our analysis diverges somewhat, but the conclusion is the same.
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members do not perish from want. Charity on the basis of church membership can-
not do this…’9 The Poor Law he submitted to parliament in 1851 was written in this 
spirit.
Opposition was fierce. According to the confessionals, the state had no business 
in this domain and the liberals regarded poor taxes as a thorn in their side. Hence the 
new poor law left everything as it was. A new attempt in 1901 to make poor relief a 
governmental responsibility encountered stiff resistance from the Anti- 
Revolutionaries. The draft law was ‘a bold attempt at violating the freedom of the 
churches.’ Ultimately, the Poor Law of 1912 would mark the tentative beginnings of 
more state influence – namely by municipalities – on poor relief.10
As we saw, the government had made a modest incursion into the domain of 
public health in the 1850s and 1860s. The mandatory establishment of health com-
missions by municipalities was rejected by parliament. It did, on the other hand, 
accept the founding of a State Medical Inspectorate. The national government made 
almost no effort to improve public hygiene. In this area, several municipalities with 
their health commissions took the lead, like Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague and 
Utrecht.11
While a young generation of physicians (the hygienists) was active in the politi-
cal domain of public health, a young generation of engineers was similarly active in 
the domain of labour.12 The way had been paved by the social liberals, who were 
convinced that not everything could be left to the market. They demanded a greater 
role for the government in social issues. Parliamentarian Van Houten’s 1874 Child 
Labour law was their first success.13 The parliamentary enquiries of 1887 and 1890 
forced a breakthrough in the debate and placed the issue of labour squarely on the 
political agenda. A new generation of engineers, educated in Delft, had appropriated 
this domain and enthusiastically supported the work of two of their fellow engineers 
in three liberal cabinets between 1890 and 1901.14 The engineer P. van der Sleyden 
succeeded as minister in shepherding a Safety Law through parliament in 1895 and 
bringing the Public Nuisance Act of 1875 and the Labour Law of 1889 together in 
an elegant fashion. The Labour Inspectorate, dominated by engineers and charged 
9 M. van Leeuwen, ‘Armenzorg, 1800–1912: Erfenis van de Republiek’, in: J. van Gerwen and M. 
van Leeuwen (eds.), Studies over zekerheidsarrangementen: Risico’s, risicobestrijding en verze-
keringen in Nederland vanaf de Middeleeuwen (Amsterdam 1998), 284–286, quote on p. 284.
10 M. van Leeuwen, ‘Armenzorg, 1912–1965: Van centrum naar periferie’, in: J. van Gerwen and 
M. van Leeuwen (eds.), Studies over zekerheidsarrangementen: Risico’s, risicobestrijding en ver-
zekeringen in Nederland vanaf de Middeleeuwen (Amsterdam 1998), 284–286. Citation from: Van 
Leeuwen, ‘Armenzorg 1800–1912’, 294.
11 H. Buiter, Riool, rails en asfalt: 80 jaar straatrumoer in vier Nederlandse steden (Eindhoven 
2005). See also: A. van der Woud, Koninkrijk vol sloppen. achterbuurten en vuil in de negentiende 
eeuw (Amsterdam 2010), 257–259.
12 H.W. Lintsen, Ingenieurs in Nederland in de negentiende eeuw: Een streven naar erkenning en 
macht (Den Haag1980), 198–325.
13 It prohibited children up to age 12 to work in factories. Notably, the prohibition did not apply to 
cottage industry, household services and agricultural labour.
14 Lintsen, Ingenieurs in Nederland in de negentiende eeuw, 330–342.
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with the implementation of the Labour Law, now also began to monitor adherence 
to the Safety Law. Furthermore, the inspectorate was empowered to nullify munici-
pal permits granted under the Public Nuisance Act if the installation in question 
violated the Safety Law. After this victory, Cornelis Lely (the engineer with the 
plans for the closure of the Zuiderzee) managed, as minister, despite vociferous 
resistance, to get parliament to pass a draft Accident Law. The editor of the journal 
De Ingenieur wrote on this occasion:
Lely has demonstrated once again that in social matters he is in the vanguard, straight 
through storms and heavy seas, never quitting his post, and in the process defying not only 
big industrialists but even more the objections advanced against his bill in the First Chamber 
…15
The objections addressed above all the practical application of the law. Who would 
organise the accident insurance and bear the risks? Should that be left to the state or 
to civil society, in particular the employers? A compromise seemed to be the only 
workable solution.. Employers could have recourse to a Government Insurance 
Bank, but also to an insurance company. They established their own cooperative 
insurance company, Centraal Beheer. Nonetheless, the Government Insurance 
Bank was given a supervisory and policy role.
A similar question troubled the Housing Law of 1901 that aimed at improving 
public housing. This was ambivalent about whether government, private enterprise 
or citizens should take the initiative. The law enabled the government to subsidise 
certified housing associations and contractors who were exclusively committed to 
the interests of public housing.
By 1900 the social question had acquired a legal framework within which ‘pil-
lars,’ governments, entrepreneurs, citizens and workers could proceed in solving 
different issues. In retrospect the legal framework can also be seen as the origins of 
the ‘caring state’ as that would develop in the twentieth century. After this period, 
well-being and quality of life acquired an entirely new dynamic.
11.2.3  The Emergence of a Modern Economy
From the 1840s on the Dutch economy underwent a radical transformation. It began 
with the liberalisation of foreign trade that cleared the way for the globalisation and 
accelerated integration of international markets. It encountered opposition from 
Dutch manufacturers. Various Chambers of Commerce and Factories called for pro-
tection for domestic industry because, ‘every nation…must attempt to shield its 
trade and agriculture from being taken unawares and being destroyed by jealous 
neighbours.’16 The government and parliament paid little heed to these appeals. 
15 ‘Uit Ons Parlement’, De Ingenieur 15(1900), 663. Quotation in: Lintsen, Ingenieurs in Nederland 
in de negentiende eeuw, 342.
16 J.C.G.  Schulte ‘De Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken, 1842–1862’ in: De opkomst van 
Tilburg als industriestad: Anderhalve eeuw economische en sociale ontwikkeling, 88–96. Zie ook: 
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They also succeeded in achieving an integration of domestic markets by means of 
legislation and the creation of new infrastructures. Modernisation of the economy 
subsequently proceeded along many fronts. Accelerated integration of the service 
sector came about with innovations on the money and capital markets. The produc-
tion ceiling in agriculture was shattered thanks to specialisation and artificial fertil-
iser, while with the coming of artificial fertiliser the circular economy of the food 
chain changed into a linear one. Steam technology broke through the production 
ceiling in small firms and stimulated specialisation and the rise of large 
enterprises.
The relationships in the economy also changed because different groups tried to 
co-opt the modernisation process and exercise influence on the national govern-
ment. Farmers’ organisations had gone nationwide after 1850, founded cooperatives 
in the 1890s and since then worked closely with the government. Workers’ associa-
tions were long a local phenomenon (with Amsterdam often in the vanguard) and 
organized by trade (with type-setters and diamond cutters as pioneers). Fifteen trade 
unions joined forces in 1906 and founded the Netherlands Association of Trade 
Unions. In 1909 several unions formed the Christian Trade Association and in 1912 
the catholic union movement united in the Roman Catholic Workingman’s 
Association.
Employers organisations followed a similar course. They began locally and by 
sector, especially in response to emerging workers’ opposition. This was followed 
by national cooperation. The Association of Netherlands Employers of 1899 was 
the first important national employers’ organisation. It emerged from worries within 
the group of textile factory owners in Twente with regard to the Accident Law that 
was then in preparation. Pillarisation of the employers’ organisations mimicked that 
of the workers’ unions. In 1907 there were 307 local and 35 national associations.17 
Factory owners did not react only in a defensive way to the workers’ movement, 
socialism and the social question. Some, including Van Marken of the Delft yeast 
factory, the machine-builder Stork in Hengelo and the linen weaver Van Besouw in 
Goirle launched initiatives such as profit sharing, housing for workers and funds for 
ill, invalid and older workers.18
The modernising economy was also characterised by the rise of new professional 
groups. These included in particular mechanics, chemists, engineers, lawyers and 
physicians. They were the representatives of a modern knowledge infrastructure.
H.W.  Lintsen and J.  Korsten, De veerkracht van de Brabantse economie: De Kamers van 
Koophandel en de kracht van netwerken [1840–2015] (Hilversum 2007).
17 B. Bouwens and J. Dankers, Tussen concurrentie en concentratie: Belangenorganisaties, kartels, 
fusies en overnames (Amsterdam 2012), 55.
18 Nijhoff and van den Berg, Het menselijk kapitaal, 47–48.
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11.2.4  The Foundations of a Modern Knowledge 
Infrastructure19
One of the most essential elements of the modern technological knowledge infra-
structure was ‘codified’ knowledge. In craft-based manufacture, knowledge was 
mostly ‘tacit,’ that is to say embedded as non-reflexive routines in the heads and 
limbs of people. It was nearly impossible to explicate and could be acquired only 
through intensive practice. Knowledge was transferred from master to apprentice or 
by means of other modes of face-to-face contact. The development of knowledge 
occurred in practice, and communication took place via the spoken word and body 
language.
‘Codified’ knowledge was explicated knowledge, knowledge that was expressed 
in the written and printed word. Knowledge and communication were in principle 
no longer bound to one person and were hence de-contextualised in time and place. 
Books and articles could be consulted at any time. They could be preserved through 
time and consulted at different places. ‘Codified’ knowledge also expressed itself in 
more precise measuring and more systematic testing and experimentation. This 
knowledge was easier to share with others by means of printed books and journals. 
It could thus acquire a collective character, that is to say, become available to a pro-
fessional community and the interested public.
The construction of a modern knowledge infrastructure in the second half of the 
nineteenth century took place to a great extent around ‘codified’ knowledge: new 
technological programs of study with their textbooks, new associations with their 
journals, new technical services with their technical literature and new laboratories 
with their scientific publications. This construction took place at all levels.
Technical education, for example, comprised the trade schools (the first dating 
from 1860), middle-level technical schools (like the Amsterdam School for 
Machinists, founded in 1878) and the Polytechnical School dating from 1864 (the 
successor to the Delft Academy for Engineers of 1842, that would in turn be trans-
formed into the Technical High School, complete with the ius promovendi, in 1904), 
while the universities educated physicists and chemists. Many of the schools owed 
their existence to private initiative. The Polytechnical School and the universities 
were financed by the government.
Until 1890 only a modest number of students were enrolled in technical educa-
tion. After 1890 their numbers increased rapidly. The trade schools, in particular, 
exhibited phenomenal rates of growth from about 1100 students in 1890 to more 
than 10,000 in 1915.20 The Delft engineering school also profited from an increased 
interest in, among others, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering and chem-
19 See for this section: M. Davids, H.W. Lintsen and A. van Rooij, Innovatie en kennisinfrastruc-
tuur: Vele wegen naar vernieuwing (Amsterdam 2013), 37–42; 52–64.
20 P. Baggen and E. Homburg, ‘Opkomst van een kennismaatschappij’, in: J. Schot, H. Lintsen, 
A. Rip and A. Albert de la Bruhèze (eds.), Techniek in Nederland in de Twintigste Eeuw (Zutphen 
2003), deel VII, 154.
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ical technology. The interest was representative of an accelerated development of 
the modern knowledge infrastructure at the end of the nineteenth century. The first 
Dutch engineering firm was that of J. van Hasselt and De Koning, founded in 1881. 
In 1890, the national government established three new agricultural experimental 
stations, followed in 1913 by a State Industrial Service for Small Businesses. 
Between 1900 and 1910 the number of private and industrial laboratories increased 
remarkably.21
With its new modern knowledge infrastructure, the Netherlands was able to 
adopt new key foreign technologies in order to develop them further in domestic 
settings: synthetic chemistry on the basis of sulphuric acid and sodium carbonate; 
communications technology including telegraphy, telephony and telecommunica-
tion; electrical technology with the incandescent lamp and the electrical motor; 
organic chemistry on the basis of coal and mineral oil and finally mechanical engi-
neering with steam technology, the internal combustion engine and the automo-
bile.22 In the course of the twentieth century, a number of these technologies would 
have a major impact on the issues of well-being and sustainability.
11.3  The Monitor of 1910: Well-being and Sustainability 
from Three Perspectives
How can we judge the endpoint of this period – around 1910 – in terms of well- 
being and sustainability? In this section we will shed light on this question from 
three perspectives. The perspective of 1850: to what extent was the societal agenda 
of the mid-nineteenth century realised? The perspective of 1910: which elements 
were praised by contemporary politicians and the public, what were the contempo-
rary concerns and what was the agenda for the future? Finally, we look at the devel-
opments with present-day eyes. How do we judge the results of the period 1850–1910 
by present-day norms? The monitor well-being 1910 provides a summary of the 
various perspectives (Table 11.1).
21 J.J. Hutter, ‘Nederlandse laboratoria 1860–1940, een kwantitatief overzicht’, Tijdschrift voor de 
Geschiedenis der Geneeskunde, Natuurwetenschapen, Wiskunde en Techniek 9 (1986), nr.4, 153, 
graph 1.
22 In the second half of the nineteenth century, scientific and technical developments in the 
Netherlands were mainly inspired by foreign examples. In some fields, however, the Netherlands 
played a leading role as in the field of dietetics with Gerrit Mulder (1802–1889) and in the applica-
tion of ‘proteins’. H.A.M. Snelders, De geschiedenis van de scheikunde in Nederland: Van alche-
mie tot chemie en chemische industrie rond 1900 (Delft 1993), deel 1, 93–102.
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Dashboard well-being ‘here and now’
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Score 0–10 ? ? ? ?
Personal characteristics
Health Life expectancy year 55 + – –
Nutrition Height (military 
conscripts)
cm 173 + – –
Housing Housing quality % slums 60 + – –
Public water supply m3/capita 19 + – –
Physical safety Victims of murder number per 
100.000 
inhabitants.
0.4 + + +
Labour Unemployment % workforce. 3.3 + + +
Education Level of education years 5.8 + –
Free time Free time hours per 
week.
? + – –
Natural environment
Biodiversity MSA % original 
biodiversity
54 + + –





3.8 + + +
Water quality Public water supply m3/capita 18.7 +
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11.3.1  Perspective 1850: An Enticing Paradise
What the monitor above all wants to express is the normative shift that occurred 
with respect to well-being and quality of life, in particular as regards poverty. From 
the perspective of 1850 – in terms of the political and societal agenda that then pre-
vailed – the Netherlands had made great progress. The extent of extreme poverty 
had been radically reduced. Hunger had become a thing of the past. The Netherlander 
was healthier and lived longer. There was ample employment and the population 
was well-educated. Criminality was low. True, a large part of the population lived in 
slums and only a small part had access to clean drinking water, toilets and sewers. 
But public housing and public health were not issues of major concern to citizens in 
1850 and were not on the political agenda. For the rest, the future of the Netherlands 
in 1910 looked quite auspicious through the eyes of 1850. Economic dynamics were 
such that the last remnants of extreme poverty would disappear. That alone was 
already a great accomplishment, but the expectations went further: the people would 
share in the increased level of well-being and would begin to enjoy a certain level of 
comfort and luxury.
In another respect too, considerable progress had been made according to the 
agenda of 1850. It is not to be found in the monitor because the issue of water man-
agement is not included. The rivers had for the most part been tamed thanks to 
normalisation and the digging of new river distributaries. Floods due to ice packs 
and ice jams had become pretty much a thing of the past.
In one respect the observer from 1850 would look with concern at the situation 
prevailing at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was the question whether 
democracy had developed positively with the considerable extension of suffrage. 
Increasing influence by all kinds of groups from among the people and the bour-
geoisie had led to major tensions between rich and poor, between workers and capi-




+ Not problematic or not problematized
– Generally acknowledged as problematic  
Under discussion: different opinions about the scale and nature of the problems 
? Unknown  
Note: The signs – and 〇 in the column of 1910 are the then important problematic themes. The 
column for 1850 shows with +, which agenda items of 1850 were realized in 1910 or were not 
problematized in 1850. The column of the contemporary perspective indicates with – which cur-
rent themes would now be regarded as problematic. For the justification of the evaluation in the 
table, see the main text
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11.3.2  Perspective 1910: The New Agenda of the Turn 
of the Century
The monitor (Table 11.1) further indicates the contents of the new agenda on well- 
being around 1910. The question of poverty had by no means been solved. Aside 
from the fact that a hundred thousand Netherlanders continued to live in extreme 
poverty, public health remained abysmal. Child mortality was high. Adults still suc-
cumbed in great numbers to tuberculosis, typhus and other epidemic diseases. The 
common people lived in miserable circumstances. Hygiene in and around the dwell-
ings and hygienic facilities in general gave much cause for concern. The labour situ-
ation in factories was very worrisome. The Netherlands faced the major challenge 
of finding a solution for the social question. Popular welfare, public health, public 
housing and labour all demanded quantitative and qualitative improvements.
The solution of the social question also demanded structural social change. Two 
unsolved issues remained at the top of the political agenda, namely universal suf-
frage (and with it the participation of all layers and groups of the population, includ-
ing women, in political life) and the subsidising of special (i.e. religiously informed) 
education (and with it influence on the education and forming of the next 
generations).
11.3.3  Present-Day Perspective: Related and Deviant Values
From a present-day perspective the beginning of the twentieth century was a turbu-
lent period in which economic prosperity and a belief in progress were accompa-
nied with uncertainties, struggle and tensions. The monitor well-being (Table 11.1) 
indicates that from a present-day perspective we would emphatically agree with the 
importance of the social question. The new values that were then emerging about 
the various aspects of quality of life, are now completely accepted. They provided 
the foundations of a normative and legal framework that would be elaborated by 
successive generations in the twentieth century. But there are also two striking 
departures from the then current agenda: the perspective on natural capital and on 
the colonies.
The dominant vision on natural capital at the time was strictly utilitarian. Nature 
was to be dominated and made to serve humans. Land had to be won at the expense 
of water, wastelands reclaimed and subsoil resources exploited. Hunting animals 
that were a nuisance to agriculture was necessary and had in fact been supported by 
a bounty system since 1851. Neither civil society nor the political establishment 
breathed a word about the depletion of raw materials or about environmental dam-
age due to the use of coal. Immediate neighbours could complain about the nuisance 
of smoke and soot on the basis of the Public Nuisance Act. But a discussion about 
the air as a collective good, the pollution of which threatened the quality of the 
environment, was still far in the future. We should of course realise that energy 
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consumption at the time was considerably lower than at present and that levels of 
SO2 emissions were far below present-day norms.
Equally unproblematized, was the change in material flows. In the fossil-fuel 
supply chains, domestic turf was replaced by foreign coal, a situation that made the 
Netherlands vulnerable on the point of its energy supply. Circular flows in the food 
chains were increasingly replaced by linear material flows. At the start of the supply 
chains farmers used ever more artificial fertiliser and imported cattle fodder. There 
was no discussion about what to do with human and animal faeces at the end of the 
production and consumption chain, once they lost their function as manure. Faeces, 
particularly those emanating from cattle husbandry, would become a big problem in 
the twentieth century.
The situation was a bit different in regard to encroachments on and damage to 
nature.23 The urban bourgeoisie, with Amsterdam’s elite in the vanguard, developed 
an increasing sensitivity to natural values. The confrontation with changes in the 
rapidly growing and industrialising cities will probably have played a role. The 
psychiatrist Frederik van Eeden, who with his colony Walden pursued a utopian 
society, repudiated cities ‘…that extend their filthy outskirts like diseased cell- 
tissues across the pure earth and that exhaust the life-force of humanity in a steady 
fire of luxury and sin…’24 Foreign examples will also have inspired the bourgeoisie, 
such as with the founding of the Animal Protection Society in 1861. Art also pro-
vided inspiration, particularly through the ‘1880s movement’ (of poets, painters, 
and authors) that etherealised nature and the landscape. Eventually the nature- loving 
bourgeoisie itself experienced the landscape in the course of day-trips by train, bike 
or automobile. In 1899 they founded the Bird Protection Society, in 1901 the 
Netherlands Natural-Historical Society and in 1905 the Association for the 
Preservation of Natural Monuments. Nature conservation was far from a political 
issue on anything like the scale of the social question. Nonetheless the movement 
scored some success, for example with the Bird Law of 1912. This prohibited the 
capture of migratory birds for consumption. But utilitarian arguments still prevailed. 
That said, it was not about ‘utility’ for agriculture or economy, but about ‘utility’ for 
humans.
The second point on which today’s normative framework deviates from the 1910 
perspective is the issue of colonial policy. In the nineteenth century, the colonies 
were regarded as sources of profit. In particular, gains from the Dutch East Indies 
comprised a substantial part of the Dutch state budget in the 1850s and 1860s. 
Average profits from the Cultivation System in those years amounted to between 
23 For the following see: J.L. van Zanden and S.W. Verstegen, Groene geschiedenis van Nederland 
(Utrecht 1993), 179–187; H.J. van der Windt, En dan: wat is natuur nog in dit land? Natuur bes-
cherming in Nederland 1880–1990 (Groningen 1995) and H. Rennes, ‘Het Nederlandsche landsc-
hap in de twintigste eeuw’, in: C. Boissevain, M. Bosboom and H. Rennes, Typisch Hollands! De 
verandering van het Nederlandse landschap en de collectie Knecht-Drenth, 1900-heden (Zutphen 
2008), 59–65.
24 Cited in: J. Bank and M. van Buuren, ‘Utopisten en socialisten’, in: 1900. Hoogtij van burgerli-
jke cultuur (Den Haag 2000), volume 3, 449.
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45% and 50% of the tax income of the national government.25 Big projects like the 
construction of the railway network were financed with moneys from the colonies. 
On the other hand, there was the development in the colonies themselves of a mon-
etary system, a land registry and infrastructures like the railways and irrigation sys-
tems. However these were intended primarily to help realise a financial surplus 
destined for the home country.
Dismantling of the Cultivation System took place in the second half of the 1860s. 
There had been repeated criticism of the Cultivation System from the left-liberal 
camp, but the chorus of criticism swelled on the publication of Multatuli’s Max 
Havelaar in 1860. At the same time it became evident that private entrepreneurs had 
developed sufficient expertise and financial resources to assume the role of the 
Cultivation System. Over subsequent years private initiative turned out to perform 
better than the compulsory cultivation system.26
The liberalisation of the colonial economy had little effect on the standard of liv-
ing of the farmers and coolies in the Dutch East Indies and on the widespread pov-
erty, that considerably exceeded the extent of poverty in the Netherlands.27 What in 
the Netherlands began to be called the ‘social question,’ became ‘ethical politics’ in 
reference to poverty in the colonies. The concept was first introduced by the liberal 
politician Pieter van Brooshooft in 1901 and was promptly included in the queen’s 
speech for that year.28 It referred to a ‘debt of honour’ that the Netherlands had to 
pay back or a ‘moral calling’ that the country had to fulfil. It was supposed to pro-
mote the independence of the Dutch East Indies. Initiatives were taken to promote 
public education, establish a public credit facility and to curb the privileges of native 
chiefs and rulers. Roads and irrigation works were further developed. The ‘ethical 
politics’ also served as legitimation for military expeditions to enforce changes. It 
did not, however, lead to the end of the colonial system.
From the perspective of 1910 the Netherlands faced a major challenge, namely 
the solution of the social question or in other words the improvement of quality of 
life in the broadest sense of the term. In addition, the tense political stalemates 
around education and suffrage demanded resolution. The struggle against the waters 
continued to be necessary, despite the fact that the threat of river floods seemed to 
have become a thing of the past.
From a present-day perspective we see two big issues looming in the background: 
the quality of natural capital (including the natural environment) and the colonial 
relationships.
25 Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, tabel 5.1, 223. See especially the section 
‘Koloniale politiek en Batig Slot’, 220–231.
26 According to C. Fasseur, administrators in the Dutch East Indies had already started to reform the 
Cultivation System by the 1840s and 1850s. Van Zanden and van Riel, Nederland 1780–1914, 226.
27 See for real wages in the Dutch East Indies in comparison with the Netherlands: table 4.6 Real 
wages of building labourers in selected countries, 1820s–2000s, in: J.L. van Zanden et al. (eds.), 
How was life? Global well-being since 1820 (OECD Publishing 2014), 81.
28 E.B.  Locher-Scholten, ‘Brooshooft, Pieter (1845–1921)’, in Biografisch Woordenboek van 
Nederland. URL:http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/lemmata/bwn1/brooshooft 
[12-11-2013]. Consulted December 2016.
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The biggest threat to well-being came from outside and was foreseen in the 
Netherlands by only a very few: the First World War. In many ways the war proved 
a turning point in Dutch history, not in the last place for the dance of well-being and 
sustainability.
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Chapter 12
The Situation Around 1910: A New Order
Frank Veraart
Abstract After tackling extreme poverty in the nineteenth century (see Chaps. 7, 8, 
9, 10 and 11) the Netherlands faced new societal challenges around 1910: the food 
supply, public health care, public housing and labour issues. Water management 
also continued to be an important issue in well-being.
Pillarisation, universal suffrage and the emergence of political parties ensured a 
long period of political stability with a dominant role for the confessional parties.
Based on the monitors of 1910 and 1970, this chapter sketches the growth of 
material welfare, the improvement in personal characteristics and the investments in 
social, economic, and human capital. It also shows the emergent problems of natural 
capital, both within the Netherlands and in foreign countries. It also provides an 
overview of shifts in the three main categories of resources (organic, mineral, and 
fossil) and the associated supply chains. In this way the chapter forms the introduc-
tion to a more detailed analysis of trade-offs in the chains of agriculture and foods 
(Chap. 13), construction (Chap. 14) and energy (Chap. 15).
Keywords Monitor · Well-being · Suffrage · Pillarisation · Economic growth · 
Natural capital
This chapter is written by Frank Veraart with contributions by Fred Lambert and Jan-Pieter Smits.
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12.1  1918 – The Counter-Revolutionary Breakthrough
We are living in troubled times. The spirit of revolution is stalking our borders. As yet they 
remain closed to its pernicious entry, as yet our sober reason and a healthy Dutch calm 
deliberation prevail, that does not easily let itself be seduced into undertaking actions 
opposed to order and authority. Yet unrest can arise among our people. A certain agitation 
coupled with fear for things that may come.1
On the 12th of November 1918 an appeal went out to Dutch Catholics to be pre-
pared. The previous day, the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP) had rattled 
the revolutionary sabres.
Comrades, the mighty movement that is causing Europe to shake on its foundations is 
approaching the borders of our country and is urging Dutch workers too to fulfil their his-
toric task… Do not let the moment pass, seize the power cast into your laps and do what you 
must and what you can.2
The SDAP leader P.J. Troelstra had treated his Rotterdam public to a fiery speech. 
Troelstra called for an orderly and civilized seizure of power.
Do not defile this great time with unworthy deeds, let it be said in times to come: the Dutch 
proletariat showed itself equal to its task, the Dutch proletarian revolution was the moment 
of glory in Dutch history.3
These words were followed by a ‘lengthy and enthusiastic applause,’ according to 
the socialist newspaper The People (Het Volk).4
Sunday, November 10, 1918, the last day of the First World War, marked the start 
of a week of great confusion and uncertainty. The German Emperor Wilhelm II fled 
to the Netherlands. Hunger had Dutch cities in its grip and hungry soldiers were 
becoming restless in their barracks. On Saturday morning, the mayor of Rotterdam, 
A.R. Zimmerman, had discussed the proletarian seizure of power with leaders of the 
SDAP.  Troelstra called out the revolution on Monday. The government in The 
Hague made an inventory of preventive measures and negotiated with the British 
about fast shipments of food.
On November 12, Troelstra demanded the transfer of power in a long speech to 
the Second Chamber of Parliament. The government did not comply. The non- 
socialist papers announced emergency consultations of various societal organiza-
tions, but also the first food shipments and the fact that the Dutch fishing fleet had 
put to sea. A few fearful days followed, but on the streets there was no sign of 
anarchy or socialist revolution, only well-orchestrated demonstrations of apprecia-
tion for the royal family and the government. After several days Troelstra admitted 
his ‘mistake.’ On November 18, the queen appeared, apparently spontaneously, at 
one of the largest demonstrations on the Malieveld, the national mall, in The Hague. 
1 ‘Katholieken..Paraat’ in De Tijd: godsdienstig-staatkundig dagblad, 12-11-1918.
2 ‘Aan de Nederl. Arbeidersklasse’ en ‘Een Rede van Troelstra’ in Het Volk, dagblad voor de 
arbeiderspartij, 12 November 1918.
3 ‘Een Rede van Troelstra’ in Het Volk, dagblad voor de arbeiderspartij, 12-11-1918.
4 ‘Een Rede van Troelstra’ in Het Volk, dagblad voor de arbeiderspartij, 12-11-1918.
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The near-revolution had big political consequences. It reinforced the position of the 
monarchy and above all of the established confessional parties, i.e. those rooted in 
religious denominations.5
The revolution in the Netherlands was announced at a curious moment, at least 
so it seemed. Many of the original socialist ambitions to improve well-being had 
just been agreed to or had already been implemented since the turn of the century. 
The so-called ‘social question’ had become part and parcel of the political culture. 
Just about every politician was busy with the ‘uplifting of the worker and the peo-
ple.’ Working conditions, public housing, public health and similar issues were all 
candidates for improvement. Nineteenth century initiatives arising in the ‘societal 
midfield’ had gained the support of the ‘progressive liberals’ (sociaal liberalen) and 
led among other things to the labour law (1889), the accident-law (1901) and the 
housing law (1901). These became the foundations of what would later be called the 
welfare state.
But at the time the question was what such a state would look like. The new laws 
still had to be applied in practice. Important issues like universal suffrage and the 
organization of education still had to be fought out. Extreme poverty had not yet 
been eradicated. Food supplies remained problematic. In short, at the outset of the 
twentieth century the quality of life of the poor and the workers was still – as we 
concluded earlier – the most important issue regarding well-being.
In many respects the First World War resulted in an about-face on the issue of 
well-being. The struggle for universal suffrage and education had been won. That 
created an entirely new political constellation and a new turn in political culture. 
The role of government changed fundamentally.
Since the nineteenth century male suffrage had been coupled to incomes, savings 
and diplomas. Between 1900 and 1913 the percentage of men allowed to vote 
increased from 46% to 67% (of men older than 23 years of age). The growth of the 
electorate benefitted especially the confessional and socialist parties. After 1900 the 
liberals began to lose power. By 1913 this led to a political impasse. None of the 
political power blocks represented a majority and none was prepared to give an inch 
in respect of their specific standpoint on universal suffrage.6 Given the circum-
stances prevailing during the war – in which the Netherlands succeeded in remain-
ing neutral – the parties were prepared to submit to a ‘pacification’ to put an end to 
this interminable dispute. In 1917 universal male suffrage was introduced, followed 
by women’s suffrage in 1919. In the first elections under this new regime the confes-
sionals, above all the Catholics, were the big winners. The liberals were the losers. 
5 F. Wielenga, Nederland in de twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam 2009), 73–77.
6 Another issue was under discussion in those years, namely education. The political debate con-
cerned mainly the question of the financing of ‘special’ (i.e. confessional) education with state 
funds. The debate became known as the ‘school struggle.’ The issue was resolved in a negotiated 
compromise between the confessional parties who wanted ‘special’ schools treated on an equal 
footing with non-denominational public schooling and liberal and socialist parties who wanted to 
introduce universal suffrage. The outcome of these negotiations became known as the ‘pacifica-
tion.’ See: Wielenga, Nederland in de twintigste eeuw, 34–44.
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The socialist parties grew but it was not the political landslide that had been antici-
pated. This may have been the motivation for Troelstra’s revolution.
The proclaimed proletarian revolution became a confessional counter-revolution. 
Much to the socialists’ surprise and dismay, their proclaimed revolution forged a 
strong alliance among confessional parties. This coalition dominated the post-First 
World War political landscape.7 The interbellum was the start of a period of political 
stability that persisted up to the mid-1960s. Catholics (30%), Protestants (25–30%), 
social democrats (20–25%) and liberals (10–20%) comprised the political spec-
trum. At a national level, the confessional parties colluded in their joint aversion to 
the ‘red danger.’ At a local level, especially in the bigger cities like Amsterdam, 
social democrats participated in government.
The First World War turned out to be a catalyst for the resolution of a number of 
thorny political issues. Wartime circumstances created an experimental setting to try 
out new approaches in direct state intervention in the economy. Due to Dutch neu-
trality and the maritime blockades, more emphasis began to be placed on national 
independence and autarchy. This translated into more intensive exploitation of the 
national territory. Investments increased, among others in the State Coal Mines. 
After extensive flooding in 1916 around the Zuiderzee, definite plans were made for 
closure and partial reclamation. The national government also saw itself compelled 
to intervene in the market for foodstuffs and other scarce commodities. Wartime 
conditions created closer relations of cooperation between government and 
business.
After the war there was a successful transition from a wartime to a peacetime 
economy as a new economic context for the development of well-being and sustain-
ability emerged. As in many western countries in the twentieth century, modernisa-
tion of society was first and foremost understood as industrialisation (see Table 12.1). 
During the ‘golden years’ between 1923 and 1929, economic growth and labour 
productivity rose to great heights. Six companies contributed significantly: Shell, 
Philips, the State Mines (presently DSM), Hoogovens, AKU (presently AkzoNobel) 
and Unilever (a 1929 merger of the Margarine Union with the British Lever Brothers). 
It was during this period that the Netherlands acquired its characteristic dual 
economic structure with a top-six of big companies and a large number of smaller 
7 Wielenga, Nederland in de twintigste eeuw, 73–77.
Table 12.1 Total value of assets of 100 largest industrial companies as a  percentage of GDP 
1913–1990
1913 1930 1950 1973 1990
United States of America 23 31 18 30 35
United Kingdoma 12 29 22 18 38
Germany 13 20 16 – 31
The Netherlands 20 38 62 88 77
The Netherlands Excluding Royal Dutch Shell 14 27 34 52 42
aMarket share of stocks
Source: Van Zanden, Een klein land in de 20e eeuw, 1997
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enterprises. The share of the big companies in industrial employment increased 
threefold in the period between the wars.8 They attached great importance to research 
and set up their own laboratories.
Forceful regulation of the economy by the government disappeared after the 
First World War, but cooperation among the firms continued. The forced wartime 
cooperation had led to the emergence of clusters in the chemicals and food- 
processing industries. After the war these were reinforced and assumed the form of 
cartels in various branches of industry. Despite the revival of international trade, the 
national perspective did not entirely drop off the radar. It remained a palpable factor 
in the production of food and in investments in basic industries.
The government continued to concern itself intensively with food supplies, public 
housing, education and other social issues. The political blocs had different opinions 
regarding the role of the government. Socialists preferred active governments with 
broad competencies in social-economic domains. The confessional parties preferred 
in principle a limited role for the national and local governments. They envisioned a 
corporatist model. This defined the state as a modern night-watchman, providing 
overall legal and financial frameworks. On this view, the execution of the societal 
agenda should be left to the ‘societal midfield.’ In this confessional perspective the 
‘midfield’ consisted of specific organizations from within their own confessional 
community with in many cases close ties to politics and churchly authorities.
The Catholics succeeded in developing an institutional and governance system 
that penetrated deeply into the capillaries of Catholic life via countless associations. 
Catholics associated at work, in leisure time and in private life, read the same news-
paper, went to the same kind of school, were members of a Catholic trade union, etc. 
The same was true of the socialists. The Protestant and liberal currents were less 
rigidly organized but here too many organizations and associations were founded on 
the basis of a specific shared ideology. This process of extremely fragmented and 
varied initiatives was the foundation for so-called ‘pillarisation’ and for the rise of a 
new political culture in which the pillarised ‘midfield’ interacted intensively with 
parliament, the government and the state apparatus. The different pillars each tried 
to shape societal development based on their particular perspective on the world. 
Authority and control were an important motivation. What influence did pillarisa-
tion have on the production of well-being? Did a specifically Dutch kind of welfare 
state come into being?
The ‘midfield’ was more inclusive than just the pillars. Even before the First 
World War it was densely populated by all kinds of professional groups like physi-
cians and engineers. They were closely associated with the enactment of laws and 
would continue to participate in political debates on the social question. In time, 
new groups like spatial planners, psychologists and sociologists would also join in. 
Was the influence of these professionals in the pillarised Netherlands at all 
noticeable?
8 Jan Luiten van Zanden, Een klein land in de 20e eeuw, economische geschiedenis van Nederland, 
1914–1995, (Houten, 1997), 59; E. Bloemen, J. Kok and J.L. van Zanden, De top 100 van indus-
triële bedrijven in Nederland 1913–1990, (Den Haag, 1993), 10.
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The social movement around landscape and nature had a special role. As we saw 
earlier, around 1900 the countryside had a mesmerising effect on the bourgeois 
elite. They regarded the countryside as a still reasonably authentic idyll suffused 
with folklore and pastoral delights. Impressionist painters in artists’ colonies like 
Laren, Katwijk and Plaswijk recorded this cherished landscape on canvas.
The simple rural huts and farms, surrounded here and there by trees, are picturesquely 
spread out across the heathlike farmer’s fields and marshes.9
A society like the Association for the Preservation of Natural Monuments (1905) 
wanted to conserve these special landscapes and their flora and fauna as in a collec-
tion. The General Netherlands Cyclists’ Union (ANWB, 1883) stimulated the dis-
covery of the idyllic countryside and ‘nature’ by bicycle, automobile or just walking. 
In these circles, country living was romanticized, it was a place of refuge and a 
perfect counterpart to modern industrializing city life.10 Would these movements 
succeed in getting biodiversity, the environment and other aspects of sustainability 
on the political agenda?
Various movements active prior to 1914 had survived the First World War. In 
addition, the war had created entirely new frameworks for well-being and sustain-
ability. These form the starting point for an analysis of the period 1910–1970. We 
will start with a comparison of the monitor of well-being for 1910 with that of 1970 
and of the material flows in both years.
12.2  Well-being ‘Here and Now’: A Life longer and Happier, 
1910 Versus 1970
Dutch population grew from 5.9 million in 1910 to 13.0 million in 1970. Real per 
capita consumptive expenditures increased by a factor of 1.75, while income 
inequality declined (Table 12.2). This meant that in this period extreme poverty was 
nearly banished. At the outset of this period some 8.5% of the population lived 
below the poverty line. In absolute terms, this still represented a sizable number of 
500,000 people.
Living conditions for the urban poor were difficult. According to socialist critics 
the cities were:
modern, ugly and repulsive heaps of humanity, (…) cancerous growths on the beautiful 
earth, ruined by smoke and stench and degenerate people (…)11
9 J.S. Göbel, De Plasmolen: Gids voor de bezoekers van den Plasmolen en omgeving, (1910). The 
colonies even drew groups of American painters who came to paint what was in their eyes a ‘Dutch 
Utopia,’ the as yet unspoilt Dutch countryside.
10 A. van der Woud, De nieuwe mens: De culturele revolutie in Nederland rond 1900 (Amsterdam 
2015), 217–25.
11 The socialist Frederik van Eeden cited in Jan Bank and Maarten van Buuren (eds.), 1900, Hoogtij 
van Burgerlijke Cultuur, vol. 3, Nederlandse Cultuur in Europese Context (Den Haag 2000), 449.
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Theme Indicator Unit ±1910 ±1970 Corresponding 
CBS methods
Population million inhabitants 5.9 13.0







index (1850=100) 200 340
Income inequality, 
general
Gini coëffic. 0–1 0.47 0.36
Gendered income 
inequality





Satisfaction with life score 0–10 ? 7.4 ?
Personal characteristics
Health Life expectancy years 55 75
Nutrition Height cm 173 182
Housing Housing quality % slums 60 6
Public water supply m3/capita 19 109
Physical safety Murder victims number per 100.000 
inhabitants
0.4 0.7
Labour Unemployment % workforce 2.0 1.6
Education Level of Education year 5.8 9.0
Free time Free time in hours/week ? 47.9 ?
Natural 
environment
Biodiversity MSA % original 
biodiversity
54 66
Air quality SO2 kg SO2/ capita 4.6 21.0
Greenhouse gas 
emissions
ton CO2/capita 3.8 10.1
Water Quality Public water supply m3/capita 18.7 109.0
Institutional environment













? Unknown or irrelevant  
Source: See note 23 of Chap. 2
12 The Situation Around 1910: A New Order
246
The poorest members of society lived in hovels, in cellars fronting on cramped and 
crowded alleyways. It was hardly surprising that politicians aimed to improve these 
living conditions. Of the entire Dutch population a bit more than 38% lived in towns 
with more than 20,000 inhabitants, and 22% in the three largest cities, (Amsterdam 
10%, Rotterdam 7% and The Hague 5%).
The majority of Dutch people in 1910 lived in the countryside. Daily life for the 
smallholders and agricultural workers on the sand grounds had hardly changed. 
Working conditions were still unremittingly heavy. Added to this was the huge 
social problem of agricultural unemployment around 1900. Many day-labourers 
abandoned the crop-farming regions and the grasslands for the cities. The unem-
ployed were put to work in reclamations, forestry, but also in ‘unproductive labour 
like breaking up rocks, unwinding rope and similar things that have been invented 
to maintain an illusion of industry.’12 Living conditions and housing were miserable. 
For example, in Emmen, in the province of Drenthe, 80% of the dwellings had only 
one-room.
Between 1910 and 1970 the Dutch economic landscape totally changed. The 
share of agricultural labour fell from 28% to 7%. Industrialisation transformed 
Dutch society. By 1970, 28% of the workforce was employed in industries, 31% in 
international services and 35% in the building trades and other services.13 The dif-
ference in income between rich and poor diminished and most likely also the pay- 
differential between men and women. Regarding the latter, exact figures for 1910 
are lacking. Women’s share of the labour force remained nearly constant between 
1910 (23%) and 1970 (26%). We can estimate that at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury women earned half or two-thirds of what men earned.14 Opinions differed 
greatly on the subject of female labour and its remuneration. In 1924, for example, 
laws on legal competence were enacted, preventing women from working as civil 
servants. These were retracted in 1956. In the early 1950s the average gross hourly 
wage of women amounted to 56% of what men earned. In 1958 European agree-
ments led to regulations enforcing equal pay. By 1960 the average hourly wage of 
women had risen to 60% and by 1970 to 70% of the gross hourly wage of men.15
On average, material welfare increased, but were the Dutch more satisfied with 
their lives? Here too figures for 1910 are lacking, as are time-series data for the 
period. But we can assume that the picture must have been quite erratic in view of 
the two world wars and a big economic recession. Increased satisfaction might have 
been expected after the Second World War thanks to economic growth and the aug-
mentation of the welfare state. We shall return to this.
The nutritional situation in 1970 relative to 1910 was much improved with more 
and better food. Conditions during the First World War had drawn attention to the 
12 Citation from the Landbouwkundig Tijdschrift in: Auke van der Woud, De nieuwe mens, 221.
13 J.L. van Zanden and R.T. Griffiths, Economische geschiedenis van Nederland in de 20e eeuw, 
(Utrecht, 1989), 27.
14 H. Pott-Buter and K. Tijdens (eds.), Vrouwen, leven en werk in de twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam 
1998), 180.
15 Pott-Buter and Tijdens (1998), 183.
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production and distribution of food. During the war and the depression of the 1930s, 
food production acquired a national character in which a balance had to be sought 
between continuity of production and acceptable prices. For the unemployed and 
those on welfare the depression was a time of ‘hunger and misery.’ Nightmares 
became reality during the ‘hunger winter’ at the end of the Second World War when 
access to and distribution of food became critical. In this period, food security was 
one of the crucial aspects of well-being. Improvements in nutrition as well as in 
medical technology became manifest in increases in average height and age.
Housing conditions also improved greatly. The number of occupants per dwell-
ing decreased from 4.45 to 3.42. The number of dwellings with fewer than three 
rooms declined from 68% to 8%. Most homes in 1970 had facilities like a toilet 
(86%), running water (99%) and electricity (99%). The number of years of school-
ing increased. Leisure time and travel increased. In 1952 44% of the population left 
home for vacation, of which 7% to foreign destinations. By 1969 this number had 
increased to 65% of which 28% to foreign destinations.16
The development of the institutional environment was a final indicator that 
pointed to improvement in well-being. The reform of the voting system increased 
democratic participation. Compulsory voting ensured turnouts of about 95%, of 
which only a small minority (7–10%) submitted invalid votes. In this way, a large 
part of the population participated in the political process. The district system was 
replaced by a system of equal representation. This stimulated the formation of 
national political parties along ideological lines. These parties were the political 
instruments of the pillarised social institutions.
Developments between 1910 and 1970 were not necessarily linear. The period 
was characterised by external vulnerabilities: two world wars and the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Unemployment in both 1910 and 1970 amounted to about 
4% of the workforce. In the 1930s it climbed to above 17%, and for the male work-
force to about 20%.17 Unemployment during the depression left deep scars in the 
collective memory. Not for nothing did the populace demand of the post-war gov-
ernment, that it devotes a good deal of attention to the creation of jobs.
Data on housing shortages in 1910 and 1970 also fail to provide an adequate 
picture of the problematic nature of well-being in the intervening decades. At 1% 
this seemed quite low for 1910, even though many lived in miserable conditions. 
Around 1970 the housing shortage stood at 5%. But in this case too the problem 
actually reached its zenith between the two sample years. In the latter 1940s, the 
Netherlands experienced a housing shortage reaching nearly 20%. Public opinion 
surveys revealed that combatting the housing shortage in the 1950s and early 1960s 
was considered the most important issue for the government to work on.18
16 Nederlands Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie (NIPO), Zo zijn wij: De eerste vijfentwintig jaar 
NIPO-onderzoek (Amsterdam 1970), 40–41.
17 B. Lodder, Twee eeuwen beroepsbevolking (Den Haag 2010).
18 Nederlands Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie, Zo zijn wij: De eerste vijfentwintig jaar NIPO-
onderzoek, 112.
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There are two areas for which the monitor in this period shows a problem. First 
of all in the area of physical safety. The number of murders per hundred thousand 
inhabitants was 0.4  in 1910 versus 0.71  in 1970. Up to 1965, it rose marginally. 
After 1965 the number of murders increased, particularly in the big cities. With 
greater frequency, men between the ages of 14 and 65 were the victims. The increase 
seems to be associated with new forms of criminality.19
A second, more inclusive problem, was the change in the natural environment. 
Biodiversity (in terms of MSA) declined, especially due to scale increases in agri-
culture. Industrial water and air pollution assumed serious proportions. These issues 
were recognized by some contemporaries. Heated debates were carried on about the 
effects of carbon dioxide on the climate, with dire predictions both of a new ice age 
and of global warming.20 It was seen as one of the many, but not the most important, 
environmental problems. It was the local problems of air and water pollution from 
which the first groups emerged that critically began to question the ‘price of prog-
ress.’ In these years, modernisation became ever more ‘contested.’
12.3  Well-being ‘Later’: Materials and Energy for a Better 
Future, 1910 Versus 1970
The substantial improvements in quality of life in 1970 relative to 1910 had been 
achieved by the investments of successive generations of Netherlanders in eco-
nomic, human and social capital (Table 12.3). These resources were essential for the 
development of well-being ‘later.’ The foundation of social capital – namely politi-
cal participation and trust in the political institutions – had been laid during and just 
after the First World War with universal suffrage and pillarisation. For the next half 
century this ensured reasonably stable social relations. This came to an abrupt end 
in the 1960s. Increasing secularisation and individualism brought new opinions and 
a rearrangement of the ‘societal midfield.’
As far as economic and human capital are concerned, we can only conclude that 
the period 1910–1970 shows an extremely positive development. Economic capital 
grew impressively. Capital-intensity (quantity of capital per worker) rose remarkably 
19 P. Nieuwbeerta and I. Deerenberg, ‘Trends in Moord en Doodslag, 1911–2002,’ Bevolkingstrends, 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1st quarter (2005): 56–63.
20 Around 1970 less than 10% of the scientific meteorological and oceanographic investigations 
into the effects of CO2 emissions made reference to global warming or cooling. In 1971 S.I. Rasool 
and S. Schneider published an article on the rising levels of sulphate aerosols in the atmosphere 
that could lead to global cooling and a new ice age. Time Magazine and Newsweek reported these 
findings in respectively 1974 and 1975. In the course of the 1970s about 60% of the relevant sci-
entific studies predicted global warming, about 10% global cooling and 40% made no predictions 
about temperature change. D. Nuccitelli, Climatology versus Pseudoscience, Exposing the Failed 
Predictions of Global Warming Skeptics (Santa Barbara 2015), 19–22.; Th. C. Peterson, W. M. 
Connolley, and J. Flerck, ‘The myth of the 1970s global cooling scientific consensus’, Bulletin of 
the American Meteorological Society 89, no. 9 (2008): 1325–37.
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during the Great Depression. In order to save on labour costs, entrepreneurs increas-
ingly invested in labour-saving technologies. The increase of this form of capital 
accelerated after the Second World War and this set the stage for an extremely high 
rate of growth in Dutch productivity, certainly by international standards. A better 
educated population was an important investment in human capital. Laws on com-
pulsory education that came into force after 1917 ensured an increase in the number 
of secondary school students and an increase in the length of schooling. Education 
become more accessible and achievable for all layers of the population.
Around 1910 the Dutch economy was in a period of transition. It was a mix of 
traditional and new sectors. Services (51%), industry – excluding foods and luxury 
foods – 24%, and agriculture (25%) shaped Dutch economic activity. The considerable 
Theme Indicator Unit ±1910 ±1970 Corresponding 
CBS methods
Natural capital






Biodiversity MSA % original 
biodiversity
54 66
Air quality SO2 emissions kg SO2/capita 4.6 21.0
Greenhouse gas 
emissions
ton CO2/ capita 3.8 10.1
Water Public water supply m3/capita 19 109
Economic capital
Physical capital Economic capital 
stock /capita
index (1850=100) 141 518
Financial capital Gross national debt % GDP 71 48
Knowledge Stock knowledge 
capital
index: 2010=100 < 0.5 30
Human capital
Health Life expectancy years 55 75
Labour Unemployment % workforce 2.0 1.6
Level of education Schooling years 5.8 9.0
Social capital





Democracy democracy index 
0–100
9.5 39.0





? Unknown or irrelevant
Source: See note 23 of Chap. 2
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agricultural interests were coupled in the agrarian sector (16%) and the food process-
ing and luxury foods sector (9%). In this respect, the economy still exhibited a very 
traditional structure. New activities were visible in the contributions of a diverse set of 
industrial sectors. These constituted another quarter of the Dutch economy. Textiles, 
construction, and raw metals were the most important sectors. Commercial services, 
among which trade, transport, and retailing, constituted the biggest piece of the Dutch 
economic pie in 1913.
In the years after the First World War, the Netherlands in many respects invested 
in a modern economy. Big companies like Shell, the State Mines, and Philips pio-
neered in chemicals and electrical engineering – the leading sectors of the second 
industrial revolution. Steel, the new trend-setting material, was produced on a large 
scale as was the electric motor as the new source of motive power. A modern knowl-
edge infrastructure emerged with the industrial laboratory as an icon. The govern-
ment continued to invest in and elaborate the number of state and semi-state 
laboratories. An important step was the founding in 1932 of TNO, the Central 
Organization for Applied Scientific Research. Additionally, other knowledge insti-
tutes came into being, like the provincial Economic-Technological Institutes (ETIs). 
The government also invested in vocational training. In the course of time, for 
example, technical education was provided at four different levels: lower, middle, 
higher and university-level programs of study.
In this period the role of the state increased substantially. It was responsible for 
maintaining the constitutional state and busy passing social and economic legisla-
tion that would eventually lay the foundations for a future welfare state. This was 
evident in the state budget. Using income from taxes and other sources these expen-
ditures increased after the First World War from several tens to nearly one hundred 
euros per inhabitant.
The government had always invested in water management and infrastructure. 
‘Large works’ characterized this period. 1918 marked the commencement of the 
project to close and partially reclaim the Zuiderzee, a project that was completed in 
1968 with the drainage of Flevoland. The great flood of 1953 initiated the Delta 
Works, a rigorous improvement of and shortening of the coastline. From the 1930s 
the government invested in a national road plan, shaped around a new network of 
limited access highways. At regional and local levels new basic services like run-
ning water, electricity, and municipal sewers and gas were implemented. The efforts 
of provinces and municipalities resulted in a high degree of coverage throughout the 
country.
The improved well-being also had a price. The Netherlands had to surrender part 
of its natural capital. The landscape changed considerably. In 1910 the countryside 
was still a kaleidoscope of different landscapes. A large variety of small-scale farm-
land alternated with large tracts of frequently open land. Every region was charac-
terized by its own crops, cattle, and farming techniques. Agricultural statistics in 
1910 distinguished 83 different ‘farming regions.’21 These were increasingly 
21 J.  Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland, Geschiedenis van de Landbouw, 1500–2000 (Amsterdam 
2008), 36–41; Van der Woud, De Nieuwe Mens, 185–90.
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replaced after the Second World War by large-scale farming and urban expansions. 
This had an adverse effect on biodiversity.
Time series data for energy consumption and CO2 emissions both show that up 
to the mid-twentieth century there was a modest increase in pressure on the environ-
ment. A period of strong growth set in after the Second World War, certainly by 
comparison with other western countries. After 1950 the consumption of materials 
and energy increased dramatically under the impact of economic growth and 
increased consumption. Mass production led to price reduction per unit product and 
increased purchasing power to mass consumption. The refrigerator, the radio, the 
electric iron and other consumer goods had already been introduced before the war. 
Developments like the Marshall Plan and the orientation to America, the introduc-
tion of the free Saturday and the emergence of large department stores contributed 
to the advent of a consumer society. There was a new attitude toward disposal and 
reuse. The quantity of household garbage per capita increased substantially.
12.4  Well-being ‘Elsewhere’: From Colonial to Global 
Trade, 1910 Versus 1970
In consequence of two world wars and the Great Depression of the 1930s the Dutch 
economy became more autarchic in the first half of the twentieth century. In addi-
tion the economic slow-downs during the war and depression years reduced the 
need for energy and therefore also demands on the natural capital of other countries. 
Energy supply was above all solved domestically by developing the coal mines in 
the province of Limburg. Exceptions were materials that were scarce or non- existent 
in the Netherlands. These included building materials like wood and metals, and 
specific raw materials like cotton for the textile industry and plant oils, and coffee 
and cacao beans for the food processing industry.
Up until the Second World War the Dutch East Indies, present-day Indonesia, 
was an important factor in Dutch foreign relations. The Dutch East Indies were 
regarded as an inseparable part of the kingdom. Like other colonial powers the 
Netherlands had also developed an ever more effective dual policy since the turn of 
the century, a policy that sought to invest in the land and the population of the col-
ony. In the context of the latter, administrators sought to promote the development 
of well-being among the colonial population as well, by establishing schools, librar-
ies, and stimulating cooperatives and savings banks.22
Investments in the land included above all exploration, making hinterlands and 
resources accessible, exploitation and other forms of modernisation. Firms like the 
petroleum company Shell, the Batavian Petroleum Company (Bataafsche Petroleum 
Maatschappij) and the mining company Billiton Inc. played an important role in the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the colonies. The main offices, from which 
22 H. Baudet and I.J. Brugmans, eds., Balans van beleid: terugblik op de laatste halve eeuw van 
Nederlandsch-Indië (Assen 1984), 35–65.
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trade was coordinated, were located in the Netherlands. In the domain of agricul-
tural products there were also close ties with companies located in the Netherlands. 
These flows of trade created the foundation for industries in refining and in produc-
ing consumer goods using raw materials from the Orient. After Indonesian indepen-
dence many of these relations continued to exist, although the companies involved 
also broadened their horizons.
Decolonisation had far-reaching consequences for the diplomatic and political 
relationships with foreign countries. Administratively, the Netherlands became 
‘smaller’ and had to realign itself in its foreign relations. To a greater extent than 
previously this became an orientation to the role of the Netherlands in a West- 
European context. In this way the Netherlands once again became strongly embed-
ded in the world economy.
The monitor well-being ‘elsewhere’ reveals an ambiguous situation (see 
Table 12.4). The relationship with the poor countries was called ‘development aid.’ 
In this context the Netherlands helped implement some of the technical aid pro-
grams set up by the United Nations after the Second World War. After 1960 bilateral 
aid programs were started in the areas of education, agriculture and health care in 
the poorest countries. Experience and knowledge gained in the colonies were dusted 
off, applied here once again and further developed. The higher goals were fighting 
hunger and poverty and the improvement of living conditions in these regions.
Import of goods from abroad reached previously unheard of levels. Industrial 
growth and well-being in the Netherlands in the period 1950–1970 were nourished 
to a large extent with imported natural resources. Rotterdam became the largest 
European petrochemical complex. Dutch harbours became the points of tranship-
ment in streams of agrarian products and metal ores. Portions were processed here 
or sent on to the European hinterland. Rotterdam acquired the appropriate name of 
‘Europoort.’
Theme Indicator Unit ±1910 ±1970 Corresponding 
CBS methods
Material Welfare
Consumption, income Development aid % gdp – 0.6
Natural capital
Natural capital Import of raw materials ton/capita 3.3 8.6





? Unknown or irrelevant
Source: See note 23 of Chap. 2
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12.5  Natural Capital and Material Flows 1913 Versus 1970
Get on out there, gentlemen Delft mining students (…) If we are not yet become a nation of 
sluggards, then extracting money from mining must also be an important item on our 
national agenda; the equal of trade and shipping, agriculture and traditional industry (…). 
If we be only granted ‘time of life,’ then will we see the Golden Century return in palpable 
form, then will our descendants, thanks to burrowing ever deeper into the core of the earth, 
experience a time that they can give their children lumps of gold and diamonds to play with 
(…) We have been asleep; long asleep, but the nap is over.23
Mining engineer G.P.  Rouffaer made no secret of his optimistic expectations 
about the future of the Netherlands thanks to mining activities. The occasion was 
the appointment of two full professors in mining technology at the Delft Institute of 
Technology and the increased political interest in domestic geology. A State Agency 
for the Exploration of Subsoil Assets (Rijksdienst voor de Opsporing van Delfstoffen) 
was established in 1903. This agency was set up to promote and coordinate the 
exploration of subsoil assets. Politicians and engineers were convinced that through 
intensive exploitation of natural capital it would be possible to develop well-being 
and thus launch a new ‘Golden Century.’ This conviction turns out to contain a lot 
of truth, if we compare the use of natural capital and its derivative material flows in 
1913 with those of 1970. The increase in well-being, as we could see in the monitor, 
was accompanied by an enormous input of energy and matter. In this section we 
provide an overview of the changes in the material flows.
The availability of raw materials (domestic production and import) increased spec-
tacularly in terms of weight (Table 12.5). Between 1913 and 1970, three times more 
bio-raw materials (including agricultural products and wood) were used, ten times 
more mineral subsoil assets (sand, gravel, ores etc.), and six times more fossil subsoil 
assets (among others coal and petroleum). Use of materials also increased in a relative 
sense, that is per capita. The use of bio-raw materials grew from somewhat more than 
2400 kg/per capita to about 3300 kg/per capita, mineral subsoil assets from 1300 kg to 
6100 kg per capita and fossil subsoil assets from 2800 to 8000 kg per capita. The 
growth of mineral and fossil subsoil assets is statistically the most impressive. In the 
top-ten list of material resources by weight for 1970, they occupy the first seven places 
(over against the first two places in 1913, see Table 12.6). Mineral oil (68,920 kton) and 
natural gas (25,650 kton) are on top in a class by themselves, followed by gravel, sand, 
rocks, coal and clay. The Dutch delta in 1970 was the scene of energetic construction 
in pursuit of a comfortable and safe existence and that cost a lot of energy.
There was a remarkable shift to processed products (Table 12.7). Raw materials 
and subsoil assets were ever more seldom directly consumed, but instead served as 
inputs to industry. That was already the case for mineral subsoil assets, but by 1970 
it also held for bio- and fossil raw materials. Imports also increasingly consisted, in 
both an absolute and relative sense, of processed products, a development mirrored 
in Dutch exports as well (Table 12.8). These shifts are typical of production and 
23 G.P. Rouffaer, in het Tijdschrift van het Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, 
Tweede Serie, deel XXIII, 1906, p. 1034–1042, geciteerd in Patricia E. Faasse, De ontdekking van de 
ondergrond, anderhalve eeuw toegepast geowetenschappelijk onderzoek in Nederland (Utrecht 2002).
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Table 12.6 Ten most massive raw materials (in kton) and the proportion imported (in procent), 
1913–1970









Bio Raw Materials Total, of 
which
14,740  42,400 22 22
  Milk 3,210     8,330  1  0
  Cereals  2,830     6,180  68  78
  Potatoes     2,650     5,040  2  0
  Sugar 
beets





 8,040  80.120 33 38
  Clay     3,450     8,470  2  10
  Sand     1,750     22,980  9  5
  Gravel     1,200     27,170  67  47
  Stone     1,060     10,390  100  68
Table 12.5 Raw materials in the Netherlands 1913–1970 in kton and ton/capita
1913 1970 Ratio 1910:1970
Bio raw materials:
  Gross Available (kton) 14,740 kton 42,400 kton 1: 2.9
  Bio/capita (ton/cap.) 2.4 ton/cap. 3.3 ton/cap. 1: 1.4
  % import 22% 22% 1: 1.0
  % export 14% 9% 1: 0.6
Mineral subsoil assets:
  Gross Available (kton) 8,040 kton 80,120 kton 1: 10.0
  Mineral/capita 1.3 ton/cap. 6.1 ton/cap. 1: 4.7
  % import 34% 38% 1: 1.1
  % export 7% 8% 1: 1.1
Fossil subsoil assets:
  Gross Available (kton) 17,430 kton 104,890 kton 1: 6.1
  Fossil/capita 2.8 ton/cap. 8.0 ton/cap. 1: 2.9
  % import 80% 69% 1: 0.9
  % export 33% 22% 1: 0.7
Total raw materials:
  Gross Available (kton) 40,210 kton 227,400 kton 1: 5.7
  Raw materials/capita 6.8 ton/cap. 17.5 ton/cap. 1: 2.7
  % import 50% 49% 1: 1.0
  % export 21% 16% 1: 0.8
Remark: Gross available = domestic production + imports
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-




Table 12.7 The portion of raw materials and subsoil resources industrially processed (in percent), 
1913–1970
1913 1970
Industrial processing of raw 
materials and subsoil resources
Industrial processing of raw 
materials and subsoil resources







Remark 1: Industry, excluding mineral and fossil subsoil asset extraction
Remark 2: Mineral resources such as clay and sand directly used in building activities (in for 
example dikes) are not treated as processed materials
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016)
Table 12.8 Import of processed products in kton and percent, 1913–1970
1913 1970
Total import 26,000 kton 155,920 kton
Import processed products 6,060 kton 44,640 kton
Import processed products (% of Total) 23% 30%
Total export 11,420 kton 95,500 kton
Export processed products 3,110 kton 62,020 kton
Export processed products (% of Total) 27% 65%
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850. 1910, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016)













17,430 104,890 81 69
  Coal 15,610     9,160  88  53
  Turf 1,600  6
  Mineral oil     68,920  97
  Natural 
gas
    25,650  0
Total 40,007 227,400 50 49
35,085 197,040  45  44
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016)
Table 12.6 (continued)
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consumption chains that grow longer and more complex. That development too, as 
we shall see, made its mark on well-being and sustainability in the period 
1910–1970.
Shifts in material flows moreover reflected the development of a new type of 
economy. An important shift is that in the fossil subsoil assets. Turf disappeared 
from the top ten most massive raw materials and coal fell from the first place in 
1913 to the sixth in 1970. They were replaced by mineral oil and natural gas 
(Table 12.5). This also marked the end of cokes as a coal product from the list of top 
ten processed commodities, while the category of petrochemical products crowned 
the new top ten list (Table 12.9).
Table 12.9 Ten most sizeable processed products (in kton) and the portions imported and exported 
(in percent), 1913–1970


















Flour 750 30 10
Bread 860 0 0
Processed 
fodder
1260 13,020 8 25 13 6
Wood- 
Industry






3100 7960 10 4 0 7
Concrete 
products




Cement 6930 33 2
Chemical 
Industry





















Iron slag 5320 66 1
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016)
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In building materials, wood and woodworking lost their dominant role in con-
struction, bricks maintained their position, but new processed building materials 
were introduced: cement, concrete and concrete products. In the metalworking and 
machinery industry steel replaced iron as the material of choice for metal products 
and machinery.
The shift in processed products in the area of bio raw materials is also interest-
ing. In 1913, flour, bread and grain fodder were on the top ten list of processed bio 
products. Flour and Bread were absent in the 1970 list. Cattle fodder remained in 
the top-ten of most sizeable processed products (Table 12.9). It was mainly utilized 
in meat producing cattle breading. This is the origin of important issues in the period 
after 1970 such as the manure-surplus and the bio-industry.
Autarchy was an important issue in the Netherlands in the period 1910–1917. 
During the First World War, the country was faced with the shortage of two essential 
raw materials: grain and coal. In 1913 the Dutch imported 68% of their grain and 
88% of their coal (Table 12.6). And yet it appears that subsequently the situation did 
not improve. In 1970 grain imports were even more voluminous (with an import 
percentage of 78%). And the Netherlands was almost wholly dependent on foreign 
sources for mineral oil (with an import percentage of 97%). That said, it was fully 
independent as far as its natural gas was concerned (0% import). The striving for 
autarchy had consequences for the exploitation of natural capital, the environment 
and the landscape. It is an important question for the following chapters.
In 1913, the Netherlands faced a big challenge. As the monitor 1910–1970 
shows, there was a lot of work to be done in the area of well-being, from a present- 
day no less than a contemporary perspective. Extreme poverty persisted. Public 
health and public housing were important issues. The satisfaction of primary needs 
left much to be desired, both in a quantitative and qualitative sense. At the same time 
the population continued to grow and to inhabit an unsafe delta.
To solve these issues, the Netherlands looked to a new way of exploiting natural 
capital, ‘here’ in the Netherlands and ‘elsewhere.’ The changes in material flows 
point to this. But that brought new problems to the fore. The monitor for 1910–1970 
reveals that these were situated in the domain of the natural environment and natural 
capital. The most important question is thus: in what way is the dynamism in the 
material flows related to changes in well-being and sustainability? To make this 
analysis we take as our points of departure the bio-materials (agriculture and foods), 
mineral substances (construction and building materials) and fossil substances 
(energy and plastics).
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Chapter 13
Agriculture and Nutrition: The End 
of Hunger
Frank Veraart
Abstract A robust supply of healthy food was the challenge in the domain of agri-
culture and foods in the twentieth century. Despite the agrarian successes of the 
nineteenth century (see Chap. 8), two world wars and the Great Depression had 
rendered food supply a persistent core element of government policy. Investments 
in agriculture like reclamations and land re-allocation transformed the landscape. 
Cooperation among the government, knowledge institutes and industry promoted 
mechanisation of agriculture. The use of artificial fertilisers and crop protection 
substances became widespread. Mixed farms transformed into specialized enter-
prises. The supply chains of agricultural products became longer and more 
complex.
In the food processing industry too innovations led to long international supply 
chains and new processing methods. New relationships between producers and con-
sumers were the result. Consumer had to be convinced of the quality of food prod-
ucts by means of government quality control and informational campaigns.
The new production chains were a major contributor to the degradation of the 
natural landscape and the reduction of biodiversity, both domestically and interna-
tionally. This culminated in growing social unrest and by 1970 in a more critical 
view of developments in agriculture and the food processing industry. This was the 
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prelude to measures in the area of sustainable agriculture and food production (see 
Chap. 18).
Keywords Agriculture · Food supply · Reclamations · Land re-allocation · 
Rationalisation · Specialisation · Longer supply chains · Biodiversity · Food 
quality · Consumption patterns
13.1  Ode to Winter
‘I hear the bitter winter calling
The snow keeps falling, falling, falling
We’re singing gaily young and old
We’re getting now so nice and cold
The cold will make us strong and hearty
My father’s job has just departed.
Food’s becoming very dear
The rent is due all through the year.
We’re very far from being merry,
My youngest sis has dysentery.
That gives us one less mouth to feed,
How good is God! How great his deeds.’
This satirical poem, Ode to Winter, was read to the Second Chamber of parliament 
in December 1903 by the SDAP (Social-Democratic Workers’ Party) parliamentar-
ian K. ter Laan in the budget debate during deliberations on primary education.1 In 
the debate, Ter Laan pressed for extra finances for food and clothing for children. 
The verse, according to Ter Laan, had been reprinted in Belgian, French, German 
and Austrian newspapers to underscore the abysmal living conditions in the 
Netherlands. Amsterdam city councillors responded irritably and even saw sacrilege 
in the verse. The political squabble caused by the poem illustrated that around the 
turn of the century food was an important and timely issue.
Food production and nutrition would remain on the political agenda throughout 
the twentieth century. Part of the problem was the distribution of food. As in the 
poem, the poor were still living from hand to mouth, though as a rule the Netherlands 
had more than enough food. The situation had improved since the nineteenth cen-
tury, but what additional measures were called for? Food security was a major issue. 
Two world wars had demonstrated that the food system was vulnerable in extreme 
situations. What policies had to be developed to banish hunger permanently? The 
distribution of food and food security belong to the classic core of well-being and 
sustainability and go back to the nineteenth century and earlier. In large part they 
determined the quality of life of the Dutch population. These problems would be 
largely solved in the twentieth century but in their place new sustainability issue 
1 Staten-Generaal Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1903–1904 15 December 1903, p. 937.
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arose. The food problem shifted to issues of quality and healthy nutrition. 
Additionally problems with the environment and the landscape came to the fore.
We shall use three case studies to illustrate the changing character of sustainabil-
ity: (1) reclamation and land consolidation, (2) crop protection and artificial fertil-
iser and (3) food quality: the so-called ‘disk of five’. We close this section with an 
overview of dynamics in the food supply chain between 1910 and 1970.
13.2  The Transformation of the Landscape
Well into the 1970s food security was the subtext of innovations and policy in the 
domain of agriculture and nutrition. In 1985, Th. M.  Bakker of the Institute for 
Agricultural Economics was able to conclude in his dissertation that the problem of 
food security in the Netherlands had been solved. Using mathematical models he 
demonstrated that:
… were we in the future, for whatever reason, unexpectedly to be confronted with a lengthy 
disruption of the supply of food and food constituents from abroad, then we would not in 
the short term … have to fear for a famine.2
Given that the means of production remained intact and provided that an annual 
energy input of 31.8  MJ would be available for producing artificial fertiliser, it 
would be possible on the basis of a diet composed of ‘cereals…and a sliver of pork’ 
to achieve a consumption of 2350 kcal per capita per day.3 A century after the agrar-
ian crisis the food supply seemed secure, even in times of war when the Netherlands 
would have to make do without imports of agricultural products.
2 T. M. Bakker, Eten van eigen bodem: Een modelstudie (Den Haag 1985), 14.
3 Bakker, Eten van eigen bodem, 11. In Bakker’s dissertation different theoretical scenarios are 
quantitatively assessed. The question at issue is whether the territory of the Netherlands and the 
associated agricultural produce could supply enough food in the event of a complete moratorium 
on international imports. These scenarios are based on the transformation of agricultural produc-
tion with the feeding of the domestic population as primary goal. In this way four scenarios are 
worked out in the dissertation. In the table the most important features:














1 – Minimum 50% 1 26:100 61:100 13.8 One-sided
2 – Maximum 100% 5.5 52:100 162:100 30.0 One-sided
3 – Responsible 76% 1.7 – – 16.4–17.9 Responsible
4 – Habitual 100% 2.3 – – 13.8 Unchanged
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This was possible thanks to radical changes in agriculture and land-use. From the 
time of the agrarian crisis in the nineteenth century, there had been increasing coop-
eration between the government and various organizations active in agriculture. 
Agriculture was not to be protected by import duties but rather stimulated. 
Specialisation and intensification would allow Dutch agriculture to claim a new 
position in the free international market propagated by the government. The first 
sign of the new cooperative spirit was the formation in 1893, by the Minister of 
Agriculture, of the Netherlands Agricultural Committee (NLC), a national coalition 
of the provincial Agricultural Boards. The NLC emphasized the importance of 
improving agricultural technology. In 1898 a Department of Agriculture was set up 
within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which enabled structured consultations 
between the government and the organised agricultural sector to take place.4 
Agricultural research and education was further professionalised. Between 1904 
and 1918 the National Agricultural School (established in 1876) acquired a fully 
academic status.5
One of the most visible agricultural developments was the expansion and modi-
fication of agricultural land by means of draining polders, reclaiming land and land 
consolidation. Yields were increased by introducing crop improvement, artificial 
fertiliser and chemical agents to protect crops.6 Yields per hectare of potatoes, sugar 
beets, grains and other crops grew steadily (Graph 13.1). Labour productivity in 
agriculture grew apace. Farming acquired an industrial and entrepreneurial charac-
ter. The supply of food increased and dependency on food from abroad declined. We 
start with reclamation and land consolidation.
The Dutch landscape underwent a transformation in the twentieth century. Large 
regions of moorland disappeared to become farming land and forests. Agricultural 
plots and grasslands were in turn swallowed up by urban expansion. Researchers at 
the Alterra institute at the Wageningen University calculated that in the year 2000 
only 7% of the moors were still located where they had been in 1900. For deciduous 
forests the figure was 25% and for pine forests 36%. In the twentieth century only 
large parcels of grassland and urban areas remained untouched (Fig. 13.1).7 Open 
natural terrain declined from more than 6000  km2 to less than 2000  km2 in the 
1970s. The greatest decline occurred in the interbellum and immediately after the 
Second World War (Table 13.1).
From the outset of the century, aficionados of nature and their associations kept 
a sharp eye on encroachments into natural terrain. After the ornithological associa-
tions founded in the final decade of the nineteenth century, 1901 saw the founding 
4 Piet de Rooy, Ons stipje op de waereldkaart: De politieke cultuur van modern Nederland 
(Amsterdam 2014), 205.
5 J. van der Haar, De geschiedenis van de Landbouwuniversiteit, (Deel I) van school naar hoges-
chool, 1873–1945 (Wageningen 1993).
6 Jan Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland: Geschiedenis van de landbouw, 1500–2000 (Amsterdam 
2008), 463.
7 W.C. Knol, H. Kramer and H. Gijsbertse, Historisch grondgebruik Nederland: Een landelijke 
reconstructie van het grondgebruik rond 1900 (Wageningen 2004).
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of the more generic Netherlands Natural History Association and 1905 the founding 
of the Association for the Preservation of Natural Monuments. Initiators of these 
associations were representatives of the societal elite who either via networks or 
professional functions were closely associated with landscape development. The 
preservation of ‘rare’ and ‘curious pieces’ of plants and animals belonged to the 
core values of the movement. The associations established nature preserves and 
agitated for legal protection for rare species.8 After the economically inspired laws 
on hunting (1852), fisheries (1857) and useful animals (1880), the associations 
scored a success in the Bird Law of 1912, that protected birds living in the wild. In 
addition the associations exerted themselves in favour of the Forest Laws of 1917 
and of a law on Scenic Beauty that was passed in 1928.9 These laws laid a legal 
foundation under their ambitions. But what was the relationship between the value 
8 H. van der Windt, ‘De totstandkoming van ‘de natuurbescherming’ in Nederland,’ Tijdschrift voor 
Geschiedenis 107(3) (1994), 485–507.; H. van der Windt, En dan: Wat is natuur nog in dit land?, 
Natuurbescherming 1880–1990 (Amsterdam 1995).; J. Cramer, De groene golf: Geschiedenis en 
toekomst van de Nederlandse milieubeweging (Utrecht, 1989).
9 M. Coesèl, J. Schaminée, and L. van Duuren, De natuur als bondgenoot: De wereld van Heimans 


































































Graph 13.1 Yields of potatoes, sugar beets and cereals 1900–1970 (tons/ha)
Source: CBS – Landbouw vanaf 1851 (Agriculture since 1851)
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Table 13.1 Land-use in the Netherlands in km2
Agrarian Forest Open natural terrain
+/− in % +/− in % +/− in %
1900 21,160 2520 6240
1905 21,270 0.5 2570 1.9 5840 −6.8
1910 21,540 1.3 2600 1.2 5530 −5.6
1915 22,010 2.1 2570 −1.2 5110 −8.2
1920 22,180 0.8 2480 −3.6 4930 −3.7
1925 22,530 1.6 2490 0.4 4480 −10.0
1930 22,950 1.8 2540 2.0 3910 −14.6
1935 23,350 1.7 2550 0.4 3570 −9.5
1940 23,240 −0.5 2580 1.2 3580 0.3
1945 21,680 −7.2 2410 −7.1 3270 −9.5
1950 25,050 13.5 2420 0.4 2730 −19.8
1955 25,330 1.1 2450 1.2 2370 −15.2
1960 25,520 0.7 2680 8.6 2360 −0.4
1965 25,690 0.7 2890 7.3 1900 −24.2
1970 25,520 −0.7 2980 3.0 1990 4.5
1975 25,160 −1.4 3080 3.2 1690 −17.8








Forest 10.8 10.3 10.4
Moorland 13.9 1.2 1.1
Grassland 42.0 50.8 47.0
Farmland 27.9 29.3 27.4
Built up areas 1.9 6.8 12.3
Sand/dune 1.8 1.3 1.4
Miscellaneous 1.6 0.3 0.4
Table: percentual change in land-use 1900, 1970
and 2000 (excluding water).
Map: Change in land-use between 1900 and 2000
Fig. 13.1 Changes in land-use 1900–2000
Source: H.  Kramer and W.C.  Knol, Historisch grondgebruik Nederland: Grondgebruik rond 
1970 in 500 meter grids (Wageningen 2003); W.C. Knol, H. Kramer, and H. Gijsbertse, Historisch 
grondgebruik Nederland, Een Landelijke Reconstructie van het grondgebruik rond 1900 
(Wageningen 2004). The table shows the percentual figures of land-use. In the studies just cited 
data is provided in km2. However there is an enormous discrepancy in measured surface area 
between 1970 and 2000. In the measured surface areas for 1900, 1970 and 2000 the largest discrep-
ancies are to be found in the category ‘water,’ which is why it is left out of the table
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of nature and the utility of reclamation and land consolidation? How were the dif-
ferent values weighed in practice?
13.2.1  Reclamations
At the end of the nineteenth century, reclaiming the moors was above all a matter of 
planting new forest. The use of artificial fertiliser also made it possible to transform 
the heath meadows into grazing pasture or crop fields. Reclamation was carried out 
by private firms - except for state-owned lands for which an agency called State 
Forest Management (Staatsbosbeheer) was called into being in 1899. Two firms 
played a pivotal role: the Heidemij (the Nederlandse Heidemaatschappij founded in 
1888) and the Grondmij (the Grondverbeterings- en Ontginningsmaatschappij 
founded in 1915). They advised on the transformation into forest, crop fields or 
pasture; proposed improvements in drainage and water-level management; and exe-
cuted the plans.
Pressure increased on available agricultural acreage during the First World War. 
The government emphatically encouraged reclamations (and new polders) in order 
to increase food production. After 1920 reclamations became far less profitable. 
Profitability was partly dependent on the ability to export agricultural produce. The 
weakened purchasing power of German consumers as a result of the hyperinflation 
of the early 1920s as well as increasing competition from Danish, Australian and 
New Zealand products in the British market caused falling prices.10 The situation 
only worsened during the economic crisis.
In cooperation with the agricultural organizations, the government exerted itself 
to the utmost to protect agriculture and the many small family farms. This so-called 
‘green front’ in which the government and the agricultural organizations cooperated 
closely, aimed to guarantee a domestic and foreign market for agricultural produce. 
Agricultural policy continued to pursue the expansion of agrarian acreage. This 
seemed counterintuitive given overproduction and the low prices of farm produce. 
But the increase of acreage aimed both to decrease dependency on foreign agricul-
tural produce, especially cereals, as well as to strengthen the position of small farm-
ers and at the same time provide work for the legions of the unemployed.11 In the 
first half of the twentieth century on the sand grounds in the east and south of the 
Netherlands, farms increased their acreage by more than 33% thanks to reclamation 
(Table13.2).12
10 Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland, 209.
11 De Rooy, Ons stipje op de waereldkaart, 210.; P.H.M. Thissen, ‘Van Heide tot boerenland en 
bos, Regionale verscheidenheid in heideontginningslandschappen, 1850–1940,’ in M. de Harde 
and H. van Triest, Jonge landschappen, 1800–1940 (Utrecht 1994), 21–37.
12 Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland, 408.
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Initially, nature lovers were enthusiastic about reforestation, but this began to 
wane as the pace of heath reclamation for agriculture increased.13 Though the State 
Forest Management (Staatsbosbeheer) and the municipalities tended to spare par-
cels that were scenically attractive, this was not enough for the Society for the 
Preservation of Natural Monuments. The society bought scattered parcels of heath 
in the provinces of Brabant, Overijssel and Drenthe, as well as in the Veluwe region 
in order to preserve regional variety. In 1929 the society set up the Heath Fund, 
based on public donations. Its first purchase was the Dwingelerveld in Drenthe, a 
37 km2 region of slightly accidented heathland dotted with fens and bogs. These 
purchases were controversial, as the 1924 acquisition of the De Campina region 
near Boxtel in Brabant demonstrated; in order to prevent local disturbances, this 
purchase was conducted in secret.14
In 1932, Nature Monuments, the ANWB (cyclists’ and motorists’ association) 
and other nature preservation associations, set up the Contact Commission for 
Nature and Landscape Protection, with the aim of representing the interests of 
nature and the agrarian landscape to the government. These associations agitated 
against the structural changes in agriculture, like reclamation and land consolida-
tion.15 These preservationists, however, had a difficult time propagating the interests 
of nature preservation, certainly when toward the end of the 1930s the persisting 
economic crisis claimed increasing attention for the problem of unemployment.
‘There is a danger that our generation, in order to temporarily mitigate some of the suffering 
of unemployment, will forever ruin much of beauty in our country to the detriment of all 
that come after us,’
13 Van der Windt, En dan: Wat is natuur nog in dit land?, 103.
14 Thissen, Van heide tot boerenland en bos, 30–31.
15 J. Dekker, Dynamiek in de Nederlandse natuurbescherming (Utrecht 2002), 26–28.
Table 13.2 Reclamation of 
‘wastelands’, 1875–1975












Source: N.H.  Lier, Een Bont Patroon, 




as the engineer J. Loeff, from the Gooi region near Utrecht, put it in 1939.16 His 
remark was incited by the plans for poldering and reclamation proposed by the gov-
ernment inspector for work projects, engineer J.  Th. Westhoff in a report to the 
minister of social affairs, C.P.M. Romme. The report occasioned a heated debate 
between representatives of agriculture and preservationists about the use and func-
tion of natural regions. It got much publicity in the national and regional papers and 
journals, including professional journals.
Preservationists saw Westhoff’s plans as a serious threat with dire consequences 
for nature. What would remain after reclamation would be ‘little parks.’17 The prom-
inent socialist politician Henri Polak climbed the barricades against the destruction 
of what he called ‘treasures of beauty.’18 Frisian preservationists associated with It 
Fryske Gea emphasized the consequences of the disappearance of nature for the 
local economy. On the other hand, the Royal Netherlands Agricultural Committee 
was a staunch advocate of drastic expansion of agricultural acreage. Under the ban-
ner of ‘The Netherlands, dare to live,’ chairman H.D. Louwens articulated his criti-
cism in local and regional newspapers:
… Natural beauty can be enjoyed only with a clear conscience. When natural beauty has to 
be maintained at the cost of the pleasure in labour of the unemployed and of lost life- 
chances for young farmers then it can no longer be experienced in innocent joy, because 
then it is burdened by a dark cloud of human suffering. True joy, including the joy of free 
nature, can never be egotistical.19
Nature was a luxury product, subservient to economy and welfare.
13.2.2  Land Consolidation
After the Second World War the transformation of the landscape acquired an extra 
dimension due to land consolidation projects. The government’s agricultural policy 
took a new turn. From efforts to maintain employment for the many small farmers 
and farm labourers, policy turned to mechanisation, rationalisation and upscaling of 
farm work. Sicco Mansholt, minister of Agriculture between 1945 and 1958, shaped 
this so-called ‘structure policy’ that was supported by new laws and by intensive 
cooperation between agricultural organisations and government agencies. The 
Agriculture Foundation, founded in 1945 by the three farmers’ organisations and 
farm workers’ unions, consulted monthly with the Minister of Agriculture and Food 
Supply. With the founding of the Agricultural Board (Landbouwschap) in 1954 this 
16 ‘Utrechtse en Hollandse plassen bedreigd’ in Utrechts volksblad : sociaal-democratisch dag-
blad, 02–05-1939.
17 ‘Natura’ in Het Vaderland: Staat- en letterkundig nieuwsblad, 12-10-1939.
18 ‘N.V.V. en Plan-Westhoff’ in Het volksdagblad: dagblad voor Nederland, 6-2-1939.
19 H.D. Louwes ‘Nederland durf te leven’ in onder andere Nieuwsblad van het Noorden (3-1-1939) 
Leeuwarder nieuwsblad (3-1-1939) De Graafschap Bode (4-1-1939) , Nieuwsblad van Friesland 
(4-1-1939), Leeuwarder courant (4-1-1939), Zaans volksblad (4-1-1939) Utrechts volksblad (4-1-
1939) en De Tijd (4-1-1939).
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corporatist consultation assumed the form of a ‘national agrarian parliament.’20 
Government policy aimed at the continued strengthening of the international com-
petitive position of Dutch agriculture. A stable market for agricultural produce was 
created thanks to guaranteed national and later European selling prices.
Agricultural organisations like farmers’ co-ops devoted themselves to improve-
ments in the supply chain. They invested in the supply and shipment of raw materi-
als and products, via their own channels like slaughterhouses, dairies, egg hatcheries 
and vegetable auctions. In the post-war years most farms shifted from mixed to 
specialized production. Farms became links in longer food supply chains. The meat- 
poultry supply chain, for example, became lengthened with ‘multipliers’ who sup-
plied ‘breeders’ with fertilized eggs, who supplied ‘fatteners’ with chicks, who 
delivered chickens to the slaughterhouses.21
Government policy aimed at structural improvements in productivity per farm. 
Policies were supported by new ideas and approaches taken from United States 
Marshall Plan technical support programs, research at Wageningen Agricultural 
University, and national agricultural schools. Education and advice via Government 
Agricultural Consultants directly and indirectly stimulated the mechanisation and 
rationalisation of Dutch farms.22 One of the more ambitious and controversial 
aspects of the plans was a policy aimed at scale increases.23 With larger parcels of 
land, agricultural efficiency could be further increased.
This made land consolidation one of the core aims of the structural policy. Due 
to purchases and divisions in the past, farmland was often fragmented into small 
parcels divided by fences, paths, hedgerows, wood banks, ditches, brooks etc. The 
aim of land consolidation was to unite the fragmented pieces into larger wholes and 
to optimize access, soil quality, drainage and water supply in the service of efficient 
production. Land consolidation implied a physical intervention, in addition to an 
economic and legal trajectory of land exchange and value-compensation. In land 
consolidation areas, the land was levelled, ditches moved, hedgerows and wood 
banks cut down and accessibility improved with new roads.
The first modest - and voluntary - land consolidation projects date from the nine-
teenth century. After the turn of the century the Royal Netherlands Agricultural 
Committee embraced the idea. After the First World War the national government 
began to formulate a policy for land consolidation, building among others on land 
consolidation laws in which procedures and financial arrangements, including gov-
20 De Rooy, Ons stipje op de waereldkaart, 211–22.
21 H. Veldman, E.van Royen and F. Veraart, Een machtige schakel in de Nederlandse land- en tuin-
bouw: De geschiedenis van Cebeco-Handelsraad, 1899–1999 (Rotterdam 1999), 177–192.
22 J. Grin, J. Rotmans, and J. W. Schot, Transitions to sustainable development: New directions in 
the study of long term transformative change (New York 2009), 287–88.
23 Especially groups of small farmers feared the plans for upscaling. Mansholt denied that upscal-
ing was a goal in itself, but he kept insisting on upscaling via land consolidation. In any case, later 
policy measures and the centralisation of marketing would later on lead to agricultural upscaling. 
See: Grin, Rotmans, and Schot, Transitions to sustainable development, 285–290.
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ernment funding, were laid down.24 The unification of various commissions con-
cerned with reclamation, drainage and land consolidation, led in 1938 to the 
founding of the Central Commission for Cultivation Technology (CCC). The 
Heidemij (a reclamation firm) played an important role in consultation and 
execution.25
The various agricultural and governmental agencies also consulted with nature 
conservation organisations, represented by the Contact Commission for Nature and 
Landscape Protection. In 1948 exchanges among the different parties led to the 
founding of the Consultation Commission for Nature and Landscape Protection the 
aim of which was to manage local conflicts around reclamations. The consultation 
platform, that in the end met only 13 times, had a difficult time finding a niche in the 
rapidly changing and ever more tightly organised agrarian world. After the creation 
of the Agricultural Board in 1954, the consultations came to a halt for the time 
being.26
By then, the structural transformation of agriculture had shifted into a higher 
gear. In 1954 a new land consolidation law came into effect.27 The procedures were 
further simplified by equalizing the legal status of land renters and owners. In the 
voting on the consolidation plans, abstention was now to count as a vote for a new 
landscape plan. A special organisation, the Cultivation Technology Service, devel-
oped the plans in the name of the CCC and looked after the financing of the projects. 
Execution of the plans fell to the reclamation firms Heidemij, Grontmij and other 
engineering bureaus.28 These measures aimed to speed up the process of land con-
solidation in order to meet the challenge of declining global prices for agricultural 
produce.29
The approach bore fruit. The large number of applications required a certain 
prioritization. That resulted in 1958 in a Multi-annual Plan for Land Consolidation. 
Plans were brought together in so-called ‘regional improvement projects’. These 
24 S. van den Bergh, Verdeeld land: De geschiedenis van de ruilverkaveling in Nederland vanuit 
een lokaal perspectief, 1890–1985 (Groningen 2004), 42–45. The first law dated from 1924. A new 
land consolidation act in 1938 increased the options for those wishing to take initiatives and 
granted new subsidies. This law proved inadequate for larger land consolidation projects. 
Temporary legislation filled the breach, as in the Land Consolidation Law Walcheren of 1947, 
initiated by the inundations during the war, and the Law on Land Consolidation of Emergency 
Zones after the 1953 flood disaster.
25 In 1935 the State Commission for Drainage, the Advisory Commission for Reclamation of 
Wastelands and the Central Commission for Land Consolidation were consolidated into the 
Central Advisory Commission for Cultivation Technology (Centrale Cultuurtechnische 
Adviescommissie). In 1938 this was renamed the Central Commission for Cultivation Technology. 
Van den Bergh, Verdeeld Land, 45.
26 Dekker, Dynamiek in de Nederlandse natuurbescherming, 84–85; J. Dekker, ‘De dynamische 
opstelling van het landbouwschap ten aanzien van het milieu, 1948–1972,’ in Jaarboek voor 
Ecologische Geschiedenis, (Eekhout 2008).
27 H. Buiter and J. Korsten, Land in aanleg: De dienst Landelijk Gebied en de inrichting van het 
platteland (Zutphen 2006), 19–47.
28 Buiter and Korsten, Land in aanleg, 60–61.
29 Van den Bergh, Verdeeld land, 46–51.
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projects included more than just land consolidation. Extension services and school-
ing in the areas of technical knowledge and entrepreneurship were set up to support 
the modernisation of farming. A Development and Renewal Fund was called into 
being in 1963 to help small farmers who wanted to stop. In this way policy makers 
wanted not only to ‘improve’ the physical structure, but the social structure as 
well.30
The agencies, firms and governments involved in land consolidation were pri-
marily interested in promoting agriculture and the economy. Initially, there was 
broad political and social support. In the 1960s, landscape consolidation projects 
had increasingly to be coordinated with urban and infrastructural developments. 
This created more room for recreational areas and other urban claims on the land-
scape. On paper the interests of nature and landscape were incorporated into the 
new land consolidation legislation that came into force in 1954. Around 1950 nature 
preservation comprised 1% of the budget. This grew to 6% around 1970.31
There were incidental controversies. In 1964, for example, farmers levelled a 
number of wood banks in a land consolidation region in Twente before the plans had 
been approved. This unilateral action caused considerable consternation within 
nature conservation organizations and led to questions in parliament. Despite the 
commotion, the farmers were not sanctioned. Within the Cultivation Technical 
Service, initiatives were taken behind closed doors to discuss and align the different 
social interests. In this context, H.P.  Gorter, director of the Society for Natural 
Monuments, was appointed to the Central Committee for Cultivation Technology in 
1968 as representative of the nature conservation organizations.
Social unrest around land consolidation projects increased toward the end of the 
1960s. The vote for a new land consolidation plan in the town of Tubbergen in the 
Twente region, for example, elicited violent protest. The protest was aimed particu-
larly at the voting procedure. In the first vote the plans had been adopted with 27 
votes in favour and 12 against. The votes of the 2938 entitled voters who didn’t 
show up counted as being in favour of the plans. This, in accordance to the rules that 
were in effect – rules once adopted to simplify land consolidation. This outcome 
was followed by riots in which the mayor’s house was set on fire and the police were 
called out. Opposition in Tubbergen was broad-based. Unrest was caused particu-
larly by the undemocratic nature of the land consolidation procedures. Besides pro-
viding an occasion to revise the procedures, the unrest also created a window of 
opportunity for bringing non-agrarian interests to centre stage. This inspired the 
restructuring of government agencies around a broader vision of land planning, 
incorporating the interests of agriculture, nature and landscape planning.32
The challenge for the period after 1970 was a more thorough integration of 
nature values and recreation into land planning. By 1985 this resulted in a land- 
planning law that put an end to land consolidation informed exclusively by an agrar-
ian perspective. But into the 1980s, the agricultural lobby continued to wield 
30 Van den Bergh, Verdeeld land, 52; Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland, 467–473.
31 J.L. van Zanden and S.W. Verstegen, Groene geschiedenis van Nederland (Houten 1993), 83.
32 Buiter and Korsten, Land in aanleg, 77–79.
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significant influence. Between 1924 and 1985, in 452 projects, 1,490,520 hectares 
of land was newly parcelled. Land consolidation projects were pending for another 
448,630 hectares. Over the course of 60 years, about two million hectares of agri-
cultural acreage had been reorganized or were about to be so.33 That amounted to 
some 59% of the surface area of the Netherlands.
The interventions in the landscape due to reclamations and land consolidation 
contributed to the decline of diversity in flora and fauna. Landscape types like 
marshes, mud flats and living peat moors as well as landscape elements like wood 
banks disappeared (Table 13.3). Specific ecotopes became smaller and more widely 
separated. Changes in water management, in part carried out to make it easier to 
work with agricultural machines, led to desiccation in many places.
The changes caused some species to disappear, while others flourished. Research 
into the historical development of biodiversity has demonstrated that, especially in 
the second half of the twentieth century, humans negatively influenced Dutch biodi-
versity.34 Reclamations and land consolidation made the landscape more monoto-
nous. Among animals, it was especially the reptiles, amphibians and butterflies that 
were victimized by the changes in the landscape. Ecotopes disappeared, became 
smaller and more fragmented.35 The decline was strongest in the riverine zones, 
sand grounds and the hilly country.36 Possibly not by chance the regions that were 
most affected by the physical interventions (see Fig. 13.1).
33 J. Bieleman, Landbouw, in Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw (Zutphen 1993), 63.; 
Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland, 468.
34 J. Noordijk et al., De Nederlandse biodiversiteit, Nederlandse Fauna, 10, 339.
35 Noordijk et al., De Nederlandse biodiversiteit, 339–354.
36 J.A. Weinreich and C.J.M. Musters, Toestand van de natuur: Veranderingen in de Nederlandse 
natuur (Den Haag 1989), 225.
Table 13.3 Changes in surface area of different landscape types with variegated ecotopes
1920 1950 1976 1988
Sandbanks/mudflats 24,000 26,000 12,800 12,000
Marsh (excl. forest) 36,000 26,500 21,000
Sand drifts 12,700 11,000 4300 1800
Living high moors 33,000 160
Excavated and drained high moors 23,400 9800
Heathland 377,000 108,000 79,000 35,800
Forest 248,000 242,000 309,000 328,700
Source: R.J. Bink et al., Toestand van de Natuur 2 (Wageningen 1994), 93
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13.3  The Modern Farm and the Environment
The transformation of the landscape was only one of the aspects of the agrarian 
transition. Another aspect was the modernisation and rationalisation of the farm 
itself. The government took a leading role in this process. It programmed research, 
put much effort into extension services and supported education. The knowledge 
infrastructure that emerged would later become known as the OVO-triangle (for the 
Dutch words Onderzoek – Research –, Voorlichting – Extension –, and Onderwijs, 
− Education). It occupied itself among other things with mechanisation, artificial 
fertiliser and crop protection. The Netherlands developed the highest agricultural 
productivity in the world and also used the most artificial fertiliser and crop protec-
tion substances (insecticides and herbicides) per hectare. These radical innovations 
contributed substantially to the solution of the food problem, but at the cost of initi-
ating new ecological calamities. What were the motive forces behind these develop-
ments? How did the Dutch deal with the new sustainability challenges?
13.3.1  Artificial Fertiliser
Artificial fertiliser together with an increase in the number of cattle sounded the 
death knell of the pre-modern cycle of fertiliser production. The increase of live-
stock in the last decades of the nineteenth century put an end to the fertiliser short-
age. It broke open the conventional fertiliser cycle. Heath meadows became largely 
superfluous for the making of fertiliser.37 The collection of human faeces in cities 
also became irrelevant, a development that was also applauded and encouraged in 
hygienist circles. The fertiliser cycle between the city and the countryside came to 
an end. The collection of faeces in barrels was replaced by hygienic sewer 
systems.38
The use of artificial fertiliser shows a steady growth since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, with the exception of the two war periods (Graph 13.2). The 
zenith was reached in the 1980s. More than 700 kilotons of artificial fertiliser were 
used in agriculture in this period, equivalent to about 350 kg per hectare.39 Before 
the Second World War, the growth was associated with a number of factors.
The knowledge infrastructure as it developed from the end of the nineteenth 
century stimulated the use of artificial fertiliser. Government agricultural advisors 
shared experiences in the area of fertilization at the state agricultural experimental 
stations (Rijkslandbouwproefstations) with individual farmers and farmers’ study 
37 M.T. Knibbe (2000), ‘Feed, fertilisers, and agricultural productivity in the Netherlands, 1880–
1930,’ Agricultural History 74(1): 39–57.
38 This was reinforced by public health and hygienic initiatives. H. van Zon, Een zeer onfrisse 
geschiedenis. Studies over niet-industriële vervuiling in Nederland, 1850–1920 (Groningen 1986), 
147–157.
39 E. Homburg, Groeien door kunstmest, DSM Agro, 1909–2004 (Hilversum 2004), 94.
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groups. Analysis of and knowledge about fertilisers was concentrated in 1915 at the 
experimental stations in Maastricht and Groningen. On the basis of this specializa-
tion the stations were in a better position to develop procedures and guidelines for 
the application of artificial fertiliser and to combat fraud. In addition, traders and 
importers, keen to market the new product, set up their own advisory bureaus for 
artificial fertiliser.40
Farmers’ cooperatives also played an important role. By means of collective pur-
chasing they were able to break the power of the German trade cartels. In this man-
ner the Central Bureau of the Netherlands Agricultural Committee (CB), founded in 
1899, developed into the biggest importer of artificial fertilisers (Graph 13.3).41 
Membership of such purchasing associations was popular. In 1920 more than half 
the farmers were members of a cooperative.42
Production and trade in artificial fertiliser were important factors in the increased 
use of artificial fertiliser and acquired an ever-more national character. On the eve 
of the First World War, artificial fertiliser was produced in the Netherlands in six 
superphosphate factories and a number of smaller factories producing the nitrogen- 
based fertiliser ammonium sulphate, mostly prepared from a waste product of cokes 
40 Homburg, Groeien door kunstmest, 29–30.
41 Veldman, Van Royen and Veraart, Een machtige schakel in de Nederlandse land- en tuinbouw, 
22–56..





















































Graph 13.2 Use of artificial fertiliser in the Netherlands 1905–2007, in kilotons
Source: CBS t/m 1998: Tweehonderd jaar statistiek in tijdreeksen, from 1999: Land- en tuinbouw-
cijfers 2008 (LEI)
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production.43 The First World War interrupted the supply especially because raw 
materials like ammonia and saltpeter were also important ingredients in the produc-
tion of explosives. Inadequate supplies forced the Dutch superphosphate factories 
into mergers. During the war, the government compelled merchants, co-operatives 
and importers to work together in acquisition associations. In the course of the war 
and immediately thereafter they pursued a more independent course with respect to 
foreign suppliers and raw materials. In December 1919, following the example of 
various municipal gas factories, the State Mines started producing ammonium sul-
phate at the cokes factory of the Emma mine. This was followed in 1923 by the 
production of this fertiliser at the cokes factories of the Hoogovens iron and steel 
plant in IJmuiden.
The invention of the Haber-Bosch process to synthesize ammonia, patented in 
1910 and first implemented in 1913 by the German chemical giant BASF, was an 
important technical innovation. The First World War facilitated its rapid diffusion.44 
In 1929, using this process to synthesize ammonia, the Company for the Exploitation 
of Cokes Oven Gas (MEKOG) – a joint venture of Hoogovens and Shell – started 
the production of artificial fertiliser. This was followed in 1930 by the State Mines 
43 The merger bore the name United Chemical Factories (Vereenigde Chemische Fabrieken (VCF). 
The Amsterdam Superphosphate Factory (ASF) also belonged to this combination but continued 
its acitivities under its own name. In 1948 the combination changed its name to Albatros.
44 The Haber-Bosch process was developed by two Germans: the academic Fritz Haber and the 
engineer Carl Bosch. Their process produced ammonia by combining hydrogen from methane gas 
with nitrogen from the air. In 1913 the Badische Analin und Soda Fabrik (BASF) set up the first 
large-scale ammonia production facility based on this process. Between 1916 and 1923, via 
obscure routes, French, Italian, German and Swiss chemists succeeded in developing alternatives 
to the Haber-Bosch process. These alternatives were marketed on the basis of licenses. See 
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Graph 13.3 Trade in artificial fertilisers by Cooperative Associations 1900–1940
Source: H. Veldman, E. van Royen en F. Veraart. Een machtige schakel in de Nederlandse land- en 
tuinbouw, de geschiedenis van Cebeco-Handelsraad, 1899–1999 (Rotterdam, 1999), 54
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with its Nitrogen Binding Company (SBB). That same year in the town of Sluiskil, 
another artificial fertiliser factory under the name of Compagnie Néerlandaise de 
l’Azote (CNA) opened its doors. Its production of 45,000 tons of artificial fertiliser 
per annum made it for a brief time the largest factory of its kind in Europe.45 Between 
1921 and 1927 no fewer than 28 factories for the production of synthetic ammonia 
and 31 nitrogen binding factories sprung up all over Europe.
Price drops in the 1920s as a result of overproduction in the Dutch and European 
artificial fertiliser industry was the final factor in the increasing the use of this com-
modity. Prices dropped dramatically. Other fertilisers like those derived from urban 
wastes and faeces disappeared from the market.46 At the same time, prices for agri-
cultural produce were also depressed. Farmers responded by increasing production 
and using more fertilisers.
Well into the 1920s, Dutch agriculture still used mostly imported fertilisers like 
Chile salpeter. But this import was gradually abandoned and Dutch industry began 
to dominate artificial fertiliser production (Table 13.4). The sector looked for solu-
tions to the price drops. The State Mines secured a significant national market in 
1930 by signing contracts with the agricultural co-operatives Central Bureau (CB) 
the Co-operative Trade Association (CHV) and the Limburg’s Agricultural Interest 
(LB). After 1927, the European nitrogen industry formed a cartel with agreements 
about limiting production and dividing the market. In 1930, the Convention de 
l’Industrie de l’Azote (CAI) allowed the State Mines and MEKOG as part of the 
so-called ‘Holland group’ to divide the domestic market between themselves. CNA 
at Sluiskil would produce exclusively for the foreign market. The Central Nitrogen 
Sales Office (CSV), set up in 1934, centralized the sale of nitrogen-based fertilisers 
within the Netherlands. In time the cartel succeeded in stabilising prices. But during 
45 Homburg, Groeien door kunstmest, 94.; E.  Homburg, ‘Van carbo- naar petrochemie, 1910–
1940’, in J.W.Schot et al. (ed.) Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw, deel II: Delfstoffen, 
Energie en Chemie (Zutphen 2000) 332–357.
46 The Company for Ammonia Manufacture from Faecal Matter (1890–1902) and the First 
Netherlands Factory for Chemical Products (1902–1915) produced ammonia salts and ammonium 
sulphate from the then extant Liernur system of sewerage. Homburg, Groeien door kunstmest, 39; 
Van Zon, Een zeer onfrisse geschiedenis, 147.
Table 13.4 Share of different nitrogen fertilisers in Dutch agriculture, fertilizing years 
1923/1924–1928/1929
1922/1923 1924/1925 1926/1927 1928/1929
Chile Saltpeter 83.3 57.6 32.6 32.1
Ammonium Sulphate 14.7 39.9 57.5 41.7
Calcium Nitrate 1.6 1.4 5.9 17.3
Calcium Cyanamide 0.4 1.1 1.0 3.1
Other – – 3.0 5.8
Source: E.  Homburg, Groeien door kunstmest, DSM Agro 1929–2004 (Hilversum, 2004), 43, 
table 2.2
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the 10 year period between 1922 and 1932 the price of ammonium sulfate declined 
from 18 guilders to about 5 guilders per 100 kilograms.47
Firms were glad to contribute to the accumulation of knowledge. Using their own 
test fields, they studied the effects of fertilisation and communicated this to a broader 
public via advertisements, consultancy and exhibitions. The Nitrogen Binding 
Division of the State Mines tested their own fertilisers in various test fields of the 
Government Agricultural Advisors. This clarified the superiority of the new fertil-
iser developed by the State Mines – Chalk-ammonium saltpeter (KAS) over sulph-
uric acid ammonia. These results were touted in the advertisements of the 
Agricultural Bureau of the State Mines – set up specifically with this aim in mind. 
After 1935 cooperation within the Dutch nitrogen industry intensified. The 
Agricultural Bureau acquired an ever-more general character and in 1948 became 
part of the Central Nitrogen Sales Office (CSV).48
During the interbellum, Dutch use of artificial nitrogenous fertilisers surpassed 
that of the surrounding countries (Table 13.5). Dutch use grew from 70 kg per hect-
are in 1950 to 100 kg around 1960 and almost 200 kg per hectare in the early 1970s 
(see Table 13.6). Dairy farming in particular exhibited the strongest post-war growth 
in use of nitrogenous artificial fertilisers. Of the 430,000 tons deposited on the land 
in 1975, more than 300,000 tons were used to fertilize grazing pastures.
Increased use of artificial fertiliser was realised thanks to the emergence of close 
cooperation among firms, research institutes and farmers generously supported by 
the government. These exertions increased both the productivity per hectare as well 
as the productivity of agrarian labour. The effects were amplified by plant breeding 
aimed at developing varieties adapted to the rapid absorption of nutrients.49
This spectacular development was celebrated as a victory in the struggle to solve 
the food question. In the late 1960s artificial fertiliser surpassed animal fertilisers in 
the category of nitrogenous fertilisers (see Table 13.6). In the early 1970s experts at 
the State Consultancy for Soil and Fertilisation Issues at Wageningen and the 
Institute for Soil Fertility at Haren first expressed concern about possible 
47 Homburg, Groeien door kunstmest.
48 Homburg, Groeien door kunstmest, 85–90.
49 Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland, 285.
Table 13.5 Use of nitrogenous artificial fertilisers in selected European countries, 1913–1951 (in 
kg/hectare)
1913 1925 1926 1927 1928 1938/39 1950/51
Netherlands 7.1 16.5 20.5 21.6 26.3 37.2 71.0
Belgium 16.0 19.7 18.7 19.8 19.3 – –
Germany 7.2 10.0 11.2 13.6 13.9 23.7 26.3
France 0.2 3.1 3.0 3.4 4.0 9.4 16.5
England 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.1 4.0 4.8 17.4
Source: E. Homburg, Groeien door kunstmest, DSM Agro 1929–2004 (Hilversum, 2004), 44, table 
2.3; ‘Hogere opbrengsten van tuinbouw en veeteelt door doelmatige stikstofbemesting’ in Nieuws 
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 over- fertilisation using conventional and artificial fertilisers. The priorities for envi-
ronmental policy in 1972 first mentioned problems with fertiliser surpluses. The 
solution proposed by the KVP (Catholic Peoples Party) minister of Public Health 
and Environmental Hygiene was to advocate the planting of crops, like green maize, 
that supported a high fertilisation intensity. The relevant agricultural experts saw the 
increased interest in these crops as a ‘…positive development to prevent possible 
soil pollution by fertilisers.’50 The solution was a textbook example of a corporatist 
arrangement involving the political establishment and agricultural organizations. 
Ranks were closed in the ‘green front’ and on the sand grounds the cornfields shot 
out of the ground like mushrooms. For the time being fertilisation hardly encoun-
tered resistance. That was certainly not the case with the use of crop protection 
substances.
13.3.2  Crop Protection
The use of chemical crop protection substances incited the first post-war criticism 
of the agricultural modernisation process. The spectacular development of chemical 
crop protection substances much resembled the introduction of artificial fertilisers. 
Here too, public-private cooperation within the network of agricultural organisa-
tions, government and private industry played a key role.
The first experiments with the chemical control of mould infections, especially 
in the fruit and flower bulb sectors, date from the 1930s. After the Second World 
War the introduction of dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) initiated a revolu-
tion in the use of chemical insecticides. Successes during the war with combatting 
typhus (lice) and malaria (mosquitos) stimulated further research. The substances 
generated much enthusiasm. Broad international appreciation was expressed in the 
Nobel prize accorded to the Swiss chemist Paul Müller for developing DDT.
As lovers of the potato plant, exotic insects like the Colorado beetle constitute a threat to 
‘our daily meal.
as the cinema newsreel Polygoon put it in 1947.51 Chemical insecticides like DDT 
were a formidable weapon against this enemy. In 1950, following up on the success 
of DDT, Shell developed a number of chlorinated hydrocarbon compounds like 
Aldrin, Dieldrin, Eldrin and Telodrin as alternative and even more poisonous insec-
ticides. In the 1950s there was much optimism about the use of insecticides (and 
also fungicides and herbicides) and the possibilities offered by these chemical 
applications.52
50 F. Bloemendaal, Het mestmoeras (Den Haag 1995), 12–13.
51 In 1947 and 1948 the cinema newsreel Polygoon Journal featured items on the fight against the 
Colorado Beetle. See website Beeld en Geluid, Open Beelden: www.openbeelden.nl/media/670176/
Strijd_tegen_de_coloradokever
52 J.  Bieleman, ‘Gewasbescherming, dieren en gewassen in een veranderende landbouw’, in 
J.W. Schot, H.W. Lintsen, A. Rip and A.A. Albert de la Bruhèze (eds.), Techniek in Nederland in 
de twintigste eeuw, deel 3: Landbouw, voeding (Zutphen 2000), 210.
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The modernisation of agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s was in the first place 
inspired by the drive for greater production and by the development of a profes-
sional and efficiency-based approach. Chemical crop protection substances helped 
to save labour. Mixed farms made way for specialized enterprises. In the market- 
garden and crop-farming sectors the number of different crops declined. This period 
also saw the emergence of agricultural contractors that assisted farmers with the use 
of specialized machinery. Plant breeding technologies aimed at suppressing leaf 
growth in order to promote richer ears. While this combination of developments 
delivered higher yields, it also caused new problems. Fewer leaves allowed more 
light to reach the soil and weeds proliferated. With monocultures diseases and 
plagues had a better chance of spreading. Shared use of (specialized) machinery 
increased the chance of infestation. International trade became subject to so-called 
‘phyto-sanitary’ regulation, which specified that export product had to be a 100% 
free of diseases, moulds and insects. All these developments together promoted the 
increased use of plant protection substances.53
From the very beginning, the use of chemical insecticides, herbicides and fungi-
cides had had its detractors. As early as 1949 the director of the Wageningen Plant 
Disease Service had warned about excessive use of chemical plant protection sub-
stances. One of the first visible problems was that pesticides also targeted useful 
insects like bees or the natural enemies of pests. A second effect, especially evident 
in the struggle against moulds, was the development of rapid tolerance to the chemi-
cal substances, thanks to mutations in the organism. These effects stimulated a 
search for other means of pest, plant and mould control, varying from plant breed-
ing for resistance, substances that were absorbed by the plant and specific plant 
protection substances per crop and per disease.54
Beyond this reorientation to the use of chemical insecticides, herbicides and fun-
gicides within the agrarian cluster, there was also increasing criticism from outside. 
In her 1962 book Silent Spring, the American author Rachel Carson described the 
effects of chemical insecticides, especially DDT, on the entire ecosystem. The 
Dutch translation, Dode Lente, followed a year later. It provided the foundation for 
a critique of modern agriculture and food supply chains from a broader environmen-
tal perspective. Spokespersons were biologists, ecologists, nature preservationists 
and critics of industrialisation, i.e. parties outside the powerful public-private agrar-
ian network.
Massive bird mortality in Drenthe (1966) and Zeeland (1968) inspired a chorus 
of criticism of crop protection substances. The livers of the dead birds contained 
high concentrations of the pesticide Dieldrin.55 From 1969 on, legal measures were 
53 Bieleman, Gewasbescherming, dieren en gewassen in een veranderende landbouw, 222–223.
54 Bieleman, Gewasbescherming, dieren en gewassen in een veranderende landbouw, 213–221.
55 J.W. Copius Peereboom, Chemie, mens en milieu: Schadelijke stoffen in milieu en voeding, een 
studie over chemische milieuverontreiniging (Assen 1976.), 126–127. Birds of prey like the hawk 
and sparrow-hawk recovered after limits were imposed on the use of crop protection substances. In 
J. van Zoest, ed., Biodiversiteit, (Utrecht 1998), 133.
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taken against pest control substances containing mercury. This was followed in 
1972 by a ban on DDT. Despite this, the Netherlands remained the global front- 
runner in the use of pest control substances well into the 1980s. The road taken, in 
which land and labour productivity were the guiding principles in agricultural inno-
vation, proved hard to leave.56
The professor of animal systematics and geography, K.H.  Voous of the Free 
University in Amsterdam had described developments in 1970 in terms of the ‘sor-
cerer’s apprentice, who could initiate a process, but who could not manage the side- 
effects of the much desired increase in agricultural yields. Humanity has poisoned 
nature. Can it itself remain healthy?’57
After the physical deterioration of nature caused by transformations of the land-
scape, a qualitative deterioration set in as modernisation and the use of fertilisers 
and chemicals caused desiccation, over-fertilisation and environmental pollution. In 
addition to the direct effects of pest control substances noted above, fertilisers also 
caused changes in vegetation. The spread of bush grass in the dunes, common rush 
in peat marshes and purple moor-grass in the heathlands were the consequences. 
The appearance of these species changed local ecosystems of mushrooms, insects, 
reptiles and birds.58 The loss of biodiversity in the Netherlands since 1950 was 
caused for about 30% by landscape transformations and for 60% by acidification 
and lowering of groundwater levels as part of the modernisation of agriculture.59
Nature and the environment appeared for the time-being to have footed the bill 
for solving the problem of food security. New challenges for sustainable develop-
ment emerged from the agricultural transitions that delivered food and well-being. 
Pesticides inspired the first measures to make agricultural developments more sus-
tainable, to inoculate them with a concern for the integral quality of life, including 
concern for ecological aspects and natural resources. This was the social agenda 
that came to fruition after 1970.
13.4  Foods and Nutritional Patterns
Since the end of the nineteenth century, concern about food shortages has been 
accompanied by concern about food quality. The supply chain of production, distri-
bution, and preparation of food changed dramatically in the twentieth century. The 
distance between locations of production and of consumption increased. The trans-
formation of the food supply chains impinged in different ways on aspects of sus-
tainability, not only in the Netherlands but also elsewhere. Thinking in terms of a 
56 Bieleman, ‘Gewasbescherming, dieren en gewassen in een veranderende landbouw, 222.
57 K.H. Voous, Natuur, milieu en mens (Kampen 1970), 47.
58 Noordijk, De Nederlandse biodiversiteit, 339–354.
59 M.P. van Veen et  al., Halting biodiversity loss in the Netherlands: Evaluation of progress, 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (2010), 7.
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food supply chain became ever more current in the course of the twentieth century. 
Three facets claim our attention.
The hygienic concerns of the nineteenth century were extended into the food 
supply chain. Food quality and hygiene came to play a central role in the activities 
of the food processing industry, users’ organisations and government. New patterns 
emerged in the food trade, in distribution and in processing in the kitchen. Monitoring 
was instituted to protect honest trade and educational campaigns were launched to 
inform consumers about food preparation and healthy nutrition.
In the second place, the industrialisation of the food processing sector led to 
lengthening and diversification in production chains. This shifted the effects of 
changing nutritional patterns to locations across the border. International trade in 
foodstuffs and industrial processing into foods were responsible for new foods in 
Dutch households and influenced economic and ecological systems elsewhere. This 
was associated with a chemical-analytical perspective on agricultural and fisheries 
products as raw materials for foods. Foods were now defined in terms of a basic or 
bulk product (in the trade jargon: a commodity) and in terms of proteins, fats, and 
vitamins. The interchangeability of raw materials transformed the food supply 
chains into a network of material flows. The flows of raw materials were reconsti-
tuted in factories into new compound foods, varying from margarine to soups and 
instant dinners.
A third facet was an increasing concern about healthy nutrition. This commenced 
with research into the one-sided nutritional patterns of the poor. After the Second 
World War a new problem arose. The formerly sober menu had been replaced by 
one laden with a surfeit of foods. Availability was no longer a problem, but rather 
the right choice from what was on offer. In the context of the different and distinct 
interests of private companies, consumers and governments, new informational 
strategies emerged in combination with efforts to combat the new welfare diseases 
that emerged in the wake of new nutritional patterns.
13.4.1  Food Quality: Commodities Law, Trademarks 
and the Modern Housewife
At the turn of the century, concern about food quality emerged within two distinct 
social settings. In 1905 a handbook for research into food quality, the Codex 
Alimentarius, was published and quickly became the bible for the professional- 
scientific approach of the internationally oriented hygienist movement. In addition, 
in the agrarian sector cooperation among science, private industry and government 
had produced a system of agricultural schools and experimental stations. 
Improvements in methods of chemical analysis that increased and objectified 
insights into the composition of foods, had made both developments possible.60
60 A.H. van Otterloo (2000), ‘Voeding,’ in J.W. Schot et al. (eds.), Techniek in Nederland in de 
twintigste eeuw, deel 3: Landbouw, voeding, 254–256.
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National regulation of food quality bogged down around the turn of the century 
in disputes about measurement methods, standards and finances among tradesmen, 
producers, scientists and civil servants. However, local arrangements emerged in 
Rotterdam (1893), Leiden (1901), Dordrecht (1909) and Drenthe (1916). The 
national government did develop quality standards for, for example, meat (1902) 
and butter (1904) mainly with an eye to international trade. During the First World 
War the necessity for a generic arrangement became more evident. The number of 
surrogates, fakes and products treated with dyes and unacceptable preservatives 
increased. In view of these developments, in 1919 a nationwide Food and Drugs Act 
came into effect based on the Codex Alimentarius.61
The Food and Drugs Act counted among its supporters the bona fide tradesmen 
and producers. They regarded the new law as a means to protect their own trade 
against fraudulent operators. In addition they began to employ trademarks and 
advertisements in order to draw attention to their industrially processed foods and 
their qualities. Thanks to packaging they were also able to present their products in 
a handy and hygienic fashion.
From the 1920s on, stiff competition became endemic in the distribution chan-
nels for food. Industrial producers like the margarine producer Jurgens acquired 
shares in the grocery chains of De Gruyter and Albert Heijn. Albert Heijn in turn 
invested in their own factories for cakes and candies. In addition various purchasing 
cooperatives emerged, like Enkabé (1929), De Spar (1932) and the wholesaler’s 
group Schuitema (1934).62
These developments in the production and distribution of foods coincided with 
ideas on the modernisation and rationalisation of the household, with the Dutch 
Association of Housewives (NVvH) as most important spokesperson. The NVvH 
had been founded in 1912 as a union of mostly middle-class housewives. By way of 
courses and educational materials on nutrition, cooking and hygiene, the NVvH 
tried to tackle the ‘servant question.’ Servants were becoming ever more scarce and 
expensive and the association wanted to make ‘housewives more conscious of the 
task they were obliged to fulfil.’63 The hygienically packaged foods and the first 
composite food products like stock cubes, baking powders and pudding powders 
merged seamlessly with the ambitions of the NVvH and the modernisation of the 
household.
Companies focused their attention on the modern housewife. Brands like Maggi, 
Calvé, Honig, Van Nelle and Verkade became trusted names in Dutch kitchens. The 
bond between producers and modern households were forged by means of trading 
stamps, coupons, sales and competitions:
The old-fashioned housewife had recourse to her own home-made store of fat: beef fat, 
lard or a mixture of the two, provided by the annual slaughter in November. For the mod-
ern housewife, who is no longer wont to keep such stocks in the cellar or the cupboard, it 
61 Van Otterloo, ‘Voeding’, 258–261; H.  W. Lintsen (ed.), Tachtig Jaar TNO, (Delft 2012), 
108–109.
62 Van Otterloo, ‘Voeding’, 264.
63 A. H. van Otterloo, Eten en eetlust in Nederland, 1840–1990 (Amsterdam 1990), 157.
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is of importance that she can have access to fat that is just as nutritious, just as tasty and just 
as economical, that can repeatedly be used in small quantities and in a fresh condition. This 
fat she finds in Delfrite (bold text in the original citation)64
The brand names of the food processing industry became the shining examples of 
food quality, hygiene and the modern household.
After the Second World War the modernisation of the household got a new 
impulse from changes in the trade and distribution of domestic articles. During the 
war and as an extension of Dutch agriculture and fisheries a deepfreeze industry had 
developed with the German armies as an important customer. After the war, agrarian 
organisations agitated for a civilian expansion of this deepfreeze supply chain. 
Deepfreeze companies succeeded in wheedling the necessary scarce funds from 
Sicco Mansholt, Minister of Agriculture, in order to invest in deep-freezers. These 
companies and food producers like Unilever developed new forms of food conser-
vation, processing and preparation. Vegetables, fish, meat and complete meals were 
offered as new deepfreeze product. The foodstuff supply chain branched and made 
detours that ran via industry to the cooling and deepfreeze facilities in stores and 
cold storage facilities. In 1956 only 3% of the Dutch households had a refrigerator, 
but by the early 1960s the low temperature supply chain had been completed with 
the massive purchase of refrigerators and freezers by households. In 1962 almost 
20% of the households had a refrigerator and by 1972, 88%.65
In 1948 the first self-service store opened its doors, to be followed in the early 
1950s by large grocery chains like De Gruyter and Albert Heijn. Regulations regard-
ing the concentration of shops that dated from the 1930s and that were intended to 
protect grocers, butchers and greengrocers and their specific skills initially limited 
the spread of self-service stores. But after a recommendation by the Social- 
Economic Council pointing to the rich variety of packaged products, the regulations 
were modified in the early 1960s. This made room for new kinds of stores like self- 
service stores and supermarkets with a more elaborate assortment and lower pric-
es.66 In the kitchens the foods were prepared in entirely new ways.
13.4.2  International Food Supply Chains
The international trade in foods long remained limited to products that could be eas-
ily conserved, including grain, butter, cheese and pigs. At the end of the nineteenth 
century technical innovations like refrigeration made it possible to transport perish-
able foods over ever greater distances. British industrialists developed ‘cold chains’ 
that guaranteed the supply of meat products. With the aid of refrigerator ships, Great 
64 Collection brochures Johannes van Dam, cited in A. H van Otterloo, Eten en eetlust in Nederland, 
1840–1990, 166. Bold in original text.
65 B. Sluijter, Kijken is grijpen, zelfbedieningswinkels, technische dynamiek en boodschappen doen 
in Nederland na 1945 (Eindhoven 2007), 148–64.
66 Sluijter, Kijken Is Grijpen, 133–40; Van Otterloo, ‘Voeding’, 284–95.
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Britain imported meat from remote regions like New Zealand, Australia and 
Argentina. In this last country around 1900 British industrialists had invested in 
about 16,000 km of railways that connected the harbour of Buenos Aires with its 
hinterland. In the name of welfare the Argentinian army launched violent campaigns 
to ‘clean out’ the native population of the pampas. Australian Aboriginals too were 
driven from fertile lands to the benefit of international trade.67 The removal of the 
‘savages’ was doubtless legitimated to everyone’s satisfaction at the time, but it 
nonetheless shows the brutal and radical way in which the expansion of, in this case 
the British, food supply chain was effected.
Where Great Britain was often the endpoint of the supply chain, the position of 
the Netherlands was different. It was more like a node of supply chains. It exported 
pork, eggs, milk and margarine – much of it to Great Britain and Germany – and 
imported raw materials like cattle fodder and vegetable oils.68
The network shaped by Dutch margarine producers illustrates the influence of 
such supply chains outside the Netherlands. In 1870, in the town of Oss, two fami-
lies by the name of Jurgens and Van den Bergh had set up margarine factories to 
produce artificial butter using animal fats, a by-product of the local slaughterhouses. 
Both entrepreneurs profited from the growing demand from England. In 1911, as 
the price of animal fats rose, both firms succeeded in obtaining a license on a 
German process whereby liquid vegetable oils and animal fats could be hardened by 
means of hydrogenation. The process opened new markets for raw materials. 
Competitors in this search for the cheapest raw materials were the soap 
manufacturers.
One of the new possibilities was the use of whale-oil. Anton Jurgens and the 
British soap manufacturer Lever Brothers toyed with the idea of establishing their 
own whaling fleet. This proved a bridge too far. Instead, in 1913 a whale pool was 
set up, a cooperative venture among Dutch, British and Austrian soap and margarine 
manufacturers to purchase whale-oil in common from the Norwegian whalers.69 
These kinds of cooperative efforts formed the foundation for the later merger 
between the Dutch-German-Austrian Margarine Unie (1927) and the British Lever 
Brothers to form Unilever in 1929. One of the reasons for the merger was control 
over raw materials. As buyer, Unilever dominated trade in whale oil. This put the 
company in a position to pressure the Norwegian government for favourable selling 
conditions for margarine and soap.70
The big demand for oils and fats by the soap and margarine industries was largely 
responsible for the resurgence of modern whaling. British and Norwegian fleets 
67 P. Högselius, A. Kaijser, and E. van der Vleuten, Europe’s Infrastructure Transition: Economy, 
War, Nature (New York 2016), 120–121.
68 A.  A. Albert de la Bruheze and A.  H. van Otterloo, The Milky Way: Infrastructures and the 
Shaping of Milk Chains, History and Technology 20(3) (2004): 249–70.
69 F.J.M van de Ven, Anton Jurgens Hzn, 1867–1945, Europees ondernemer, bouwer van een 
wereldconcern (Zwolle 2006), 137–140.
70 P. Thonstad and E. Storli, Big business and small states: Unilever and Norway in the interwar 
years, Economic History Review 66(1) (2013): 109–31.
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dominated the whaling industry. They developed factory ships and new harpooning 
techniques. These made it possible to hunt for a wide variety of whales in Antarctic 
waters.71 But what had initially appeared to be an endless supply of whales soon 
began to diminish. By the 1930s, negotiations on international agreements were 
underway. However, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) mandated with 
a coordinating role, had great difficulty maintaining headway in the face of the 
diverse geopolitical interests. Governments regularly leaned heavily on the IWC or 
unilaterally terminated agreements. Given continuing demand it appeared impossi-
ble to prevent decimation of the whale population.72 By the 1970s populations of 
most species of whale had been reduced to a mere 10% of their 1946 numbers. 
Whaling became one of the first symbols of the emerging nature and environmental 
movement as embodied in organisations like the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) and Greenpeace.73
In addition to whaling, Unilever and its predecessors invested in plantations and 
oil factories in Africa, South America and the Dutch East Indies. The investments 
aimed to guarantee the supply of raw materials and to decrease dependency on 
middlemen. These concerns also moved them to invest in their own fleets. After the 
1929 merger, Unilever consolidated the joint African possessions of tens of thou-
sands of hectares of plantations, oil factories and trading posts under the flag of the 
United Africa Company (UAC), a trading firm at a discreet distance from the parent 
firm Unilever. The UAC functioned as a trading post for Unilever products and as 
supplier of raw materials. It exploited plantations for vegetable oil and fruit and ran 
its own merchant fleet.74 The company also invested outside of Africa in the Solomon 
Islands, Malaysia, and the Dutch East Indies. Two thirds of the plantations culti-
vated palm oil, raw material for the margarine and soap industries.75 After difficult 
years during the depression and the war, the UAC developed into an important com-
ponent of the Unilever empire. As priority buyer from the UAC, Unilever had a 
dominant position in the international trade in vegetable oils and fats. After the 
Second World War, 10% of the multinational’s profits came from the African trade.76 
The plantations also proved important to the firm for the supply of raw materials in 
the long term.77
71 Factory ships made it possible to undertake longer campaigns to the richer fishing grounds 
around Antarctica. New harpoon techniques also made it possible to hunt whales that sunk after 
being killed. J. R Bruijn en J. C.A. Schokkenbroek, De laatste traan: Walvisvangst met de Willem 
Barentsz, 1946–1964 (Zutphen 2012), 14–19.
72 Bruijn en Schokkenbroek, De laatste traan, 251–56.
73 A.  Kalland, Management by totemization: Whale symbolism in the anti-whaling campaign,’ 
Arctic 46(2) (1993): 124–33. D. Toke, Epistemic Communications and Environmental Groups, 
Politics 19, no. 2 (1999): 97–102.
74 D.K. Fieldhouse, Merchant capital and economic decolonization: The United Africa Company, 
1929–1987. (Oxford 1995), 176–225.
75 Fieldhouse, Merchant capital and economic decolonization, 450.; G. Jones, Renewing Unilever: 
Transformation and tradition (New York 2005), 197–203.
76 W.J. Reader, Vijftig jaar Unilever, 1930–1980 (London 1980), 82.
77 Jones, Renewing Unilever, 197–201.
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The cultivation of market crops like palm oil, coffee, tea and cacao had various 
consequences for well-being and sustainability. Worries were expressed about ero-
sion, droughts and the fluctuation of water levels. But forests were mainly seen as 
serving industries and trade.78 At the time, the loss of biodiversity was not an issue. 
Jungle was replaced by plantations with a monoculture. Differentiated agricultural 
systems were traded in for one-sided plantations. In Southeast Asia the survival of 
the Orangutan was threatened by palm oil production. We also see a transformation 
of local economies in Asia and Africa. Unilever bought out the self-sufficient farm-
ers, who subsequently had to survive as labourers. Where local food production no 
longer provided adequate nutrition, recourse was taken to more expensive import of 
food. In the period of decolonisation after the Second World War the economic 
structures also remained virtually intact and market crops contributed to the increas-
ing inequality between the West on the one hand and Africa and Asia on the other.
The example of the growth of the Dutch margarine industry shows how flows of 
raw materials and sustainability issues were transported beyond the national bor-
ders. The production of food was dissociated from the places where raw materials 
were produced. ‘Blue Band’ and ‘Zeeuws Meisje’  – popular Dutch margarine 
brands - were made of whale oil and palm oil. International trade networks in raw 
materials made it possible for Dutch consumers to pay ‘not a penny too much’ for 
their margarine. The costs with respect to economic and ecological sustainability 
were paid in Africa and Asia. The growth of Dutch margarine production was made 
possible by exploiting natural capital elsewhere; in Antarctic waters and in the tropi-
cal plantations.
13.4.3  Healthy Nutrition and Excess
Around 1890 food costs still made up about half the household budget. In Amsterdam 
in 1935 this had declined to 22%. The poorest segment of the population spent 
35–37% of the family budget on food and the wealthiest less than 10%.79 In the first 
half of the twentieth century, diets became more varied, but the menu of the under-
class continued to consist mostly of bread, milk, porridge and potatoes, once in 
while supplemented by a bit of meat.
Around the turn of the century socially concerned physicians began to investi-
gate the diets of workers. They concluded that these exhibited little variety and suf-
fered from a dearth of calories and nutrients.80 Food shortages during the First World 
War and the consequences for public health led to the founding of the Netherlands 
78 D.A. Zoethout, De plant in nijverheid en handel, (Amsterdam 1914), 84–87.
79 For 1850 data see van Otterloo, ‘Voeding’, 282; data 1935 in ‘Inkomsten, Uitgaven, Verbruik En 
Physiologische Waarde van Voeding, uit Verschillende Kringen Der Bevolking Gedurende de 
Periode 1 Maart 1934–28 Februari 1935,’ Statistische Mededeelingen (Amsterdam: Bureau van 
Statistiek der gemeente Amsterdam, 1935), 45.
80 Van Otterloo, ‘Voeding’, 241.
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Institute for Popular Nutrition in 1919. The instigator, the physician dr. E.C. van 
Leersum, enjoyed the support of food processing companies and local government, 
including the city of Amsterdam. The Institute began to investigate the relationship 
between nutrition and health. In 1922 it was integrated into the University of 
Amsterdam.
The economic crisis and the mounting threat of war in the 1930s moved the gov-
ernment to take action. It was involved in the founding of the Commission for 
Household and Family Education (1934) that disseminated nutritional information 
via exhibitions, classes and demonstrations. It also supported the Foundation for 
Household Education in the Countryside (1935) that provided information about 
cooking, hygiene and health in cooperation with the Dutch Association of 
Housewives (NVvH) and cooking teachers. The TNO research institute  - for the 
most part funded by the state – was augmented in May 1940, as German armies 
invaded the country, with the addition of a Central Institute for Nutritional Research 
(CVO). At the same time a Nutritional Board was founded as a sub-commission of 
the Health Board.81
The focus of food research shifted from quantity to quality. In the interbellum, 
for example, a basis was laid for knowledge about vitamins. New insights revealed 
that vitamins were not only medicines against specific diseases, but also essential 
for a balanced nutrition. Via the Nutritional Board and TNO these insights rapidly 
penetrated into private industry and the societal ‘midfield.’ In 1927, for example, the 
food industry succeeded in fabricating a tasteless vitamin concentrate from cod liver 
oil that could be added to margarine. The importance of vitamins was exploited in 
advertisements to prize products containing such supplements. Knowledge of food 
quality was transmitted via informational and educational activities like cooking 
lessons, cookbooks and magazines.
Supplements also entailed risks. In 1960 some 100,000 people in the Netherlands 
suffered from an allergic reaction. After an investigation lasting several weeks it 
transpired that the ‘blister disease’ was caused by the emulsifier ME18, that had 
been added as an anti-spatter substance to the margarine brand Planta. The additive 
had been approved by the State Institute for Public Health after animal tests. The 
so-called Planta affair was widely publicized in the press. After Unilever had paid 
damages, but without admitting guilt, the affair was publicly framed as a mistake by 
a big and complex company. The affair did have an effect on food research: it put 
the safety aspects of industrially processed foods on the agenda. TNO pumped more 
resources into research in this field. Unilever became one of the most important 
clients. Next to specific research contracts it also funded half of the collective 
research done by the TNO Food Organization.82
After the Second World War, increasing well-being manifested itself in the menu 
of the Dutch household. The consumption of meat, sugars, edible fats, and luxury 
products like nuts, peanuts and chocolate articles increased, while grain and  potatoes 
81 Van Otterloo, ‘Voeding’, 266–268.; H. W. Lintsen (eds.), Tachtig jaar TNO (Delft 2013), 109.
82 Lintsen, Tachtig Jaar TNO, 121–122; Van Otterloo, ‘Voeding’, 288.
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constituted an ever smaller part of daily energy input (Graph 13.4).83 The new nutri-
tional habits were encouraged in magazines. On their trips abroad, Dutch travellers 
encountered other food cultures. And countrymen returning from the Dutch East 
Indies and foreign guest-workers brought new dishes with them to the Netherlands. 
How could the country cope with this superabundance? In 1953 the Extension 
Service for Nutrition, modelled on an American example, introduced the so-called 
‘disk of five,’ a slogan that rhymes mnemonically in Dutch: schijf van vijf. The disk 
described the basic nutritional groups that ought to compose a healthy daily diet: 
grain products, vegetables and fruit, dairy products, meat and fish and finally fats. 
This nutritional advice emphasized variety and quality. The consumption of vita-
mins, minerals and animal protein was to be encouraged.84
The food industry was only too willing to contribute to an ever more varied 
menu. Under the banner of the modernisation of cooking it introduced pre-prepared, 
83 J.F. de Wijn and W.A. van Staveren, De voeding van elke dag (Utrecht 1986), 166.
84 Wijn and Staveren, De voeding van elke dag.; Lintsen, Tachtig jaar TNO, 117.
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Graph 13.4 Percentual contribution of groups of foods to the average energy consumption of the 
human body in the Netherlands in the period 1936–1980
Source: J.F. de Wijn and W.A. van Staveren, De Voeding van Elke Dag (Utrecht 1986), 166
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deep frozen and composite foods. In addition they attempted to change eating pat-
terns by introducing new ‘eating moments.’ Such innovations often proved more 
difficult than imagined, but gradually new ‘eating moments’ for snacks, in-betweens, 
and appetizers penetrated into the daily lives of most Netherlanders. New foods like 
French fries, croquettes and sorbet became common. Old foodstuffs acquired new 
identities like ‘cheese in the fist’ (lump of cheese without bread) and ‘Hollandse 
Nieuwe’ (literally ‘Holland’s New,’ referring to salted herring caught in the current 
season).85 Food became part of a lifestyle. Its primary function, the preservation of 
the human body, retreated ever further into the background.
13.5  New Food Chains, New Problems
For a long time the food supply chain had a rather simple structure. For a large 
number of products it ran from the farmer via the market to the plate. Often pro-
ducer and consumer were one and the same: the farmer who ate his own produce 
and the city dweller with his own vegetable patch. In part, producers marketed their 
own products, like butter and cheese. For another part, products came from afar, like 
cereals and coffee. The food industry was limited to simple processing: grinding 
grain, baking bread, extracting oil etc.
Starting at the end of the nineteenth century, the food supply chain got more and 
more complex. First, it was evident that the chain was getting longer, that is to say, 
characterized by an increase in the number of links between producer and consumer 
and in the geographic distance between links. Second, chains were becoming more 
differentiated. Links split up into a variety of processing activities. Finally, the food 
chains began to assume the character of networks. They were coupled to organisa-
tions that did not belong to the primary production and consumption process.
In the changing food chains new dynamics emerged around the problem of food 
supply. This aspect of well-being had long remained limited to food distribution and 
food security. This remained relevant in the twentieth century, in particular due to 
the two world wars in which the Netherlands was confronted with hunger and scar-
city. In addition, food quality moved higher up the societal agenda. Problems of 
excess and changing nutritional habits came to the fore. New also was the problem-
atic issue of sustainability, in particular the landscape and biodiversity. Who 
addressed these problems?
At the start of the supply chain a dense network evolved that was composed of 
farmers, agricultural organizations, suppliers (among other things of machinery and 
artificial fertiliser), traders, banks (especially the Farmers’ Lending Banks), research 
institutes and the government. The government took a leading role, partly inspired 
by the war situations, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the reconstruction after 
the Second World War. It invested in a flourishing agricultural sector that contrib-
uted to economic growth and international trade. This ambition had to dovetail with 
85 Van Otterloo, ed., ‘Voeding,’ 283; H. W. Lintsen, Made in Holland, Een techniekgeschiedenis 
van Nederland 1800–2000 (Zutphen 2005), 49–50; Lintsen, Tachtig jaar TNO, 115.
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the ambition to secure a dependable food supply for the Dutch population. The 
Second World War was a watershed for this policy. Until 1940 the numerous small 
farmers had been the focus of attention and reclamations and new polders had to 
contribute to conserving jobs and food security. After 1945 the government and the 
agricultural network devoted all their attention to upscaling, land consolidation and 
the rationalisation of large farms in the context of an emergent European Union. 
Opposition to this policy was limited and had little effect. Conservation organisa-
tions had a marginal position in the network. Other agricultural variants like the 
biological-dynamic approach survived only in the societal periphery.
Another network, separate from the agricultural network, emerged in the middle 
of the food supply chain. It was based on the increasing interchangeability of raw 
materials for foodstuffs, the separation of raw materials into valuable elements, the 
reconstitution of materials in new products, the improvement of transport and grow-
ing international flows of commerce. The position of firms like Unilever changed 
from being a link in the chain to being a node in an international network. In this 
way, the production of food in the Netherlands became intimately linked to new 
sustainability issues abroad. Governments and international organisations negoti-
ated some practices like whaling, but with limited success. Other issues like the 
social and ecological effects of large-scale plantations were utterly ignored. That 
happened only in the course of the 1970s.
Finally, new networks developed in the middle and at the end of the food supply 
chain. They consisted of food processing firms (with a dominant position for 
Unilever) grocery stores and purchasing organisations (with a growing role for self- 
service chains like Albert Heijn), government agencies (like the Nutrition Council), 
research institutes (for example, the TNO Nutrition Organization) and consumer 
organisations (originally the Dutch Association of Housewives, later also the 
Consumers Union). Government bodies, research institutes and consumer organisa-
tions were the spokespersons for the issue of food quality. The food industry and 
food retailers jumped on this bandwagon. Around 1900 the emphasis shifted from 
the caloric content of foods to hygiene and perishability. In the 1930s interest 
increased in healthy foodstuffs like vitamins. With increasing prosperity after the 
Second World War organisations slowly but surely began to express concerns about 
the new feeding habits. The recommended diet in the 1950s - two bread meals and 
a main meal according to the ‘disc of five’ – was threatened by an enormous range 
of foodstuffs that could be consumed at any moment of the day.
After 1970 the latent agricultural problems would lead to widespread protests. 
They presaged the demise of the agricultural network that had come to full flower in 
this period.
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Chapter 14
Building Materials and Construction: 
Constructing a Quality of Life
Frank Veraart
Abstract Catastrophes and new societal ambitions energized the huge construction 
effort undertaken between 1910 and 1970. The floods of 1917 and 1953 led to enor-
mous investments in coastal defences. The government also undertook major invest-
ments in the construction of roadways and other infrastructural works. New building 
codes, damage incurred during the Second World War and population growth incited 
new housing construction on a colossal scale. Demand for building materials grew 
apace.
The need for wood and mineral subsoil resources transformed nature and land-
scapes in the Netherlands and at foreign sites. Dutch forestry practices were ration-
alised. Imports from the Baltic regions by and large met the Dutch demand for 
wood. But the creation of monocultures and production forests in these regions 
reduced local biodiversity. Gravel and marl were mined above all in the province of 
Limburg. That led to tensions with local stakeholders. Gravel extraction transformed 
the floodplains of the Meuse into a lake landscape. It led directly to the Excavation 
Law, the first environmental law in the area of land-use. After 1970, regulations 
concerning land-use and new landscape values would regularly inspire conflicts in 
the national supply of building materials (see Chap. 19).
This chapter is written by Frank Veraart with contributions by Harry Lintsen.
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14.1  Could the Flood Disaster Have Been Prevented?
1953. The night of January 31st to February 1st. A northwest wind roared across the 
North Sea at hurricane force. The storm had already lasted for hours. An enormous 
mass of water was being driven at great speed in the direction of the southwest 
Netherlands. Around midnight it was supposed to be low tide, but the waters had not 
retreated. Quite the contrary, the waters continued to rise and looked ominous; it 
was black and full of driftwood. The next high-tide was a super high-tide.
(That afternoon…) you saw masses of water charging from afar over the Oosterscheldt. It 
was magnificent, magnificent! We stood there thrilled by the tremendous power of nature.
as the soldier Jo Leune and his girlfriend Suus Priem from Stavenisse later recalled.1 
The majority of the population was not really worried. Many people were visiting 
or at a party, as was normal for Saturday night. The floods of 1906 and 1916 sur-
vived only as the vague memory of an older generation. Toward the end of the war 
Walcheren had been flooded. But that had been done on purpose to support the 
Allied invasion of the continent. In this night it was certainly exceptionally heavy 
weather, but here and there measures had been taken and flood-boards erected. That 
would suffice.
Several hours after midnight the Dutch delta was transformed into an unimagi-
nable pandemonium. In some places sirens had wailed or church bells chimed. In 
many places there had been no warning at all. The dikes burst at more than 150 
places. Around 140,000 hectares of land were flooded. 1835 people lost their lives. 
Thousands of head of cattle were drowned. Nearly 50,000 buildings were destroyed 
or damaged. The economic damage was estimated at about 700 million euros (at 
current prices equivalent to more than 10 billion euros).
God had shown his hand, according to the deeply pious part of the inhabitants of 
Zeeland. In the book In the Grip of the Water Wolf, published in response to the 
disaster, it was written:
God saw the work of man…and they did what was evil in His eyes. They loved money and 
power…and violence ruled in the streets… Then He used His right and he chastised us, so 
that the whole of humanity should learn that love is more than violence.2
1 Cited and translated from: K.  Slager, De ramp: Een reconstructie: 200 ooggetuigen over de 
watersnood van 1953 (Goes 1992), 15.
2 C. Baardman, In de greep van de waterwolf (Den Haag, 1953), 171.
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Others emphasized the mystical power of nature. Nature surprised humans time and 
again. Humans might think they had conquered nature with their modern technolo-
gies. But that was a misconception.
But we must ask: Is this perception accurate? Had the Netherlands no inkling of 
these kinds of extraordinary natural phenomena in 1953? Was there no knowledge 
of the consequences of the unusual circumstances that had presented themselves? A 
day after the disaster of February 1st, 1953 an emotional engineer wrote:
Natural disasters! But our civil engineers already knew beforehand where these ‘natural 
disasters’ would strike. They warned in reports and expert advice about the dikes that were 
too low and too weak…3
He pointed to research undertaken by the Research Unit of the Estuaries, Tidal 
Rivers and Coasts of the Dutch Agency for Public Works and Water Management, 
Rijkswaterstaat. The research unit was set up in 1929. During the 20 years prior to 
the flood disaster an average of 50 persons per year worked on the problem of the 
delta region, that is, about 1000 person-years in total. Old conceptions made way for 
new theories and traditional rules of thumb were abandoned. Endless measurements 
and soundings were taken and registered. New instruments and new approaches like 
the application of statistical methods and factor analysis of storm surges were intro-
duced.4 The investigations arrived at a clear conclusion. The delta region was a kind 
of time-bomb and vulnerable to big threats. Draconic measures would be needed to 
turn the tide.
But even with all this knowledge the disaster could not have been prevented. 
New approaches take time to penetrate into the domain of policy and politics. 
During the Second World War the Netherlands was occupied with other matters. 
Designing and constructing a new coastline would require gigantic investments, 
investments that were unthinkable from a social perspective during the Depression 
and post-war reconstruction.
‘Calamities produce policy’ is an oft-cited saying in civil engineering circles. 
After the disaster things moved quickly, among other things because the plans were 
already prepared. The disaster took place on February 1 1953. On the 21st of that 
month the Delta Commission was sworn in. Between 1953 and 1955 the commis-
sion published five fundamental and radical reports. In 1955 it proposed a Delta 
Law that was ratified by parliament in 1958. By then the Rijkswaterstaat had already 
been long at work.
The vulnerable delta is one of the fundamental aspects of well-being and sustain-
ability in the Netherlands. The well-being monitor of Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
lacks an indicator to reference this issue. This is hardly surprising because the set of 
indicators we use in this study conforms to international guidelines. A specifically 
Dutch issue like the flood-prone situation cannot be coupled to one of these 
3 R. Verloren van Themaat, ‘Watersnood 1953’, De Ingenieur 65(1953), nr. 6, A 56.
4 P.J. Wemelsfelder, ‘Wetmatigheden in het optreden van stormvloeden’, De Ingenieur (1939), B, 
nr. 31 and J. van Veen, Te verwachten stormvloeden op de benedenrivieren (internal report, 
Rijkswaterstaat, directie Benedenrivieren, afdeling Studiedienst, 1939).
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 indicators. But for the Netherlands it is an ancient and crucial issue. This was the 
case in the twentieth century and it will remain the case for future generations.
14.2  Well-being, Vulnerability and Liveability
In addition to the vulnerable delta, poverty was one of the biggest determinants of 
well-being and sustainability in the past. Despite the positive developments at the 
end of the nineteenth century, the differences among living conditions of the various 
segments of the population were still very large. The unemployed and low-paid 
workers lived in hovels, while industrialists, bankers and other well-off prominent 
citizens fitted their opulent dwellings with modern delights like bathrooms, electric 
illumination and telephones. Public housing demanded significant improvement. In 
addition, population growth also demanded a continual growth in welfare. This in 
turn required growth in business and in transport, energy and communications 
infrastructures.
The further elaboration of the infrastructures, the defences against flooding and 
the construction of liveable housing for the poor dominated the enormous construc-
tion agenda of the twentieth century. This effort had far-reaching consequences for 
the quality of life and for natural capital in the Netherlands and abroad. The effects 
on natural capital had two dimensions, a spatial and a material. Construction of 
housing, roads, utility buildings and urban layout had implications for the use of 
space. In the course of the twentieth century it proved necessary to reflect ever more 
profoundly on the division and utilisation of the country’s limited surface area. It 
was also impossible to build without a supply of materials. Millions of kilos of 
wood, bricks, concrete and steel found their way to construction sites. Between 
1910 and 1970 building materials were among the biggest material flows in the 
Dutch economy (see Tables 12.5 and 12.8).
In this section we briefly describe the water management and infrastructural 
developments. To an important degree these were extensions of nineteenth century 
policy. Subsequently we shift our focus to public housing construction for the poor 
and to urban development. After that the supply side of the enormous building effort 
demands our attention. Where did the raw materials come from? What influences 
did this have on changes in the environment and the landscape?
14.2.1  Safe Behind the Dikes
The closure and reclamation of the Zuiderzee (1919–1969) and the Delta Works 
(1956–1998) were the calling cards of Dutch civil engineering. After the reclama-
tion of the Haarlemmermeer using the world’s biggest steam engine, plans were 
made, starting in the mid-nineteenth century, for the next step: the reclamation of an 
entire sea. The first proposals still seemed like fantasies, but in 1886 liberal circles 
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founded a Zuiderzee Association that began to develop concrete plans. The young 
engineer Cornelis Lely authored the various technical reports published by the asso-
ciation. In 1891 Lely left the association to become Minister of Public Works, Trade 
and Industry. During his first and second terms as minister nothing came of the 
Zuiderzee plans. In 1913 he accepted a third term, but only on condition that now a 
decision would be taken in favour of closure and reclamation.
The outbreak of the First World War again threatened the plans. Though the 
Netherlands succeeded in remaining neutral, the war in the surrounding countries 
nonetheless caused material and food shortages. The storm surge and floods of 1916 
that affected the region of the Zuiderzee caused local food shortages. This not only 
put the food situation squarely on the agenda but also provided an important impulse 
for the Zuiderzee plans.
Together with the Delta Works these were the dizzying heights of Dutch hydrau-
lic engineering in the twentieth century. The works confirmed the image of the 
Netherlands as a nation of dike-builders. Dike-builders who with perseverance and 
investments had wrested land from the sea and who, after completing the Delta 
Works, could resist the sea as well.
14.2.2  New Roads and the Unification of the Netherlands
At the turn of the century the Netherlands was a patchwork of loosely connected 
regions. During the twentieth century these were stitched together by various infra-
structures, that reduced time needed for travelling, communications and hauling 
goods. Important infrastructural works included the construction of canals, the 
improvement of the rivers and the building of road, energy and communications 
networks.5 In the twentieth century the Netherlands was a colossal ‘work in 
progress.’6 The country was literally smothered in networks of conduits, pipes, rails, 
asphalt and electromagnetic waves. Every bit of the Netherlands, wet or dry, was 
eventually connected up with a larger whole. Links among households, farms and 
factories were established throughout the country. Intentionally or not, the material 
infrastructures thus became an important medium of the ‘unification of the 
Netherlands,’ the socio-spatial integration of regions and communities within the 
national territory.7
They also contributed to economic growth and the growth of well-being. 
Networks were built up and broken up again or partially lost their function. The 
5 Erik B.A. van der Vleuten, ‘De materiële eenwording van Nederland,’ in Techniek in Nederland 
in de twintigste eeuw  - Techniek en modernisering, balans van de twintigste eeuw, by Johan 
W. Schot et al., VII (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003), 42–73.
6 A. van der Woud, ‘Stad en land: Werk in uitvoering,’ in D.  Fokkema and F.  Grijzenhout, 
Nederlandse Cultuur in Europese Context (Den Haag 2004).
7 H. Knippenberg and B. de Pater, De eenwording van Nederland: Schaalvergroting en integratie 
sinds 1800 (Nijmegen 1988).
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nineteenth century telegraph network lost some of its functions to the telephone 
network as it unfolded into a national and international network in the twentieth 
century. The local gas networks suffered competition from the electricity networks, 
that were ultimately organized at a provincial level. The railway trunk network 
branched out after 1880 with connections to numerous ‘secondary’ local rail net-
works and inter-local tramways. There were also ‘tertiary’ municipal tramway net-
works. Around 1930 there were about 6500 km of railways and tramways. Large 
portions were later torn up.
The network that made the largest claims on space and spatial planning was the 
road and highway network. The ANWB, founded in 1883 as an organisation for 
cyclists, developed into one of the most important advocates of improvements to the 
road infrastructure. In 1920 this organisation, together with the Royal Institute of 
Engineers (KIvI), organised the First Netherlands Road Congress. The congress 
accelerated the road improvement program that was already underway. Additional 
consultations between the government and interest groups led to a national road 
plan by 1924, a plan that was ratified by parliament in 1928.8
In the 1930s ideas about roads exclusively for motorised traffic gained currency. 
The national road plan, especially in the western part of the country, gradually 
became a plan of limited access highways. The ANWB, the KIvI and other organ-
isations saw the highway as an alternative and successor to the railways. Construction 
of the first highway between The Hague and Utrecht began in 1934 and took 5 years. 
Other sections followed.9 After 1958, bowing to popular pressure, the Minister of 
Transport and Public Works increased the pace of highway construction. Between 
1950 and 1970 the total length of the highways grew from about 100 to a 1000 km. 
In 1970 all the roads in the Netherlands taken together had a collective length of 
77,000 kilometres.10
The investments in communications, energy and road infrastructure contributed 
to the spread of industries throughout the country. The textile factories in Brabant 
and Twente were heavily dependent on their connections to the maritime ports in the 
western part of the country. Coal from the Limburg mines was able to fuel the Dutch 
economy only after this region had been opened up by the canalisation of the river 
Meuse and railroad connections. The development of infrastructures fostered indus-
trialisation throughout the Netherlands.
Building of infrastructures and industrialisation contributed significantly to 
improving the quality of life. That had been demonstrated unequivocally in the 
nineteenth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century there was still a yawn-
ing gap between rich and poor. Part of the elite was of the opinion that the poor 
should have more of a share in the increase in well-being. This focused attention on 
another aspect of the building agenda, the construction of public housing.
8 G.  Mom and R.  Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit: De mobiliteitsexplosie (1895–2005) 
(Zutphen 2008), 173–201.
9 Mom and Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit, 197.
10 Mom and Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit, 314–317.
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14.3  Living and Quality of Life in the City
We cannot say in the abstract: this or that is a good habitation; that depends entirely on the 
situation in a given municipality. When one hears, for example, that people live in a house 
made of turf, then this sounds very miserable to a city-dweller, but I have seen such turf 
houses that I would far prefer to some rooms in one of the big apartment buildings in the big 
cities, where one lives between stone walls, but where one loses all freedom…where out-
side of one’s room there is no single domain in which one is one’s own boss. In a dwelling 
on the heath, even if it is made of turf, one is just as well protected from cold or heat; one is 
one’s own boss and is not bothered by neighbours, piano-players and such.11
The quality of dwellings, argued the parliamentarian for the Christian Historical 
Union (CHU), squire A.F. de Savornin Lohman, in 1901 in the Second Chamber 
deliberations on the new housing bill, was subjective. Reports on housing condi-
tions in the Netherlands had produced a clear image of the hovels and miserable 
workers’ dwellings. But opinions diverged on what was to count as good housing.
Inspired by and based on foreign examples, Dutch Hygienist groups in the soci-
etal midfield had developed ideas about daylight and ventilation and about sanitary, 
cooking and sleeping facilities. At the end of the nineteenth century they themselves 
set an example with the construction of workers’ housing. At the political level the 
right approach remained up for grabs. Liberal and confessional politicians feared 
that the demands made on housing would infringe the rights of landlords and that 
housing would become unaffordable for the poor. The social-liberal cabinet led by 
N.G. Pierson resolved the debate by introducing the Housing Law of 1901.
14.3.1  The Housing Law and Housing Construction
The Housing Law aimed at the elimination of hovels and the improvement of the 
quality of dwellings. Starting with the census of 1899 information on housing had 
been gathered with each census. This revealed that more than half the dwellings had 
only one or two rooms, a statistic that provided an estimate of the proportion of 
hovels in the total housing supply. The housing statistics of various cities over a 
number of years showed the effect of the Housing Law. In a half century the number 
of one and two room dwellings declined sharply (Table 14.1).
Eliminating the hovels was work for the municipalities. Municipal inspectors 
made an inventory of the many workers’ homes in order to be able to advise on the 
housing situation. The residents of these homes regarded the members of the com-
mission with mixed feelings. For them, a declaration that their homes were uninhab-
itable meant eviction or higher rent. The prominent socialist member of Amsterdam’s 
city council, F.M. Wibaut, member of the Public Health Commission from 1907 to 
1914, noted a typical reaction:
11 Handelingen Tweede kamer 1900–1901, ‘Wettelijke bepalingen betreffende de volkshuisvest-
ing’, 60ste Vergadering −15 Maart 1901, 1218.
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Gosh, sir, just let us live here. I’m sixty-four. Was born here in this cellar. My husband is 
sixty-six and for him it’s alright too. Never a doctor. If we want fresh air we have the street. 
Brought up twelve children here. Figuring out sleeping places was a real puzzle. But it went 
fine… It was a good family. All of them married. Two dead, all of them healthy.12
In their reactions the residents reflected the arguments of the commission members 
about health, light and fresh air. The focus on living conditions meant that decisions 
were made about and for the lowest classes. The supervisors and elite champions of 
workers’ housing were mocked and were known among the hovel-dwellers para-
doxically enough as ‘poor-people-rejectors.’13
12 F.M. Wibaut, Levensbouw, memoires, Querido, Amsterdam, 1936, cited in Egbert Ottens, ‘Ik 
moet naar een kleinere woning omzien want mijn gezin wordt te groot’, 125 Jaar Sociale 
Woningbouw in Amsterdam (Amsterdam 1985), 22.
13 Ottens, ‘Ik moet naar een kleinere woning omzien want mijn gezin wordt te groot’.
Number of rooms per dwelling (in %) 
1 2 3 4 5 and more
Amsterdam 1900 19.1 25.7 22.4 23.6 9.2
1930 10.2 8.9 17.5 26.4 37.1
1947 0.6 3.1 15.2 32.5 48.5
1956 0.6 3.2 15.3 31.6 49.4
Rotterdam 1900 20.1 41.1 16.8 14.3 7.7
1930 5.3 12.8 15.7 21.7 44.5
1947 0.3 3.4 8.9 27.5 59.9
1956 0.3 3.0 10.2 31.5 55.0
Groningen 1900 34.8 31.7 12.0 11.2 10.4
1930 6.8 16.4 16.6 16.4 43.8
1956 1.1 5.3 11.5 18.3 63.9
Nijmegen 1900 15.0 32.3 16.8 16.1 19.7
1930 1.9 6.7 10.6 13.6 67.2
1956 0.0 1.9 6.1 13.8 78.2
Tilburg 1900 2.5 37.5 31.9 19.8 8.3
1930 0.7 4.5 12.2 22.1 60.5
1956 0.0 1.1 9.7 10.5 78.7
Maastricht 1900 31.2 32.6 12.4 11.4 12.5
1930 7.8 18.2 17.5 15.9 40.6
1956 0.5 3.0 7.0 11.1 78.4
Enschede 1900 7.5 38.3 23.6 20.0 10.5
1930 1.6 4.0 6.1 10.8 77.5
1956 0.0 0.4 5.1 11.1 83.4
Emmen 1900 80.0 13.2 3.6 2.5 0.7
1930 31.6 25.9 15.0 10.0 17.5
1956 3.1 11.2 14.8 16.2 54.7
Table 14.1 Development of the number of rooms per dwelling as a percentage of the total number 
of dwellings in different cities
Data from ´Uitkomsten der Woningstatistiek´ behorende bij Volkstellingen 1899/´Woningtelling 
en Gezinsstatistiek’ behorende bij Volkstelling 1930/‘Volkstelling annex woningtelling’ 
1947/‘Algemene Woningtelling’ 1956
Source: NIWI- KNAW/CBS (www.volkstelling.nl)
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The Housing Law compelled municipalities to establish a department of building 
and dwelling inspection and to formulate building codes. Construction plans that 
satisfied legal demands were financially supported by the national government. The 
law took account of local differences. The law’s implementation took a long time, 
among other things due to the time it took to formulate local building codes and the 
guarantees against misuse of state financing, the lengthy debates on the proper rents 
for subsidized dwellings, the discussion about the role and recognition of building 
societies and the delaying tactics of powerful landlords.
In 1904 the national government published the first ‘guidelines’ that provided a 
point of departure for state financing. In subsequent years ministerial letters and 
new guidelines in 1927 ensured harmonisation of the building codes.14 This enabled 
the national government to be specific about the quality of workers’ housing. 
Alcoves were forbidden and separate rooms for cooking, sleeping and toilet facili-
ties became mandatory. Every dwelling had to have an outside space. The toilet in 
the dwelling was not allowed to open into the kitchen. Bedrooms had to have a 
window.15 The admission of air and light became the new adage, with the typical 
Dutch ‘doorzonwoning’ - a house equipped with large glass panes front and back so 
as to admit sunlight both morning and afternoon - as the characteristic outcome. The 
minimum surface area of a dwelling was originally fixed at 30 m2. In 1920 this was 
upgraded to 40 m2. The average size of Dutch dwellings in that year was 47 m2.16 
The national average dwelling size increased starting in the 1950s to 109  m2 in 
1970. The surface area differed according to the type of housing; the surface area of 
non-subsidized dwellings grew especially rapidly in the 1960s (Table 14.2).17
Subsidies were granted to recognized housing corporations. In order to stream-
line discussions among municipalities, the national government, and housing corpo-
rations, a Housing Council was established in 1913 in which the certified housing 
corporations united themselves.18 During the First World War, housing construction 
ground to a halt. Construction workers and materials were scarce. The government 
eased the restrictions on loans for housing construction and framed a Housing 
Shortage Law. This mandated municipalities to support housing corporations or 
take housing construction into their own hands. Many municipalities adopted the 
latter course and set up their own housing agency or housing firm. In 1917 munici-
14 N. de Vreeze, (Ed.), 65 miljoen woningen: 100 jaar Woningwet en wooncultuur in Nederland 
(Rotterdam 2001), 105–111.
15 J. Huisman et al., Honderd jaar wonen in Nederland, 1900–2000 (Rotterdam 2000), 16.
16 Vreeze, 65 miljoen woningen, 107; Huisman et al., Honderd jaar wonen in Nederland, 1900–
2000, p. 25. For more detailed analyses of the development of dwelling size in the city of Groningen 
see: A.M.L. Diepen, ‘Spatial Aspects of Housing,’ in Green Households? Domestic Consumers, 
Environment and Sustainability, ed. Klaas Jan Noorman and Ton Schoot Uiterkamp (London 
1998), 105–7.
17 L.A.  Bruggeman, ‘Kwalitatieve woningdocumentatie (KWD) 1948–1970: Enkele kwaliteit-
saspecten van de nieuwbouw van woningen over de afgelopen 30 Jaar,’ kwalitatieve woningdocu-
mentatie (Zoetermeer 1981), Table V.
18 Wouter Beekers, Het bewoonbare land: Geschiedenis van de volkshuisvestingsbeweging in 
Nederland (Amsterdam 2012), 107–33.
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palities also acquired the right to appropriate housing corporations.19 Despite the 
long start-up phase and difficult circumstances, between 1901 and 1918 the housing 
corporations built, with government support, more than 50,000 dwellings. The num-
ber of corporations rose from 400 in 1914 to 1300 in 1920.20 This made corporative 
building the most important force in housing construction in this period.
After the First World War the national government took stock of its position, 
reduced subsidies and coupled them to slum clearance. Housing corporations and 
municipalities saw this about-face as a death blow to the Housing Law and protested 
fiercely. Exerting themselves, they plumbed alternative sources of financing and in 
this way managed to triple the production of new homes between 1918 and 1940.21 
In the total housing production the share of corporative housing construction 
declined to 10 or 20%.
The production of new housing by housing corporations and private parties grew 
from about 20,000 dwellings per year around 1900 to 30,000 just before the out-
19 Beekers, Het bewoonbare land, 135–142.
20 P. Ekkers, Van volkshuisvesting naar woonbeleid (Den Haag 2006), 63.
21 Beekers, Het bewoonbare land, 172.
Table 14.2 Development of dwelling size in the Netherlands: average surface area in m2



















1948 56 50 55
1950 56 46 53
1952 54 44 49
1954 55 47 51
1956 58 50 54
1958 58 50 54
1960 57 49 53
1962 57 51 54 70 56 66 62 52 58
1964 60 52 57 68 59 66 63 54 60
1966 67 60 63 75 66 73 69 60 66
1968 66 59 63 85 62 82 72 58 68
1970 69 59 65 89 57 85 75 55 69
1972 70 58 66 90 56 88 78 54 72
1974 67 52 63 95 66 93 78 52 72
1976 67 53 64 100 60 98 80 52 74
The average surface area is the sum of the surface areas of the kitchen, living room, and bedrooms
aHousing Law, Unsubsidized, and Premium dwellings
Source: Bruggeman, L.A. “Kwalitatieve Woningdocumentatie (KWD) 1948–1970, Enkele 




break of the First World War. In the interbellum housing production increased fur-
ther to about 50,000 dwellings around 1930, after which it declined to a bit more 
than 30,000 per year. After the Second World War the Ministry of Public Housing 
and Reconstruction assumed responsibility for housing construction. The number of 
new dwellings per year rose from 50,000 per year in the early 1950s to more than 
150,000 in the early 1970s. (See Graph 14.1)
These building efforts brought the average number of occupants per dwelling 
down from five around 1900 to four on the eve of the Second World War. After the 
war the number of occupants per dwelling climbed again until another decline set in 
during the 1960s. At the end of the 1970s the figure was three occupants per 
dwelling.
Throughout the twentieth century there was a shortage of dwellings in relation to 
the number of households. In 1900 the shortage amounted to 100,000 dwellings for 
1.1 million households (9% housing shortage). Housing construction reduced this 
shortage up to the First World War, but due to production cutbacks and an increase 
in the number of households the shortage again increased to more than 130,000 
dwellings in the early 1920s (8% housing shortage). After that there was a decline 
until the Second World War. War damage, a moratorium on construction during the 
war, shortages of materials and the post-war increase in the number of households 
forced the housing shortage up to a half million dwellings for 2,6 million house-
holds (20% housing shortage) at the end of the 1940s. For the second time in the 



























































Government Cooperative housing association Private parties
Graph 14.1 Housing production by the government, housing construction corporations and pri-
vate parties 1920–1970
Source: CBS – Historie bouwnijverheid vanaf 1899
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enormous housing production of the 1950s and 1960s once again reduced the hous-
ing shortage to about 150,000 dwellings (4% housing shortage). With these building 
efforts the government succeeded in limiting the housing shortage in the post-war 
years. But even after the 1970s some 3% of the households still did not have its own 
dwelling (Graph 14.2).
The focus of attention of building contractors, housing corporations and the gov-
ernment gradually changed. From slum clearance, attention shifted to fighting the 
housing shortage. The Housing Law explicitly defined the minimum requirements 
for a Dutch dwelling. The massive share of one and two-room dwellings had assur-
edly been reduced but without any palpable increase in the size of dwellings. With 
the stipulation of minimal requirements housing shortage became the new name for 
a shortage of quality dwellings. Housing shortage shaped the building activities of 
post-war ministers of reconstruction and public housing. In view of the unheard-of 
production of more than 123,000 dwellings in 1969, the Minister of Public Housing 
and Spatial Planning, W.F. Schut, felt able to announce the end of the housing short-
age.22 It seemed that the worst of it was indeed over. However, the end of the  housing 
shortage was announced time and again simply because it persisted, albeit at a lower 
level than before.
With the shift of attention from the quality of dwellings to the struggle against 
the housing shortage, more effort was put into the production of new dwellings. 
Elimination of the hovels and slum clearance became secondary issues. New hous-
ing construction was situated in the urban peripheries, satellite towns, and so-called 
‘growth cores.’ The fixation on new construction meant that in the 1960s portions of 
the old cities were still deteriorating into slums. An investigation by the Commission 





































































Graph 14.2 Percentage of households without a dwelling and average number of occupants per 
dwelling in the Netherlands, 1900–2010




for Slum Clearance and Redevelopment of the Ministry of Public Housing revealed 
that in 1957 approximately 6% of the housing supply, or 145,450 dwellings, con-
sisted of hovels. The provinces of North and South Holland topped the list with 
respectively 30,000 and 29,650 hovels. The housing problem was thus far from 
solved, but it assumed an entirely different aspect in the 1960s. In the statistics the 
improvements in housing quality became increasingly visible in the growth of the 
number of rooms per dwelling (see Table 14.3).
The pauperization of the cities was intensified by the growing suburbanisation of 
the 1960s. By means of redevelopment and ‘city formation’ according to modernist 
principles, city governments tried to maintain their inner cities as economically 
viable centres.23 Growing welfare was responsible for the flight of families with 
increased purchasing power from the cities. New sustainability issues around resi-
dency came to the fore, because, where were these people to live? With this, the 
housing question and urban development after the Second World War acquired an 
emphatically spatial dimension.
14.3.2  Expanding Cities 1900–1970
The growth of the cities was governed by two different spatial dynamics. In the first 
place it was about urban density: how many inhabitants are there per square kilome-
tre? This was closely related to the housing developments just described. A second 
spatial aspect concerns the expansion of cities and their infrastructures into the 
countryside. How much land was used for the city and for the infrastructures that 
connected the cities to each other? Both these spatial aspects were consequential for 
deliberations about how to use the territory of the Netherlands, for the food supply, 
industrial development, nature and residence patterns.
23 H. De Liagre Böhl, Steden in de steigers: Stadsvernieuwing in Nederland 1970–1990 (Amsterdam 
2012), 17.












With 6 or more 
rooms
x1000 % % % % % %
1899 1091 28.3 30.7 17.6 15.3 15.3 8.1
1909 1237 18.7 29.2 20.0 21.3 21.3 10.8
1920 1366 . . . . . .
1930 1824 7.4 14.5 16.3 18.3 18.2 25.3
1947 2117 2.2 8.2 11.4 17.8 24.0 36.4
1956 2546 0.9 4.5 10.4 17.9 28.4 37.9
1971 3873 0.2 1.5 7.9 16.6 38.0 35.9
Source: CBS – Historie bouwnijverheid vanaf 1899
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Limited housing space and a limited surface area due to city walls and moats 
made nineteenth century cities very densely populated. This situation was basically 
the same in 1900 (Table 14.4).24 After changes to the Fortress Law in 1874, the util-
ity and necessity for city walls had disappeared and urban expansion became pos-
sible. The national government forced the cities to formulate detailed expansion 
plans as a condition for acquiring the formerly military zones. This marked the 
starting point of a more structured approach to urban development, one shaped by 
the city government in consultation with experts and interested parties. The new 
urban space on and around the old walls was devoted to the elaboration of traffic and 
transport possibilities and new utilities like gasworks and electrical power plants. 
Many railway stations came to be located in the late nineteenth century expansions 
of the city, just outside the old defensive works.25
The new international ideas about light, air and space, previously applied to the 
design of dwellings, also seized the imaginations of urban planners. Dutch urban 
planners were influenced by German handbooks. Around the turn of the century 
international congresses in London (1906), Vienna (1908), Düsseldorf (1913) and 
Ghent (1913) contributed to the spread of ideas and knowledge amongst urban 
planners.26
24 P. Ekamper, R. van der Erf and N. van der Gaag, Bevolkingsatlas van Nederland: Demografische 
ontwikkeling van 1850 tot heden (Den Haag 2003), 42.
25 L. de Klerk, De modernisering van de stad 1850–1914: De opkomst van planmatige stadsontwik-
keling in Nederland (Rotterdam 2008), 198–227.
26 De Klerk, De modernisering van de stad 1850–1914: De opkomst van planmatige stadsontwik-
keling in Nederland, 274–289.
Table 14.4 Ten cities with the highest population density on January 1, 1850, 1900, 1950 and 
2000 (inhabitants per km2)
1850 1900 1950 2000
× 1000 × 1000 × 1000 × 1000
Leiden 21.4 Amsterdam 22.0 The Hague 8.5 The Hague 6.5
Amsterdam 13.5 Maastricht 14.4 Utrecht 7.6 Voorburg 6.2
Rotterdam 11.9 Vlaardingen 9.2 Leiden 7.2 Leiden 5.3
Maastricht 10.6 Schoonhoven 9.1 Haarlem 6.3 Haarlem 5.0
Schoonhoven 5.1 The Hague 8.5 Voorburg 5.7 Maassluis 4.4
Breda 4.2 Breda 7.5 Amsterdam 5.3 Amsterdam 4.4
Vlaardingen 4.2 Haarlam 7.1 Groningen 5.3 Cappelle aan den IJssel 4.4
Gouda 4.2 Leiden 6.6 Urk 4.9 Gouda 4.2
Haarlem 4.1 Enschede 6.4 Rotterdam 4.4 Schiedam 4.1
Delft 3.5 Rotterdam 6.1 Bussum 4.4 Bussum 3.8
Remark: The population density depends on the surface area of the municipality. Due to the 
redrawing of municipal boundaries in the second half of the twentieth century the population den-
sity of a number of cities declined. If the population density is expressed as the number of inhabit-
ants in a radius of 25 km, The Hague, Rotterdam and Amsterdam are the cities with the highest 
population density
Source: P.  Ekamper, R. van der Erf and N. van der Gaag, Bevolkingsatlas van Nederland, 
Demografische Ontwikkeling van 1850 tot Heden, (Den Haag 2003), 43–49
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The first nineteenth-century city parks like Rotterdam’s Maaspark (1853) and 
Amsterdam’s Vondelpark (1865) had become green enclaves surrounded by densely 
built up neighbourhoods. In the eyes of the improvers of housing conditions these 
parks were too small. Toward the end of the century they developed a new vision for 
parks: in addition to offering a touch of nature, they should also provide space for 
sports and games.27 Renowned architects, naturalists and politicians like J.Kruseman, 
H.P. Berlage, J. van Hasselt, D. Hudig, C.A. den Tex en Jac.P Thijsse testified as 
members of Amsterdam’s Housing Council in 1909 that 
‘parks, green areas and sport facilities are an absolute necessity for every single neighbour-
hood. Where they have once been established their zoning may never be changed into that 
of building plots again.’28
In 1908 the Housing Law was amended to allow a zoning specification of ‘park’; 
by 1921 it had become embedded in the law. With the parks, nature was brought into 
the city. In 1908 Rotterdam’s city government pronounced that parks served to com-
pensate the working population for ‘the lack of rural, dust- free pedestrian routes and 
attractive spots.’ A year later the director of Rotterdam’s municipal public works, 
G.J.  Jongh, presented his plans for parks in the Blijdorppolder and around the 
Kralingen Lake. The latter consisted of a terrain of 315 hectares the plans for which 
included not only a park and woods, but also athletic fields, ponds and playgrounds 
as well as plots for villas and allotment gardens. The cost was estimated at 7.7 mil-
lion guilders, but according to the director it would result in ‘a kind of natural monu-
ment, that would be of lasting value to future generations.’29
Around the turn of the century, architects and urban planners in Germany and Great 
Britain developed ideas for so-called garden cities. In these types of urban expansions 
there was more room for greenery and private gardens. Socially conscious housing 
corporations embraced the garden city concept and implemented it in the Netherlands. 
In the more generous use of residential space they saw  possibilities for elevating the 
working masses. With the aid of architects like H.P. Berlage (Amsterdam and Utrecht), 
C.J. van Eesteren (Amsterdam), M.J. Granpré Moliere (Rotterdam) and W.M. Dudok 
(The Hague) housing corporations realized garden city neighbourhoods, villages and 
districts on the outskirts of the large cities. Even middle-sized cities like Hilversum 
and Apeldoorn were developed according to these concepts. In the expanding indus-
trial cities big firms established new garden towns, like the garden village ‘t Lansink 
developed by the Stork company in Hengelo or garden village Heyplaat developed by 
the Rotterdam Drydock Company as well as the Philipsdorp and Drentsdorp, built by 
the Philips company in Eindhoven. In the mining region of the (Catholic) province of 
Limburg the project to curtail the ‘socialist threat’ and a Catholic parochial structure 
went hand in hand with the creation of a village structure in the mining colonies, 
developed by the Catholic housing construction corporations.30
27 K. Bosma et al., Bouwen in Nederland, 600–2000 (Zwolle 2007), 586.
28 J. Kruseman (secretary), Rapport over de Amsterdamsche parken en plantsoenen, commission 
consisting of H.P. Berlage, J. van Hasselt, D. Hudig, J.Kruseman, C.A. den Tex and Jac.P Thijsse, 
Amsterdamse Woningraad, 1909, cited in Klerk, De Modernisering van de Stad 1850–1914, 219.
29 Bosma et al., Bouwen in Nederland, 600–2000, 595–97.
30 W. Rutten, ‘Een archipel van koloniën: Wonen in de mijnstreek,’ in A. Knotter, Mijnwerkers in 
Limburg: Een sociale geschiedenis (Nijmegen 2013), 432.
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The point of departure for both the creation of new city parks as well as the gar-
den city concept was to bring the joys of nature closer to the urban population. 
Nature was seen as the counterpart of the urban and as the purveyor of healthy air, 
rest and space for relaxation. But the paradoxical result of these developments was 
that the spatial footprint per urban household increased, with the consequence that 
the cities laid an ever-increasing claim on space, a development that proceeded at 
the cost of the landscapes surrounding the cities.
During the interbellum, urban expansion plans were aimed not only at the city, 
but more and more pointedly at the surroundings as well. The national road plan 
designed by engineers in the 1930s was the occasion for the first spatial reconnais-
sance of the Netherlands as a whole. Urban planners developed ideas for a National 
Plan ‘that indicates the land-use of the Dutch territory and that aims to promote the 
harmonious development of the surface of our country along pre-determined lines’ 
in the words of the urban planner F. Bakker-Schut in 1937.31 During the German 
occupation these centralistic spatial planning ideas acquired an institutional ground-
ing in the State Service for the National Plan, established in 1941. The service was 
mandated to develop national plans for different facets of the ordering of the national 
territory. This included planned spaces for nature, traffic, built-up areas, agriculture 
and industry. By way of preparation, the service made lists of areas of special scien-
tific or landscape significance and compelled municipalities to report land transac-
tions and activities in those areas.
This centralist approach came under fire from lower levels of government that 
wanted to retain their municipal development plans and their regional structure 
plans. After the war, ideas about central planning and the rule of expertise acquired 
wider currency. In the economic sphere this was visible in the founding of the 
Central Planning Office in 1945. National plans in the domain of spatial planning 
first appeared in the form of a Building Plan and an Industrialization Memorandum 
in 1949. According to this memorandum the best chances for economic recovery 
were to be found in the large cities in the west and in the industrial regions of 
Twente, Brabant and South Limburg. The accompanying Building Plan described 
how the still scarce building materials should be distributed among these regions.32
In 1956, the spatial planners at the State Service for the National Plan assessed 
the effects of existing policy in a report entitled The West…and the rest of the 
Netherlands. It described the exodus from Zeeland, Limburg and the northern prov-
inces. The study provided the impetus for a first government memorandum on spa-
tial planning, that appeared in 1961. The document aimed at ‘a balanced development 
of our country as a whole.’ The plan anticipated a redistribution of economic activi-
ties, thanks to which the boundaries between ‘the west’ and ‘the rest of the 
Netherlands’ would become more vague.
The policy of regional economic stimulation proved to be a success, not least 
thanks to economic developments in the 1960s. In the middle of that decade the 
31 F.  Bakker Schut cited in H. van der Cammen and L. de Klerk, Ruimtelijke ordening: Van 
grachtengordel tot vinex-wijk (Utrecht 2003), 157.
32 Cammen and de Klerk, Ruimtelijke ordening, 207.
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CBS calculated that with this kind of growth in the economy and in welfare the 
population would number about 20 million by the year 2000. The population of the 
‘Randstad’ (the horseshoe-shaped urban cluster in the western part of the country) 
would grow from 5.5 to 9 million inhabitants. These predictions caused much con-
sternation and precipitated a flood of regional and national plans. In response to the 
different ideas, the government published its second spatial planning memorandum 
in 1966, with concern for a broad quality of life.
‘Our country has entered a phase in which more than in the past the government and society 
must take to heart a concern for the maintenance of a good living environment.’
The spatial plans opted for so-called ‘bundled de-concentration,’ an effort to 
spread suburbanisation to smaller centres in urban zones around the big cities. The 
metropolitan district became the new spatial unit for planning.33 The plan reserved 
a remarkable amount of space for nature and recreational landscapes. The spatial 
planners expected that increasing leisure time would lead to ‘a recognition of the 
creative possibilities of the natural environment.’ In these spatial plans nature thus 
acquired a new, specifically recreational function.34
The implementation of the memorandum was institutionally supported by the 
Law on Spatial Planning enacted in 1965. This law defined the frameworks for the 
different planning levels of municipality, provinces and national state. Following 
the subsidiarity principle - decentralize what can be decentralized - the centre of 
gravity of planning came to rest with the municipalities. With their zoning plans 
they shaped the local space. The provincial regional plans harmonized the supra- 
municipal functions of the region. National plans described zones for housing, 
working, agriculture, recreation and nature. In addition the law provided for har-
monisation of procedures for permissions and protests at all levels.35
This spatial policy was in part responsible for steering Dutch urban development 
away from the kind of dense metropolitan spatiality characteristic of London or 
Paris. In the Netherlands population growth was spread out over many cities that 
were closely tied together by roads and railroads.
The urban density in the centres of the old cities stood at about 150–200 dwell-
ings per hectare around 1970. Post-war outskirts had densities of 75 dwellings per 
hectare and in smaller settlements the housing density stood at about 25–30 dwell-
ings per hectare.36 Urban and infrastructural development claimed ever more space 
in the course of the twentieth century. Between 1900 and 1970 this increased from 
2 to 6% of the national surface area.
The planning of space had originated around the planning of national infrastruc-
tures like roads and canals. Subsequently attention shifted to a fair distribution of 
economic development throughout the country. In the 1960s the idea took hold that 
space was becoming a scarce commodity. It became necessary to think about how 
33 Cammen and de Klerk, Ruimtelijke ordening, 208–215.
34 H. Meyer, De staat van de delta: Waterwerken, stadsontwikkeling en natievorming in Nederland 
(Nijmegen: Van Tilt 2016), 132.
35 Cammen and Klerk, Ruimtelijke ordening, 177–78.
36 Verstedelijkingsnota 1976.
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to apportion space among the various needs and desires of society. In spatial terms, 
improvements in housing quality and in material prosperity tended to be made at the 
cost of heath meadows and sand drifts. These fell prey to urbanization, agriculture 
and forestry (Figure and Table 13.1).
14.4  The Demand for Building Supplies and Construction 
Materials
The construction of infrastructures and housing had not only a spatial, but also a 
material dimension. Building activities were responsible for an enormous increase 
in the use of building materials. Where did these enormous quantities of building 
materials come from? Which societal organisations shaped the procurement and 
production of the building materials that made housing construction and urban 
development possible? How did the procurement and production of these materials 
influence changes in natural capital domestically and abroad?
Clay, sand, gravel, bulk ceramics (including bricks and roof tiles), stone and 
wood were the dominant materials in 1913. In 1970 construction materials were 
also part of the sizeable material flows. Concrete, concrete products and cement had 
relegated the role of clay and clay products to a second place. Together with raw 
metals and chemical products they formed a broad spectrum of material flows 
within the industrialised society of the Netherlands.
The use of building materials and activities in the sphere of public housing 
exhibited a parallel upward development (Graph 14.3). Though building materials 
were not used exclusively for housing construction, the large scale of this activity 
shaped the demand. In addition to the increasing use of classic building materials 
like wood and bricks, the use of concrete and later steel became ever more  prominent. 
These developments were the result of the application of new building methods and 
changing use of materials. An increasing proportion of construction work - espe-
cially after the Second World War  - was carried out in concrete, composed of 
cement, sand and gravel.
Only a portion of the necessary building materials were produced in the 
Netherlands. The domestic production of building materials consisted around 1900 
above all of clay products like bricks for buildings and streets, and roof tiles. During 
the 1920s this was supplemented by domestic production of cement at the marl pits 
near Maastricht and of steel at the Hoogovens in IJmuiden. With the increasing use 
of concrete, domestic production of gravel also increased sharply. The extraction of 
clay, marl and gravel had, above all, local implications for the immediate surround-
ings. This was not the case with imported building materials, like wood, iron and a 
portion of the cement. These influenced natural capitals elsewhere. The First World 
War made the dependence on these materials painfully clear. This had diverse con-




14.4.1  Wood Production and Resources from Foreign Forests
Prior to the First World War the Dutch building sector was heavily dependent on 
imports. Resources like wood, cement and iron were found elsewhere. What was the 
origin of these raw materials and how were they processed in the Netherlands?
Among the most common traditional building materials was wood. But for a 
long time the Netherlands had little (remaining) forest. Forest acreage in 1900 
amounted to a bit less than 268,000 hectares, about 8–9% of the country’s total 
surface area. This was 0.05 hectare of forest per inhabitant. This made the 
Netherlands, together with Great Britain (3.9% forest cover and 0.03 ha/inhabitant) 
and Denmark (6.3% forest cover and 0.10 ha/inhabitant) one of the least forested 
countries of Europe.37
Since the mid-nineteenth century forest acreage was on the increase again in 
connection with projects to reclaim the wastelands; the sand drifts and heathlands 
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Shipping and construction wood (in tons)
Graph 14.3 Utilization of wood, bricks, cement, iron and housing production in the Netherlands, 
1850–1970
Source: wood – trade statistics for various years; G.B. Janssen, Baksteenfabrikage in Nederland, 
1850–1920 (Zutphen 1987); J.A. de Jonge, De Industrialisatie in Nederland Tussen 1850 en 1914 
(Nijmegen 1976), 497–501; Joh. de Vries, Hoogovens IJmuiden, 1918–1968, Ontstaan En Groei 
van een Basisindustrie (Amsterdam 1968); J.C.A. Everwijn, Beschrijving van Handel en Nijverheid 
in Nederland (‘s Gravenhage 1912)
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(see previous chapter). Private and public organizations like the Heidemij (1888) 
and the State Forest Service (Staatsbosbeheer 1899) coordinated the planting of 
new forest. At its founding the State Forest Service had assumed responsibility for 
2000 hectares of forest and more than 10,000 hectares of so-called wastelands. 
Making these lands profitable was in fact the main purpose of this organisation.38 
Nature conservationists and the ANWB tourist organisation also welcomed the cul-
tivation of new forest by the state. Together with a number of foresters they advo-
cated the planting of a natural forest with a variety of hardwoods and pines. Their 
plea fell on receptive ears and this resulted in a program to plant not only fir trees on 
the sand grounds, but also Douglas spars, the Corsican pine and various kinds of 
larches. The second director of the State Forest Service, E.D. van Dissel, appointed 
in 1902, himself anchored concern for ‘natural’ re-forestation in the organization’s 
DNA. From 1907 until his retirement in 1937, in addition to his leadership of the 
Forest Service, he was also a board member of the Association for Natural 
Monuments. This meant that from very early on the executive of the Forest Service 
had an opening to nature and to natural forests.
The chief activity, however, was still the creation of forests for wood production 
and the improvement of the soil. Only at extremely unique locations did the service 
abstain from planting new forest in order to preserve special natural landscapes.39
In 1910 a bit more than half of the Dutch forests consisted of various species of 
softwoods. For the rest they were composed of 20% oak forest, 8% other hard-
woods, 5% reeds and wicker, and 13% other coppice wood. The most important 
building applications were in carpentry, railroad ties and beams for shoring up 
mineshafts.40 Domestic wood production was limited in relation to the demand for 
wood, but not unimportant. This became clear during the First World War as imports 
of wood and coal were throttled. Wood prices soared and people took to the woods 
in search of alternative fuels. Associations devoted to nature, heritage and tourism 
applied to the government to take measures to protect the forests and natural beauty. 
In 1917 the government submitted an emergency law to appease the persistent com-
plaints about increasing logging activities and illicit forays to gather firewood.41 The 
law prohibited the chopping of wood in forests of unusual natural beauty, in imma-
ture forests and where damage to the wood supply might be expected. The State 
Forest Service was mandated to issue permits. In 1922 the emergency law was 
transformed into a permanent one. This was intended to protect forests against 
plagues, diseases and fire, as well as illegal logging.42
38 M. Coesèl, J. Schaminée and L. van Duuren (2007), De natuur als bondgenoot: De wereld van 
Heimans en Thijsse in historisch perspectief (Zeist 2007), 164–67.
39 J. Buis and J.P. Verkaik, Staatsbosbeheer 100 jaar: Werken aan groen Nederland, ed. Fred Dijs 
(Utrecht 1999), 11–49.
40 J.C.A. Everwijn, Beschrijving van handel en nijverheid in Nederland (Den Haag 1912), 208.
41 There had been proposals as early as 1908 and 1912 for a forestry law, especially with a view to 
preventing plant diseases, plagues and fire. The associated violations of private property had pre-
vented adoption.
42 Buis, Verkaik and Dijs, Staatsbosbeheer 100 jaar, 51–69.
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During the Second World War the Dutch wood supply suffered considerable 
attrition. The German occupiers forcibly requisitioned more than 4.7 million cubic 
metres of wood from the Dutch forests. During the so-called ‘Hunger Winter’ of 
1944–45, another million cubic metres of firewood disappeared. The annual pre-war 
wood production of 550,000 cubic metres more than doubled during the war years. 
In order to satisfy an acute post-war demand for mining wood, permission was 
granted by the Allied authorities after the war to chop wood in German forests near 
the border.43 The appraisal of the exact war damage took until 1950. It then trans-
pired that 55,000 hectares (13%) of the Dutch forest acreage had been lost during 
the war.44
After the war, rational approaches gained the upper hand in forestry, just as they 
had in the broader agricultural sector. Foresters saw it as their obligation to create 
new forest as quickly as possible in order to satisfy the demand for wood. This was 
an opening for agrarian, rational and business-economic approaches. Increasing the 
profitability of forest production was now informed by academic research, as it had 
long been in the traditional wood producing countries.45 It led to an increase of pro-
duction forests characterized by monocultures, a lack of biodiversity and vulnera-
bility to diseases.
In the end, Dutch wood consumption relied heavily on foreign imports. This was 
a long-standing tradition. Since the late middle ages wood had been imported via 
the big rivers and across the sea. By the end of the nineteenth century the famous 
Höllander Holzfloss (Dutch wood-raft) trade with its enormous wood rafts floating 
down the Rhine, had come to an end. Around 1900 only 1% of the Dutch wood sup-
ply (about 10,000 tons) came to Dutch wood vendors via this route.46 The decline 
was an example of ecological over-exploitation causing the demise of a commodity 
flow. The pirating of the forests around Württemberg on the shores of the high Rhine 
was stimulated by the increasing demand from the river’s lower reaches, in the 
industrialising Ruhr and the export to the Netherlands.47 Nineteenth century de- 
forestation in Germany led to a focus on Nachhaltigkeit (sustainability) in forest 
management. There was extensive debate on how this might be achieved. Foresters 
and wood merchants saw sustainability above all in terms of optimization of the 
production cycle.48
In the twentieth century, Dutch wood imports came primarily from the Baltic 
countries. For the Netherlands, Russia had been the most important source before 
the First World War; thereafter Sweden and Finland became the main suppliers. 
43 Up to 1948 the State Forestry Service had been able to recover 550,000 cubic metres of wood 
from German forests. This was about the annual growth of the Dutch forests and equivalent to 
8 years of timber cutting in the 1930s.
44 Buis, Verkaik and Dijs, Staatsbosbeheer 100 jaar, 91–94.
45 Buis, Verkaik and Dijs, Staatsbosbeheer 100 jaar, 100–112.
46 R. Stenvert, Kerkkappen in Nederland, 1800–1970 (Zwolle 2013), 52–53.
47 J.  Buis, Holland houtland: Een geschiedenis van het Nederlandse bos (Amsterdam 1993), 
139–40.
48 J. Radkau, Holz - Wie ein Naturstoff geschichte schreibt (München 2012), 229–42.
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(Table 14.5). In the late 1920s the Netherlands was the most important export mar-
ket for the Finnish wood industry after Great Britain.49 In this period the wood trade 
constituted 90% of Finnish exports. Under the influence of scientific research and 
Darwinist conceptions, German forestry practices were further developed in 
Finland. Soil Forestry was optimized thanks to botanic knowledge and new methods 
of production. Dense monoculture forests were the ideal in which the Finnish for-
estry authorities and the industrial foresters found common cause. In this context, 
‘sustainable forestry’ was redefined as the maximisation of a theoretical growth 
potential of a particular soil type. The approach consisted of razing contiguous par-
cels of forest and replanting. Other kinds of forestry like selective felling were dis-
couraged by regulations.
After the Second World War the demand for wood increased even more. In 
Finland this resulted in further intensification of forest production. By means of 
49 Malcom, De houthandel van Nederland, 21.
Table 14.5 Import of wood according to country of origin 1905, 1930, 1962 en 1970 (in kton)




























1,060,944 388,739 29,288 23,132 313,873 108,464
Latvia 128,715 4063
Estonia 22,745 158
Finland 316,952 28,302 427 639,317 15,832 326,691 1557
Sweden 302,496 222,733 2500 10,002 918,055 8082 659,312 19,394
Norway 70,050 1293 7760 2411 7516 1334
Poland 74,393 19,091 7788 28,756 20,606
Germany 195,694 128,924 85,534 74,572
GDR 92,762 6964 120,630 37,992
DDR 19,980 20,840
Belgium 73,524 12,702 3830 11,050 45,828 92,243 27,225 110,500
France 246 242 90,983 917 60,755 313
Austria 13,264 61,529 359 46,143 179
Czechoslovakia 34 384 143,459 76 72,348 72
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draining high moors, fertilizing the forests and improving access to the forests for 
men and machines, the wood yield per hectare was further increased.50
In this way, the growing demand for wood from the Netherlands, among others, 
did not lead to deforestation in the wood-producing countries. But it did have seri-
ous repercussions in these regions. The industrialisation of forestry in the twentieth 
century led to extended forests in monoculture. The original forest was transformed 
into much younger production forests. This had far-reaching consequences for the 
decline of local biodiversity, not only because of the monoculture in these woods, 
but also because of the disappearance of a variegated landscape.51
The domestically produced wood and the overwhelming share of imported wood 
was further processed in the Netherlands in sawmills and carpentry shops and in the 
furniture industry. In 1913 Zaandam was the largest wood import harbour on the 
European continent. Fifty percent of the Dutch wood import was unloaded here. 
The supply of wood changed as a result of the foreign industrialisation of forestry. 
Wooden beams - roughly sawn trunks - were gradually replaced by already sawn 
wood. For the exporting firms this meant more value added to the export product. In 
addition, ships could be more efficiently loaded with sawn wood. Waste products 
like sawdust, pulp and cellulose became raw materials for the paper industry that 
emerged in the forestry countries.52
14.4.2  Steel and Cement: Vacillating Support for Basic 
Industries
In 1898 the Society for the Promotion of Factory and Trade Industry presented plans 
for a national steel-foundry. A blast furnace facility would stimulate the develop-
ment of Dutch shipyards, machine builders and construction firms.53 In 1913 the 
board of the Society for Industry (Maatschappij van Nijverheid) appointed a com-
mission to explore the expansion of cement production.54 Dutch neutrality and the 
troubled supply of materials and resources during the First World War provided a 
new context for both plans. More than ever before, the Netherlands was thrown back 
upon its own resources. What would happen to trade after the war? Would not the 
combatant nations first look to their own needs when it came to raw materials? In an 
exploration of the post-war situation, the Delft professor I.P. de Vooys definitely saw 
chances for a leading position for the Netherlands if rapid measures could be taken 
50 J. Kotilainen and T. Rytteri, ‘Transformation of forest policy in Finland since the nineteenth 
century,’ Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011): 429–39.
51 T. Myllyntaus and T. Mattila, ‘Decline or increase? The stading Timber stock in Finland 1800–
1997,’ Ecological Economics 41 (2002): 271–88.
52 P.J. Middelhoven, Hout en trouw: De geschiedenis van een familiebedrijf de wed. stadlander en 
middelhoven H = houthandel te Zaandam (Zaandijk 1975), 55.
53 J. de Vries, Hoogovens IJmuiden, 1918–1968 (Amsterdam 1968), 23–29.
54 A. Heerding, Cement in Nederland (IJmuiden 1971), 72–75.
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to invest in industrial and infrastructural activities. But he had doubts about the 
‘general feeling regarding the big technical-economic, and thus above all national, 
problems.’ He referred to the Zuiderzee Works, the electrification of the country, the 
founding of a national cement industry, steel plants and rolling mills, exploitation of 
subsoil assets, the industrialisation of the Dutch East Indies and the expansion of 
domestic road and waterway networks.55 De Vooys was enthusiastic about a Dutch 
steel foundry. The state was obliged to support this project financially:
We have started to exploit our coal fields… But for years now the lack of blast furnaces has 
kept just as many engineers busy as the reclamation of the Zuiderzee… Both stimulate the 
creative urge to provide for the future by undertaking a large enterprise.56
Prohibitions on export of iron and steel products to the Netherlands by both England 
and Germany placed the plans for a Dutch blast furnace facility in an entirely new 
light. Under the leadership of the chairman for the state commission for the distribu-
tion of iron and steel, the engineer-entrepreneur H.J.E.  Wenckebach, plans were 
developed during the war for the founding of an iron and steel plant. In the plans for 
the facility Wenckebach not only included the production of iron and steel, but also 
the exploitation of other material flows like the production of cokes gas and cement 
using blast-furnace slag. By early 1917 the plans were ripe for financial negotiations 
with firms and banks. The latter particularly insisted on financial participation by 
the state. After tough negotiations and parliamentary debates, the Government 
Gazette of July 1918 was able to announce state financing for the blast furnace 
facility.57 A lobbying effort by the metalworking industry had been able to convince 
the banks and the government to risk an investment of 11.3 million euros (160 mil-
lion euros at current value) for the blast furnace facility. The government guaranteed 
30% of the investment.
In 1919 the first harbours were excavated at the site of the future blast furnaces in 
IJmuiden. In 1920 the site was connected to the Haarlem-Uitgeest railway line and 
construction was started on the first blast furnace. On January 22, 1924 the first blast 
furnace was ignited and the production of Dutch raw iron and steel could begin.
Considerably more effort was needed to establish a national cement industry. 
There had been some modest attempts to mine marl and establish a cement factory.58 
In 1919 the government installed a commission to study the chalk and cement prob-
lem. This commission charged the Government Service for Exploration of Subsoil 
Resources (Rijksopsporingsdienst van Delfstoffen) with investigating the commer-
cial feasibility of mining chalk in Limburg.59 In 1921 the commission published a 
provisional report recommending a state-run cement factory. But it was critical of 
55 A. Heerding, Cement in Nederland (IJmuiden 1971), 72–75; I.P. de Vooys, ́ De economische taak 
van den ingenieur na den oorlog´ in De Ingenieur 32 (1917), nr 33, 597–611, (quote p. 600).
56 I. P. de Vooys, ´Het hoogovenplan´ in De Ingenieur 33 (1918), nr 14, 243–244.
57 J.J. Dankers and J. Verheul, Hoogovens 1945–1993: Van staalbedrijf tot twee-metalenconcern 
(Den Haag 1993), 19–32.; Heerding, Cement in Nederland, 85.
58 Heerding, Cement in Nederland, 60–69; A. Nieste, Van mergel tot cement: 70 jaar ENCI, 1926–
1996 (Maastricht 1996), 17–25.
59 Heerding, Cement in Nederland, 71–93.
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the quality of the raw materials in the Limburg subsoil, despite successful experi-
ments during the war.60 During the economic recession of the early 1920s the pos-
sibility of financing by the government also receded from view. The debate had a 
welcome side-effect. In response to the proposed exploration, foreign cement ven-
dors lowered their prices in the Netherlands, aiming to undermine the founding of a 
domestic cement factory.
During the interbellum, Belgium developed into an important cement-exporting 
country, with a share of world trade amounting to 17–26%. In the Netherlands, 
cement cartels and suppliers from Belgium, Germany, England, France, Switzerland 
and Austria and even Poland fought for a share of the Dutch market. In 1925, during 
this battle for a market share, a Belgian-Swiss consortium applied for permission to 
set up the First Netherlands Cement Industry (ENCI) at the Sint Pietersberg in 
Maastricht.
The establishment of the cement factory and the mining of marl in an open pit 
was not uncontested. The Natural History Fellowship in Limburg protested vehe-
mently. The polemic issued in a petition against a permit for the ENCI, a situation 
that brought the question before parliament. In subsequent negotiations the factory 
reached agreements with the city and the local planning board, but the Ministry of 
Education, Arts and Sciences kept making additional demands. This led to revision 
and modification of the permit, such that a number of historically valuable ruins 
were protected and a wooded hillside of the Sint Pietersberg was retained in order 
to partly hide the unsightly excavation. The permit was finally issued in 1925. In 
January 1927 construction on the factory commenced and in 1928 the first cement 
oven was fired up.61
With the founding of the ENCI the Netherlands became less dependent on the 
import of cement. The locally produced cement was used to make cement mortar, 
but chiefly for concrete. After the Second World War concrete became a favourite 
building material. Between 1958 and 1970, concrete production rose from 460,000 
to 6.6 million cubic metres. Relative to the total national surface area, Dutch use of 
concrete in this period exceeded that of Belgium and Germany. In 1970 53% of the 
concrete was used for housing construction, 36% in utility construction, 8% in 
hydraulic engineering and 3% for road construction.62
The increasing demand for concrete had consequences for the Dutch landscape 
at those locations where marl and so-called additive materials like gravel and sand 
were found. In addition, ENCI was among the industries with the highest level of 
carbon dioxide emissions. That was also the case for the Hoogovens. In the final 
decades of the twentieth century this point became an element in discussions about 
sustainability. The transformations in the landscape had become an item on the soci-
etal agenda much earlier.
60 Quote from 1924 by Prof. J.A. Van der Kloes, founder of Dutch cement testing, cited in Heerding, 
Cement in Nederland, 65.
61 Heerding, Cement in Nederland, 91–105; Nieste, Van mergel tot cement, 28–29.
62 A.A. van der Vlist, Tussen cement, zand en grind... en beton: 50 jaar betonmortelindustrie in 
Nederland, 1948–1998 (Driebergen 1998).
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14.4.3  Gravel Pits and Marl Quarries, What Is Lost?
The discussion about the ENCI pit flared up again in 1948 after new proposals to 
expand the excavations. Once again local administrators and the company stood on 
opposite sides of the fence. Municipal, provincial and national advisements by the 
State Service for the National Plan, founded in 1941, hindered further expansion of 
the pit. In 1946 this agency had pronounced the Sint Pietersberg to be a protected 
nature zone. Local cultural and conservationist interests appeared to be blocking the 
expansion.
As an alternative for ENCI’s expansion plans, the State Service for the National 
Plan developed the ‘Valley Plan.’ This was a proposal to excavate portions of the 
Margraten Plateau near the town of Sibbe, nine kilometres northeast of the ENCI 
pit. ENCI had also studied this location during the war, but had concluded that such 
a relocation was not economically feasible. In 1948 new negotiations about the 
extension of the existing permits took place among ENCI, provincial authorities and 
representatives from the Ministries of Reconstruction and of Education, Culture and 
Science. After long and difficult negotiations, the ‘Valley Plan’ was dismissed. 
What followed was a new expanded 60 year concession at the existing location with 
an annual ceiling of 600,000 tons. Permission was also given to excavate the wall 
created earlier between the Meuse and the pit so that the factory could expand fur-
ther. By way of compensation, terrain to the west of the pit would be spared and 
there would be an investigation into the cultural history of those marl caves that 
were to succumb to the excavation. Finally a plan would be developed concerning 
the condition of the pit after marl mining had been terminated.63
The discussions about the conditions for granting a permit were unusual for the 
time. The duration and acerbic quality of the debate were probably due to the prox-
imity of the city of Maastricht and the historical role of the Sint Pietersberg. In 
addition, the deliberations were shaped by chance occurrences and local, sometimes 
even individual interests. The controversy around the excavations was above all a 
local problem. The huge demand for cement made it into a national interest.
The intensive building efforts relating to post-war reconstruction and the struggle 
against the housing shortage brought the procurement of building materials and 
their coordination more forcefully into the national political arena. This became 
clear in relation to the delving of gravel - next to cement a second important raw 
material for making concrete. In the flat countryside and close to rivers, gravel pits 
quickly became lakes, resulting in loss of land and effects on water management. 
Prior to the turn of the century the use of the land was the business of the owners. 
From the mid-nineteenth century on, gravel mining in the rivers was controlled by 
the need for permits and by rules policed by the Rijkswaterstaat. In the early twen-
63 Nieste, Van mergel tot cement, 45–64.
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tieth century new hydrological insights placed ever more restrictions on gravel min-
ing in the rivers themselves. The gravel industry shifted its activities to the 
floodplains and to sites in close proximity to the rivers.64
In 1950, in view of the enormous demand for materials, the Minister of 
Reconstruction and Public Housing concluded that the existing regulations for sand 
and gravel extraction were inadequate. He proposed to make the State Service for 
the National Plan responsible for coordinating the winning of sand and gravel. In 
the course of parliamentary debates, a few parliamentarians pointed out that deci-
sions about sand and gravel extraction addressed not only a material question, but 
that recreational and natural values had to be taken into consideration as well. But 
the plans were above all economically motivated: in the words of the responsible 
minister, ‘as concerns this sand winning, its costs (may) not be so high as to force 
the land prices for public housing to rise to intolerable levels’.65
In 1951, in response to the proposed changes, the Minister of Transport and 
Public Works appointed an inter-ministerial commission to investigate the question 
of sand and gravel extraction.66 In February 1953, only a few days after the flood 
disaster in the southwest Netherlands, the Communist newspaper De Waarheid 
reported on clay and sand pits in the river area near Culemborg:
Agricultural land is being exported with permission from the government. While in the 
southwest of our country, thousands are fighting for every centimetre of land that can be 
salvaged from the sea, while in the reclamation of the Zuiderzee 17,000 to 18,000 guilders 
are spent in order to wrest a hectare of land from the sea, at Culemborg 78 hectares of 
floodplains have been sold in order to be excavated. This is an inestimable loss for our 
country. This concerns excellent river clay, one of the most fertile soil types that we have.67
The owner of this land had sold it to an excavating company that exported to 
Belgium. But everything had been done quite legally. National, provincial and 
regional authorities were stalemated. The Waarheid’s true interest was the tenant 
farmers who were being driven from their fields by landowners and dealers in sand 
in what they called a ‘capitalist chaos.’ The paper pinned its hopes on ‘engineering 
circles’ who would propose a national sand mining plan in which sand would be 
mined at one central location. Opponents of these plans pointed to the differences in 
64 H. van Heiningen, Diepers en Delvers: Geschiedenis van de zand en grindbaggeraars (Zutphen 
1991), 259–322.
65 Minister cited by parliamentarian Ten Hagen in Handelingen der Tweede Kamer 1950–1951, 
30ste Vergadering, 7 December 1950, 812.
66 Handelingen der Tweede Kamer 1951–1952, Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1950–1951 kamer-
stuknummer 1900 IX A ondernummer 15, Memorie van Antwoord, Rijksbegroting voor het dien-
stjaar 1951 (Wederopbouw en Volkshuisvesting), 18–19; Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 
Algemene Beschouwingen, Bijlage A Tweede Kamer, Rijksbegroting van het dienstjaar 1951, 
1900 IX B (Verkeer en Waterstaat), V 202, 50.
67 ‘Met toestemming van regering worden cultuurgronden geëxporteerd’ in De Waarheid, Februari 
14, 1953, 3; ‘Kostbare kleilaag afgegraven omdat Belgen zand willen’ in De Waarheid, May 16, 
1953, 4.
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sand qualities and the special properties of river sand and gravel. According to the 
paper such a decision ‘could best be left to the engineers. They have no ‘mushy’ 
plans in their head.’68
The reports of the excavations at Culemborg led to parliamentary questions 
being put to the Minister of Transport and Public Works about possibly putting a 
stop to the gravel mining there. In view of the existing legal framework, the minister 
regarded this as impossible. He added that new statutes were in the making.69 After 
this, discussions about excavations flared up repeatedly in response to new planned 
mining announcements and rumours.
After gravel mining had been relocated to the floodplains, the province of 
Limburg had become the most important supplier of gravel. In 1938, in order to 
acquire a say in the mining activities, the province formulated an ‘ordinance against 
the infringement of natural beauty by excavating or digging in the ground.’ Halfway 
through the 1950s the provincial authorities modified the ordinance to require refill-
ing of the gravel pits. The gravel companies rejected this as an impossible demand 
due to the lack of sufficient material with which to refill the pits. The province 
threatened to take the matter to court and with that the debate once again moved to 
parliament.
In 1958 parliament asked the Minister of Agriculture to formulate a standpoint 
regarding the loss of agricultural land to gravel mining along the Meuse. The min-
ister determined that gravel mining was undertaken haphazardly and that due to 
combined sand mining much more land was dug up than anticipated. In view of the 
scarcity of arable land he ordered an investigation into the economic rationality of 
gravel mining at a national level. At the same time he expressed a preference for 
refilling the gravel pits, with the costs being borne by the gravel vendors. According 
to the minister this would imply a reduction of profits made by gravel miners by 
10–30% and a price hike for concrete of 1–3%.70 The Catholic Peoples’ Party (KVP) 
parliamentarian W.J. Droesen welcomed this idea, though he remained critical of 
the strictly economic approach to the gravel mining:
I assume that gravel mining, from a national economic point of view, is a necessity, but that 
doesn’t give the nation the right to totally mutilate the Limburg countryside for the future. 
The modern excavating and dredging machines snatch about 50 hectares of superior acre-
age from the shores of the broad river Meuse each year, creating enormous disorderly holes 
up to and soon around the village centres. In order to prevent the destruction of an old and 
beautiful landscape, the costs of refilling should not be weighed on an analytical balance, 
but the Netherlands should say: Beloved Limburg, we need your gravel for our construc-
68 ‘Ingenieurskringen voor nationaal zandwinningsplan’ in De Waarheid, May 28, 1953, 3.
69 Aanhangsel tot het Verslag van de Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, Deel III, Zitting 1952–1953, 
nr. 3043, 3069.
70 Verslag van de Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1957–1958, nr. 4900, ‘Rijksbegroting 
voor het Dienstjaar 1958, Hoofstuk XI, Landbouw Visserij en Voedselvoorziening, voorlopig ver-
slag’, nr 11, 20; Verslag van de Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1957–1958, nr. 4900 
‘Rijksbegroting voor het Dienstjaar 1958, Hoofdstuk XI, Landbouw Visserij en Voedselvoorziening, 
Memorie van antwoord’, 37.
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tions, but we want to repair your damage, even if that means that concrete will become a 
few percent more expensive.71
Fearing a possible stagnation of the gravel supply, the Ministry of Reconstruction 
and Public Housing initiated mediation between the province and the gravel dredg-
ers. These negotiations led to a levy on gravel which could be used to fill up the pits. 
The levy of 0.20 euro per ton of gravel and 0.11 euro per ton of sand was enacted in 
August 1958. The agreement also compelled the gravel dredgers to hand over the 
empty pits to the province. Using the funds from the levies that were collected in a 
so-called gravel fund, the province would then take responsibility for filling up the 
pits and restoring them to agricultural use.72
The provincial authorities settled on mine rock as suitable fill material. The first 
trials were undertaken after talks with the State Mines in 1959.73 These proved suc-
cessful and in the 1960s hundreds of tons of mine rock were used to fill up the gravel 
pits. In 1968 more than 4.5 million tons of mine rock was processed, enough to 
restore 475 hectares of land. In that year the contract was upgraded to an annual 
bulk of 3.5 million tons. This was partly made possible by excavating the mine rock 
hill at the Maurits State Mine, which incidentally made it possible to expand the 
chemical plants located on the mine site. With this mass of stones another 200 hect-
ares of gravel pits could be refilled.74
In 1961, after more than a decade of negotiations by various political interests in 
inter-ministerial and provincial commissions, no less than six ministers submitted a 
proposal to parliament for a Law on Subsoil Excavations (Ontgrondingswet).75 
Parliament insisted on strong ties with the Ministry of Public Housing. 
Parliamentarians also advocated harmonisation with the law on spatial planning that 
was then in preparation.76 The new law was published on October 27th 1965. It 
harmonised the different provincial regulations. As part of an application for a dig-
ging concession, the sand and gravel mining industry was now obliged to submit 
plans for re-use, accompanied by financial underpinnings. The execution of the per-
mits became a provincial task and was to be aligned with the provincial regional 
71 Verslag van de Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1957–1958, 29 session 11 December 
1957, 3437.
72 Province of Limburg, ‘De afronding van het grindfonds’, appendix to Letter Provinciale State 
van Limburg, 4 oktober 2005, onderwerp: Afronding ontgrindingsfonds (via web: http://portal.
prvlimburg.nl/psonline/ accessed 16-8-2012); H.B. Kramer, ‘De grintwinning In Midden-Limburg: 
Een evaluatie van alternatieve winningsgebieden,’ Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale 
Geografie. 58, nr mei/juni (1967), 113–125.
73 Soil mechanics reports by T.H.Huizinga in 1942 had proven the suitability of these materials for 
dikes and banks.
74 ‘Afgraving steenberg Maurits levert materiaal voor vulling van 200 ha grindgaten in Midden-
Limburg’ in Nieuws van de Staatsmijnen, Oktober 25 1968, 8.
75 Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1960–1961, ‘Regeling omtrent ontgrondingen 
(Ontgrondingwet), Memorie van Toelichting’, nr 6338.
76 The law on spatial planning entered into force in June 1961.
14 Building Materials and Construction: Constructing a Quality of Life
322
plans.77 The incorporation of the proposals into provincial regulation took another 
few years. While discussions and provincial planning continued, the Law on Subsoil 
Excavations silently came into force on September 1, 1971.78
The nature of the discussion gradually changed. Acquisition of materials, water 
management and agrarian interests had motivated the law, but the creation of recre-
ational areas now also became a growing consideration.79 This became visible at the 
presentation of the regional plan for gravel mining locations by the Limburg provin-
cial authorities in 1969. In the ensuing discussion new actors came to the fore. At 
the behest of municipalities along the Meuse River, H.B. Kramer, a geographer at 
the Catholic University of Nijmegen, had executed an economic cost-benefit analy-
sis of the provincial proposals. On the basis of these - for that time modern - calcula-
tions, he was able to propose an economically viable alternative in which the gravel 
pits along the Meuse would be transformed into an ‘international’ centre for aquatic 
sports. This could produce new economic activity, certainly desirable in view of the 
immanent closure of the mines. Kramer concluded that filling in the gravel pits and 
restoration of the agrarian function had become less relevant in view of agricultural 
developments in a European context. The cost-benefit analysis revealed the eco-
nomic advantages of continued gravel mining along the Meuse and the transforma-
tion of the region into a zone for aquatic sports with ‘international allure.’80
The provincial council was receptive to these arguments and consulted the tourist 
organisation ANWB and the Royal Dutch Yachting Association (KNWV). In 1971 
these organisations published a voluminous joint report exploring the possibilities 
for aquatic sports in the gravel pits. According to both organisations there were 
good chances for this region that in the past had only very limited possibilities for 
waterborne recreation. The proximity of Germany was regarded in this connection 
as an extra plus. The gravel pits as new nature zones with unique economic possi-
bilities would support the economic development of the region.81
After 1970 contracts for gravel mining in Panheel were signed by the gravel min-
ing companies and the province. The agreements also included a twenty-year mora-
torium on gravel mining outside of the planned zone.82 The 1970s were the high 
water mark for gravel dredging in Limburg. The activities were not without conse-
quences. Gravel hunger transformed the landscape around Roermond and at many 
places along the Meuse.
77 The figures are mentioned in: Tweede Kamer zitting 1963—1964 no. 6338, ´Memorie van 
Antwoord, Regelen omtrent ontgrondingen (Ontgrondingenwet), Wijziging van de onteigening-
swet: Wijziging en aanvulling van de Rivierenwet´, Submitted 20 april 1964, 2.
78 Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1973–1974, ´Aanhangsel tot het verslag van de 
Handelingen der Tweede Kamer´, Vragen nr 840, 1681; P. Ike, De planning van ontgrondingen 
(Groningen 2000), 31–41.
79 Handelingen der Eerste Kamer, Zitting 1965–1966, ´Regeling omtrent ontgrondingen 
(Ontgrondingwet), etc.´ 3e vergadering 5 oktober 1965, 23.
80 Kramer, ‘De grintwinning in Midden-Limburg’.
81 ANWB en KNWV, ‘Grintgaten in Limburg’ (Den Haag 1971).
82 Kramer, ‘De grintwinning in Midden-Limburg’.
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14.5  The State, Construction and Well-being
Since time immemorial, construction consisted of short supply and command chains 
among purveyors of raw materials, builders and clients. Building materials were 
transported directly to the construction site, as in the case of sand for raising the 
ground level, or processed and then transported to the construction site, as in the 
case of clay and bricks. In a geographic sense there was often a long supply chain. 
Many construction materials, for example wood and stone, had to be imported. For 
the rest, the construction site was a node for the supply of various materials, includ-
ing wood, mortars and stone. It also resembled a network because the construction 
site gathered a variety of trades like carpenters, bricklayers and excavation workers 
who processed these materials.
In the twentieth century the supply chains for mineral substances (construction 
and building materials) became more and more complex, just like those of bio- 
materials (agriculture and foods) and fossil substances (energy and plastics). New 
chains were added, among others those of steel, with new links like the processing 
of steel in metal products, machines and constructions. Supply chains thus became 
longer and more differentiated. New actors concerned themselves with the supply 
chains. The networks around specific links became more ramified. The fundamental 
dynamic of the supply chains was the increasing size of the enormous flows of 
materials. This caused tensions and problems in the chain and its environment.
With respect to the issue of well-being and sustainability the role of the state in 
the construction supply chain was crucial. From the beginning of this period the 
state was a new and dominant actor. The Housing Law of 1904 gave it directive 
powers over the construction of public housing. In subsequent decades the state 
defined the quality of dwellings for the poor and on that basis financially supported 
housing construction. Together with housing corporations and municipalities it 
achieved a significant improvement in public housing construction, one of the big 
issues in quality of life in this period.
The influence of the state extended to other supply chains as well. The First 
World War had made it clear what the international embargo on raw materials like 
wood, cement and steel meant for the Netherlands. The same confrontation fol-
lowed in the Second World War. During both wars the state did its best to allocate 
flows of materials. Post-war reconstruction also demanded government steering in 
order to prevent a descent into chaos.
During peacetime, the state made efforts to diminish the vulnerability of material 
flows, among other things by creating the prerequisites for a more independent posi-
tion vis a vis foreign suppliers. After the First World War it co-financed the iron and 
steel plant Hoogovens, which reduced Dutch dependency on foreign suppliers to 
5% of the total market. Dependency on foreign suppliers of natural stone (in par-
ticular marl for making cement) decreased: imports declined from 100% in 1913 to 
68% in 1970. Dependency on foreign gravel also decreased: imports declined from 
67% in 1913 to 47% in 1970 (Table 12.8). It should be noted that the latter develop-
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ments were the result of initiatives by private entrepreneurs. Nonetheless here too 
the state played an important role. It intervened in local conflicts around the extrac-
tion of raw materials in order to guarantee a stable supply. The Excavation Law of 
1971 became the legal framework within which the state, the provinces and other 
parties would solve conflicts in the future.
The local conflicts and state interventions had to do with the interests of raw 
materials extraction, agriculture, recreation and landscape. In the 1920s landscape 
conservation became an issue in the marl excavations in Maastricht. Later, during 
gravel dredging, priorities shifted from agrarian interests to that of recreation and 
landscape conservation. Limburg became the territory in which national and local 
interests were weighed in the balance. Landscapes were sacrificed for the material 
needs of housing, utility buildings, roads and the Delta Works. Zeeland was wrested 
from the sea while Roermond changed into a centre for aquatic recreation, a win- 
win situation for safety and the economy.
Ultimately the state was also confronted with the consequences of the construc-
tion agenda in this period. The expanding cities and the building of infrastructures 
infringed increasingly on the available space. That provided fertile soil for conflicts. 
It was the first time that politicians and national policy makers had the feeling that, 
in an incoherent fashion, the Netherlands was becoming ‘full’ of buildings and con-
structions. Residential quality, the human environment, economic capital and natu-
ral capital had to weighed in claims on space. The Law on Spatial Planning of 1965 
created the legal framework in which discussions on well-being and sustainability 
were to be carried on.
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Chapter 15
Energy and Plastics: Toward a Fossil Land 
of Milk and Honey
Frank Veraart, Rick Hölsgens, and Ben Gales
Abstract Two energy transitions characterised the period 1910–1970: the rise and 
fall of a national mining industry and the shift from coal to oil and natural gas. 
Domestic coal made the Netherlands less dependent on foreign supplies. World 
wars and economic crises long inspired a lifestyle based on low energy 
consumption.
An energy-intensive lifestyle emerged after the 1960s with the import of cheap 
oil and the discovery of natural gas in Groningen. The discovery also led to the 
attraction of energy-intensive industries, to the massive use of natural gas in green-
house farming and to a national gas grid for households.
Oil and gas also laid the basis for the production, processing and use of plastics. 
These became the symbol of modernity and of the rise of the consumer society. As 
packaging material and raw material for cheap consumer goods they also initiated 
the waste society and formed the iconic example of the linear economy. The prod-
ucts of this linear economy ended up en masse on the rapidly growing waste heaps.
Increasing energy consumption in industry and households caused local air pol-
lution. The first investigations of and policy measures in the area of air pollution 
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were initiated from the viewpoint of public health. Pollution mobilised local resis-
tance against the excesses of modernisation. Local environmental groups were the 
cradle of a broad societal concern about the environment, ecology and climate 
change in the following decades (see Chaps. 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21).
Keywords Energy supply · Coal · Oil · Natural gas · Plastics · Waste · Linear 
economy · Air pollution · Environmental movement
15.1  Working on a National Energy Supply
15.1.1  Vulnerable Energy Supplies and Public Welfare
‘A country that does not know how to use its natural sources of wealth proves that it 
does not deserve them,’ according to the second-chamber parliamentarian from the 
province of Limburg, W.H. Nolens, speaking in December 1897.
We all know that societal income, the material component of national well-being, comes 
into being through the combination of natural givens with labour, capital and entrepreneur-
ial ambition, that the size of this income will depend on the quantity of each component and 
from the more or less correct proportions with which they are brought into contact with one 
another...1
At the end of the nineteenth century, subsoil core samples had demonstrated mine-
able layers of coal under significant portions of South Limburg. Despite various 
requests for mining concessions and the construction of a railway line to the south, 
a flourishing coal-mining industry remained a distant vision. Nolens characterised 
coal mining as vital to:
the national interest...the economic independence of our country...A measure by the German 
Government to temporarily prohibit the export of coal would be disastrous for our country, 
even now.2
1 W.H.  Nolens in Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 35ste vergadering, 22-12-1897, 675, italics in 
original.
2 W.H. Nolens in Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 35ste vergadering, 22-12-1897, 675, italics in origi-
nal, Nolens referred to an article entitled ´Een Nationaal Belang,´ De Ingenieur 4(1889), no. 25. 
Nolens’ remarks suggest that policy makers above all feared the Netherland’s dependency on 
Germany. Around the turn of the century German coal increased its market share in the Netherlands 
and the latter became ever more dependent on the Ruhr region. But public opinion also referred to 
other suppliers. See, for example, H.C. van der Houven van Oordt and G. Vissering, Economische 
beteekenis van afsluiting en drooglegging der Zuiderzee, (Leiden 1901), 250: ‘Should war with 
England ever break out again, then the State Mines will be of decisive importance.’ The Boer Wars 
in South Africa made such a conflict conceivable. An even greater threat was perceived in ‘that 
huge spider’ the United States.
But it must be noted that the Netherlands also had some advantages. Because of British com-
petition the Rhineland-Westphalian coal syndicate kept prices on the Dutch market lower than in 
their home market.
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His call to modify the Mining Laws were heard by the government, that subse-
quently made efforts to promote the development of domestic mining.
From the perspective of well-being, Nolens’ argument was telling. First of all, he 
made an explicit connection between national well-being and the exploitation of 
natural capital. In the nineteenth century, in imitation of England, the Netherlands 
had invested in steam engines and railways. This was accompanied by a transition 
in energy supply. Coal increasingly supplemented Dutch demands for energy. In 
1870 the Dutch energy supply still consisted for 62% of classic sources: turf and 
wood, wind and water and the muscle power of humans and animals. Around 1900 
this share had declined to 34%.3
The gradual energy transition to coal made the Netherlands completely depen-
dent on foreign supplies, which made the country vulnerable. This was Nolen’s 
second point. He regarded the development of a domestic coal supply as the neces-
sary precondition for a stable and sustainable development of the economy and of 
well-being.
The theme of foreign dependency recurred regularly throughout the twentieth 
century. Between 1870 and 1970 the Netherlands passed through two energy transi-
tions. The first was the transition from traditional forms of energy to coal (1870–
1910), the second the transition to oil and natural gas (1950–1970). The first 
transition was already anticipated by the end of the nineteenth century, but almost 
no one could imagine that after a bit more than 50 years domestic coal production 
would be traded in for oil and natural gas. From a present-day perspective the ener-
getic values of coal, oil and natural gas and an increasing energy consumption seem 
almost autonomous drivers for this transformation process.4 The truth lay 
elsewhere.
The new fuels that shaped the modernisation of society were scarce goods 
throughout most of the twentieth century. The two world wars and their aftermaths 
led to rationing. Foreign conflicts meant fluctuations in price and delivery. This 
absolute and relative scarcity was a continuous spur to improvements in energy 
consumption. In this chapter we shall first of all consider the energy question. How 
dependent was the Netherlands and how did the country develop in the twentieth 
century? From being a net importer of energy around 1900, by 1970 the Netherlands 
had changed into a net exporter of energy, thanks to the discovery of natural gas in 
the Groningen subsoil. What effects did this have on the Dutch economy and energy 
consumption?
Coal, oil and natural gas varied in composition. The raw materials had in many 
cases to be processed before they could be used. The purification and refining of 
fossil assets were the basis for the development of chemical complexes. These com-
3 H.N.M. Hölsgens, Energy transition in the Netherlands: Sustainable challenges in a historical 
and comparative perspective (Groningen 2016), 20.
4 The energetic or combustion values are expressed in units of produced energy (joule) per kilo-
gram. For methane - the major fraction of natural gas - this is between 50–55 MJ/kg, for petrol 
(gasoline) this is 44–47 MJ/kg, for diesel this is about 45 MJ/kg, anthracite coal is 27 MJ/kg, lig-
nite coal about 15 MJ/kg, and wood and dry turf also about 15 MJ/kg.
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plexes produced not only fuels, but other products as well. After the Second World 
War, plastics became an important sector with companies like DSM and Shell 
deploying a great deal of innovative prowess. We discuss this sector in the second 
part of the chapter.
We conclude with the ecological downsides of the fossil transition. What effects 
did production and consumption have on air, water and soil? How did these negative 
effects gradually find their way onto the political agenda? How did these evolve into 
the origins of the present-day sustainability challenges? We focus in particular on 
air pollution.
15.1.2  Domestic Coal Production
Parliamentarian Nolens’ declamations have to be viewed in the light of the slow and 
difficult development of coal mining in the Netherlands. On the eve of the twentieth 
century coal was mined in only two small mines, the Domaniale and the Neuprick 
Mines in Kerkrade. From 1850 on, geological explorations confirmed the presence 
of coal over a larger area in South Limburg. Around 1860 and especially after 1876, 
15 concessions were granted on the basis of French mining laws dating from 1810. 
In this period of liberal dominance, many entrepreneurs succeeded in staking a 
claim. These concessions were above all a matter of speculation and the creation of 
reserves by foreign mining companies. In 1891 the Minister of Public Works, Trade 
and Industry put a stop to this by recalling the concessions and granting the Company 
for the Exploitation of Limburg Coal Mines a concession for the Oranje-Nassau 
Mine. From the very beginning – with the digging of the shafts – the enterprise 
struggled with technical problems and accidents. Policy makers became increas-
ingly irritated with the delay. In 1898 new concessions were granted for the exploi-
tation of the Willem, Sophia and Laura en Vereeniging mines.
In early 1901 Minister Lely proposed establishing state-owned mines in 
Limburg. Instead of a limited area, the government reserved the entire territory 
known to contain coal in its subsoil at that point in time. This was, internationally 
speaking, a unique move. In addition to economic and nationalist motivations, 
social considerations played a role. A state enterprise, according to the Catholic 
parties, could prevent labour conflicts and the disruption of traditional society. The 
debate about the State Mines took place during the ‘coal crisis.’ The price of 
German coal had risen steeply. Subsequently Great Britain imposed duties on its 
coal exports. Given these circumstances the public and parliament concurred in 
Lely’s proposition.
In 1903 construction was started on the Wilhelmina State Mine and in 1906 the 
Emma State Mine opened its gates, followed by the Hendrik State Mine in 1911. At 
the same time various private mines started producing: Oranje Nassau (1899, with a 
second mine in 1904), Willem Sophia (1902) and Laura (1907).5 In barely a decade 
5 Ad Knotter (eds.), Limburg Kolenland, over de Geschiedenis van de Limburgse Kolenmijnbouw 
(Zwolle 2015), 66–67.
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a serious mining industry had come into existence thanks to much hard work both 
by private parties and the state.
The domestic production of coal increased steadily after 1910. Nonetheless the 
spectre of foreign dependency came to haunt the country during the First World 
War. Coal shortages followed on the abrupt cessation of foreign imports. Only after 
difficult negotiations and in exchange for other important ‘war commodities’ like 
food, was the Netherlands again able to import very modest quantities of coal. In the 
final years of the war this led to rationing and the closing of factories.
It took until the mid-1920s before coal consumption again reached pre-war lev-
els. In the meantime, however, domestic production was meeting 60% of the 
demand. In 1937 the Dutch mines even supplied about 90% of the domestic demand. 
In the first years of the Second World War, coal production remained stable, but 
after 1942 war circumstances began to play a role and production declined. After the 
war the ideal of self-sufficiency was quietly laid to rest.6 Imports met an increas-
ingly large part of the demand for coal and this caused no worries. Up to the 
announcement of the Limburg mine closures in the mid-1960s, the state mines were 
responsible for delivering 60–80% of the domestic demand for coal (Graph 15.1).7
Self-sufficiency and foreign dependence became increasingly unimportant fac-
tors. But the preoccupation with a responsible use of subsoil resources remained 
undiminished. Policy makers feared that the mining companies, in pursuit of quick 
profits, would first concentrate on the richer layers and thereby make the extraction 
6 H.N.M. Hölsgens, ‘Resource vulnerability and energy transitions in the Netherlands since the 
mid-nineteenth century’ in Energy Policy, Forthcoming.





























































total coal consumption domestic coal production share
0
Graph 15.1 Consumption and domestic production of coal in petajoules (left scale) and share of 
domestic production in total consumption in percent (right scale)
Source: B. Gales and H. Hölsgens in: H.N.M. Hölsgens, Energy transition in the Netherlands: 
Sustainable challenges in a historical and comparative perspective (Groningen 2016), 207–217
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of other layers impossible. By also taking on the thinner layers from the outset, 
costs would rise by 10–15% but in the end the entire supply would be utilized. This 
became an important point in the debate on the nationalisation of the private mines 
that took place after 1946. In the event, nationalisation was not pursued but a ‘thin 
layers policy’ became the norm. A less than optimal level of productivity became 
the price for less waste.8 The tradition of responsible use was continued in the 1970s 
in decisions to first tackle the smaller natural gas fields and to keep the big field at 
Slochteren partly in reserve.
15.1.3  The End of Domestic Coal
Coal still played an important role in the post-war energy supply and thus occupied 
a central place in Dutch society. The decision, in 1952, to open a new State Mine 
(Beatrix) in Vlodrop attested to that. The previous year, the Netherlands had become 
part of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a cooperative trade and 
production agreement signed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands. This cooperative venture had developed along the transna-
tional cartels of the powerful iron and steel industries of especially France, Germany, 
Belgium and Luxembourg. From a Dutch perspective, the emergence of West- 
European cooperation in the ECSC was a complex juxtaposition of national inter-
ests aimed at the rapid recovery of export markets, at monetary integration at the 
behest of the USA and of opening up markets for coal and steel that were important 
for reconstruction and industrialisation.9
With this European cooperation, domestic mining activities found themselves in 
a new international playing field. The Suez crisis of 1956, and particularly the 
blockage of the canal, moved energy to the top of the European agenda. Reports by 
the ECSC high authority demonstrated that West European energy demands could 
not be met with coal mining. Increasing demand would have to be met by importing 
coal and oil. Nuclear power also offered hope. In 1958, with the founding of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), cooperation on the European market inten-
8 Staatscommissie ingesteld bij Koninklijk Besluit van 26 November 1946 No. 1, Den Haag 1948, 
25–26, 33.
9 The cooperation among France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in the 
ECSC had diverse origins. Important roots were the formation of economic cooperation between 
Belgium and Luxembourg in the 1920s, the economic cooperation in the framework of the Benelux 
since 1944, as well as post-war international cooperative arrangements like the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC). More on this in W.  Kaiser and J.  Schot, Writing the rules for Europe: 
Experts, cartels and international organisations, (London 2014), 212–16. Concerning the national 
and macro-economic considerations of the Dutch government in the realisation of the ECSC, see: 
J. Luiten van Zanden and R.T. Griffith, Economische geschiedenis van Nederland in de 20e eeuw, 
(Utrecht 1989), 247–54.
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sified. At the same time Euratom started a program to satisfy increasing energy 
demands with nuclear energy.
These developments turned Dutch coal mining into a plaything in a world of 
covert national subsidy programs in the surrounding countries.10 Moreover, oil 
began to compete with coal. Mounting imports of foreign coal and oil eroded profit-
ability. Process improvements in the steel industry meant a much lower demand for 
cokes, leading to overproduction. To add insult to injury, the discovery of natural gas 
in Groningen cast an entirely new light on the national importance of coal mining.
Mining engineers pointed out that Dutch coal mines were among the most mod-
ern in Western Europe. But the government had doubts about the size of the reserves 
and the profitability of mining. They placed these doubts over against the alternative 
of national exploitation of natural gas and a choice for the latter became inevitable. 
In 1962 the first decisions for the gradual phasing out of the mines were taken. In 
1965 the Minister of Economic Affairs, Joop den Uyl, announced the definitive 
closing of the mines in a speech in the municipal theatre in Heerlen, headquarters of 
the State Mines. Nine years later, colliers employed by the Oranje Nassau mine 
brought op the last of the Dutch coal.11
In 1958 more than half the energy consumption was still provided by coal, while 
the share of oil was about 40%. By 1964 the figures were the inverse.12 Statistics on 
energy consumption show the fuel transitions in the 1960s across different sectors 
(Table 15.1). About half of the energy was consumed by electricity production and 
industrial applications (both 24%). These sectors consumed mainly oil and coal. In 
industry, coal demand declined only gradually, but its consumption was dwarfed by 
the growing use of oil and natural gas from the late 1960s onward. Transportation 
was largely oil-driven and accounted for about 10% of the energy demand. 
Households and small businesses were the main consumers of coal (41% in 1962). 
In the late 1960s these small-scale users also transferred to oil.
With this shift in energy consumption, dependency on foreign sources again 
increased. And, as a result of the increasing use of oil and the founding of OPEC in 
1960 – the cartel of oil-exporting countries – Dutch energy supplies became even 
more vulnerable.13 Just as at the outset of the twentieth century, the Netherlands was 
now also in large measure dependent on foreign suppliers. But now too it had the 
option of partially compensating its dependency. By the mid-1960s the enormous 
10 On the development of mining and the national subsidy programs of the participants in the ECSC 
see B. Breij, De mijnen gingen open, de mijnen gingen dicht (Alphen aan den Rijn 1991). 125–128 
and 147–165.
11 The history of the mine closures is more complicated than can be described here. How the situa-
tion evolved and which arguments were used by different groups of engineers and politicians is 
described in detail in B. Gales, ‘Delfstoffen.’ in J.W. Schot et al. (eds.) Techniek in Nederland in 
de twintigste eeuw - Delfstoffen, energie, chemie (Zutphen 2000), 61–65. and C.E.P.M. Raedts, De 
opkomst, de ontwikkeling en de neergang van de steenkolenmijnbouw in Limburg (Assen 1974), 
198–201.
12 Hölsgens, Energy transition in the Netherlands, 31–32.
13 Calculations concerning the vulnerability of the Netherlands with respect to energy supplies and 
different energy sources can be found in Hölsgens, Energy transition in the Netherlands, 19–59.
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gas field in Groningen had turned the Netherlands into a net exporter of energy. 
Worries about scarcity, at least for the coming decades, were a thing of the past.
15.1.4  A Warm House
Concerns about energy scarcity, foreign dependency and costs had governed the use 
of fossil resources up to the end of the 1960s. Frugality was woven deeply into the 
fabric of Dutch society, and extended to the use of fuels. In firms, innovations for 
energy-saving and for increased production often went hand in hand. For example, 
the brick and glass processing industries introduced new ovens so that progressively 
less fuel would be needed per unit product.14 The effects of such investments could 
be seen in the relationship between energy consumption and investments in 
machines and apparatus. Over the long term these figures exhibit a continual decline, 
with the exception of short periods before and after the First World War and at the 
end of the 1960s.15
14 G.B. Janssen, Baksteenfabrikage in Nederland, 1850–1920 (Zutphen 1987), 276–78.; E.J.G van 
Royen and H. Buiter, Grofkeramische industrie (Zeist 1994).; B.A. van Veen, Glas- en glasbewerk-
ingsindustrie (Zeist 1994).
15 Hölsgens, Energy transition in the Netherlands, 81–83.
Table 15.1 Energy consumption by fuel and sector 1958–1974 (in PJ)
1958 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974
Coal 152 145 137 131 133 73 34 32
Oil 117 230 303 202 514 243 170
Gas 7 9 13 40 133 245 312
Industry Coal 110 105 92 95 81 76 80
Oil 161 182 198 234 168 293 353
Gas 5 7 42 132 266 434 499
Transport Coal 2
Oil 118 185 250 252
Gas 2 3 3
Other
(Incl. Households)
Coal 309 238 202 130 93 46 19 9
Oil 219 363 440 318 574 348 214
Gas 10 20 63 166 306 518 607
All Coal 460 495 444 353 322 201 129 121
Oil 614 775 941 939 1255 1135 989
Gas 22 36 117 340 706 1200 1420
Grand Totals 460 1131 1255 1412 1601 2162 2464 2531
Electicity production 152 268 376 447 375 721 522 515
Industry 277 294 332 461 515 803 932
Transport 120 188 253 255
Other (incl. houseoulds) 309 466 585 634 577 925 886 829
Total 460 1131 1255 1412 1601 2162 2464 2531
Electricty
production 
Sources: CBS Statistical Yearbooks 1967, 1971, 1973, 1975
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In the household, frugal use of fuels was encouraged by the building codes. The 
national government was able to influence the construction of public housing via 
various guidelines. These so-called ‘suggestions’ were inspired by the ideology of 
simplicity and sobriety. Guidelines in the area of heating dated from the 1920s and 
assumed a stove in the kitchen and a hearth in the living room. These had to provide 
warmth for the entire home. Compared to surrounding countries Dutch heating 
facilities were extremely frugal. From time to time Netherlanders suffered from 
cold en masse.16
During the Second World War, architects developed new concepts in housing 
construction. Among other things this included heating the home by means of cen-
tral heating or block heating, which were held to improve the comfort of the home 
as well as its compatibility with the future.17 But these ideas were at loggerheads 
with the stringent post-war restrictions imposed by the government on scarce mate-
rials and means. The government was able to control the production of materials via 
its system of distribution and to control the specification of housing standards via its 
systems of financing. It was even able to regulate the configuration of neighbour-
hoods by means of its ground-price policy.18
Given the limited financial means, the government tried to augment housing pro-
duction by implementing a radical standardisation of floor plans for dwellings. In 
this way the government consciously or unconsciously also shaped the level of com-
fort and heating of the home. These politics had a favourable effect on the low 
expenditures for domestic fuels and on the energy rationing around and during the 
Second World War. The fear of future energy shortages caused these measures to 
remain in force until well into the 1950s.
It seemed that the occupants themselves were not overly concerned about the 
cold in the house. Dissatisfaction seemed limited to experts, who kept insisting on 
structural improvements to facilities in the home. But households plotted their own 
course in improving domestic comfort. Supplementary heating by means of mobile 
electric or petroleum stoves supplied the desired comfort. A survey conducted in 
Utrecht in 1948 revealed that more than 20% of the households kept the cold at bay 
in this fashion. A nationwide survey in 1957 revealed that 27% of the Dutch house-
holds used an electric and 6% a petroleum stove as supplementary heating. In 1964, 
61% of the households owned an electric stove and only 24% of the households had 
no form of supplementary heating.19
The guided heating policy seemed to be effective on the supply side. Modest 
heating facilities limited the demand for domestic solid fuels. But portable stoves 
compensated the lack of comfort in the homes. From a financial point of view this 
16 B. Gales, ‘Gemütlich Am Ofen?’, Zentrum Für Niederlande-Studien - Jahrbuch, 2009, 91–112.
17 Gales, ‘Gemütlich Am Ofen?’, 100.
18 K. Schuyt and E. Taverne, 1950: Welvaart in zwart wit (Den Haag 2000), 204–5.
19 P. van Overbeeke, Kachels, geisers en fornuizen: Keuzeprocessen en energieverbruik in 
Nederlandse huishoudens, 1920–1975 (Hilversum 2001), 179.
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did not seem to be the ideal solution. Electric stoves cost 200 cents per 100 mega-
joules (about 28 kwh) of heat.20 The detour of using electricity to produce warmth 
also entailed extra energy costs. The energetic efficiency of coal-fired electricity 
plants in the Netherlands in the late 1950s hovered around 28%.21 In exchange for 
comfort and ease, households were prepared to suffer higher energy consumption 
and higher costs.
In comparison with surrounding countries stoves long remained commonplace. 
In Sweden, by 1961, 99% of the new residences had central heating. With only 5%, 
the Netherlands struck a discordant note among other West European nations.22 
Around 1960, architects and societal organisations became ever more insistent in 
addressing the question of heating. ‘Good Living’ (Goed Wonen), a foundation for 
promoting a modern lifestyle, typified the bedroom as a polar region. In its view it 
was necessary to put an immediate end to this dire situation.23 The transition to natu-
ral gas marked the turning point. From the early 1960s on the number of new hous-
ing units in which central heating was installed grew explosively. After 1965 almost 
all new flats were equipped with central heating; around 1970 this was also the case 
for one-family homes. In that year only 26% of the dwellings in the Netherlands had 
central heating; by the early 1980s this was about 50% and only around the turn of 
the millennium had homes without central or collective heating become an excep-
tion (see Table  15.2). The guided energy policy reverberated long after its 
inception.
20 Other options were bottled gas (180 cents), municipal gas (105 cents) and petroleum (55 cents) 
for the same quantity of heat. See van Overbeeke, Kachels, geisers en fornuizen, 180.
21 This meant that most of the energy in coal was lost in friction, heat and transformation losses. 
J.H. de Boer, ‘Primaire en secundaire energiebronnen,’ in Bevolkingsgroei en energie-Verbruik 
(symposium at the University of Amsterdam held in the summer of 1957, Assen: Van Gorcum & 
Comp NV, 1958), 76. Internationally in the 1950s and 60s the efficiency varied between 30–40%. 
See V. Smil, Energy in world history (Oxford 1994), 171–75.
22 Central heating in homes in West European countries in 1961: Switzerland (90%), Denmark 
(76%), Belgium (70%), France (44%) and West Germany (24%). Van Overbeeke, Kachels, geisers 
en fornuizen, 165.
23 Gales, ‘Gemütlich Am Ofen?’, 107.
Table 15.2 Different types of heating in percent, 1947–1998
1947 1957 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1978 1981 1998
Coal stove/hearth 97 84 58 } 61 43 26 17 1 0 0
Oil Stove 0 8 19 2 1 0
Gas stove/hearth 0 3 11 21 31 39 42 40 34 11
Individual central heating } 3 5 8 11 16 24 30 47 55 78
Block/neighborhood/district 
heating
4 7 10 11 11 10 10 11
Source: Peter van Overbeeke, Kachels, Geisers en Fornuizen, (Eindhoven 2001)272
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15.1.5  Natural Gas to Spare
The first drilling for natural gas was in 1959, but it took more than 4 years before 
the different parties were able to reach agreement on an acceptable way to exploit 
this new natural resource. Since the interbellum, exploration for and exploitation of 
oil and gas had been the monopoly of the Dutch Petroleum Oil Company 
(Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij, NAM). The NAM was a joint venture of the 
oil companies Shell and Esso. Earlier gas finds had been entirely financed and dis-
tributed by the State Gas Company (SGB).
But given the gigantic size of the Groningen gas field, this construction became 
untenable. Against this background, negotiations commenced, about building an 
infrastructure of pipelines, the sale of gas domestically and abroad, and the division 
of the income. The role of the government was a complicating factor for Shell and 
Esso. Foreign governments of oil-producing countries demanded a big cut in sales 
incomes from the oil companies. Were the Dutch government to make similar 
demands with respect to the Groningen gas, this would compromise Shell’s and 
Esso’s negotiating position elsewhere. The Minister of Economic Affairs, J.W. de 
Pous, had to weigh the considerable investments of these companies in the 
Netherlands, like the oil refineries in Rotterdam’s Botlek area, against the possibil-
ity of extraction via a state enterprise.
In the course of the negotiations, the government proposed that its other energy 
enterprise, the State Mines (nowadays DSM) become a partner in the extraction and 
distribution of the Groningen natural gas. In 1962, after nationalistic sentiments 
within the government had been quelled, the minister presented a ‘Memorandum 
regarding the Natural Gas’. This led to the founding of the Gas Union (Gasunie) in 
1963, a joint venture in which DSM participated for 40%, Shell for 25%, Esso for 
25% and the state for 10%. Thanks to this division of shares as well as corporate 
taxes, about 70% of the income accrued to the state.24
In the course of the negotiations, Esso and Shell developed plans for selling natu-
ral gas to households and small businesses. The oil companies calculated that this 
could be the most profitable market. The gas could be coupled to existing municipal 
gas networks by means of a national distribution network, which would make it 
immediately competitive with coals and fuel oil. Households were to utilize the gas 
for space heating, cooking and warm water. Additionally, plans were made to 
develop a so-called premium market for applications in the chemical, metal and 
ceramic industries. Private users and firms consuming large quantities of gas could 
bargain for significant discounts.25
24 G.P.J.  Verbong, ‘Energie,’ in J.W.  Schot et  al. (eds.), Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste 
eeuw - Delfstoffen, energie, chemie, (Zutphen 2000), 206–10., W. Kielich, Ondergronds rijk: 25 
jaar gasunie en aardgas (Groningen 1988), 41–45., A. Correlje, Hollands welvaren: De geschie-
denis van een Nederlandse bodemschat (Hilversum 1998), 27.
25 Correlje, Hollands welvaren, 21–32.
15 Energy and Plastics: Toward a Fossil Land of Milk and Honey
338
In 1963 the Gasunie laid down the first high-pressure pipelines that were to 
deliver the gas from Slochteren to the municipal gas companies. Within 5 years 
almost all onshore Dutch municipalities were connected to the natural gas network. 
In the cities and towns gas companies were busy modifying and installing new heat-
ing and cooking appliances. In the early 1970s households became one of the largest 
consumers of natural gas (see Table 15.1 and Graph 15.2).
By the mid-sixties expectations about nuclear energy were driving the sale of gas 
to new heights. It was self-evident that nuclear energy was destined to become the 
energy source of the future and to replace fossil fuels. That would be the end of 
natural gas profits. After 1966 natural gas was increasingly used to fuel conven-
tional electric power plants. Low gas prices were employed to seduce industries 
with large energy requirements into investing in the Netherlands. In this way a con-
sortium consisting of the Billiton Company, Alusuisse and Hoogovens founded an 
aluminium smelting facility, Aluminium Delfzijl (Aldel), in the province of 
Groningen. The government agreed to a consignment of 13 billion cubic metres of 
natural gas, enough to produce 60,000 tons of aluminium in 40 years. The alumin-
ium ore was provided by the Billiton Company and came from bauxite mines in 
Surinam.26
Other energy-intensive sectors also profited from the declining energy prices due 
to the availability of natural gas. Natural gas, for example, utterly transformed the 
greenhouse farming industry. Greenhouses were heated with natural gas and also 
supplied with carbon dioxide (CO2). The cultivation of vegetables in commercial 
gardening under glass increased between 1960 and 1970 from 4200 to 5300  hectares, 
the cultivation of cut flowers from 500 to 1700 hectares. In addition there was a 
yield increase thanks to the addition of CO2. The yield of tomatoes, for example, 
increased from 10 to 15 kilograms per square meter.27 Along such devious paths, 
26 H. Beukema, Lichtmetaal op zware grond: 40 jaar Aldel (Delfzijl 2006).
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Groningen’s natural gas had fundamental consequences for energy use and the 
industrial structure of the Netherlands.
Natural gas, oil and coal were not only used to make fuels. They were also raw 
materials for countless chemical products and materials. A new type of material was 
the synthetic materials, especially plastics.28 Prior to the Second World War there 
had been a number of basic inventions in this area, especially in Germany and the 
United States. After the war, plastics technology created a revolution. A 1949 a 
Dutch treatise on the state of the art in plastics opened with these sentences:
Next to atomic physics and radar there is probably no domain that has so exercised the 
public imagination as that of plastics. Throughout the world new materials have come into 
use and new applications for these materials have been found, thanks to which new indus-
tries have come into being or existing industries have expanded beyond recognition...29
In the post-war Netherlands, plastics were the fastest growing industrial sector. At 
the same time it very quickly won the heart of the welfare society. It offered the 
masses ease, comfort and pleasure. At the same time, plastics were from the very 
first controversial materials. They were associated with poor quality, consumerism 
and environmental problems. The history of plastics is a sublime illustration of the 
tension between well-being and sustainability. As a part of the fossil material flows, 
plastics will get special attention in the next section and in the next part.30
15.2  Wellfare with Plastics
15.2.1  The Netherlands as Leader
Plastics are built up from long chains of mostly carbon atoms, with molecules that 
are 1000 to 100,000 times bigger than molecules of substances like water and sugar. 
During manufacture they can be moulded or are fluid and at the final stage they 
assume a more or less permanent form. In the course of moulding or casting, i.e. 
plastic shaping, these synthetic materials acquire their material function.
28 In the past, elaborate factory complexes had developed around fossil subsoil resources. An early 
example was the rise of the synthetic dye industry in Germany after 1870, an entirely new branch 
of industry that settled among other places in the neighbourhood of coal basins. In the Netherlands, 
small-scale chemical industry flourished around the production of city-gas in municipal gasworks. 
In Limburg a large-scale chemical complex developed under the control of the State Mines once 
coal deposits there began to be exploited.
29 R. van de Kasteele, Het kunststoffengebied: Chemie, grondstoffen en toepassingen (Amsterdam 
1949), 13.
30 See for the following: H.W. Lintsen, M. Hollestelle and R. Hölsgens, The Plastics Revolution. 
How the Netherlands became a global player in plastics (Eindhoven 2017), the prologue and part 
I. Furthermore: E.M.L. Bervoets en F.C.A. Veraart, ‘Bezinning, ordening en afstemming 1940–
1970’, in: J.W. Schot et al., Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw (Zutphen 2003) Part VI, 
214–239.
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Bakelite – invented around 1907 by the Belgian Leo Baekeland – was the first 
synthetic material derived from a fossil raw material and substances derived there-
from (in this case coal and its derivatives).31 The three plastics that as bulk products 
would dominate the market after the Second World War had been developed in the 
1920s and 1930s in large foreign chemical enterprises: polystyrene at the American 
Dow Chemical Company and the German IG Farben, polyvinyl chloride (PVC) at 
IG Farben, and polyethylene at the British ICI. The most important plastic fibre, 
nylon, was invented at the American chemical firm DuPont.
Prior to the Second World War, Dutch firms played next to no role in plastics 
technology. In 1923 Philips became one of the companies that produced and pro-
cessed Bakelite. It was used to make speakers, radio cabinets and insulating base 
plates for x-ray apparatus, but also for lightbulb fittings, plugs and switches. A few 
firms specialized in Bakelite moulding.32 After the war the Netherlands lagged far 
behind the USA, England and Germany. Despite this, within 20 years it would suc-
ceed in becoming one of the front-runners in plastics technology.
An important reason was the presence of raw materials for plastics production. 
DSM was perched on top of the coal in the Limburg subsoil. Shell had access to oil 
and refineries in Pernis. Pernis and Europoort developed into the largest storage and 
trans-shipment location for crude oil in Europe. That attracted foreign firms. The 
plastics industry thus represented a classically Dutch type of industry, namely the 
trafiek, a processing and value-adding industry based on flows of trade.
A second reason was that the Netherlands was able to appropriate plastics tech-
nology very quickly. Shell, DSM and AKU (General Artificial Silk Union) invested 
large sums in research and development and built world-class competencies in the 
production and processing of plastics. TNO, the largest public research organisation 
31 As early as the mid-nineteenth century, materials that could be molded were the object of exten-
sive experimentation. Various materials like paper-maché (based on paper and glue) and vulca-
nised natural rubber (based on natural rubber and sulphur) were not (and are not) counted as 
synthetic materials. Parkesine, named after its inventor Alexander Parkes (1813–1890), was the 
first substance that later acquired that predicate, albeit somewhat half-heartedly. Some speak of a 
half-synthetic substance because cotton was the basic material. The cotton was treated with a mix-
ture of nitric and sulphuric acid and subsequently mixed with vegetable oil and organic solvents. 
This produced a kneadable dough that could be cast, formed, cut and painted to produce a variety 
of products like medallions, billiard balls, buttons and letter openers. But the material was brittle, 
breakable and flammable. An important improvement was the addition of camphor, that made the 
material strong and flexible. The American John Wesley Hyatt (1837–1920) succeeded at the end 
of the nineteenth century in producing this material (that now is called celluloid) and its derivative 
products at an industrial scale.
32 With a bit of good will we can also count the artificial horn and artificial silk industry as part of 
the plastics sector. But these were in fact half-synthetic plastics (to speak in contemporary terms) 
because the artificial horn was prepared from casein, a by-product of the dairy industry and the 
artificial silk from cellulose derived from wood and cotton. The International Artificial Horn 
Industry (IKI) for example, belonged to the plastics sector. ENKA (the First Netherlands Artificial 
Silk Factory in Arnhem, founded in 1912) was the first producer of artificial silk in the Netherlands. 
Other artificial silk factories followed. In 1928 the ENKA took over one of those firms, the Holland 
Artificial Silk Industry and merged in 1929 with the German Vereinigte Glanzstoff Fabriken AG to 
form the Algemene Kunstzijde Unie NV (AKU).
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in the Netherlands, founded the Plastics Institute TNO, that developed into the 
national centre of expertise in plastics.
In the 1960s the sector grew at an extraordinary rate. The Netherlands expanded 
its plastics production capacity so quickly that by the mid-1970s it ranked among 
the top producers worldwide.33 Domestic consumption rose from 1.7 kg per inhabit-
ant in 1950, to 9.1 kg in 1960, to 35 kg in 1971.34 The most important market for 
plastics in the 1970s was construction (30%). Products included water conduits, 
gutters, rain pipes, bathroom fixtures, and sinks. A second big category was packag-
ing (23%) such as bags, bottles, crates and shrink-wraps. Then there were several 
smaller market segments among which were transport (6%) especially applications 
in cars; households (5%) with utilitarian objects, decorations and toys. In addition 
there were numerous other markets and application domains, like electronics, 
machine-building, furniture, paints and medicines.
15.2.2  The Plastics Revolution
The career of plastics after the Second World War can justifiably be characterised as 
a revolution. Where plastics were still marginal materials just before the Second 
World War, only 30 years later they had become one of the most prominent materi-
als in the Netherlands. The revolution was caused by, among other things, the 
extremely low oil prices at the time, a raw materials cost-factor that immediately 
made plastics price-competitive with classical materials like wood, metal, cotton 
and wool. Another important factor was the great variety of plastics – each with its 
own functionality.35 What also made plastics so attractive was the promise of 
33 Production of plastics per capita in various countries in 1963 and 1975 (kg).
Production (kg/cap) 1963 Estimated production (kg/cap) 
1975
West-Germany 24.3 78





34 Initially this was significantly less than the average American, the largest user of plastics. The 
difference between America and the Netherlands (and other Western European countries) dimin-
ished in the course of the 1950s. Around 1970 Germany would become the largest user with 62 kg 
per year per capita.
35 F. Van der Most, F.V. Homburg, E. Hooghoff and A. Van Selm, ‘Nieuwe synthetische producten: 
plastics en wasmiddelen na de Tweede Wereldoorlog’, in J.W. Schot, H.W. Lintsen, A. Rip and 
A.A. Albert de la Bruhèze (eds.), Techniek in Nederland in de Twintigste Eeuw – deel II (Zutphen 
2000), 364.
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 mass- production, the possibility of imitation and the allure of modernity. Growing 
welfare did the rest.
Crockery, statues, medals, chains, dolls and a cornucopia of consumer articles 
could be produced cheaply and en masse. These kinds of products were formerly 
made of wood, leather, glass, earthenware, metal or ivory. And components of dura-
ble products like cupboards, tables and chairs could be made of plastic or treated 
with synthetic paints. Dresses, shirts, socks and other clothing made of tricot weaves 
could also be fabricated with synthetic fibres. Many products had formerly only 
been affordable for the middle and upper class. Now they came within the reach of 
the working class. And with plastics, modern design also entered the home. Middle 
and upper-class consumers could flaunt their good taste with radio cases of satiny 
black laminates in streamlined forms, elegant tables with shiny plastic surfaces and 
a chrome-plated frame or cast plastic clocks of eccentric design.
Originally, plastic had a bad reputation: a plastic product was cheap junk and of 
poor quality. This improved in the course of time. In the 1960s a plastic product 
stood for ‘strong, hygienic, washable, lightweight, attractively coloured and...a 
pleasant design.’36 Plastic played an essential role in the rise and the shaping of 
consumer society.
15.2.3  Symbol of the Linear Economy
Low production costs also made plastics eminently suitable as packaging material. 
The light weight, the cheap raw materials and the ease with which it could be 
shaped, increasingly caused plastics to be seen as the ideal material for disposable 
packaging.37 This, together with the rise of the self-service store, resulted in increas-
ing use of pre-packaged food products and beverages. Experts in the packaging 
industry stated in 1957: ‘The most important development in cast plastics insofar as 
it relates to packaging is the acceptance of the idea that packaging is made to be 
thrown away.’38
Recycling of rags, rubber, glass and paper declined and more and more material 
was disposed of as waste or burned. In earlier times the Netherlander was careful of 
his possessions and was constantly refurbishing and re-using them. Now there were 
goods that one threw away after using them briefly and only once. The first dispos-
able packaging was made of paper, glass or tinned steel, materials that were increas-
36 G.  Staal, ‘Het wonder, het wantrouwen en de weerstand’, in M.  Boot, A.  Von Graevenitz, 
H. Overduin and G. Staal (eds.), De eerste plastic eeuw: Kunststoffen in het dagelijks leven (Den 
Haag 1981), 22.
37 G. Hawkins, ‘Made to be wasted: PET and topologies of disposability’, in J. Gabrys, G. Hawkins 
and M.  Michael (eds.), Accumulation: The material politics of plastic (London 2013), 49–67; 
J.L. Meikle, ‘Materia Nova: Plastics and Design in the U.S., 1925–1935’, in S. Mossman and 
T. Morris (eds.), The development of plastics (Cambridge 1994).
38 In Hawkins ‘Made to be Wasted’, 5 cited in Lintsen, Hollestelle and Hölsgens, The Plastics 
Revolution, part I.
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ingly replaced by plastic. The consumer society also became a waste society. That 
was a new phenomenon and plastic waste became its symbol.
Until the early 1970s, the debate on plastic waste remained restricted to those 
processing the waste. Between 1950 and 1970 the volume of household waste per 
inhabitant doubled. In 1972 the four main waste categories in weight and volume 
were vegetable, fruit and garden waste (GFT), paper, glass and plastics. Despite 
their as yet brief presence in Dutch households, in 1972 about 12 kg of plastic was 
thrown out per household. That amounted to a volume of about 234 litres (see 
Table 15.3).
It became more and more difficult to turn the garbage into compost. The increas-
ing glut of materials like glass, paper and plastics that decomposed only with diffi-
culty, if at all, forced waste processors to switch to new methods. The new 
composition of municipal wastes increased their caloric value, causing many 
municipalities to consider investments in waste incinerators.39 This appeared to 
solve the spatial aspect of the growing waste burden. The problem went up in smoke, 
at least partly. A fine solution, so it seemed, but certainly one that fits in with a linear 
production and consumption chain. With the advent of plastics the circular economy 
became ever more distant.
15.3  Dark Clouds Gather Above Well-being and the Human 
Environment
15.3.1  The ‘Super Pipe’
On September 26, 1965, the under-minister of social affairs and public health cere-
monially rammed the first of 196 piles into the ground that would serve as a founda-
tion for the ‘Super Pipe,’ a 213 meter-high smokestack at the Shell refinery complex 
at Pernis. The smokestack was completed in 1968 and was part of the fight against 
air pollution. Twenty-five processing units were connected to the smokestack that 
39 W. van Dieren, Een grondige zaak: 50 jaar vuilafvoermaatschappij VAM, 1929–1979 (Amsterdam 
1979), 131–36.
Table 15.3 Household waste in the Netherlands in 1972
Veg.Fruit & Garden (GFT) Paper Plastics Glass Ferro Textile
Specific gravity: kg/m3 300 120 50 300 400 250
in million kg 1,534 800 156 348 100 66
in million m3 5.1 6.7 3.1 1.2 0.2 0.3
per household
in kg 116 60 12 26 7 5
in liters 385 503 234 87 19 20
Processed data of CBS – Composition of Household Waste, 1940–2011
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could dispose of 1000 m3 of waste gasses per second. Not without a touch of pride, 
Shell refinery engineers announced in 1969 that since the smokestack had come on 
line,
it has become necessary to install more sensitive apparatus in the Shell monitoring stations 
in order to measure sulphur dioxide concentrations [...] We have tried to follow the cloud 
with a mobile laboratory. Despite all our efforts it has proved impossible to define the loca-
tion where the cloud touches the ground. Nothing remains of the sulphur-dioxide concen-
trations after the cloud has travelled several kilometres in the higher air layers.40
Air pollution problems seemed to have dissolved, literally and figuratively. It might 
have seemed surprising that an under-minister of public health should have per-
formed the start-up ceremony at the Shell refinery. From a present-day perspective 
the ‘Super Pipe’ is certainly in no way a solution for air pollution. The presence of 
the under-minister shows that at that time air pollution was seen as a public health 
issue.
Urban liveability and environmental problems belonged to the most important 
political and societal topics at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. 
Local groups of experts called attention to the issue. They mobilised local residents 
and journalists. New political currents politicised the environmental issues.41
This was the context in which environmental legislation around surface water 
(1970) and air pollution (1972) was passed. This raises various questions. How seri-
ous was air pollution? How did different groups throughout the twentieth century 
look upon air pollution and what conclusions and interventions followed? We shall 
attempt to answer these questions in the following section. We start with the last 
question.
40 Reports on the ‘Super Pipe’ in: ´Tegen de luchtvervuiling: Reuzentoren voor Shell in Pernis´ in 
De Telegraaf 28 februari 1964; ´Eerste paal voor Superpijp van Shell´ in Gereformeerd Gezinsblad 
27 september 1965 and citation from Henk Thonen ‘Vuilstort’der Staatmiijnen ook nog onder raf-
finaderij wolken´ in Limburgs Dagblad, 11 oktober 1969. Furthermore F.V. Homburg, A. Selm, 
and P.F.G. Vincken, ‘Industrialisatie en industrie-complexen: De chemische industrie tussen over-
heid, technologie en markt’, in J.W. Schot, H.W. Lintsen, A. Rip and A.A. Albert de la Bruhèze 
(eds.), Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw – deel II (Zutphen 2000),. 376–401.
41 Top 5 problems according to survey of Dutch voters
1967 1971 1972 1977
Unemployment 29 3 11 57
Housing shortage 21 28 15 6
Environment 1 22 18 4
Political 
Problems
11 4 12 3
Income and 
Prices
8 7 15 7
From Aarts 1989 Cited in H.T. Siraa, A.J. van der Valk, and W.L. Wissink, Met het oog op de 
omgeving: Het Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, 1965–
1995 (Den Haag, 1995), 234.
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15.3.2  Polluted Air as a Nuisance
For centuries local authorities issued regulations to limit water and air pollution 
seen as a nuisance and a threat to health. These rules were aimed at perceptible pol-
lution, i.e. pollution that you could see and smell. In 1896, the various regulations 
were nationally integrated into the form of the Nuisance Law. This law was intended 
to prevent nuisance and dangers caused by industrial activities, for example explo-
sions, poisoning of water and polluted air.42 Stench, smoke, soot and ash were the 
directly perceptible components of air pollution. The measures prescribed in the 
Nuisance Law aimed at these components, such as zoning for smelly enterprises 
like slaughterhouses, tanneries and steam-powered factories.
In 1905, the minister of Agriculture, Industry and Trade contacted the executive 
board of the Society for Industry (Maatschappij van Nijverheid) in order to discuss 
possible new articles in the Nuisance Law ‘against smoking factory chimneys.’ 
Inspired by German and British examples, the industrialists advocated the promo-
tion of ‘economic steam production,’ whereby thanks to total combustion less soot 
was produced. The consultation led neither to the subsidized stokers’ courses advo-
cated by the industrialists nor to new rules. On the minister’s advice the Society for 
Industry founded the Association for the Promotion of Smoke-free Stoking. This ‘in 
order to combat smoke formation by factory chimneys on our own power.’43 In 1910 
the association counted 54 members responsible for 244 boilers. In that year the 
association merged with the Netherlands Association against Water Pollution to 
form the Netherlands Association against Water, Soil and Air Pollution. The mem-
bers of the association included industrialists, but also public health inspectors and 
representatives of public works and municipal utilities. The association emphasized 
that it was not ‘hostile’ or ‘less sympathetic’ to the interests of agriculture and 
industry. The universal interest in clean air, water and soil had to be achieved by 
mutual consultation and enlightenment.44
Water pollution was the dominant topic in the association’s journal, Water, Soil, 
Air. The sporadic articles on air pollution were largely accounts of British and 
German research into the effects of coal combustion. Smoke was seen as a danger 
to health chiefly in closed spaces and in cases of direct inhalation of soot clouds. 
Municipal health services investigated the effluents of specific factories after com-
plaints by nearby residents. Incidental investigations were carried on in cooperation 
with research institutes like agricultural experimental stations and the Central 
42 T. J. Dijkstra, Het bezwaar: De beleving van leefomgevingshinder in de periode 1870–2000 in de 
Friese havenstad Harlingen (Groningen 2006), 54–58.; E.M.T. Beenakkers, Aandacht van de over-
heid voor bodembescherming: Sinds wanneer? (Den Haag 1991), 7–15.; Siraa, van der Valk, and 
Wissink, Met het oog op de omgeving, 230–233.
43 J. de Kuijser, ‘Mededeelingen betreffende de vereeniging tot bevordering van rookvrij stoken’ in 
Water Bodem, Lucht, vol 1. 1910–1911, p. 7–10
44 Redactie, ‘De Oprichting Der Vereeniging´ in Water, Bodem Lucht, 1(1910–1911), 19–20; see 
also H. van der Windt, ‘De Totstandkoming van ´de Natuurbescherming´ in Nederland,’ Tijdschrift 
Voor Geschiedenis 107(3) (1994): 485–507.
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Laboratory for Public Health, founded in 1909. The solution was found in optimiz-
ing the combustion of coal and diluting the smoke concentration. Given the right 
chimney-height the latter could be achieved and this, most critics agreed, solved the 
problems.45
15.3.3  A National Monitoring Network for Air Pollution
In December 1930 sixty-three people died in a deadly fog in the Meuse Valley town 
of Engis in Wallonia (Belgium). Immediately after the disaster, it was speculated 
that poisonous chemicals were to blame. Subsequent investigation showed the 
disaster was the result of serious air pollution. This conclusion caused hardly a rip-
ple in the Netherlands, despite the participation of the Leiden physician, Willem 
Storm van Leeuwen, in the investigation. Air pollution  – as the reports of the 
Association against Water, Soil and Air Pollution attest – was a foreign problem 
especially in the industrialised areas of Germany, England and Belgium. In those 
regions, for the time being, no measures were being taken to curb pollution.46
In medical circles there was, however, concern about air pollution and conse-
quences for labour and public health. In the Netherlands, the inspector of public 
health, M.J.N. Schuursma, spoke out about the dangers of air pollution.
Air pollution due to smoke, exhaust gases and condensation nuclei are prevalent where 
there are large concentrations of industry and can produce irritation and danger. As indus-
trialisation increases it is desirable to pay attention to this matter.’47
In 1948, the city of Rotterdam established a commission for Soil, Water and Air. In 
the 1950s this body investigated excessive quantities of fluoride and sulphur- dioxide 
in the region’s atmosphere caused by artificial fertiliser factories, electrical power 
plants and oil refineries. On the basis of data from 18 air-quality measurement sta-
tions, the commission was able for the first time in the Netherlands to chart the 
geographical dispersion of pollution.
London’s ‘Great Smog’ of December 1952 gave an extra impulse to the public 
health aspects and encouraged a more integral approach to pollution. Medical 
research concluded that about 4000 people died as a result of the smog. In Great 
Britain the event led to the making of new laws on air pollution that came into force 
in 1956. The legislation focused not only on industry, but also on the use of coal in 
domestic stoves and cooking stoves. In the Netherlands too, investigations focused 
45 Redactie, ‘Luchtverontreininging door eene loodaschbranderij’ in Water Bodem, Lucht, 5(1915), 
89–91; J. De Kuijser, ‘Luchtverontreininging en hinderwet aangelegenheden’, in Water Bodem, 
Lucht, 6(1916), 45–56 and E. Buijsman, Er zij een meetnet...: Een geillustreerde geschiedenis van 
het luchtmeetnet van het RIV(M) (Bilthoven 2003), 18–19.
46 B. Nemery, P.H.M. Hoet, A. Nemmar, ‘The Muese Valley fog of 1930: an air pollution disaster’, 
in The Lancet, Vol. 357, (2001); Redactie, ‘Mist in het Maasdal’ in Water, Bodem, Lucht 21(1931), 
8–9; E. Buijsman, ‘De Moordende Mist: De Ramp in Maasvallei bij Luik in 1930 (Houten 2010).
47 Buijsman, Er zij een meetnet, 20–21.
F. Veraart et al.
347
more explicitly on regions rather than on specific industrial plants. Rotterdam was a 
prime example of a region with a high concentration of industry and was the first 
municipality to focus attention on the regional situation. In 1953 TNO followed in 
Rotterdam’s footsteps, investigating pollution in the environs of the Hoogovens. In 
1956 the National Institute for Public Health (RIV) started investigations into air 
pollution around the State Mines in Limburg and in Amsterdam’s harbour area.48
The measurements showed an extremely high level of air pollution. Scientists 
began to use ever more forceful terminology. In 1958, prof. W.F.J.M Krul, chairman 
of TNO’s Institute for Health Technology, stated that the future habitability of the 
‘Randstad Holland will depend in large measure on whether the technical and eco-
nomic problems of air pollution will admit of a solution.’49 But according to the 
minister of Social Affairs and Public Health:
... the air pollution is [...] not so serious, that it endangers public health...According to the 
National Weather Service (KNMI) the Netherlands does not have to fear for inversions such 
as those that in combination with a number of other factors cause London “smog”.50
But in January 1959 and December 1962 Rotterdam suffered ‘winter smog’ under 
the influence of the polluted air. This added fuel to the fire in the debate among 
scientists, politicians and policy makers, a debate that now found its way to the 
pages of the public media. The research focused on the health effects of air pollu-
tion. The Rotterdam Commission for Soil, Water and Air registered a slight increase 
in mortality rates, hospitalisations and sick-leave, but did not consider the situation 
alarming. It concluded that air pollution still ‘played an insignificant role compared 
to sickness and mortality associated with traffic accidents, poor nutritional habits, 
substandard housing and spoiled food.’ And other research that focused especially 
on the increase in lung cancer concluded that explanations should be sought in 
smoking, rather than in polluted air.51 Public review of the various investigations 
expressed increasing concern about air pollution. The unease was not quelled, 
despite the soothing conclusions. Protest groups like the Society against Air 
Pollution in and around the New Waterway (1963) and the Committee for the 
Habitability of the Waterway Region (1968) became the protagonists of the dissat-
isfaction. Municipal politicians, scientists and local experts took the initiative. The 
local groups continued to demand attention for liveability and environmental issues.
48 E. Buijsman, Een geannoteerd overzicht van publicaties over chemische samenstelling van lucht 
en neerslag in Nederland (Houten 2011), 10.
49 Cited in J.W.Tesch ‘Volksgezondheidsaspecten van luchtverontreiniging’ in Water Bodem, 
Lucht, 50(1960), 44.
50 ‘Verslag van het mondelinge overleg betreffende afdeling VII (Volksgezondheid)’, Rijksbegroting 
voor het dienstjaar 1960, Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, zitting 1959–1960, Kamerstuk 
Tweede Kamer 1959–1960 kamerstuknummer 5700 XII ondernummer 19, p. 17–18.
51 ‘Uit Rotterdams rapport blijkt: Sterke luchtverontreiniging werkt ziekte in de hand- Lichte toe-
name sterfgevallen tijdens zware mist’, in De Waarheid, 25 april 1984, p. 3; ‘Dr. Bierstekers ver-
rast in proefschrift: Verontreinigde lucht zo gevaarlijk nog niet.’ in De Tijd, dagblad voor 
Nederland, 30–6-1966, p.5.
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In 1963 the government moved to appoint a Council on Air Pollution. A year 
later it produced a draft law on air pollution. The law was ratified in 1970 and came 
into force a year later. It coupled the air pollution of emissions to specific limiting 
values. The limit value was defined as that point where emissions ‘can negatively 
affect human health or create a nuisance for humans, or cause damage to animals, 
plants or goods.’52 The law was a so-called framework law. General Administrative 
Ordinances were to fill in the further details.
The new regulative structure was thus impossible without knowledge of air qual-
ity. In 1965 the ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health consulted with experts 
in the Inspectorate of Environmental Hygiene, Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute 
(KNMI), TNO and RIV (National Institute for Public Health). These talks resulted 
in a number of investigations and a design for a national air quality monitoring net-
work. The RIV was assigned the task of realising a completely automated measure-
ment network. By 1967, in cooperation with the KNMI, TNO and Philips, it had a 
test network up and running in Twente. Automation placed new demands on the 
measurement system and the processing of the data. The first automated piece of 
apparatus was a sulphur-dioxide monitor designed in part by Philips. While experts 
realised that other substances were also relevant for determining the level of air pol-
lution, sulphur-dioxide levels thus became the benchmark for air quality. The first 
fully automated measurement network, using so called ‘sniffing poles’ to monitor 
air quality, was set up in 1969 in Rotterdam’s harbour region at the behest of local 
health services and the Rijnmond Regional Authority (Openbaar Lichaam 
Rijnmond). Provinces and municipalities got involved in the plans for a national 
monitoring network. In November 1970 the under-minister of public health granted 
approval. In 1975 a national air-quality monitoring network was completed.53
15.3.4  The Overture to New Sustainability Problems
During the 1960s for the first time an overall picture of the national diffusion of air 
pollution became available. How serious was air pollution? The measurements 
focused on two important components: sulphur-dioxide (SO2) and so-called ‘black 
smoke,’ dust particles smaller than four microns. Both substances were related to 
the combustion of coal, the customary fuel in industry and households. The concen-
tration of sulphur-dioxide was measured by means of sampling and chemical analy-
sis, that of black smoke by means of filtration techniques.
The first investigations focused on problems around specific factories and on 
extreme situations such as the smog episodes in the winters of 1952 and 1962. The 
52 Cited in and translated from: G.H. Dinkelman, Verzuring en broeikaseffect: De wisselwerking 
tussen problemen en oplossingen in het Nederlandse luchtverontreinigingsbeleid (1970–1994) 
(Amsterdam 1995), 36.
53 Buijsman, Er zij een meetnet., 13–75; E. Buijsman, ‘Van mosterdgas naar zwaveldioxide: Over 
de oorsprong van de eerste zwaveldioxidemonitor,’ Studium 3(8) (2015),159–62.
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measurements showed that the sulphur-dioxide levels at Rotterdam in 1962 began 
to approach those of the Big Smog in London 10 years earlier (Table 15.4).
Systematic measurements dating from the 1960s revealed high concentrations of 
sulphur dioxide and ‘black smoke.’ The concentrations of both substances declined 
after the mid-1960s (Graph 15.3). The transition from coal to natural gas had benefi-
cial side-effects. The switch liberated the Netherlands from the strongly polluting 
coal fumes in the cities and the surrounding industrial parks. The heyday of choking 
air pollution seemed to be definitely on the way out by the end of the 1960s.
The difference in rates of decline between sulphur dioxide and black smoke were 
the first indication of other developments (Graphs 15.3 and 15.4).54 Measurements 
in Utrecht showed that motorised traffic contributed strongly to the presence of dust 
particles (Graph 15.5).55 More research was needed. The need for more data on the 
composition of the air and its consequences for health shaped a new agenda for 
research institutes and policy makers. Local interests groups developed into envi-
ronmental organisations. The new organisations in the ‘societal midfield’ developed 
new strategies to influence public opinion and government. While during the first 
decades after the war, water and air pollution were still dismissed as inevitable col-
lateral consequences of welfare, around 1970 some were concluding that the price 
of this kind of welfare was far too high. New demands on the quality of air, water 
and soil became the overture to the sustainability problems of the following decades.
54 Buijsman, Een geannoteerd overzicht van publicaties over chemische samenstelling van lucht en 
neerslag in Nederland; E.  Buijsman, Meten waar mensen zijn: De ontwikkeling van stedelijke 
luchtkwaliteit in Nederland (Houten 2010).
55 E.  Buijsman, Stof in Nederland: Een reconstructie van historische metingen in Nederland 
(Houten 2010).
Table 15.4 Extreme air pollution in Europe, 1952 and 1962
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) in μg/m3 Smoke (dust) in μg/m3
1952
London (8 Dec) 1800–2000 1200–1500
1962
Rotterdam & Surr. (5 Dec) 1040–1610 160–530
Paris (7 Dec) 840–1260 600–800
Ruhr (6 Dec) 2300–4000 –
London (5 Dec) 1400–4650 1700–4550
Norm 2016
Daily average (max 3 days) 125 (Limit value)
Hourly average (24x p.j.) 350 (Limit value)
Hourly average (3 hours) 500 (Alarm value)
Sources: E. Buijsman, Er Zij een Meetnet..., Een Geillustreerde Geschiedenis van het Luchtmeetnet 
van het RIV(M) (Bilthoven 2003), 38 and F.M.W. de Jong and P.J.C.M.  Jansen, Luchtnormen 
Geordend, (Bilthoven 2010)
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Chapter 16
The Turn of the Tide. Well-being 
and Sustainability Around 1970
Frank Veraart and Harry Lintsen
Abstract Around 1970, welfare and economic growth became increasingly sus-
pect. This chapter analyses and explains how this came about. It provides an inven-
tory of the driving forces and institutional frameworks that shaped the development 
of well-being. In the period 1910–1970 the government energetically pursued the 
building of the welfare state. It was supported in this endeavour by a radically pil-
larised societal midfield. The economy was also under the tutelage of a dirigiste 
government. The six large Dutch multinationals generally supported the govern-
ment’s ambitions regarding the development of well-being. Characteristic for this 
period was the development of new patterns of consumption and a linear economy. 
Thanks to the mutual alignment among government, midfield and private enterprise 
it seemed possible to make well-being.
The monitor is used to evaluate the state of well-being around 1970 from three 
perspectives. Viewed from the perspective of 1910, the monitor shows how the orig-
inal agenda was realised. But when viewed through the lens of the new societal 
visions of 1970, an entirely different image emerges. The increase in welfare had 
been achieved at the cost of serious environmental pollution and the loss of nature 
in both the Netherlands and elsewhere. The mounting criticism of the dark side of 
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well-being introduced a period in which ecology, natural resources, energy and cli-
mate change received emphatic attention (see Chaps. 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21). From 
the perspective of 2010 the situation had indeed become serious. In retrospect it 
appeared that around 1960 welfare, well-being and sustainability were most in 
balance.
Keywords Government · Midfield · Private enterprise · Welfare state · Linear 
economy · Monitor · Trade-off
16.1  Aldrin, Dieldrin, Eldrin en Telodrin: Blessing  
or a Shady Business?
In the Netherlands populations of various bird species (have) gone downhill at a tremen-
dous rate. The decline of the sandwich terns on the island Griend from 40,000 pairs around 
1955 to at present maximum 700 pairs is very likely partly due to serious pollution of the 
North Sea and the Wadden Sea with herbicides and pesticides… This pollution is mainly 
due to wastewater from chemical firms along the New Waterway…The feeding grounds of 
the sandwich terns are located a few hundred kilometers away from the factories that emit 
the poisonous wastewater. Nonetheless seaweed and plankton have been poisoned, and the 
fish that ate these organisms, and the birds that ate the fish. The 1962 Law on Herbicides 
and Pesticides that came into force in 1964 gives the government new possibilities to 
intervene…1
The Shell facility at Pernis, in the Rotterdam Harbour, was one of the world’s fore-
most producers of pesticides. Its pesticides Aldrin, Dieldrin, Eldrin and Telodrin 
were held responsible for the massive bird mortality. In 1967 the toxicological divi-
sion of the company invited the national press to a press-conference and a visit to 
the British Shell laboratory at Sittingbourne. In the conservative newspaper, De 
Telegraaf, Shell experts responded to the claims of what they called ‘emotionally 
moved’ alarmed individuals.
Today 12,000 people in the world will die of hunger…and over the entire year an estimated 
1.3 million. That is an awful reality…The world is on the threshold of the biggest famine in 
her history…In order to feed the 6 billion inhabitants of this globe, three times more food 
has to be provided than is now produced…the yield of every square meter of arable land 
(must) be maximized to the fullest extent possible. And according to the insecticide experts 
this is only possible if the production of these pesticides – in the eyes of the public often 
regarded as shady substances  – is significantly increased…Unfortunately several recent 
catastrophes  – massive local bird mortality in England and Drenthe  – have made the 
conservation- minded public wary and distrustful, which according to insecticide producers 
1 B. Bruins, ‘We veranderen de wereld.. met chemische vergiften’ in Het vrije volk: democratisch-
socialistisch dagblad (5-8-1967), 4.
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is lamentable because it is precisely the responsible substance Dieldrin, as well as Aldrin 
and DDT, that have over the course of years contributed so frightfully much to combating 
world hunger… And as far as bird mortality goes, however lamentable that may be, it pales 
into insignificance compared to the number of birds that are daily crushed by motorists on 
European highways.2
The debate between the critics of pesticides, who, following Rachel Carson, feared 
for the poisoning of humans and nature and the proponents from industry and agri-
culture was framed as the ‘pesticide paradox.’ It was presented as a dilemma of 
local environmental protection versus global food production, the offering that had 
to be brought to mitigate the famines in the world. In the background, of course, 
there were the interests of Shell, the significance of the agrarian sector, and jobs in 
the Netherlands.
Shell’s charm-offensive was intended to temper the ever-growing criticism of 
environmental pollution. By the late 1960s Dutch industries were ever more insis-
tently being held responsible for air and water pollution and the degradation of the 
environment. The ‘pesticide paradox’ was a typical outcome of vested ambitions 
and new choices in well-being by governments, the societal mid-field, firms and 
researchers. In this chapter we will first of all chart the different ambitions in their 
institutional contexts. After that we take a look at the monitor for 1970. We look at 
which ambitions were realised, which new problems were articulated and who artic-
ulated the problems. Wat does this analysis portend for well-being and sustainabil-
ity after 1970? New demands, concerns and norms informed new challenges. To 
conclude, we examine well-being in 1970 in the light of present-day norms. How 
rosy or how threatening was the situation?
16.2  Synergetic Dynamics: Government, Citizens, 
Researchers and Entrepreneurs
16.2.1  Government – Makeable Well-being
The First World War was in numerous respects the starting point for new institutional 
relationships in the Netherlands. Under pressure of the wartime situation, the political 
‘pacification’ was achieved. Crucial disputes like universal suffrage were resolved and 
with the first general elections the relationships among the political parties were deter-
mined for many years. The confessional parties would long dominate both parliament 
and the government. The socialists and the liberals were constantly frustrated by their 
power. In the big cities the socialist parties also took part in local government.3
2 A. Huguenot van der Linden, ‘Landbouw legt het af tegen groei van wereldbevolking als gewas 
niet wordt beschermd’ in De Telegraaf (29-07-1967). H.G.S. van Raalte was since 1964 employed 
at Shell’s Toxological Division. S. Howarth and J. Jonker, Powering the Hydrocarbon Revolution, 
1939–1973 (New York 2007), 401.
3 P. de Rooy, Ons stipje op de waereldkaart: De politieke cultuur van modern Nederland 
(Amsterdam 2014), 151–73.
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The government, as it had for years in the past, pursued a welfare state. Economic 
growth was the basis of national well-being. In the nineteenth century, the govern-
ment tried to encourage this by investing in infrastructure. This policy was contin-
ued into the twentieth century. The national government, province and municipalities 
all constructed roads. The provinces invested in provincial electrical networks. In 
the end the national government managed the telephone network et cetera. Education 
was also a domain in which various governments kept a finger in the pie and that 
began to consume a major part of the national budget in the twentieth century. A 
new phenomenon was the influence of the national government on flows of raw 
materials and on land-management. At the end of the nineteenth century it inter-
vened in agriculture, founded the State Forest Service in 1899, underwrote the 
Hoogovens in 1920 and concerned itself with local conflicts around the mining of 
marl, gravel and clay. The national government developed an elaborate (but shift-
ing) set of instruments to regulate and stabilize flows of raw materials and more 
generic economic processes.
Also new was the fact that the state, besides wanting to be a welfare state, now 
also had the ambition to become a ‘caring-state.’ That had already become visible 
prior to the First World War in its concern for the so-called ‘social question.’ It com-
miserated with the fate of the poor, the workers and the vulnerable ill with the 
Housing Law (1901), the Accident Law (1901) and the Invalidity Law (1913). These 
laws were followed by, among others, the Unemployment Act (1917), the Illness 
Law (1930), mandatory socialized health insurance (1941) and a series of laws 
passed after the Second World War: the Emergency Law Old Age Assistance (1946), 
followed 10 years later by the General Old Age Law (AOW), the General Widows 
and Orphans Law (1959) and the Unemployment Assistance Law (1964). The finale 
was the General Welfare Law that came into force in 1965. With this latter law the 
government absolutely replaced private initiatives in caring for the poor. Poor relief 
was no longer a question of charity; it now became a right and a duty for municipal 
governments to provide support.4 The ‘caring state’ had now definitively been 
founded.
Finally, the state had an age-old task in the domain of public works and, most 
crucially, water management. In the twentieth century this particularly Dutch aspect 
of well-being once again demanded important investments. The Zuiderzee Works 
(1918) and the Delta Works (1953) were the most impressive national projects. The 
provinces, water boards and municipalities also undertook a wide range of projects 
aimed at reducing the vulnerability of the Dutch delta.
The state’s political ambitions were revealed in the formation of new ministries 
and the allocation of the government budget. In 1910 the ministry of Public Works, 
the ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade and the ministry of Internal Affairs 
were active in the expansion of well-being. The latter ministry included budgets for 
education, public health and social affairs. The costs of these ministries accounted 
for about 40% of the total government budget. This share grew to about 50% in the 
interbellum and again after 1960. In 1918 a new ministry of Education, Art and 
4 K. Schuyt and E. Taverne, 1950: Welvaart in zwart wit (Den Haag 2000), 288–306.
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Sciences was called into being. In that same year the ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Agriculture founded a department for Labour, which blossomed into the ministry of 
Social Affairs in 1933. After the Second World War the new ministries of 
Reconstruction and Public Housing, Transport and Public Works, and Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food Supply underscored the new agenda of the Dutch government. 
In 1951 government dedication to public health crystallized in a new ministry of 
Social Affairs and Public Health.
Alongside the expansion of the governmental apparatus, budgets increased for 
policy domains like education, social affairs, infrastructure, public housing and 
public health.5 State expenditures increased from a few tens just after the First World 
War to nearly a hundred euros per inhabitant at the end of the 1930s. After the 
Second World War government spending again increased steadily (Graph 16.1). 
These expenditures also began to comprise an ever larger share of the national econ-
omy. The share of government spending in the national economy rose from less than 
10% at the outset of the twentieth century to more than 40% around 1980.6
The steadily growing government intervention was partly the consequence of 
external crises. Two wars, the Great Depression, and reconstruction cleared the 
way for new perceptions of the role of government. But these perceptions required 
support among the population at large as well as among specific societal groups. 
5 Handelingen Tweede Kamer, ‘Nota betreffende den toestand van ‘s lands financiën’ 20 september 
1920. Via www.rijksbegroting.nl/algemeen/rijksbegroting/archief (1910).
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Graph 16.1 Government Finances, expenditures and income in euro per inhabitant, 1900–1970
Source: CBS – Rijksfinanciën vanaf 1900
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Hence, after the Second World War there was clear social support for a dirigiste 
role for government. The first questionnaires circulated by the Netherlands Institute 
for Public Opinion (NIPO), founded in 1946, included the question ‘What should 
the government tackle first?’ The results showed that according to the population, 
the government should take the lead in seeing to it that primary needs were met: 
food, housing and sufficient income.7 But even more important was support from 
specific social groups and associations. These articulated social needs, represented 
their constituencies in politics and possessed the means to exert influence. It then 
appears that the solid anchoring of politics and the government in the ‘societal 
midfield’ was decisive for the success of government policy with respect to well-
being. But in precisely that anchorage lay the seeds of new problems around well-
being and sustainability.
16.2.2  The Exalted ‘Mid-Field’
In the period between 1910 and 1970 the ‘societal midfield,’ the complex of non- 
governmental associations based on shared interests and religious convictions, 
became increasingly densely populated. Confessional groups as well as socialists 
organised themselves in countless organizations and institutions. Thanks to their 
supremacy at national and municipal levels they were able to direct significant sub-
sidies to their own organizations; this enabled them to engage in all kinds of social 
services: aid to the poor, the construction of public housing, public health and edu-
cation. Though it was true that the Welfare Law of 1965 had compelled confessional 
groups to surrender their dominance in the fight against poverty to municipalities, 
other aspects of well-being surfaced in its stead. There were short and direct con-
nections to the political parties. Pressure on the government and the public admin-
istration was severe. The pillarised mid-field co-authored the legal framework for 
well-being or lent its support to such efforts. It was also able to influence what was 
to count as well-being.
It should not be supposed, however, that the mid-field was composed only of the 
‘pillars.’ Quite the contrary. The economic domain, for example, was also populated 
by a variety of branch organisations.8 During the first half of the nineteenth century 
the Netherlands had seen the rise of a number of agricultural organizations. These 
would become more numerous (in part via the fragmenting effects of the pillars), 
would dissolve into a network of governmental organisations, knowledge institutes 
and enterprises and in this way eventually come to be known as the ‘green front.’ 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, other economic domains sprouted interest 
7 The Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion (NIPO) was founded in 1946, with the aim of col-
lecting information on opinions among the populace as an aid to government. J.C.H Blom, Crisis, 
bezetting en herstel: Tien studies over Nederland, 1930–1950 (Rotterdam 1989), 184–90.
8 B. Bouwens and J. Dankers, Tussen concurrentie en concentratie. Belangenorganisaties, kartels, 
fusies en overnames (Amsterdam 2010), 54–57.
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and lobby groups of building contractors, butchers, bakers, carpenters and other 
‘petit-bourgeois’ groups. These began locally and were often the basis for national, 
partly pillarised, organisations. During the First World War they became more 
numerous. In 1907 the ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade counted 35 
national and 307 local organisations. After the war their number increased to no less 
than 337 national and 1329 local organisations. They were in the first place interest 
groups of entrepreneurs seeking to limit competition among themselves, to offer 
courses to their members, to exchange information about innovation and to lobby 
the government. But they were also harnessed to help solve the social problems of 
their time. During the First World War, for example, the national government 
worked closely with the Bakers’ Union and the Station for Milling and Baking that 
the latter had founded. Due to the flour shortage, they had to formulate norms for 
so-called government wheat, search for flour substitutes and develop alternative 
recipes for baking bread.9 In this way branch organisations became involved in food 
quality, housing construction, working conditions and so on. Increasingly they 
formed a portal for welfare legislation and set themselves up as essential links and 
consultation bureaus. They also began to play an active role in industrialisation 
policy after the Second World War.10
In addition, the mid-field also sported an increasing number of professional soci-
eties that also felt compelled to take some stand on well-being. Accountants, soci-
ologists, home economists, electrical engineers and other professionals organized 
themselves in the first half of the twentieth century around new academic programs 
of study. Their professions were extremely dynamic and in search of social and 
academic recognition. At the end of the nineteenth century, engineers had already 
shown how that could be done. The members of the Association of Civil (later 
Delft) Engineers participated in the debate on the ‘social question’ and loudly pro-
claimed the relevance of their profession in finding solutions. They did the same in 
the course of the debates during the interbellum on the rationalisation of the econ-
omy and the firm.11 They argued that this would provide advantages for the entre-
preneur, the worker and national welfare. Together with accountants and 
psychologists, engineers were the shock troops of the rationalisation movement. 
The movement itself was broader and included politicians, entrepreneurs, leading 
cadres, civil servants, and advisors. They came together in large numbers for the 
first time at the Economising (Efficiency)-Congress in Amsterdam in 1923 and 
organised themselves in the Netherlands Institute for Efficiency, the 
NIVE. Professionals did not exert their influence on politics and policy by way of 
the pillars, as did the confessionals and socialists, but via these kinds of networks. 
The networks of congress organisations, knowledge institutes and laboratories were 
interwoven with ministries, provincial services and municipal organisations.
9 M. Davids, H.W. Lintsen, and A. van Rooij, Innovatie en kennisinfrastructuur: Vele wegen naar 
vernieuwing, vol. 5, Bedrijfsleven in Nederland in de Twintigste Eeuw (Amsterdam 2013), 75–76.
10 Bouwens and Dankers, Tussen concurrentie en concentratie, 158–159.
11 H.W.  Lintsen, Made in Holland: Een techniekgeschiedenis van Nederland [1800–2000] 
(Zutphen 2005), 171–173.
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There was also a category of civil associations not associated with a pillar, eco-
nomic sector or profession, like the tourist organisation ANWB (1883), the 
Association for the Preservation of Natural Monuments (1905), the Netherlands 
Association of Housewives (1912) and the Netherlands Consumer Union (1953). 
These too became more or less involved in defining and ameliorating the quality of 
life. The Netherlands Association of Housewives (NVVH), for example, first pro-
filed itself as a think-tank for labour-saving solutions in the household.12 Together 
with liberal and socialist women’s clubs they took the initiative in finding collective 
solutions for the more tedious aspects of housekeeping. There were, for example, 
experiments with putting the family laundry out to collective laundries and delegat-
ing cooking to collective kitchens. Special housing complexes were designed with 
collective facilities like a space for washing and drying, a bath-house, central heat-
ing, a central waste disposal chute or a central kitchen. These initiatives did not 
survive the experimental phase. In addition, the NVVH concerned itself with the 
quality of household work and household products. Their seal of approval for 
household products: ‘Approved by the NVVH’ was probably the best known of all. 
In essence the NVVH was still an old-fashioned status organisation, because it fur-
thered the interests especially of middle-class ‘petit bourgeois’ women.
These civil associations had varying kinds of influence. The ANWB fought for 
highways and found strong partners in the Royal Institute of Engineers and the 
Rijkswaterstaat (the national public works agency). Hence the organisation was 
allowed a finger in the pie of the National Road Plan of 1928. Contrariwise, nature 
associations were hardly able to make a dent in the land consolidation projects that 
were carried out on a large scale. Nature conservation and environmental problems 
were neither big issues for the government nor in politics more generally. Despite 
this, the civil associations concerned with this issue did score regular, if small, suc-
cesses. The occasion was more often than not a local problem that was taken up by 
a local interest group. In 1925, for example, the Natural History Society in Limburg 
protested against marl mining that threatened to consume the local hill, the Sint 
Pietersberg, a stance that led to the amendment of the permit. Similarly, protests 
against gravel dredging in Limburg led to the Excavation Law of 1965. Disquiet 
among Rotterdam’s population concerning air pollution was articulated by the 
Association against Air Pollution in and around the New Waterway (1963) and the 
Committee for Habitability of the Waterway Region (1968). These organisations 
mobilized political pressure, resulting in the 1970 Law on Air Pollution. Nature 
conservation and environmental organisations had to look for support to the ‘pil-
lars,’ that had access to the political parties, or to the professionals with their net-
works in the state apparatus. They were the part of the ‘mid-field’ that made the 
‘pillarised’ and ‘professional’ Netherlands receptive to environmental issues and 
nature conservation and that paved the way for the big debate on sustainability that 
welled up at the end of the 1960s.
12 R. Oldenziel, ‘Het ontstaan van het moderne huishouden: toevalstreffers en valse starts, 1890–
1918’, in: J.W. Schot, H.W. Lintsen, A. Rip en A. Albert de la Bruhèze (eds.), Techniek in Nederland 
in de twintigste eeuw (Zutphen 2001), deel IV, 41–41.
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16.2.3  Research for Well-being
The ‘professional’ Netherlands, that is to say, the higher and academically educated 
part of the Dutch population with their professional associations, was tightly bound 
to the modern knowledge infrastructure whose foundations were laid in the First 
World War. We focus here on the laboratory, that became the icon of the production 
of innovations and well-being during the interbellum. The laboratory became the 
place where research was done on resources and materials and where experiments 
were performed on new products and processes. To be sure, innovations still origi-
nated on the work floor, in workshops, by dint of the efforts of inventive entrepre-
neurs and entrepreneurial inventors, but the laboratory was the modern route. As far 
as we know, there were at least 500 laboratories in the Netherlands around 1940, of 
which about 31% at the universities, 30% in (semi-) government agencies, and 19% 
in industry. The rest was private or was run by an association or foundation.13 The 
1932 founding of Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), 
the central government laboratories, was an important decision. After a difficult 
start, this organisation eventually developed into the biggest public research insti-
tute in the Netherlands. In 1965, TNO had four branches: the Industrial Organisation 
TNO, the Health Organisation TNO, the Nutrition Organisation TNO and the 
National Defence Organisation TNO with all told nearly 40 research institutes.14 
The Industrial Organisation with 24 institutes was the biggest branch. TNO was a 
cooperative research organisation, an alliance among the government, industry and 
the ‘professional’ Netherlands. Ministerial functionaries, members of sector- 
organisations and researchers at the (technical) universities were well-represented 
in all the managerial and consultative organs of TNO. They drew up the collective 
research agendas. The government and industry financed the research.
Some of the laboratories were dedicated to research and development. This was 
especially the case for the industrial laboratories. These labs produced a stream of 
innovative prototypes, including electron tubes, margarines, radios, plastics, chemi-
cal insecticides and pesticides, industrial automatons and artificial fibres. The 
(semi-) governmental laboratories also contributed to this stream. For example, the 
agricultural test stations investigated the use of artificial fertilizer and the tillage of 
vegetables. TNO operated in numerous fields and among other things developed 
new plastics, analysed the behaviour of building constructions, searched for better 
vaccines and investigated conservation techniques. In addition to research and 
development the laboratories also dedicated themselves to the important task of 
testing and evaluating. They developed testing methods, designed standards of qual-
ity, collected data on the quality of raw materials, semi-finished products and end- 
products and evaluated production processes and products.
The researchers contributed to paving the way for a modern economy, one in 
which the electro-technical and chemical industries were dominant and in which all 
13 Davids, Lintsen en Van Rooij, Innovatie en kennisinfrastructuur, 100–102.
14 H.W. Lintsen (eds.), Tachtig jaar TNO (Delft 2012), 29.
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sectors were suffused with the new principles of efficiency and rationality. They 
were also partly the trailblazers of the consumer society and experimented with new 
services like the telephone and electricity as well as with an enormous potential in 
new consumer goods like vacuum cleaners, washing machines, electric irons, radios 
and plastic toys. Between the two world wars, parts of the middle class garnered 
experience with these new commodities. After the Second World War the new con-
sumer goods became available to the masses.
The researchers were also deeply involved in aspects of well-being and the con-
struction of the caring state. TNO made especially important contributions. The 
Industrial Organisation TNO investigated the quantitative aspects of public housing 
construction (rate of production, costs of production and labour productivity) as 
well as the qualitative aspects (problems with moisture, frost damage, thermal resis-
tance etc.).15 The Health Organisation TNO worked on public health, for example 
the relation between personal health, housing, work and the environment (soil, 
water and air).16 The Nutrition Organization TNO analysed, among other topics, the 
main components of food like carbohydrates, proteins, vitamins, minerals, fats and 
fibres. The results were used to produce nutritional charts.17 Research and testing by 
TNO often led to norms for working conditions, housing quality, fire safety, food 
quality and food safety.
In the 1960s the researchers became ever more involved in environmental prob-
lems. Knowledge of air, soil and water pollution would in large measure come to 
shape the debate on environmental problems. New measuring instruments increased 
the accuracy with which it was possible to chart both old types of pollution and 
newly discovered ones. Politicians and policy-makers mobilized researchers to 
define problems, establish norms and provide solutions.
16.2.4  The Linear Economy
By the 1960s economic developments had finally ushered in the welfare state. That 
followed on several violent shocks: two world wars and an economic recession. 
After the Second World War, the economy stabilised and grew rapidly. Economic 
historians qualify the period as an economic wonder. It signified the definitive break-
through of welfare for the vast majority of the population. Some see its origins in the 
favourable development of the world economy, the politics of planned wages, indus-
trialisation policy and so on. But viewed over the long term we must conclude that it 
was a case of the crystallisation of an oversaturated solution. In the Netherlands, as 
in many West-European countries, the welfare state had been in the works for more 
than a half-century: technically, economically, politically and culturally. It was just 
15 Lintsen, Tachtig jaar TNO. (2012): 44.
16 Lintsen, Tachtig jaar TNO. (2012): 133.
17 Lintsen, Tachtig jaar TNO. (2012.: 144.
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a question of waiting for favourable economic circumstances to enable the entire 
structure to blossom – and these were certainly present in the 1960s.
In this period, the economy and society had a strongly corporatist bent. 
Netherlanders worked together in many fields in associations, foundations, councils 
and other public and private organs. Corporate bodies were present in agriculture, 
public housing and healthcare. Entrepreneurs cooperated in branch organisations. 
Cartels were important instruments in ordering markets and regulating competi-
tion.18 A corporatist tradition of consultations lay at the foundation of Collective 
Labour Agreements (CAOs) and the Social-Economic Council (SER). It was also 
visible in TNO’s structure. The corporatist model (the polder or Rijnlands model as 
it would later be called) was based on the belief that cooperation was better than 
competition for economic growth and social progress. In this model the government 
fulfilled a key role. It was dirigiste in the creation of the caring state and a safe 
hydraulic structure, coordinating in the rise of the welfare state and a follower in the 
emergence of the consumer society.
Another characteristic of the economy was the dominance of six multinationals: 
Philips, Shell, DSM, Akzo, Unilever and Hoogovens. They played a big part in the 
growth of the economy and employment. They also shared in the ambitions for 
well-being in the Netherlands. Philips, for example, invested in housing, schooling, 
health care, recreation and culture for its employees.
Characteristic of this economy dominated by multinationals was the complexity 
and international character of the chains of production and consumption. The chains 
were long (they included multiple production processes), became denser (numerous 
production processes co-existed within one organisation) or differentiated (chains 
split up into multiple chains). For example, biochemical research at Unilever led to 
the interchangeability of vegetable and animal oils and fats. Margarine could be 
produced from whale blubber, fish oil or palm oil. Chains of raw materials frag-
mented into different basic products (commodities) that were traded as bulk goods 
on the international market. This changed the position of food processing firms. 
Where it once was a purveyor of added value in a chain of foodstuffs, it now became 
a hub in a network. This enabled them to acquire important positions of power in the 
diverse international flows of products. These developments transported sustain-
ability issues around the production of food across the national borders. While in the 
Netherlands ‘not a penny too much’ was paid for margarine, in the Congo vast 
swaths of the jungle was cleared for palm oil plantations in order to satisfy the 
demand for oil ‘on the global market.’
The linear nature of the economy was also an important determinant of sustain-
ability. Materials were acquired at one location, separated and processed at other 
places, and consumed at a third location, after which they degenerated into waste 
products or emissions. This had already long been the case for the use of turf as fos-
sil fuel in the Netherlands. Coal, oil and natural gas made no difference here. The 
combustion of fossil fuels was by definition linear. With the increasing use of 
18 Bouwens and Dankers, Tussen concurrentie en concentratie. Belangenorganisaties, kartels, 
fusies en overnames, 158–159.
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 artificial fertiliser and the flushing of faecal matter through sewers at the end of the 
nineteenth century a similar linear chain developed for food. In the course of the 
twentieth century other substances like paper, glass and plastics were added to the 
list. At the start of the chain, the linear economy dotted the landscape with empty 
gravel pits, marl pits and closed mines, and at the end with huge garbage mounds.
The period was marked by a short effort, born of necessity, to retreat back to the 
circular economy. During the Second World War disrupted supplies of raw materials 
encouraged re-use and substitution. Wood replaced energy suppliers like coal and 
gas. Soap was fabricated from bones. Paper, textiles, glass, metals, rubber, hair and 
many other materials were collected in order to be recycled.
16.3  The Monitor for 1970: Development of Well-being 
and Sustainability
How can we judge the culmination of this period – around 1970 – in terms of well- 
being and sustainability? In this section we will address this question from three 
perspectives (Table 16.1). The perspective of 1910: to what extent was the societal 
agenda of the first decades of the twentieth century realized? The perspective of 
1970: which elements were at the time praised by politics and policy, what were the 
contemporary concerns and what was the agenda for the future? Finally, we look at 
the developments from a present-day perspective. How do we judge the results of 
the period 1910–1970 by today’s norms?
16.3.1  Perspective 1910: The Agenda at the Turn 
of the Century
The further suppression of extreme poverty (securing the vital necessities: food, 
clothing and housing) had been supplemented as a social-economic agenda with 
concerns about the quality of food, housing, health and labour. Around 1970 the 
aims of 1910 had been largely realised. Extreme poverty had been abolished. Much 
had been accomplished in regard to food quality, housing quality, public health and 
working conditions. The population had also profited from increased economic and 
material welfare. People lived longer and were healthier, had jobs and time for 
themselves.
These aims were achieved by means of the large-scale employment of domestic 
and foreign natural capital. Increased exploitation of natural capital had been an 
explicit goal around 1900. ‘Wastelands’ had been reclaimed and land had been 
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Material Welfare and Well-being
(continued)
Table 16.1 Dashboard well-being and sustainability ‘here and now’ in 1970 from the perspectives 
of 1910, 1970 and a present-day perspective
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wrested from the sea. Coal, salt and marl were mined and sand, gravel, oil and gas 
extracted from the subsoil. Imported metal ores, crude oil, grains, natural oils and 
fats were incorporated into Dutch production processes. Increasing exploitation was 
accompanied by increasing energy consumption. The political and policy establish-
ment of 1910 would have looked at these indicators with great satisfaction. That 
would also have been the case for the indicators of economic and human capital and 
of democratic quality, while they would have been concerned about the political 
turbulence around 1970 (social capital) – as they were about political struggles in 
their own time. Politics and policy in those days had no goals for biodiversity and 
emissions, so that little can be said from this perspective about the declining biodi-
versity and increasing emissions. On the other hand the political elite of 1910 would 
have deeply regretted the changed relationship to the former colonies (development 
aid) and would have rejoiced at the increased exploitation of foreign natural capital 
(import raw materials).
16.3.2  Perspective 1970: Environmental Problems  
in New Babylon
These developments were viewed in an entirely different light from the perspective 
of 1970. Up to the end of the 1950s the Netherlands, a country faithful to traditions 
and customs, had been maintained by a system of pillarisation. A few individuals 
foresaw a great change. Automation and robotisation would create a New Babylon, 
as Cobra artist Constant Nieuwenhuys proclaimed in 1959. The future would see 
the rise of ‘homo ludens,’ the creative, playful human.19
Ten years later these intimations of change had become the fertile soil for diverse 
forms of protest against authority, industrialisation and modernisation. Compared to 
surrounding countries, the turnaround was gradual and without extreme violence, 
either on the side of the opposition or on that of the authorities.20 Confessional, 
socialist and liberal parties remained at the centre of power, but cloaked with a new 
‘progressive’ élan. And they had to co-exist with new political parties and move-
ments. Around 1970, the Pacificist-Socialist Party (1957), the Farmers’ Party 
(1963), Provo (1965), the Democrats ‘66 (1966), the Political Party Radicals (1968), 
the Kabouter (Gnome) Movement (1970) and other political movements attempted 
to change the existing political and institutional structures on the basis of their own 
social visions.
The renewed traditional parties and most of the new ones shared one big concern, 
namely concern about the natural environment and the exploitation of natural capi-
19 J. van der Lans and H. Vuijsje, Lage landen, hoge sprongen: Nederland in de twintigste eeuw 
(Wormer 2003), 185.
20 J.C. Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw: Nederland in de jaren zestig (Amsterdam 1995), 
9–22.
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tal. The worries focused originally on changes in the landscape (among other things, 
biodiversity), the use of materials (e.g. the growing mountains of waste), water pol-
lution (especially surface waters) and air pollution (particularly the emission of sul-
phur dioxide). The exhaustibility of raw materials and energy sources soon surfaced 
as a major social problem. Other aspects like the safety of nuclear energy and the 
emission of greenhouse gases were not yet on the agenda.
An important theme at the time was certainly the global opposition between rich 
and poor. It was essential to support the poor countries. Between 1965 and 1975 the 
Dutch contribution rose from one million to nearly one billion euros. This made the 
Netherlands, along with Norway, one of the most generous countries in the world.21
16.3.3  The View from 2015–1970 as a Critical Watershed
From a present-day perspective the construction of the caring and welfare state was 
a great achievement. The Netherlands had become a prosperous country, in which a 
quality of life had been achieved that pretty much answered to present-day stan-
dards. Both the general and material aspects of well-being were at a high level. To 
be sure, the wage inequality between men and women that prevailed in 1970 would 
have raised eybrows in the present day. Average life expectancy had increased and 
was still climbing. The numerous victims of traffic accidents, the large numbers of 
smokers and other health risks would no longer be acceptable. On the other hand, 
the low incidence of crime would be something to long for again. The housing 
shortage was nearly solved and big investments in this field continued. And the 
internal arrangements and furnishings of homes increasingly approached present- 
day standards for heating and sanitation. The spacious homes built in the 1970s are 
still popular nearly 50 years later. The level of unemployment was lower than what 
is presently considered acceptable. Access to and quality of education was high.
At the same time a present-day observer would share the big concerns about the 
natural environment and natural capital. In 1970 biodiversity was in better shape 
than it is at present. And even then it was anything but hopeful. Salmon and trout 
had disappeared from rivers and streams due to pollution of surface water. Emissions 
of poisonous effluents in the Rotterdam Harbour area threatened flora and fauna in 
the Wadden Sea. Farmers sought to eliminate every kind of weed and insect that 
threatened their yields. Reclamations and land consolidation created an ever more 
monotonous landscape. In 1970 natural ecosystems and biodiversity were under 
extreme pressure.
Air pollution due to sulphur dioxide emssions was significant, but diminishing 
thanks to the use of filters, de-sulphurisation of fuels and the transition from coal 
to gas. New insights into air quality would lead to new concerns about public 
health and air quality. Soot particles, nitrous oxides and fine dust replaced sulphur 
21 Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw, 73–74.
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dioxide as an indicator of air quality. In 1970 there was as yet little concern about 
climate change; that debate surfaced only in the 1980s after which it began to draw 
increasing attention. Due to the increased use of energy and materials the emission 
of ‘climate gases’ increased. CO2 emissions at the time were about 21% higher 
than the current 2020 European goal of 8.6 tons per inhabitant. In the domain of 
natural capital and the human environment the period around 1970 was indeed a 
watershed.
16.3.4  The 1960s as the Great Transformation
In the prologue to this book we wrote about the great transformation in well-being: 
the Netherlands increased the quality of life of its population, but at the cost of 
depleting Dutch and foreign natural capital. That transformation can be traced over 
the course of the 1960s. In this part of the book it has been analysed for the three 
large material flows – the bio and the mineral and fossil sub-soil assets – and from 
the perspective of the four institutions – government, economy, the societal mid- 
field and research. And yet the issue still demands a generic explanation. That 
explanation will have to account for a remarkable phenomenon. The biggest issue in 
the career of well-being in the Netherlands, namely the problematic quality of life 
of the population, was solved at the outset of the 1960s with the establishment of the 
‘caring-state.’ But the big problems with natural capital and the natural environment 
arose after that period. As statistics of various material flows make amply clear, the 
exploitation of natural capital accelerated in the course of the 1960s. This was 
accompanied by an accelerated growth in emissions that soon reached levels exceed-
ing present-day norms. What is the origin of this ‘de-railing?’ Did it have to do with 
the demands that the ‘caring state’ had to make on natural capital in order to guar-
antee a certain quality of life for a growing population? Was it a consequence of the 
welfare state? Could it be attributed to fundamental changes in the economic struc-
ture, among other things due to the discovery of the Groningen natural gas field? In 
the epilogue to this book, when we review the entire period from 1850 to 2010, we 
will return to these questions. The issue raises another insistent question. At the end 
of the 1960s contemporaries were aware of the ‘de-railing’ that was taking place. 
Around 1970 a critical boundary in sustainability had been passed in various 
respects. Old and new groups in the societal mid-field signalled problems around 
the over-exploitation of natural capital and the pollution of the environment and 
manoeuvred them onto the societal agenda. Despite this, the situation would get 
worse before it got better. The problems proved nearly intractable. Why was it so 
difficult to create a sustainable society? That will be the most important question of 
the next part.
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Chapter 17
The Point of Departure Around 1970: 
Overabundance and Discontent
Frank Veraart
Abstract Around 1970 anti-authoritarian groups rose up against industrialisation 
and the development of welfare. They were the vanguard of a broader societal senti-
ment. At the end of the 1980s environmental problems were at the core of social and 
political debate Despite increasing worries the pattern of consumption barely 
changed. Contrasting the monitor for 1970 with that of 2010, this chapter sketches 
the growth of material welfare and the development of quality of life. Smoking, 
overweight and unemployment became the new societal challenges. The domestic 
consumption of energy continued to grow. In this period pressure on natural capital, 
both domestic and foreign, increased dramatically. The Netherlands continued to be 
dependent on foreign lands for important material flows  – in some cases to an 
extreme extent. 80% of Dutch grain, for example, was still imported. These devel-
opments led to shifts in the sustainable development of the Netherlands to foreign 
countries. The following chapters analyse the societal dynamics in the in the chains 
of agriculture and foods (Chap. 18), construction and building materials (Chap. 19) 
and energy and plastics (Chap. 20)
Keywords Protest movements · Protest · Monitor · Well-being · Natural capital · 
Internationalisation · Sustainability
This chapter is written by Frank Veraart with contributions by Fred Lambert.
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17.1  The Mushroom of the New Society
How does a new society emerge from the old one? Like a mushroom on a rotting tree trunk. 
An alternative society emerges from the subculture of the existing order. The underground 
society of the rebellious youth surfaces and begins to manage itself independently of the 
still ruling authorities. This revolution is now occurring…
On February 5th 1970 the Amsterdam Gnome Party (Kabouterpartij) led by the 
former Provo activist Roel van Duijn, announced the establishment of the Orange 
Free State (Oranje-Vrijstaat). This had its own anthem, its own constitution and, via 
the Gnome Party’s city council seat, its own ‘embassy’ to the regular administra-
tion. Van Duijn and his comrades no longer wanted to remain in the opposition:
…This is the end of the underground, of protest, of demonstrating; from now on we devote 
our energy to building an anti-authoritarian society. We will take what we can use from the 
old society: knowledge, socialist ideals and the best of the liberal traditions. The mushroom 
of the new society feeds itself on the juices of the rotting tree trunk until it is 
decomposed.1
Twelve ‘peoples departments’ were the administrative units that were to put the ide-
als of the new state into practice. For example, the ‘people’s department of public 
works’ was charged with cultivating parks and green spaces and with demolishing 
highways. The department of ‘environmental hygiene’ devoted itself to restoring 
biological equilibrium and the department ‘for need satisfaction’ aimed at building 
an ‘alternative economy that did not have profit as a goal, but the satisfaction of 
human needs.’ The Orange Free State was anti-authoritarian and pacifistic.2
The Gnome movement was rooted in Provo, the anarchist movement that tarted 
public administration and authority with provocative, often one-off, demonstrations 
in the second half of the 1960s. Provo described itself as a ‘first, furious reaction to 
the emergence of a technocratic mass-culture.’3 Provo agitated against the ‘petty 
folk,’ the greedy, hard-working, boring masses devoid of fantasy. The ruling elite 
had succeeded in suppressing the rebelliousness of workers with stimulants, drugs 
and amusement.4
The proletariat has subjected itself to its political leaders and its TV. It has melted together 
with the old bourgeoisie into a big grey petty mass of addicted consumers.5
Demonstrations targeted the monarchy and agitated against modern addictions like 
smoking, watching television and the automobile. The movement acquired interna-
tional notoriety with the detonation of smoke bombs during the marriage of crown- 
princess Beatrix. At the end of the sixties the movement lost its momentum. Provo 
1 Tasman, Louter Kabouter, Kroniek van een Beweging 1969–1974 (Amsterdam 1996), 401.
2 Tasman, Louter Kabouter, 403.
3 Roel van Duijn, Provo, de Geschiedenis van de Provotarische Beweging, 1965–1967 (Amsterdam 
1985), 7.
4 James C. Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in Aanbouw, Nederland in de Jaren Zestig (Amsterdam 1995), 
133.
5 Roel van Duijn in Buiten de Perken, cited in Tasman, Louter Kabouter, 18–19.
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became just another part of ‘rebellious Amsterdam’ together with squatters and 
revolutionary students. This was even exploited as a tourist attraction. As part of a 
guided tour, and for a fee, tourists could let themselves be harangued by Provos. 
Authorities gave Provo a podium and took some of its criticisms to heart. This took 
the sting out of their actions. Provo became a victim of this ‘politics of assimilation’ 
and disbanded itself in 1967.6
Parts of Provo survived in the Gnome movement. The founder, Roel van Duijn, 
cherished the ideal of restoring harmony between culture and nature and of search-
ing for the ‘ideal marriage between city and countryside.’ Humans should see nature 
as their ally and not as an opponent that had to be conquered. With the founding of 
the Orange Free State, the Gnome movement wanted to give shape to societal 
changes and to work out prototypes of alternative ways of life. The first National 
Squatters day – May 5th 1970 – was a manifestation to demand a solution of the 
housing shortage. Gnome stores became the urban outlets for organic foods. The 
Gnome movement acquired a national following in more than sixty Gnome groups. 
Gnomes participated in the 1970 elections for municipal councils in fifteen places. 
Besides Amsterdam, Gnomes won seats in the city councils of Leeuwarden, The 
Hague, Alkmaar, Leiden, Arnhem, and Amersfoort.
But the Gnome movement was not destined for a long life. Internal conflicts took 
their toll and its influence declined rapidly after 1971. The movement was a typical 
sign of the times. Experiments and political demonstrations brought the problematic 
issue of well-being into the public limelight. Many other initiatives followed in the 
1970s, each with its own perspective on dealing with nature, the environment and 
energy. In 1969, Otto Munters, a student at Leiden University, founded the ecologi-
cal commune, ‘De Hobbitstee’ in the village of Wasperveen in Drenthe. Students at 
Wageningen Agricultural University founded the ‘Farmers’ Group’ (Boerengroep) 
in 1971, in which they worked together with small farmers in the search for a more 
equitable distribution of incomes for farmers within and without the European 
Community. They also mobilized protests against land reapportionments.7 In 
Riethoven in the province of Brabant, the journalist Sietz Leeflang and his wife 
Anke founded the environmental-experimental farm ‘The Small Earth’ (De Kleine 
Aarde) in 1972. This project developed experiments with biodynamic agriculture 
and alternative energy production.8
The environment became one of the most important societal issues. In the voter 
survey held prior to the national elections of 1971 and 1972, this issue headed the 
list of problematic issues (Table 17.1). Environmentalism was also embraced by 
6 Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in Aanbouw, Nederland in de Jaren Zestig, 136.
7 D. Strijker and I.J. Terluin, ‘Rural Protest Groups in the Netherlands’ in Rural Protest Groups and 
Populist Political Parties, ed. D. Strijker, G. Voerman, and I.J. Terluin (Wageningen 2015).
8 Leeflang was a former employee at Philips and worked as science editor for the national newspa-
per Algemeen Handelsblad. He was a prominent critic of nuclear energy and wrote critical articles 
on the petrochemical industry. Dick Hollander, ‘Tegen Beter Weten In’. de Geschiedenis van de 
Biologische Landbouw En Voeding in Nederland (Hurwenen 2012), 99. Egbert Tellegen and Jaap 
Willems, eds., Milieu-Aktie in Nederland (Amsterdam 1978), 155–59.
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political parties. Local initiatives and social concern acquired extra momentum with 
the publication of Limits to Growth, the report of the Club of Rome, that appeared 
in 1972 and of which half the copies printed worldwide were sold in the Netherlands.9
Around 1970 the individual pleasures of modernisation came into conflict with 
collective needs. In the early 1970s, the Social and Cultural Planning Office noted 
the conflicts in the domain of the living environment
Recent developments, to put it in a nutshell, boil down to a scarcity of space (congestion) 
and increasing erosion of the quality of space as a living environment. Virtually everyone is 
affected by these developments: it is almost impossible to escape the smells, noise, traffic 
congestion, ‘horizon pollution’ and overfull vacation destinations.10
According to the researchers, food security for the Netherlands came with a price: 
an enormous impact on the landscape as well as environmental degradation. The 
quality of nature and biodiversity declined precipitously due to developments in 
agriculture.11 At the same time, increased recreation stimulated a broader apprecia-
tion of natural values and of the experience of landscapes. Land was no longer seen 
as solely a means of production in the food chain, but acquired new functionalities 
like nature and recreation. After massive bird mortality at the end of the 1960s, the 
pro-nature associations succeeded in bringing the negative impacts of agrarian 
developments into the limelight. Debates on pesticides produced the first rents in the 
fabric of the public-private agricultural bastion.
The environmental aspects of agricultural production also led to questions 
regarding food safety. Were we not busy poisoning ourselves? Consumer associa-
tions took the environmental aspects as the point of departure for a critical analysis 
of the food supply chain. Did we know where our food came from, what was added 
to it, and whether all this was healthy for us? – these were the questions. The same 
kinds of questions were also raised in and around the industrial zones of the Limburg 
mining region, the Rijnmond area and around the North Sea Canal. Did the smells, 
the soot pollution and the smog not compromise the health of nearby residents?
Concern about the environment and nature would wax and wane in subsequent 
decades. It declined in the course of the 1970s and 1980s, only to return with great 
force at the end of the 1980s and once again at the start of the present century. The 
results of the environmental movement were also variable. In some domains like 
sustainable energy and combating air pollution the Netherlands was quite advanced 
compared to other European countries. After 2000, the Netherlands fell behind in 
9 Jacqueline Cramer, ‘Milieu’, Elementaire Deeltjes 16 (Amsterdam 2014), 14.
10 “Sociaal Cultureel Rapport 1974” (Den Haag 1975), 83.
11 There is little data on the development of biodiversity in the long term. Significant time series 
data is available for only a few animal and plant species. There is also data on the prevalence of 
flora and fauna in specific areas. The latter clearly show that the geographical range of many spe-
cies is getting smaller. In 1989 a report entitled The State of Nature 2 concluded that: ‘On the 
average, rare species are getting rarer and common species are becoming even more common or 
are stable. On a regional level this is causing a decline in diversity. Overall at a national level there 
is an ongoing decline in biodiversity.’ cited in R.J.  Bink et  al., ‘Toestand van de Natuur 2’ 
(Wageningen 1994), p. 11; Jan Luiten van Zanden and S.W. Verstegen, Groene Geschiedenis van 
Nederland (Utrecht 1993), 81.
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the implementation of alternative energy sources. Whence this variable perfor-
mance? What were initiatives taken and by whom? What were the drivers and what 
were the obstacles? In this section we examine the difficult transformations in agri-
culture and nutrition, and the use of materials and energy between 1970 and 2015. 
Using the well-being monitor we first provide an overview of changes between 
1970 and 2015.
17.2  Well-being ‘Here and Now’: Transition  
to a Postmodern Society, 1970 Versus 2010
Halfway through the 1970s a previously unheard of period of powerful economic 
growth came to an end. Labour-intensive industries, like the textile, tobacco and 
shoe manufactures suffered from increased foreign competition. Wages had 
increased substantially, so that the Netherlands was no longer a low-wage country. 
The growth potential of the most important key technologies, chemicals and elec-
tronics, was exhausted. This return to ‘normal’ coincided with international eco-
nomic stagnation, reinforced by increasing oil prices and oil crises. The latter 
impacted in particular on sizeable energy-intensive industries, including chemical 
firms.12 Originally the various crises had no direct effect. Exports and investments 
declined and fell behind international developments, but an increase in consumption 
nonetheless fostered economic growth. Unemployment remained low in the first 
few years. It was only at the end of the 1970s and well into the 1980s that the full 
impact was felt in the Netherlands.13
Between 1970 and 2010 the Dutch population increased from 13 to more than 
16.5 million inhabitants (Table  17.2). The consumptive expenditures of the 
Netherlanders increased during this period. After the mid-1980s, in addition to 
household appliances and a car, Dutch households possessed ever more electronic 
gadgets like video and cd players and computers. The economic recession at the end 
of the seventies slowed these developments. The 1990s witnessed a new upsurge of 
economic prosperity that lasted until the financial and economic crisis of 2008. 
Increased consumptive expenditures were reflected in continually increasing mate-
rial welfare in the household (Graph 17.1).
The economic decline of the 1980s had a major impact in the area of income 
inequality. The decline that commenced in the late 1970s was followed by an increase 
after the mid-1980s. The reason was the lowering of the minimum wage and the exten-
sion of welfare benefits during the recession of the 1980s, followed by the restructur-
12 Jan Pieter Smits, ‘Technologie, Productiviteit en Welzijn.’ in Techniek in Nederland in de 
Twintigste Eeuw, Techniek en Modernisering, Balans van de Twintigste Eeuw, J.W. Schot et al. 
eds., vol. 7, 7 vols., Techniek in Nederland in de Twintigste Eeuw (Zutphen 2003).
13 Jan Luiten van Zanden and R.T. Griffith, Economische Geschiedenis van Nederland in de 20e 
Eeuw, (Utrecht 1989), 255. Table 10.1.
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index (1850=100) 340 581
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Satisfaction with life Score 0-10 7,4 7,8
Personal characteristics
Health Life expectancy years 74 81
Nutrition Height (military conscripts) cm 178 (183)
Housing Housing quality
Public water supply
% slums 6 <1
m3/capita 109 120
Physical safety Murder victims number per 100.000 
inhabitants.
0,7 (1,1)
Labour Unemployment % workforce. 1,6 5,0
Education Level of education years 9 (11)
Free time Free time hours / week 47,9 44,7
Natural environment
Biodiversity MSA % original biodiversity 66 (63)
Air quality SO2 kg SO2/capita 21 4
Greenhouse gas emissions ton CO2 capita 10,1 10,6
Water quality Public water supply m3/capita 109 120
Institutional environment








Theme Indicator Unit ±1970 ±2010
(2000)
Population





? Unknown or irrelevant
Note: The numbers in brackets are from J.L. van Zanden et al. (ed.), How was life? Global well-
being since 1820 (OECD Publishing 2014) and relate to the year 2000. Numbers for these indica-
tors – measured according to the same methodology – are not available for 2010
Source: See note 23 of Chap. 2
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ing of social security and tax reforms in the 1990s.14 The end result was that income 
inequality in 2010 stood at nearly the same level as it had in 1970. The discrepancy in 
wages between men and women showed a more favourable development. The differ-
ence between men and women declined, but the hourly wage difference of 18% in 
2010 was higher than the average for the European Union as a whole (16% in 2010).15
In the personal sphere the differences between 1970 and 2010 show contradic-
tory tendencies. In 2010, the average Netherlander lived longer, healthier and under 
ever better living conditions in comparison with 1970. Average life-expectancy and 
height increased. In 2010 life expectancy in the Netherlands reached 81 years. Men 
(78.5 years) were above the European average; women, at 82.6, just below. 
Increasing tobacco and alcohol consumption among women retarded increases in 
life-expectancy.16 In general, alcohol use and overweight increased since the 1980s 
while smoking as an unhealthy habit declined (Graph 17.2).
This period was marked by continuing improvements in housing and utilities. 
Water, natural gas and electricity networks now penetrated into every corner of the 
14 Wiemer Salverda et al., ‘Nederlandse Ongelijkheid Sinds 1980: Loonvorming, Overheidsbeleid 
En Veranderde Samenstelling van Huishoudens’ in GINI Growing Inequalities´ Impacts 
(Amsterdam 2013); Wiemer Salverda et  al., ‘Growing Inequalities and Their Impacts In The 
Netherlands’ in Changing Inequalities and Societal Impacts in Rich Countries: Thirty 
Countries´Experience, ed. Brian Nolan et al., vol. 20 (Oxford 2014), 459–87.
15 Szilvia Borbély, The Netherlands: Gender Pay Gap (GPG) (Budapest 2016).
16 Rutger Hoekstra and Jan Pieter Smits, ‘Monitor Duurzaam Nederland 2009.’ Monitor Duurzaam 
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Graph 17.1 Ownership of consumer goods per household (in percent) 1970–2004
Source: CBS  – Historie inkomen, vermogen en consumptie/Duurzame goederen; bezit naar 
huishoudenskenmerken
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country. In the 1970s and 1980s, the last slums fell prey to urban renewal projects. 
Investments in education manifested themselves in among other things extension of 
compulsory schooling and a growing number of students in vocational and aca-
demic educational programs. Netherlanders continued to be longer and better 
educated.
The economic decline of the 1980s and the recession after 2008 had an equivocal 
effect on unemployment. After 1980, unemployment quickly exceeded the ‘friction’ 
level of 4%. In the first half of the 1980s more than 10% of the workforce was out 
of work – a percentage that declined only very gradually to about 6% in the early 
1990s. A period of economic growth, especially in the information and communica-
tions sector and in services, was responsible for a period of low unemployment 
around the turn of the century. After that unemployment rates again increased grad-
ually (Graph 17.3). The decrease in the amount of free time per week is striking; 
work in particular took up an ever larger part of the day.17 Developments between 
1970 and 2010 exhibited a deterioration in the areas of employment and free time.
Other indicators of the personal life-world also show negative developments. 
The chance of becoming a victim of murder, for example, increased.18 Other kinds 
of criminality like theft also increased. Theft accounted for about three quarters of 
the total number of registered crimes.19 The total number of registered crimes grew 
from 2,65,000 in 1970 to 1,218,000 in 2006 (Graph 17.4).
17 Mariêlle Cloin et al., Met Het Oog op de Tijd, Een Blik op de Tijdsbesteding van Nederlanders 
(Den Haag 2013), 34–35.
18 Paul Nieuwbeerta and Ingeborg Deerenberg, ‘Trends in Moord en Doodslag, 1911–2002.‘ 
Bevolkingstrends, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek Bevolkingstrends, 1e kwartaal (2005): 
56–63.



















Graph 17.2 Development of unhealthy lifestyle as a percentage of the population 1981–2011
Heavy smoking: >20 cigarettes per day
Heavy alcohol use: 1 × per week, >6 glasses alcohol in one day
Overweight: Body Mass Index (BMI) > 25 kg/m2;
Moderate overweight: BMI: 25–30 kg/m2
Serious overweight: BMI: >30 kg/m2
Source: CBS: Health, lifestyle, health care demand and supply, mortality; from 1900
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With respect to the natural environment there was an improvement in the domes-
tic situation, but at the same time an entrenchment of the international problems. Air 
and water quality recovered in the course of the 1980s and thereafter.20 The decline 
20 CBS, PBL, Wageningen UR (2016). ‘Vermesting in grote rivieren, 1970–2014’ (indicator 0249, 
version 10, 13 April 2016). www.compendiumvoordeleefomgeving.nl. CBS, Planbureau voor de 
Leefomgeving en Wageningen UR (2012). Milieucondities in water en natuurgebieden, 1990 – 








Graph 17.3 Levels of unemployment 1970–2006
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Financial crime Vandalism and public policy
Graph 17.4 Crimes 1970–2006
Source: CBS – Legal Protection and Safety; History
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in biodiversity was arrested and after the 1990s there was even evidence of the 
beginnings of a turnaround, but in general the natural environment in the Netherlands 
continued to be under serious duress.21 Per capita emissions of greenhouse gases 
continued to increase in this period. Measures to combat climate change did little 
more than stabilise emissions at 1980s levels. The consumption of fossil fuel energy 
and the per capita contribution to the global climate problem remained as high as 
ever. Dutch per capita emissions were higher than was the case in the surrounding 
countries of Belgium, Germany, France, Great Britain, Norway and Denmark.22
Comparing indicators of well-being ‘here and now’ for 1970 with those of 2010 
reveals a variegated picture. The problem of extreme poverty, the most important 
issue of well-being and sustainability in the past, became totally irrelevant to the 
issue of quality of life in this period. One of the last remnants, the housing shortage 
and in particular the elimination of slum-dwellings, was solved in this period. 
Instead of extreme poverty, other issues now came to the fore: like criminality, 
work, nature, environment and climate change. Improvements were situated mostly 
in the individual life-world; in the more inclusive societal and global context, indi-
cators exhibited a deterioration or at best a stabilisation.
17.3  Well-being ‘Later’: Material Growth in a Cleverer 
and Cleaner Country, 1970 Versus 2010
The economic structure of the Netherlands changed radically after the mid-1970s. 
A wave of bankruptcies marked the industrial transition. Industries like shipping, 
textiles and many branches of manufacturing began to founder in heavy weather. 
The six multinationals in the economy, including Philips and AkzoNobel, relin-
quished some of their pre-eminence in the national economy. New key technologies 
like biotechnology, medical technology and information and communications tech-
nology became driving forces. Employment opportunities were increasingly found 
in knowledge-intensive sectors. New investments were called for in knowledge 
development, education, innovations and infrastructures.
Economic capital developed favourably thanks to the strong growth in invest-
ments, though at the cost of an increasing national debt. The growing stockpile of 
knowledge had a positive effect on economic capital. Investments in research and 
development acquired their own labels. At the end of the seventies investments were 
being channelled into ‘the information society,’ a Pollyanna that by the nineties had 
21 CBS, PBL, Wageningen UR (2015). ´Trend fauna – alle gemeten soorten – Living Planet Index 
Nederland, 1990–2014´ (indicator 1569, version 02 , 29 oktober 2015). www.compendium-
voordeleefomgeving.nl. PBL (2014). ´Natuur´ Website Balans van de Leefomgeving 2014. www.
pbl.nl/balans2014. Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, Den Haag.
22 Data EU: Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) – CO2 time series 




morphed into the ‘knowledge economy.’ Research expenditures by private firms and 
the government crowded close to the European average. In 2011 the Netherlands 
found itself in the European middle-bracket, spending a bit more than 2% of its 
gross domestic product on research.23
These investments also had an impact on human capital. Expenditures for higher 
education increased in the 1990s in step with the European average. Between 1990 
and 2010 the number of highly educated Netherlanders increased from 19% to 28% 
of the population.24 Thanks to investments and new constraints on compulsory 
schooling, the number of students following secondary and tertiary (higher voca-
tional and university) education increased – despite the demographic decrease. In 
2010 the Netherlands boasted a better educated and (insofar as this can be deduced 
from life-expectancy) a healthier workforce. Insecurity about employment, how-
ever, was greater. Unemployment was higher than in 1970. More flexible work situ-
ations via employment bureaus, temporary contracts and part-time work increasingly 
became the norm.
Indicators for social capital exhibited no shifts. But behind the figures remark-
able changes were afoot. While the social climate around 1970 was influenced by 
‘left-wing, anti-authoritarian’ youth groups and environmental groups dedicated to 
preserving nature and the environment, by 2010 the political climate was dominated 
by so-called ‘right populism’ a movement that was deeply sceptical about environ-
mental problems and climate change and that championed new issues like Dutch 
identity, the migrant problem and the issue of integration. We shall come back to the 
consequences below.
Natural capital exhibited a bifurcation. On the one hand improvements could be 
seen. After the 1970s, concern for the environment and the natural surroundings 
increased. Dutch air and water quality improved and the decrease in biodiversity 
was turned around. On the other hand, the incessant growth of consumption and 
production meant undiminished demands on energy, land-use and raw materials. 
Although in the 1980s there was increasing social and political concern about inter- 
regional, international and global environmental problems like acid rain and climate 
change, energy consumption in this period was still based largely on the combustion 
of fossil fuels. In 2010 only 4% of the energy consumption was derived from renew-
able sources.25 An energy transition was still very much in the initial phases. With 
that, this period is characterised by an unmitigated negative development as regards 
the emission of greenhouse gases. The improvement in natural capital thus took 
place above all on the domestic front (Table 17.3 ).
23 CBS – Statistics Research & Development, 1970–1994 (via Statline), data R&D personnel en 
R&D investments. Walter Manshanden et  al., ‘De Staat van Nederland Innovatieland, R&D: 
Impuls Voor Economische Groei,’ Special Issue, Strategy & Change (Den Haag 2013), 40–49.
24 Data CBS Statline – Sociale Monitor; 1990–2011.
25 André Meurink and Reinoud Segers, Hernieuwbare Energie in Nederland 2014 (Den Haag/
Heerlen 2015), 18.
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Natural capital
Energy Energy consumption TJ /capita 0.16 0.17
Non-fossil
fuels
Domestic consumption ton /capita 9.4 9.8
Biodiversity MSA % original biodiversity 66 63
Water Public water supply m3/capita 21 4
Air quality SO2 emissions kg SO2/capita 10.1 10.6
Greenhouse gas emissions ton CO2/capita 109 120
Economic capital:
Physical capital Economic capital
stock/capita
index (1850=100) 518 1046
Financial
capital
Gross national debt % gdp 48 59
Knowledge Stock knowledge capital index (2010=100) 30 100
Human capital:
Health Life expectancy years 75 81
Labour Unemployment % workforce 1.6 5.0
Educational
level
Schooling years 9.0 (11)
Social capital:









the change from 
CBS monitor
2018
Theme Indicator Unit ±1970 ±2010
(2000)





? Unknown or irrelevant  
Note: The numbers in brackets are from J.L. van Zanden et al. (ed.). How was life? Global well-
being since 1820 (OECD Publishing 2014) and relate to the year 2000. Numbers for these indica-
tors – measured according to the same methodology – are not available for 2010
Source: See note 23 of Chap. 2
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17.4  Well-being ‘Elsewhere’: An International Trading 
Power, 1970 Versus 2010
Dutch support for the poorest countries continued to develop in a positive fashion. 
There was a substantive shift in development aid, in which the autonomy of the 
developing countries, but also Dutch industrial interests, acquired more leeway. 
Together with the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands disbursed the most 
development aid per unit gross domestic product.26
Between 1970 and 2010 economic and material growth translated into an undi-
minished increase in the import of raw materials. The percentage of raw materials 
imported from abroad increased in this period from 49% to 53%. 12,500 kilograms 
of raw materials were imported per capita. This flow of goods imposed an enormous 
burden on foreign sources of supply as well as on domestic and foreign transport 
facilities (Table 17.4).
26 A.  Nekkers and P.A.M.  Malcontent, eds., De Geschiedenis van Vijftig Jaar Nederlandse 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 1949–1999 (Den Haag, 1999), 339–43.
Consumption,
income
Development aid % gdp 0.6 0.8
Natural capital Import of raw materials ton/capita 8.6 12.9
Material welfare
Evaluation of
the change from 
CBS monitor
2018
Theme Indicator Unit ±1970 ±2010
(2000)
Natural capital





? Unknown or irrelevant  
Source: See note 23 of Chap. 2
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17.5  Natural Capital and Material Flows: 1970–2010
A number of remarkable changes took place in the development of material flows 
between 1970 and 2010. Just as in previous periods, the flow of goods and products 
increased, in this case by no less than 60%. The growth was above all due to growth 
in biological (60%) and fossil (90%) raw materials. The most striking feature, how-
ever, was the enormous growth in the export of raw materials (230%) over against a 
minimal growth in import (20%) (see Table 17.5). A closer examination of the mate-
rial flows can shed some light on these changes.
In absolute numbers this period experienced a substantial growth of raw materi-
als. Per capita the growth of minerals and bio materials was modest. Solely the use 
of fossil resources increased with 50% (Table 17.5). This data concerns resources 
processed in the Dutch economy (i.e. domestic production and imports added 
together). In contrast data of domestic material consumption (i.e. domestic produc-
tion and imports added together minus export) result in other conclusions. According 
to European reports the consumption of raw materials declined between 1970 and 
 Table 17.5 Raw materials in the Netherlands, 1970–2010 in kton 
1970 2010 Ratio 1910:2010
Bio raw materials:
  Gross available (kton) 42,400 kton 67,020 kton 1 : 1.6
  Bio/capita (ton/cap.) 3.3 ton/cap. 4.0 ton/cap. 1 : 1.2
  % import 22% 31% 1 : 1.4
  % export 9% 23% 1 : 2.6
Mineral subsoil resources:
 Gross available(kton) 80,120 kton 95,570 kton 1 : 1.2
  Mineral/capita (ton/cap.) 6.1 ton/cap. 5.8 ton/cap. 1 : 1.0
  % import 38% 58% 1 : 1.5
  % export 8% 17% 1 : 2.1
Fossil subsoil resources:
  Gross available (kton) 104,890 kton 199,630 kton 1 : 1.9
  Fossil/capita (ton/cap.) 8.0 ton/cap. 12.0 ton/cap. 1 : 1.5
  % import 69% 69% 1 : 1.0
  % export 22% 47% 1 : 2.1
Total raw materials:
  Gross available(kton) 227,400 kton 362,220 kton 1 : 1.6
  Raw materials/capita (ton/cap.) 17.5 ton/cap 21.9 ton/cap. 1 : 1.3
  % import 49% 59% 1 : 1.2
  % export 15% 35% 1 : 2.3
Remark: Gross available = domestic production + imports 
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016)
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2001 from 14.7 to 13.7 tons per capita.27 National data show a decrease from 18 to 
15.5 tons per inhabitant between 1996 and 2006.28 These developments suggest a 
so-called de-materialisation of the Dutch economy. The reduction in the use of 
materials was above all due to a decreased consumption of mineral raw materials, 
the use of which declined between 2000 and 2004 from about 10 to 8 tons per inhab-
itant. In 2011 the Netherlands belonged to the group of European countries with a 
low per capita domestic consumption of materials.29 In other words: the resource 
use per capita serving the economy (i.e. also serving export) tends toward stabilisa-
tion. In domestic material consumption per capita there seems a gradual de- 
materialisation. The situation is however more complex, the analysis of 
dematerialization ideally should also include complex final products (i.e. cars, 
machines, electronics). Possibly this dismisses dematerialisation trends, more 
research on this issue is necessary to come to final conclusions.30
Another conclusion is that the Netherlands remained dependent on foreign sup-
plies for important material flows, in some instances to a considerable degree (see 
Table 17.6). Almost 80% of grain consumed was still imported from foreign sources. 
Foreign dependency increased for mineral raw materials. Due to its geological 
structure, the Netherlands had long been dependent on foreign sources for ores and 
stone. In addition, foreign shipments of gravel – a commodity that was plentiful in 
the Netherlands – also increased (for the explanation see Chap. 19). Due to the clo-
sure of the coal mines, electric power plants were stoked with foreign coals. 
Petroleum was largely imported from overseas. It was only in natural gas that the 
Netherlands was a net exporter. The Netherlands was able to supply merely 47% of 
its material needs domestically (2008).31
The effects of the industrial transition and the dematerialisation were visible in 
the material flows in two ways. A first indication was the relative decline in the 
processing of domestic raw materials and subsoil resources (see Table 17.7). Firms 
made progressively less use of domestic natural capital. This national uncoupling 
pertained particularly to processors of bio and fossil raw materials. These industries 
were fed by an increasing import of unprocessed raw materials from abroad. In the 
second place, total imports more than doubled in an absolute sense and exports 
almost tripled (see Table 17.8). Processed products formed the lion’s share. The 
figures sketch the rough contours of a changing industry that oriented itself less and 
27 Helga Weisz, Development of Material Use in EU-15: 1970–2001, Material Composition, 
Cross-Country Comparison and Material Flow Indicators (Vienna 2006), 30.
28 Sjoerd Schenau et al., Milieurekening 2008 (Den Haag/Heerlen 2009), 44.
29 Rita Bhagethoe-Datadin and Roel Delahaye, ‘Materiaalstromen En Grondstofafhankelijkheid 
van de Nederlandse Economie,’ in De Nederlandse Economie 2013, ed. Hans Langenberg et al., 
De Nederlandse Economie (Den Haag/Heerlen 2013).
30 One of the problems is the issue double counting. The Netherlands exports raw materials and 
processed (semi-finished) products (i.e. parts for the car industries). These partially return with the 
import of final products (i.e. cars).
31 Sjoerd Schenau et al., Milieurekening 2008 (Den Haag/Heerlen 2009), 45–46.
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 Table 17.7 Proportion of domestic raw materials and subsoil resources processed in Dutch 
industry (in percent) 1970 and 2010 
1970 2010
Industrial processing of domestic raw 
materials and subsoil resources
Industrial processing of domestic raw 










Remark 1: Industry, excluding mineral and fossil subsoil asset extraction
Remark 2: In mineral resources application at building sites, ca. 50% of gravel and 20% of sand 
usages is assumed for concrete production
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016) 
 Table 17.6 The ten most prominent raw materials (in kilotons) and the portion thereof imported 
(in percent), 1970–2010 









Bio raw materials Total, of which 42.200 67.020 22 27
  Milk      8.330     11.290   1    4
  Grain      6.180      9.180  78   81
  Potatoes      5.040   0
  Raw maize 
fodder
    11.630   3
Mineral subsoil 
resources
Total, of which 80.120 95.570 38 41
  Clay      8.470   1
  Sand     22.980     28.360   5   27
  Gravel     27.170     19.900  47   82
  Stone     10.390     17.460  68   81
  Ores     15.030  100
Fossil subsoil 
resources
Total, of which 104.890 199.630 69 69
  Coal      9.160     22.190   1  100
  Turf
  Mineral oil     68.920     98.140  97   97
  Natural gas     25.650     77.930   0   23
Total 227.400 362.220 49 53
   197.040    311.110  44   64
Remark: Gross available = domestic production + imports
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016) 
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less to domestic demand and increasingly became a link in international flows of 
trade and commodities.
The changes in the ten biggest flows of raw and processed products confirm this 
picture and reveal several core economic activities (see Tables 17.6 and 17.9). 
Among biological products, the material flows of raw maize fodder and mixed fod-
ders are prominent. Both are largely for domestic consumption. These feed the 
strongly increased intensive livestock farming sector and its production of animal 
products like milk and meat. But the most striking change is the growth in the fossil 
raw materials and petrochemicals sector. In 2010 mineral oil and natural gas were 
by far the biggest material flows. The refining of mineral oil and gas also produces 
an enormous flow of organic chemical products like artificial rubber, plastics and 
other petroleum products. By contrast, the size of the flows of mineral subsoil 
resources decreased or grew only slightly. In 2010, in contrast to 1970, the 
Netherlands was no longer involved in big construction projects like the Delta 
Works or massive housing projects.
After 1970 the Netherlands commenced a new phase in its history and had to find 
an answer to new problems of well-being and sustainability. The country was con-
fronted with the question how to combine the development of personal well-being 
with the collective interest in the natural environment and natural capital. It turned 
out to be a real struggle. We work this out in the following chapters. How could 
agriculture and food production achieve an equilibrium with natural values and sus-
tainable nutritional patterns? How much room was there for the extraction of min-
eral resources? How should we deal with the globally shrinking sources of materials 
and energy? A complicating factor was the increasingly international scope of the 
issues, like acidification and climate change. These too demanded new answers in 
the subfields of biological, mineral and fossil material flows.
 Table 17.8 Imports and 
exports of processed products 
in kilotons and in percentage 
of total imports and exports, 
1970 and 2010 
1970 2010
Total imports 155.920 kton 359.150 kton
Imports processed products 44.640 kton 144.880 kton
Imports processed products 
(% of total)
29% 40%
Total exports 95.500 kton 279.500 kton
Exports processed products 62.020 kton 153.480 kton
Exports processed products 
(% of total)
65% 55%
Source: F.  Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 
1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrapport Technische Universiteit 
Eindhoven, oktober 2016) 
17 The Point of Departure Around 1970: Overabundance and Discontent
394
Literature
Bhagethoe-Datadin, Rita, and Roel Delahaye. (2013). ‘Materiaalstromen En 
Grondstofafhankelijkheid van de Nederlandse Economie.’ In De Nederlandse Economie 2013, 
edited by Hans Langenberg, Rita Bhagethoe-Datadin, Frank Notten, and Marieke Rensman. 
De Nederlandse Economie. Den Haag/Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.
Bink, R.J., D.  Bal, V.N. van den Berk, and L.J.  Draaijer. (1994). ‘Toestand van de Natuur 2.’ 
Wageningen: Informatie- en KennisCentrum Natuur, Bos, Landschap en Fauna, Ministerie van 
Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij.
Borbély, Szilvia. (2016). The Netherlands: Gender Pay Gap (GPG). Budapest: WITA GPG.
Cloin, Mariêlle, Andries van den Broek, Remko van den Dool, Jos de Haan, Joep de Hart, Pepijn 
van Houwelingen, Annet Tiessen-Raaphorst, Nathalie Sonck, and Jan Spit. (2013). Met Het 
Oog Op de Tijd, Een Blik Op de Tijdsbesteding van Nederlanders. Den Haag: Sociaal Cultureel 
Planbureau.
 Table 17.9 The ten most prominent processed products (in kilotons) and the proportions thereof 
imported and exported (in percent), 1970 and 2010 




























7.960 6.850 4 9 7 8
Concrete 
products
11.600 7.600 5 17 4 7
Concrete and 
asphalt
26.000 16.000 0 0 0 0


















Raw steel 5.330 7.030 5 3 3 1
Rolling mill 
products
8.020 11.460 41 59 35 57
Iron slag 5.320 66 1
Source: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrap-
port Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016) 
F. Veraart
395
Cramer, Jacqueline. (1985) ‘Milieu’. Elementaire Deeltjes 16. Amsterdam: AUP, 2014.
Duijn, Roel van. Provo, de Geschiedenis van de Provotarische Beweging, 1965–1967. Amsterdam: 
Meulenhoff.
Hoekstra, Rutger, and Jan Pieter Smits. (2009). ‘Monitor Duurzaam Nederland 2009.’ in Monitor 
Duurzaam Nederland. Den Haag/Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.
Hollander, Dick. (2012). ‘Tegen Beter Weten In.’ in de Geschiedenis van de Biologische Landbouw 
En Voeding in Nederland. Hurwenen: 4 Heuvels.
Irwin, G.A., J.J.M. Holsteyn, and J.M. de Ridder. (2005). ‘Dutch Parlementairy Election Study 
2002–2003.’ NIWI-Steinmetz Archive. Amsterdam: Foundation for Electoral Research in the 
Netherlands, SKON.
Kennedy, James C. (1995). Nieuw Babylon in Aanbouw, Nederland in de Jaren Zestig. Amsterdam: 
Boom, 1995.
Manshanden, Walter, Marcel de Heide, Olaf Koops, and Tom van der Horst. (2013). “De Staat van 
Nederland Innovatieland, R&D: Impuls Voor Economische Groei.” Special Issue. Stratagy & 
Change. Den Haag: The Hague Centre for Stratagic Studies en TNO.
Metze, Marcel. (1996). De Staat van Nederland, Op Weg Naar 2000. Nijmegen: SUN.
Meurink, André, and Reinoud Segers. (2015). Hernieuwbare Energie in Nederland 2014. Den 
Haag/Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.
Nekkers, J.A., and P.A.M. Malcontent, eds. (1999). De Geschiedenis van Vijftig Jaar Nederlandse 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 1949–1999. Den Haag: SDU Uitgeverij.
Nieuwbeerta, Paul, and Ingeborg Deerenberg. (2005). ‘Trends in Moord En Doodslag, 1911–2002.’ 
Bevolkingstrends, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek Bevolkingstrends, 1e kwartaal, 56–63.
Salverda, Wiemer, Loes de Graaf-Zijl, Christina Haas, Bram Lancee, and Natascha Notten. 
(2013). ‘Nederlandse Ongelijkheid Sinds 1980: Loonvorming, Overheidsbeleid En Veranderde 
Samenstelling van Huishoudens.’ in GINI Growing Inequalities’ Impacts. Amsterdam: 
Gini-research.
Salverda, Wiemer, Christina Haas, Marloes de Graaf-Zijl, Bram Lancee, and Natascha Notten. 
(2014). ‘Growing Inequalities an Their Impacts In The Netherlands.’ In Changing Inequalities 
and Societal Impacts in Rich Countries: Thirty Countries’ Experience, edited by Brian Nolan, 
Wiemer Salverda, Daniele Checchi, Ive Marx, Abigail McKnight, István György Tóth, and 
Herman van de Werfhorst, 20:459–87. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schenau, Sjoerd, Roel Delahaye, Bram Edens, Isabel van Geloof, Cor Graveland, Maarten van 
Rossum, and Kees Jan Wolswinkel. (2009). Milieurekening 2008. Den Haag/Heerlen: Centraal 
Bureau voor de Statistiek.
Siraa, H.T., A.J. van der Valk, and W.L. Wissink. (1995). Met Het Oog Op de Omgeving, Het 
Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening En Milieubeheer, 1965–1995. Den 
Haag: SDU Uitgeverij.
Smits, Jan Pieter. (2003). ‘Technologie, Productiviteit En Welzijn.’ In Techniek in Nederland in 
de Twintigste Eeuw, Techniek En Modernisering, Balans van de Twintigste Eeuw, edited by 
J.W. Schot, A. Rip, H.W. Lintsen, and A.A. Albert de la Bruheze, Vol. 7. Techniek in Nederland 
in de Twintigste Eeuw. Zutphen: Walburg Pers.
Sociaal Cultureel Rapport 1974. Den Haag: Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 1975.
Strijker, D., and I.J. Terluin. (2015). ‘Rural Protest Groups in the Netherlands.’ In Rural Protest 
Groups and Populist Political Parties, edited by D.  Strijker, G.  Voerman, and I.J.  Terluin. 
Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers.
Tasman, Coen. (1996). Louter Kabouter, Kroniek van Een Beweging 1969–1974. Amsterdam: 
Babylon-De Geus.
Tellegen, Egbert, and Jaap Willems, eds. (1978). Milieu-Aktie in Nederland. Amsterdam: De 
Trommel/Vereniging MilieuDefensie.
Todoseijevic, Bojan, Kees Aarts, and Harry van der Kaap. (2010). “Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Studies, Data Source Book, 1971–2006.” DANS Data Guide 7. The Hague: DANS.
17 The Point of Departure Around 1970: Overabundance and Discontent
396
Weisz, Helga. (2006). Development of Material Use in EU-15: 1970–2001, Material Composition, 
Cross-Country Comparison and Material Flow Indicators. Vienna: Eurostat/IFF-Social 
Ecology.
Zanden, Jan Luiten van, and R.T. Griffith. (1989). ‘Economische Geschiedenis van Nederland in 
de 20e Eeuw’. Aula 190. Utrecht: Het Spectrum.
Zanden, Jan Luiten van, and S.W.  Verstegen. (1993). Groene Geschiedenis van Nederland. 
Utrecht: Het Spectrum.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
F. Veraart
397© The Author(s) 2018 
H. Lintsen et al., Well-being, Sustainability and Social Development, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76696-6_18
Chapter 18
Agriculture and Foods: Overproduction 
and Overconsumption
Frank Veraart
Abstract In the period 1970–2010, environment, landscape and healthy nutrition 
were core issues in the supply chain of agriculture and foods. Concern for the envi-
ronment put pressure on agriculture. Since the 1950s, agriculture had oriented itself 
to ever higher levels of production. This had seduced farmers into extreme speciali-
sations with consequences for the environment, both domestically and elsewhere. In 
order to reveal these dynamics, this chapter follows developments in cattle hus-
bandry. In the early 1980s, European measures to restrain overproduction and 
increasing concern about acidification and over-fertilisation destabilised the estab-
lished agricultural world.
In the wake of changing ecological insights, new issues emerged in regard to the 
landscape. Nature management and agricultural interests had to be harmonised. 
Though the Netherlands laid the basis for the European Natura 2000 directive, it 
encountered great difficulties in implementing them domestically. Food consump-
tion also presented new challenges; for example the problem of overweight. The 
chapter analyses how government, private firms and consumers responded to this 
issue. Consumers appear to have great difficulty grasping the complex issues of 
sustainable and healthy nutritional patterns.
Keywords Agriculture · Over-fertilisation · Acidification · Overproduction · 
Landscape · Nutritional patterns · Overweight
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18.1  The Bolt Out of the Blue
On Friday, November 2 1984, the Minister of Agriculture Gerrit Braks announced:
that, in view of the manure surplus situation in the Netherlands, and in anticipation of the 
passage of the new Manure Law and the Law on Soil Protection, it is necessary to forbid the 
creation and expansion of hog and poultry farms in the Netherlands, or in certain designated 
regions in the Netherlands.1
The interim law was to go into immediate effect and it hit the agricultural organiza-
tions like a steamroller. Many farmers rushed to acquire permits to expand their 
farms and their livestock. In various town halls in the province of Brabant, home to 
numerous hog farms, civil-servants burned the midnight oil in order to be able to 
handle all the applications.2
The government deemed quick action essential because of the introduction of a 
European milk quota, aimed at limiting the production of milk. In view of this con-
straint on dairy farming, many farmers were considering switching to hog and poul-
try farming. This threatened a huge increase in the volume of animal manure. The 
Netherlands faced a quandary: ‘drowning in the milk or otherwise choking in a 
manure surplus’ according to a parliamentarian who championed the adopted 
course.
Agricultural organisations denounced the sudden decision. In the words of the 
secretary of the Society for Agriculture in the province of Gelderland: ‘This is cer-
tainly a fatal stab in the back for a great number of agrarian enterprises.’ According 
to him it deprived countless young farmers of the opportunity to develop a future: 
‘In this way the countryside is doomed to death.’3 The chairman of the Poultry 
Section of the Agricultural Board saw hog farming as the chief culprit. ‘We have to 
prevent poultry farming from having to foot the bill.’4 The North-Brabant Christian 
Farmers’ Union (NCB) characterised the measures as ‘a raid.’ But not all the farm-
ers were in mourning. As a pig breeder from Boekel in Brabant put it: ‘There are 
more than enough pigs. The measure may have a positive effect on the price of 
pork.’5
More legal restrictions in subsequent years provoked many agricultural enter-
prises to switch to other types of animal husbandry. In 1989, due to manure regula-
tions, the number of pigs had increased by 28% and that of chickens by 16% relative 
to 1984. The number of sheep had also increased significantly. After the  introduction 
1 Koninklijke Boodschap, ‘Verbod tot vestiging en uitbreiding van varkens- en pluimveehouderi-
jbedrijven in Nederland dan wel bepaalde delen daarvan (Interimwet beperking varkens- en plui-
mveehouderijen)’ Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1984–1985 kamerstuknummer 18695 ondernummer 
1, ‘s Gravenhage, 1 november 1984.
2 Frits Bloemendaal, Het Mestmoeras (Den Haag: SDU Uitgeverij, 1995), 7.
3 P.  Jongeling et  al. ‘Opzetten nieuwe varkens- en pluimveebedrijven verboden’ in Nederlands 
Dagblad: Gereformeerd Gezinsblad, 03-11-1984 p. 1.
4 Anoniem. ‘Landbouwschap volslagen verrast’, Leidsch Dagblad, 3 november 1984, p. 9.




of the ‘super-levy’ in 1984 the number of dairy cows decreased and the number of 
cows destined for beef production increased (see Graph 18.1).
The measures taken by the Minister of Agriculture without prior consultation 
with the farming world betrayed the changing relationship between the government 
and the agrarian sector after the mid-1980s. It turned out to be one of the first nails 
in the coffin of the ‘Green Front’ with the Agricultural Board (Landbouwschap) as 
a powerful actor. Specialisation within agriculture had also served to fragment the 
sector into conflicting interest groups. In this respect the recriminations among dif-
ferent livestock sectors were revealing. The strong corporatist character of the 
agrarian sector as a whole with strong bonds among farmers, administrators and 
civil-servants began to fall apart, as the further analysis of the manure problem 
below will show. In addition, agriculture in this period was also confronted by new 
issues like nature, landscape and biodiversity to which we shall also devote atten-
tion. Tensions were not limited to agriculture. In this period the entire food chain 
was under pressure. The availability of great quantities of cheap food raised new 
questions for public health, like obesity and heart and circulatory diseases. What 

































































Laying hens Dairy and Calf Cows
Other milk and breeding livestock Meat and Pasture Livestock
Graph 18.1 Development of most common livestock (excluding broilers) 1960–2015 
(1960 = 100)
Source: CBS – Landbouw; from 1851
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18.2  The Shifting Perspective on Agriculture
18.2.1  Specialisation and Over-Fertilisation
The modernisation of agriculture after the Second World War was a great success. 
Mechanisation, rationalisation and the structural policies of the government led to 
an increase in yields per hectare and per farm. It proved possible to maintain farm-
ers’ incomes at satisfactory levels. Agricultural organisations and the government 
were happy bedfellows and aimed at increased production and the stimulation of 
export. The problem of surpluses was accepted as a given. Throughout the 1970s 
Dutch agriculture was oriented entirely to competition with the other member states 
of the European Community.6
Further specialisation was the guiding principle. Livestock farmers abandoned 
the mixed farm, that provided for the needs of its own livestock. In 1961 the govern-
ment rescinded the ‘poultry regulations’ that had been introduced in 1953 to limit 
the number of animals to the amount of land available. This opened the door for the 
so-called non-land-coupled husbandry of especially chickens and pigs. This live-
stock was now maintained on the basis of purchased (mostly imported) feed. These 
changes led to an enormous increase in livestock for meat production. The number 
of broilers increased from 4,5 million in 1960 to almost 50 million in 2015. In the 
same period the pig population increased from 3 to almost 13 million. (see Table 18.1)
Specialisation also transformed other agricultural sectors. The sale of vegetables 
and greenhouse export crops like tomatoes and peppers increased, as did that of flower 
bulbs, while the national fruit production decreased.7 In the dairy sector, refrigerator 
tanks, box stalls and milking and feeding robots further industrialised farming. The 
6 Jan Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland, Geschiedenis van de Landbouw, 1500–2000 (Amsterdam: 
Boom, 2008), 476.
7 Bieleman, 543–66.
Table 18.1 Development of livestock 1960–2015 (× 1000 animals)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2015
Goats . 13 . 61 179 353 470
Laying hens 37,886 25,315 37,455 44,320 44,036 47,904 47,684
Broilers 4525 30,060 38,609 41,172 50,937 44,748 49,107
Dairy and calf cows 1628 1896 2356 1878 1504 1479 1622
Bulls 25 37 44 43 37 22 26
Other milk and breeding cattle 1495 1650 1908 1686 1299 1225 1324
Meat and pasture livestock 281 298 336 718 446 322 252
Veal calfs 78 434 582 602 783 928 909
Sheep 456 575 858 1702 1305 1130 946
Pigs 2955 5533 10,138 13,915 13,118 12,255 12,603
Source: CBS - Landbouw; from 1851
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introduction of plastic foils made ensilage an attractive option. With this technique the 
annual yield of raw fodder could be doubled compared to traditional haymaking. New 
technologies and materials accommodated an increasingly intensive exploitation of 
farming land.8
The strategy of specialisation and export was of a piece with the common agri-
cultural policy developed within the EEC in the 1960s. A complex funding system 
shielded a stable internal market from global price fluctuations, among other things 
by guaranteeing minimum prices for agricultural products. This system worked well 
in times of scarcity, but by the end of the 1970s had lost its polish. New policy 
instruments were needed to put an end to the unprecedented growth of milk lakes 
and butter mountains. In addition, global negotiations under the umbrella of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) put European policy under pres-
sure.9 By the end of the 1970s a European quota on milk production was in place. 
Farmers had to pay a levy on the production of excess milk. The levies set bad blood 
between domestic policy makers and agricultural organisations. And new environ-
mental constraints only increased the pressure on the agricultural world
The shifting perspective was clearly visible in relation to the problem of over- 
fertilisation. At the end of the 1960s the Institute for Soil Fertility had already 
expressed concern about over-fertilisation of the soil. In 1972, the Foundation for 
Nature and Environment compared the bio-industry with the mythological Augean 
Stables and lambasted the effects of unregulated spreading of animal manure, espe-
cially on the sand grounds. The agricultural world responded irritably and pro-
nounced it a shame that a prosperous sector should be hindered in its development.
The Ministry of Agriculture sought succour in technical solutions. It played 
down the problems, among other things by pointing the finger at phosphates associ-
ated with the use of laundry detergents. The message was that agriculture was not 
the sole polluter. Nonetheless, the ministry established manure banks. Matching the 
supply of manure with the demand was only partly successful. In the event, it 
appeared that by expanding the cultivation of fodder corn the government and farm-
ers could kill two birds with one stone. Not only was this crop easy to cultivate and 
harvest and excellent as fodder, it also grew exceptionally well on the abundantly 
fertilised sand grounds. Between 1970 and 2010 the acreage of fodder corn grew 
steadily from 6000 to 231,000 hectares.
New knowledge about the relationship between acid substances in the air and 
soil totally undermined the permissive policy of the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1982 
researchers at the Wageningen Agricultural University published new findings about 
the role played by ammonia in acidification.10 These findings added a new  dimension 
8 Bieleman, 531–33.
9 Bieleman, 511; A.H. Crijns, ‘De Grote Ommekeer in de Agrarische Sector’, in Geschiedenis van 
Noord-Brabant, Dynamiek En Expansie, 1945–1996, ed. H.F.J.M. van den Eerenbeemt, vol. 3, 3 
vols., Geschiedenis van Noord-Brabant (Boom, 1997).
10 N. van Breemen et  al., ‘Soil Acidification from Atmospheric Ammonium Sulphate in Forest 
Canopy Throughfall,’ Nature 299, no. 5883 (October 7, 1982): 548–50.
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to the manure problem.11 The newly appointed Minister of the Environment, Pieter 
Winsemius, saw acidification 
‘as one of the biggest problems we have to deal with. … New data … show that acidifica-
tion in the Netherlands is caused for 20% by NOx, for 45% by SO2 and for 35% by NH3. … 
We know where the handles … are located, namely road traffic, electrical power plants and 
most probably intensive livestock husbandry.’12
Winsemius hesitated due to a brief controversy at Wagening about the data being 
presented, but possibly also because he feared reactions from the agricultural sector. 
In the end, together with prime-minister Ruud Lubbers, Winsemius was able to 
convince the Minister of Agriculture of the seriousness of the situation. The latter, 
in the person of Gerrit Braks, took the unexpected and in agricultural circles incom-
prehensible measure to limit the number of hogs and chickens  – the affair with 
which we began this chapter. The incomprehensibility was among other things 
rooted in the apparently one-sided manner in which the measure had been con-
ceived. Moreover there had been no prior consultation with the agricultural organ-
isations with the result that the ministry now appeared to be opposed to the powerful 
agricultural lobby. For the first time, agricultural organisations felt their influence 
waning in The Hague.
The incident also revealed the vulnerability of agrarian cooperation. There was 
no consensus in agricultural circles about possible solutions. Specialisation had 
fomented different interests in different agricultural sectors. The lack of unity finally 
broke the power of the Agricultural Board and made it possible to introduce new 
measures that privileged ecological interests above those of production. But, though 
the power of the Green Front and the Agricultural Board might be broken, a divided 
sector with many new specific interest groups made the introduction of policy mea-
sures more difficult. Due to fraudulent practices by municipalities and farmers, dis-
pensations and lack of cooperation by administrative organs, the number of pigs 
increased substantially even after restrictive measures came into force.13
The Ministry of Agriculture continued to put its faith in technical and bureau-
cratic solutions that could tackle the manure problem while at the same time permit 
the growth of animal husbandry. This approach was only partly successful. From 
1987 on, funds were pumped into the industrial processing of manure. Promest in 
Helmond focused on the processing of pig manure. After several difficult years the 
factory folded in 1990. The industrial processing of chicken manure was more suc-
cessful. In addition to the production of manure pellets, the late 1990s saw the 
introduction of manure incinerators. In this process, nitrogen was released into the 
11 G.H.  Dinkelman, Verzuring En Broeikaseffect, de Wisselwerking Tussen Problemen En 
Oplossingen in Het Nederlandse Luchtverontreinigingsbeleid (1970–1994) (Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, 1995), 84–90.
12 P. Winsemius in Vaste commissie voor milieubeheer, 1983, p. 34, geciteerd in H. Dinkelman, 
Verzuring en Broeikaseffect, de Wisselwerking Tussen Problemen en Oplossingen in het 
Nederlandse Luchtverontreinigingsbeleid (1970–1994), (Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1995), 90.
13 John Grin, Jan Rotmans, and Johan W.  Schot, Transitions to Sustainable Development, New 




atmosphere and phosphate was reclaimed from the ashes, to be used for non- 
agricultural purposes.14
In 1991, goaded by the European Nitrate Directive, an accounting system for the 
emission of minerals was set up. In 1998 a mineral denotation system (MINAS) was 
introduced. In addition, the scale of production was fixed per farm in terms of so- 
called ‘animal-allotments’ for pigs (1999) and poultry (2001). In 2002 this was fol-
lowed by the Manure Disposal Agreements (MAOs). These administrative measures 
were coupled to financial sanction mechanisms. These measures, however, appeared 
inadequate to meet the targets of the European Nitrate Directives. In 2003 the 
Minister of Agriculture, Veerman, characterized the problem succinctly: ‘We import 
feed, we export pigs and keep the mess here. That system has seized up.’15 In 2006 
under European pressure a new Fertiliser Substance Law came into effect. Among 
other things the law mandated a meticulous accounting of the fertilisation of the soil 
and of soil use. Thanks to this detailed accounting, Dutch agriculture was granted a 
European exemption, a so-called derogation, with respect to its manure use.16
In addition to measures like these, after 1997 the Ministry of Agriculture also 
developed plans to reduce the size of especially the hog-farming sector. By purchas-
ing excess livestock, a so-called ‘warm restructuring’ was initiated. Dramatic epi-
demics like swine fever (1997, 1998), hoof and mouth disease (2001), and bird flu 
(2003) accelerated the warm restructuring and eventuated in a reduction of the size 
of pig and poultry stocks (see Graph 18.1 and Table 18.1). In 2001 the manure prob-
lem seemed solved, but this turned out to be only a temporary victory.
With the Fertiliser Substance Law and the derogation arrangement breathing 
down its neck, the Dutch cattle husbandry sector remained under continuous pres-
sure to meet the targets of the environmental directives. This was a precarious bal-
ancing act. In 2014 new European derogation guidelines were negotiated, which 
emphatically included the dairy sector. The suspension of the milk quota in 2015 
felt like ‘Liberation Day’ for the dairy sector. Many of the dairy farmers had invested 
in new stalls for more animals. Despite warnings by the ministry and environmental 
organisations, increased manure production quickly became a problem. The 
Netherlands even threatened to lose its favourable exemption arrangement and it 
would be unable to satisfy the demands of the strict general European directives. 
New ad hoc measures by the ministry and negotiations with the dairy farmers were 
supposed to bring profitability for the dairy sector and enforcement of environmen-
tal directives into alignment again.
The manure question is illustrative of the way in which, from the 1970s on, 
specialisation and specific interests caused the agricultural conglomerate to fall 
apart into smaller units, each with its own interests. The Ministry of Agriculture, 
from the perspective of the farmers, became more of an opponent than the ally it 
had always been. The Ministry searched for an ecological balance in food produc-
14 Ben Hermans, De Mestmarathon, Kroniek van Ruim 42 Jaar Nederlands Mestbeleid (Utrecht: 
Natuur & Milieu, 2016), 20.
15 Minister Veerman cited in Hermans, 25.
16 Hermans, 28.
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tion and created strict frameworks within which agriculture was to be practiced. At 
the same time the ministry continuously kept an eye out for ways to increase scale 
and profitability.
The disquiet and new directives turned out to provide fertile soil for other forms 
of agriculture. In crop farming sophisticated technologies were used to implement 
so-called ‘precision agriculture’ in which fertilisers and crop protection substances 
were applied at the right place and in the most optimal amounts.17 In addition, some 
farmers followed a new path: organic farming. The number of certified organic 
farms grew from 835 in 1998 to 1412 in 2014. Organic acreage grew in the same 
period from 22,268 ha to 49,333 ha. In 2014 this was only a modest 2.7% of the total 
agricultural acreage.18 The transition to a more sustainable  – not necessarily 
organic – agriculture is one of the great challenges for the twenty-first century.
18.2.2  Room for Agriculture, Nature and Public Health
In the 1970s a new approach to nature development emerged. Conservation evolved 
into a new, more ecological approach to nature. The unintended and unexpected 
spontaneous nature development in the area around the Oostvaardersplassen (a 
marshy remnant within the new polder Flevoland) was in this respect a revelation. 
Nature conservation now became a matter of restoring plant and animal ecotopes. 
The ‘nature restoration’ notion was accorded a wondrously warm reception by 
nature, environmental and tourist organisations as well as by provincial and national 
governments and even by agricultural organisations.19
In 1975 the Ministries of Agriculture and of Public Housing, Spatial Planning 
and Environment presented the so-called ‘Relation Memorandum’ (relatienota) in 
which they described the points of departure for nature and landscape conservation 
in agricultural landscapes. This policy defined two types of management. In so- 
called reservation areas agricultural activities were all but banned. In the course of 
about three decades approximately 100,000 hectares of farming land in these 
regions were to be purchased by the state and brought under the management of the 
State Forestry Service and environmental protection organisations. Additionally the 
ministries designated about 100,000 hectares as so-called ‘management zones.’ In 
these zones farmers would be compensated for nature management, like the 
 restoration of hedgerows, planting flowers along drainage canals and protecting 
17 Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland, Geschiedenis van de Landbouw, 1500–2000, 573.
18 Compendium voor de Leefomgeving, Biologische landbouw: aantal bedrijven en areaal, 1998–
2014, (Indicator, 21 mei 2015), www.clo.nl/indicatoren/nl0011-biologische-landbouw; CBS, 
Ruim 1,4 duizend biologische landbouwbedrijven (19-12-2014), www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2014/51/
ruim-1-4-duizend-biologische-landbouwbedrijven
19 Arjen Buijs, Thomas Matthijssen, and Bas Arts, ‘“The Man, the Administration and the Counter-
Discourse”: An Analysis of the Sudden Turn in Dutch Nature Conservation Policy,’ Land Use 
Policy 38 (2014): 678.
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field birds. Constrained in the 1980s by European measures to limit production, 
farmers were in search of extra income. Despite the fact that little profit was to be 
had, about half the farmers in the management zones participated.20
In 1990 the ecological approach was codified in the first Nature Policy Plan pub-
lished by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Nature Management. Particular 
attention was called to the changes considered necessary in the domain of 
agriculture.
The extension of agricultural production will have to be in agreement with, for example, 
contributions to protecting the environment, the conservation and development of nature 
values and the maintenance of the habitability of the countryside.21
The Nature Policy Plan entailed a spatial vision of nature development, namely the 
so-called Ecological Main Structure (EHS). Within this structure, important nature 
areas were connected with each other via ecological transition zones. One example 
was the ‘wet axis’ from the Lauwerszee and the German Ems in the north to the 
Biesbosch and the Zeeland Delta in the south. The EHS comprised a continuous 
network of more than 700,000 hectares of nature zones, landed estates, nature 
development areas and connective corridors. With these plans, the Netherlands, 
together with Estonia and Flanders, propelled itself into the European vanguard. 
The EHS together with already existing habitat directives was the direct inspiration 
for the European Natura 2000 policy, that was codified into new European rules at 
the turn of the century.22
The originally broad support was among other things based on the perception in 
agricultural circles that the new measures were a further elaboration of the policy 
embodied in the Relation Memorandum. And the exemplary role that this policy had 
played in the realisation of the Natura 2000 directives was also presented with a 
certain pride.
But in 2000 the mood changed abruptly. In that year, basing its case on the new 
legislation, the conservation association Das en Boom (Badger and Tree) com-
menced legal proceedings against the construction of an industrial park in Heerlen. 
The construction threatened the habitat of the Korenwolf, a type of hamster rare in 
the Netherlands. The lawsuit stopped the construction of the prestigious industrial 
park. This example was followed by other nature organisations to put a stop to other 
undesirable construction and agrarian activities. Between 2001 and 2010 the num-
ber of legal actions rooted in the nature conservation laws grew apace.23
20 C.M. Volker, Boeren in Betwist Landschap, Strategische Keuzes van Boeren in een Waardevol 
Agrarisch Landschap (Wageningen Universiteit, 1999), 56–59.
21 Natuurbeleidsplan, Pub. L. No. TK 21149, 1989–1990 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2 (1990), 
191.
22 Rob H.G. Jongman, ‘Nature Conservation Planning in Europe: Developing Ecological Networks,’ 
Landscape and Urban Planning 32 (1995): 196–183.
23 Raoul Beunen, Kristof van Assche, and Martijn Duineveld, ‘Performing Failure in Conservation 
Policy: The Implementation of European Union Directives in the Netherlands,’ Land Use Policy 31 
(2013).
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The confounded local politicians, real estate developers and agricultural organ-
isations vented their spleen on the Natura 2000 policy. They saw this as an impedi-
ment to economic growth. Policy makers mobilised the weapon of ‘substantial 
societal interest’ in order to gain the upper hand in lawsuits. Societal unrest and 
political dissatisfaction undermined the legitimacy of the nature conservation rules. 
In 2009 prime minister Balkenende wrote a letter to the chairman of the European 
Commission, Barosso, in which he requested more ‘equilibrium among ecological 
values, economic interests and other uses.’24 No adjustments were forthcoming, but 
subsequent Dutch cabinets persisted in seeking weaker regulations. The environ-
mentalist directives were framed as elite and ‘left-wing hobbies’ that impeded the 
economic development of the Netherlands.25
‘There is only a very small elite that gets their kicks from the unique nature that you’re sup-
posed to be able to find in Natura 2000 zones. You almost need an academic degree to be 
able to appreciate it,’
as Minister of Agriculture Henk Bleker put it in 2011.26 Ever fewer farmers saw 
profit in nature development (see Graph 18.2). On the other hand, nature developers 
did succeed in finding new partners, for example in the domain of gravel mining 
(see Chap. 19).
Nature development was only one of the challenges facing the agrarian world. At 
the end of the twentieth century the countryside acquired new functions. It was no 
longer the exclusive domain of agriculture. Due to the increasing urbanisation of the 
countryside, by 2016 some 3 million people lived in rural neighbourhoods. Of these, 
only 173,000 worked in agriculture. Farmers saw the opportunities in these develop-
ments and combined their farming with health care, child care, recreation, education 
and energy production (see Graph 18.3).
24 ‘Balkenende wilde andere natuurwet’ in NRC, 11 januari 2010.
25 Buijs, Matthijssen, and Arts, ‘“The Man, the Administration and the Counter-Discourse”: An 
Analysis of the Sudden Turn in Dutch Nature Conservation Policy.’
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Source: CBS- Landbouw; bedrijven met verbredingsactiviteiten
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But the increasing population of the countryside also brought new tensions with 
it. Circles defining zones of odour nuisance were a spatial illustration of the con-
flicts between the old and new uses. The Q-fever epidemic of 2007–2011, involving 
microbes that could be transmitted from humans to animals, exhibited the tensions 
between economic agrarian interests and the public health of recreational visitors 
and Dutch residents in the countryside. The spatial challenge facing the large-scale 
and technologically advanced agrarian enterprises was to integrate intensive animal 
husbandry within a densely populated country, while also paying due respect to 
issues of ecology and energy.
18.3  The Wages of Excess – In Search of Tasty Healthy Food
Netherlanders are losing control of their diet. In the 1950s most of the Dutch had 
adopted a clear nutritional pattern: each day two bread meals and a warm meal, ide-
ally constituted according to the ‘disk of five.’ Since then, the Dutch eating pattern 
has changed dramatically. Although food comprises a substantially smaller portion 
of the household budget, it has by no means become less important. In 1960 more 
than 30% of the household budget was spent on food. By 1980 this had declined to 
16% and by 2011 to a mere 11%. At the same time the attitude to food shifted. For 
most of the Dutch population, food is not so much a necessity of life as it is a means 
of expression, an element of a lifestyle: ‘You are what you eat.’ More luxurious 
foods became available and new exotic nutritional patterns emerged, visible, among 
other things, in the increased consumption of meat and dairy products.27 And also in 
the increasing patronage of restaurants.
The classic nutritional pattern and the ‘disk of five’ was consonant with the 
epoch of the wage-earner model, in which the man of the family earned the money 
and the woman devoted her labour power to care for the home and family. Women’s 
organisations, businesses and governments aimed at the housewife in their informa-
tional and educational campaigns. This model gradually lost its force. In 1973 only 
21% of the married women worked for wages; this increased to 44% in 1997.28 By 
2016 women in 60% of the couples had paid employment.29 Meanwhile the number 
of single persons increased due to individualisation and an increasingly aged 
population.
Changes in nutrition were also related to globalisation. The decolonisation of 
Indonesia and Surinam, labour migration from Southern Europe, Turkey and 
Morocco and the growing number of foreign vacation destinations introduced new 
27 Ronald van der Bie et  al., Smakelijk Weten, Trends in Voeding en Gezondheid (Den Haag / 
Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2012), 40–41.
28 A.H. van Otterloo, ed., ‘Voeding,’ in Landbouw & Voeding, vol. Voeding, Techniek in Nederland 
in de Twintigste Eeuw 3 (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2000), 282.
29 CBS Statline: Arbeidsdeelname Paren
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food habits. The reliance on potatoes diminished and was replaced in evening meals 
by rice, pasta and pizzas.30
The Dutch diet became much more varied thanks to an ever-more elaborate selec-
tion of foodstuffs. The food industry developed a broad range of instant foodstuffs, 
of consistent quality and homogeneous taste. Conservation techniques and additives 
regulated taste, color, smell, appearance and shelf life. All of this was aimed at the 
needs of the consumer and supported by a media offensive controlled by the food 
sector. The supermarket giant, Albert Heijn, developed the door-to-door magazine 
Aller Hande (1954) available for free in all its stores since 1983. During the 1990s, 
multinational Unilever started worked with commercial television stations to 
develop cooking programs.31 Magazines, television and books became important 
channels for the diffusion of new eating patterns and knowledge about foods.
18.3.1  Snacks Everywhere
During the 1960s, the food-processing industry made inroads into the ever- 
expanding household food budget. Riding the wave of the popular fascination with 
American culture it initiated research into new snacks and new ‘eating moments.’ 
Their introduction was not a foregone conclusion. In 1971, Unilever researchers 
concluded that the consumption of snacks in the Netherlands took place chiefly 
within the home between the hours of 20:00 and 22:00, during TV viewing and the 
entertainment of guests. The Dutch hearty breakfast and the early warm meal inter-
fered with earlier snack moments, according to the investigators.32
Changing established food patterns turned out not to be a simple task. It required 
many experiments and much research. Market research became ever more elaborate 
and aimed at an ever larger variety of subgroups with their own customs and tastes. 
This made it possible to gradually define new eating moments for a variety of break-
fast, lunch, sport, happy hour, desert and casual snacks. From small ‘in-betweens’ 
consisting of relatively simple products like potato chips and nuts, snacks developed 
into more complex products like pizzas, hamburgers and breakfast bars. Gradually 
the pattern of the day with its three meals transformed into one in which food and 
drink were consumed throughout the day at different moments (see Graph 18.3).33
30 Marlou Schrover et  al., ‘Lekker,’ in Verandering van Het Alledaagse, 1950–2000, ed. Isabel 
Hoving, Hester Dibbits, and Marlou Schrover, Cultuur En Migratie van Nederland (Den Haag: Sdu 
Uitgevers, 2005), 77–112.
31 Schrover et al., ‘Lekker,’ 106–12.
32 Otterloo, ‘Voeding,’ 366.
33 C.T.M van Rossum et al., The Diet of the Dutch, Results of the First Two Years of the Dutch 
National Food Consumption Survey, 2012–2016, RIVM Letter Report 2016–0082 (Bilthoven: 
National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), 2016), 37–39.
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Outside of the home, eating habits also changed. Restaurants were increasingly 
frequented. In bistros, French cuisine from the vacation could be re-experienced and 
in ‘Chinese restaurants’ the pleasures of the former colony. American culture could 
be tasted starting in 1969 at Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) and from 1971 on at 
McDonalds.34
Despite the increasing number of eating establishments the majority of meals in 
2016 (78%) were still eaten at home. But the age group between 9 and 50 also ate 
more frequently at school or at work (15%–18%), in restaurants or on the road 
(5%–6%) or at other locations (2%–3%).35 Food and fast foods were available at 
more and more places and times.36 This included not only fast food restaurants in 
cities, transportation hubs and along highways, but also increasingly coffee corners 
in garden centres, bookstores and home furnishing stores.
The ever expanding assortment, the increasingly ready availability and increasing 
welfare had different effects on health. Sufficient and sufficiently healthy food had 
an unmistakably positive effect on the general health of the Dutch. Longevity and 
average height continued to increase. The incidence of so-called  deficiency- diseases 
also declined. Malnutrition disappeared, but was rapidly replaced by over- 
34 M. van Rotterdam, De 70’s, Alles over de Jaren Zeventig (Utrecht/Antwerpen: Kosmos, 2005), 
85–93; W. Schreurs, De Jaren Zeventig van Abba Tot Zitkuil (Amsterdam: Balans, 2016), 57–58. 
The first McDonalds restaurant in Europe opened its doors in Zaandam in 1971. The concession 
was set up in cooperation with the Dutch supermarket chain Albert Heijn. In 1975 the cooperation 
between McDonalds and Albert Heijn was ended.
35 Rossum et al., The Diet of the Dutch, Results of the First Two Years of the Dutch National Food 
Consumption Survey, 2012–2016, 63.
36 Anneke H. van Otterloo, ‘Healthy, Safe and Sustainablie, Consumers and the Public Debate on 
Food in Europe and the Netherlands Since 1945,’ in Food Practices in Transition, by Gert 
Spaargaren, Peter Oosterveer, and Anne Loeber, Studies in Sustainable Transitions 3 (New York / 
London: Routledge, 2012), 71.
Graph 18.3 Number of food consumption occasions of the Dutch population by hours of the day
n = 2237 stratified by age-gender groups, weighted for socio-demographic characteristics, season 
and day of the week
Source: Van Rossum et al. (2016) RIVM – DNFCS 2012–2014
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consumption (see Graph 18.4). The new food regime of abundant, fat and sweet 
created new health concerns. Combined with decreasing physical exertion at work 
this led to increasing overweight, heart and circulatory disease and diabetes. The 
increasing incidence of different forms of cancer was also attributed to the new eat-
ing and lifestyle habits.37 Governments, business and consumers responded differ-
ently to the changes in food consumption and lifestyles.
18.3.2  Government: Informing the Public and Research
In 1983 the Dutch government published a first Memorandum on Food Policy. This 
was above all a continuation of the existing agenda supplemented with concerns 
about hygiene. The core was a robust supply of safe foods along with the encourage-
ment of good eating habits.
Until the 1980s the Law on Food Commodities had been the means to guarantee 
food quality in the Netherlands. In 1982, harmonisation with European food direc-
tives was experienced as a step backward. The Netherlands could not turn its back 
on the more liberal European policy, that was more lenient in regard to the use of 
additives and the making of health claims by the food processing industry.38 
However, unrest among consumers gave rise to a supplemental European directive 
37 C.F. van Kreijl and A.G.A.C. Knaap, Ons Eten Gemeten, Gezonde Voeding En Veilig Voedsel in 
Nederland (Bilthoven: Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (RIVM), 2004), 55–56.



















in 1989. With the mandatory publication of ingredients on the packaging it became 
possible for consumers to make conscious choices.39
In more recent decades, the big challenge has been combatting the new welfare 
diseases. In the 1980s ‘reducing fat consumption’ was the main issue. Policy aimed 
above all at preventing heart and circulatory disease and cancer. By the end of the 
1990s the government had become more concerned about food habits and lifestyles. 
The Nutrition Centre and public campaigns targeted both the general public and 
specific subgroups. Young people were apprised of healthy eating habits through 
school-based programs. From the 1990s on the government sought to enlist the 
business community using the instrument of covenants. Research monitored the 
effects of this food policy.40
In 2004 the National Institute for Public Health and Environment measured the 
health effects of food and lifestyle. The effects were expressed in terms of so-called 
Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY), an indicator that cumulated the number of 
lost and dependent years over a lifetime. From the calculations it followed that a 
dearth of physical exercise, bad nutritional habits and overweight were the most 
significant factors in the health and longevity losses. Compared to these factors, the 
losses due to food allergies, infections or chemical substances were trivial.41 In the 
first decades of the twenty-first century government policy therefore shifted from 
regulating foodstuffs to influencing lifestyles, with food consumption as a specific 
target. Varied and healthy foods and sufficient attention to physical exertion were 
the main ingredients.
18.3.3  Private Enterprise: New Functional Foodstuffs
Overconsumption was indirectly the result of the success of the agrarian sector and 
the food processing industry. This laid the basis for the enormous assortment and 
the low prices. This did not mean that nutritional problems left the business com-
munity cold. For them the problems in a certain sense meant a new challenge to 
produce tasty foods, but now, for example, containing less fat, sugar and calories.
The 1980s saw a proliferation of research into so-called ‘functional foods,’ food-
stuffs developed in order to promote health. A firm like Unilever already had a lot 
of experience in this area. As early as the 1960s the company had already developed 
the cholesterol-lowering margarine Becel, aimed in the first place at heart patients.42 
39 Otterloo, Healthy, Safe and Sustainable, Consumers and the Public Debate on Food in Europe 
and the Netherlands Since 1945, 71.
40 Kreijl and Knaap, Ons Eten Gemeten, Gezonde Voeding En Veilig Voedsel in Nederland, 104–9.
41 Kreijl and Knaap, 283–90. The results of the calculations for health loss were as follows for these 
aspects: unfavourable diet (245.000 DALY), overweight and obesity (215.000 DALY), insufficient 
exercise (150.000 DALY), food allergies (1000 DALY), food infections (1000–4000 DALY) and 
chemical substances (500–1000 DALY).
42 Mila Davids, ‘Technology as the New Frontier: Unilever and the Rise of Becel Margarine,’ 
Journal of Modern European History 14, no. 1 (2016): 101–18.
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In the early 1970s the same firm introduced halvarine, a margarine with half of the 
usual fat percentage.
The link between food consumption and lifestyle was evident in the consumption 
of soft drinks. After the introduction of ‘family size’ bottles in the mid-fifties this 
market expanded steadily. In 1970 the average Netherlander drank about 55 litres of 
soft drinks per year. At the end of the 1980s consumption increased markedly and 
around the turn of the century per capita soft drink consumption was almost a hun-
dred litres per year, nearly a can (30 cl) per day (see Graph 18.5).
With the development of synthetic sweeteners like cyclamate (1951) and sac-
charine (1958) sugar-free soft drinks could be developed and tentatively marketed. 
Initially they were aimed above all at the market for diabetics. The Dutch Food 
Commodities Law was conservative when it came to such artificial additives. But 
for diabetics exceptions could be made. Only a few manufacturers, at the end of the 
1960s, developed sugar-free soft drinks. Advertisements in which these were pre-
sented as diet products were challenged in the 1970s by both the Ministry of Public 
Health as well as by manufacturers of soft drinks containing sugar.
In 1984 European regulations admitted saccharine, cyclamate and the new artifi-
cial sweetener aspartane as safe sugar substitutes for sweetening foods. This was the 
origin of the so-called ‘light’ products. Gradually sugar-free soft drinks established 
a position in the soft drink market. The market share grew from 3% in 1985 to 13% 
in 1992 to 30% in 2015.43 The soft drink industry also promoted the sale of bottled 
mineral water by playing on emergent consumer preferences for healthy and low- 
calorie nutrition. The consumption of mineral water increased from a half litre per 
43 Peter Zwaal, Frisdranken in Nederland, Een Twintigste Eeuwse Productgeschiedenis (Rotterdam: 
















Graph 18.5 Annual consumption of soft drinks, mineral water and fruit juice  (in l/cap.), 
1970–2015
Source: CBS and after 2011 FWS (CBS Statline – Voedings- en genotmiddelen; consumptie per 
Nederlander, 1899–2009; Nederlandse Vereniging Frisdranken, Waters, Sappen (FWS)  – 
Kerngegevens/Basic Statistical information 2016 via www.frisdrank.nl)
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capita per year in 1970 to more than 30 litres per capita per year in 2015, almost as 
much as light soft drinks (see Table 18.2).
European regulations that came into force at the end of the 1990s expanded the 
possibilities for the use of additives and vitamin preparations. They also increased 
leeway in making health benefit claims.44 Using claims about the reduction of cho-
lesterol, the prevention of heart and circulatory disease and better health through 
less sugar consumption and the use of natural colour and taste substances, the food 
industry played to the increasing concerns about health and overweight. In the 
meantime a lively debate has emerged about the grounding of those claims.
Welfare diseases and a lifestyle of excess have silently been transformed into a 
new market for the sale of craftily designed foodstuffs.
18.4  Crisis in Nutrition
A portion of the consuming public was extremely critical of the increasing industri-
alisation and commercialisation of agriculture and foodstuffs. This criticism had 
already been ventilated in the anarchistic program of the Provos and the Kabouters 
around 1970 (see Chap. 17). They laid the foundations for numerous so-called 
macro-biotic stores with organic products. This created an important link between 
organic farming and consumers.45
The sale of organic products was limited until the 1990s, in part because of the 
high prices consumers had to pay for them. The new regulations for synthetic addi-
tives in 1989 and the debates between 1998 and 2002 about allowing genetically 
modified agricultural products in the EU initiated a new discussion about healthy 
and sustainable food production. The outbreak of ‘mad cow disease’ (BSE) in 1987, 
the compulsory hog slaughter in connection with hoof and mouth disease in 2001 
and the subsequent chicken slaughter after outbreaks of avian flu in 2003 added fuel 
to the fire. Environmental and animal welfare associations joined in the public 
debate about food safety and the food chain. They provided a perspective on more 
44 Otterloo, ‘Voeding,’ 374.
45 Dick Hollander, Tegen Beter Weten In. de Geschiedenis van de Biologische Landbouw En 
Voeding in Nederland (Hurwenen: 4 Heuvels, 2012), 105–6.
Table 18.2 Consumption of soft drinks, mineral water and fruit juice (in litres per capita per year)
Soft drinks Mineral water Fruit juice
Sugared Light
1984 53 1 9
1992 67 10 15
2012 69 31 22 29
2016 56 26 26 24
Source: CBS and after 2011 FWS
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sustainable food patterns via publicity campaigns aimed at the products available in 
supermarkets and the behaviour of consumers.
The international ramifications of the food chain make the debate even more 
complex. Concepts like ‘food kilometre,’ ‘ecological footprint’ and the associated 
‘footprint of our food’ are intended to give consumers insight into the problems of 
the international character of the food chain.46 Raw materials and food are dragged 
hither and thither. That costs energy, produces emissions and makes it more difficult 
to monitor food safety. Food kilometres attempt to express this. Dutch pigs, for 
example, are transported to the Italian city Parma in order to be processed into 
Parma ham, a product that can bear this name only if it is produced in that city. The 
ham subsequently finds its way to the Netherlands. The footprint is supposed to give 
us an idea of the ecological effects, for example the effects of cattle husbandry on 
logging, reclamation, draining of swamps and disproportionate water use. Social 
aspects are often also at issue, like fair trade with the developing world and the 
working conditions of farm workers. A variant is a calculation by the Dutch Nature 
and Environment Federation of the size of the claim a consumer makes on the 
amount of land annually necessary to provide his or her food.47 For a Dutch person 
that would be 6.2 hectares, while the rest of the world population makes do with an 
average of 2.7 and while there is only 1.8 hectare per person available. Their conclu-
sion is that the Dutch use disproportionate amounts of land and that nature is being 
disproportionately abused. While the concepts and calculations may be contested, 
they do express concerns about the biological capacity of the earth and the habit-
ability of the planet for future generations.
How is a consumer to get a grip on the complex issues of sustainable and healthy 
nutritional patterns? Among his resources are the trademarks, certificates and 
labels.48 These are supposed to provide him with information about, among other 
things, environmental effects, animal-friendly production, fair trade and health 
effects. Despite this, the certificates only partly succeed in winning the confidence 
of the consumer in sustainable, healthy and responsible food. A comprehensive and 
unambiguous image of healthy and sustainable food is lacking. The variety is over-
whelming. Doubt is often cast on the objectivity of the information provided. The 
claims made are not always grounded. The organisation providing the information 
is not always independent. Even information based on extensive scientific research 
is a cause of confusion. Notorious in this respect are the discussions about 
E-numbers, a European system for the coding and classification of supplements to 
food, like dyes, coagulants, anti-oxidants and vitamins.
The consumer faces many dilemmas. In this way eating becomes an act of know-
ing and conscience, of believing and hoping.49
46 L.O.  Fresco, Hamburgers in het paradijs. Voedsel in tijden van schaarste en overvloed 
(Amsterdam 2012), 364–369.
47 http://voetafdruknederland.nl/over-de-voetafdruk/ (geraadpleegd op 20–11-2017).
48 Fresco, Hamburgers in het paradijs, 369–373.
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Chapter 19
Building Materials and Construction: 
Sustainability, Dependency and Foreign 
Suppliers
Frank Veraart
Abstract This chapter describes the extraction of mineral subsoil resources in a 
changing context of increasing internationalisation and domestic concern for nature 
and the environment. The cases are gravel and marl in the province of Limburg and 
the European inventory of strategic mineral resources. The period around 1970 
formed the high point of Dutch building activities. The extraction and production of 
building materials had an increasing impact on the landscape (see Chap. 14). 
Bringing laws against excavations and spatial planning to bear, the government 
increased its control over the extraction activities. The new policy integrated the 
excavations in spatial planning and landscape goals.
The politicisation of environmental issues led to the harmonisation of the extrac-
tion of mineral resources with the local societal requirements for tourism, nature 
development, and flood control. Intensification of European cooperation positioned 
domestic extraction within a European economic framework. Higher prices for 
gravel and other building materials made recycling, among other things, attractive. 
The mining of gravel shifted in part to surrounding countries where it resulted 
in local damage to the landscape.
The outsourcing of gravel mining was similar to the overall European offshoring 
of the mining of mineral subsoil resources. From 2008 the European Commission 
commenced investigations into strategic mineral resources. The Netherlands fol-
lowed in its footsteps. Initially, geological, economic and geo-political aspects were 
the main concerns. In a later phase, environmental issues and working conditions 
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played a role. Developments in the area of well-being and sustainability required 
not only measures close to home, but also a concern for these issues outside of the 
Netherlands.
Keywords Mineral resources · Gravel · Offshoring · European Union · Metals
19.1  A Celebration in Margraten
Justified joy for many in Limburg yesterday after the unexpected decision by minister Smit- 
Kroes to spare the Margraten plateau. The years-long struggle by the people around and on 
this beautiful piece of Limburg, municipal officials, and environmentalists, has not been 
futile…1
Despite the potential loss of jobs, the government had rejected a request by the 
cement company ENCI to expand its operations. As the government explained to 
the Provincial Estates of Limburg: ‘In 1992, in the framework of an emergent 
Europe, maintaining a national cement industry has declined in value.’2 The deci-
sion came as a surprise:
… Yesterday no one had much hope that the cabinet would arrive at this decision. A deci-
sion that does however resonate with the bow-wave of interest that has emerged recently at 
all levels for the improvement of our natural environment. An issue for which even employ-
ers and trade unions have fallen into each other’s arms. On the Plateau of Margraten the 
environment has triumphed over industry…
Opinions about digging for mineral subsoil resources like marl, gravel and sand had 
shifted. Up to 1970, housing construction, the Delta works and other investments 
under the aegis of reconstruction had been the priorities steering the domestic pro-
duction of cement and the mining of sand and gravel. After that time, landscape and 
environment also began to be incorporated into policy-making.
In the first part of this chapter we dwell upon the building programs from the 
1970s on. What role did Dutch raw materials play? What factors were responsible 
for changing views on the domestic production of raw materials? In the second part 
of the chapter we illustrate these changes using gravel-mining as an example. 
Changing perspectives provided the impulse for developing a raw materials policy 
for construction materials.
But worries about mineral raw materials extended beyond marl, gravel, and sand. 
European assessments and unrest about Chinese policies led in 2010 to questions 
1 ‘Eigen cementindustrie in open Europa niet nodig’, in Limburgs Dagblad 19-01-1989, p 21




about the depletion and availability of copper, tin, indium and other metals. Once 
again the question was raised: what role did (mineral) raw materials play in the 
Dutch economy? What risks were there for Dutch industrial sectors? What policy 
was needed for economically vital raw materials? These last questions will be 
addressed in the concluding part of this chapter.
19.2  The Building Programs
Dutch building efforts experienced an apotheosis around 1970. On the basis of the 
1966  Second Memorandum on Spatial Planning, that had predicted 20  million 
inhabitants by the year 2000, the volume of housing construction stood at an all- 
time high. In 1972 and 1973, 150,000 new dwellings per year were being realised. 
They were built above all in the outskirts of cities and in suburban ‘growth cores.’3 
A new national road plan – also published in 1966 – stimulated an increase in the 
construction of national roads, for the most part, limited access highways. 1966 also 
saw the publication of the Memorandum on Maritime Harbours, that envisioned the 
improvement of Rotterdam’s Europoort harbour by means of landfills and its fur-
ther extension into the sea in the form of the Maasvlakte.4 Coastal defences also 
acquired a significant boost from the ongoing Delta works.
The enormous pace of construction and the technocratic style of governance that 
made this possible became a focus of criticism around 1970. Social protest decrying 
the poor quality of life in cities and emerging worries about the environment turned 
against the planners and builders of cities, roads and dikes. The protest movement 
succeeded in convincing the political establishment. Plans were re-evaluated. The 
symbol of the turnaround became the storm-surge barrier in the Eastern Scheldt (the 
Oosterscheldekering) a marvel of technological prowess that replaced the planned 
total closure of the estuary, the Eastern Scheldt. This adjustable storm-surge barrier 
was completed in 1986.5
Urban construction aimed at urban renewal and the compact city. In addition to 
investments in city centres, it included the construction of about 835,000 dwellings 
between 1995 and 2015 around nexuses of public transport in close proximity to the 
bigger cities. The plans also included investments in the ‘mainports.’ Rotterdam’s 
harbour was to be expanded with a second Maasvlakte and its throughput capacity 
3 H. van der Cammen and L.A. de Klerk, Ruimtelijke Ordening, van Plannen Komen Plannen, de 
Ontwikkelingsgang van de Ruimtelijke Ordening in Nederland, 4e ed. (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 
1999), 147.
4 Han Meyer, De Staat van de Delta, Waterwerken, Stadsontwikkeling en Natievorming in 
Nederland (Nijmegen: Van Tilt, 2016), 129–32.
5 A.  Bosch and W. van der Ham, Twee Eeuwen, Rijkswaterstaat 1798–2015, 2e druk (Asten: 
Nieuwe Uitgevers, 2015), 261–65.
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augmented with the Betuwe route, a freight railway line to the German hinterland. 
Schiphol Airport would get a fifth runway and would be made accessible for high- 
speed trains.6
Perilously high river stages on the Meuse and Rhine in 1993 and 1995 were an 
incitement to reassess flood risks in the region of the large rivers. In 1995 portions 
of cities along the Meuse were flooded and 250,000 people were evacuated from the 
river-region of the province of Gelderland. These crises eventuated in the Delta Plan 
for the Big Rivers, an accelerated program of levee reinforcements in the river 
region. At the same time more attention was devoted to the expected effects of cli-
mate change, in particular increasing rainfall and sea-level rise. These new insights 
took shape in the ‘Room for the River’ program that was implemented between 
2005 and 2015. In this program engineers combined the creation of hydraulic infra-
structures with environmental policy, landscape development, and spatial planning.
The new political preferences of a conservative national government became vis-
ible in 2004  in proposals contained in the so-called Space Memorandum (Nota 
Ruimte). This memorandum brought together different spatial planning domains 
like transport, nature, agriculture, industry and urban development. However, their 
coordination was transferred from the national to lower levels of government. The 
national government was to restrict itself to the delineation of overall structure and 
core regions in line with European directives.
Sensitivity to climate change and sea-level rise led to increased concern for the 
coast. A survey held in 2003 revealed that more than 40% of the primary coastal 
defences did not yet satisfy the Delta norms established in 1961. The ‘weak links’ 
along the coast were dealt with after 2006. At various locations the coast was rein-
forced by sand suppletion in a manner that conserved the ecological and recre-
ational values of the dune landscape. In 2007 the government appointed a new Delta 
Commission. This analysed the consequences of sea-level rise for the Netherlands 
and recommended possible countermeasures. In 2009, the Commission’s recom-
mendations led to the financing of this sustainability agenda and to a first ‘National 
Water Plan’ that would guarantee not only defences against water but also the sup-
ply of fresh water. The plan, to be revised every 6 years, ongoingly establishes the 
norms and the implementation program.7
19.3  Grounded Excavation
Sand, gravel, and chalk (including marl) were the most voluminous building materi-
als. Domestic mining of gravel and marl had been concentrated since the mid- 
twentieth century in the province of Limburg (see also Chap. 14). The mining of 
6 Nil Disco and Frank Veraart, ‘A Farewell to Big Planning? 1990–2010,’ in Builders and Planners, 
a History of Land-Use and Infrastructure Planning in the Netherlands, ed. Jos Arts et al. (Delft: 
Eburon, 2016), 361–77.




these kinds of shallow subsoil resources had been regulated since the 1960s in the 
Excavation Law. New excavation permits thus became embedded in regional struc-
ture plans, that also regulated activities like recreation and nature conservation. 
Digging for shallow subsoil resources thus became increasingly constrained.
In 1974 the Federation of Shallow Subsoil Resource Extraction Industries 
(FODI) sounded the alarm. It warned that if a conservative excavation policy were 
maintained it would not be possible to guarantee materials supplies for the building 
industry, including the public works sector.8 In response, the Ministry of Transport 
and Public Works launched an investigation into the demand for raw materials. 
After 1976 a National Commission for the Coordination of Excavation Policy 
(LCCO), composed of representatives of the Ministry and the provincial estates, 
was charged with harmonizing the demand for and the supply of shallow subsoil 
resources. The LCCO developed ‘target plans’ for the different provinces in the 
form of 10-year plans. The first of these ‘target plans’ appeared in 1978.
The establishment of the LCCO was seen as the first step toward a national exca-
vation policy. The environmental movement also began to take part in the discussion. 
The Foundation for Nature and Environment presented its own ideas for excavation 
policy. It pointed to alternatives such as the use of demolition waste, dredging mud, 
and slag from furnaces. They also pointed to alternative mining sites at sea, an 
increase in imports and they argued that because of its spatial implications excava-
tion policy should be part and parcel of spatial planning policy.9 The 1966 Second 
Memorandum on Spatial Planning, after all, sketched the rough contours of land use, 
with specific attention to space for recreation and nature (see also Chap. 15).
Against this background, in 1976 the cement industry ENCI developed plans for 
extending the extraction of marl beyond 1991. Its existing concession on the Sint 
Pietersberg appeared to have reached its economic limits. This is why the firm now 
set its sights on extraction on the Margraten Plateau. This option, once rejected in 
the 1940s, now seemed the economically most opportune. The opposition, however, 
was fierce. No less than 8000 persons filed objections, in addition to the mayors of 
the affected villages and the chief superintendent of the Margraten American War 
Cemetery, who added an unexpected diplomatic loading to the controversy. 
Succumbing to popular pressure, the Limburg provincial estates postponed a deci-
sion on the procedures. ENCI as well as FODI protested and took the matter to 
court. In 1978 the Council of State, the nation’s highest administrative court of 
appeal, ruled in their favour.
The subsequent renewal of the planning procedures was once again followed by 
mass protests and by a legal war of attrition involving objections and delaying tac-
tics. Opponents also produced alternative plans and reports. Investigations into 
other extraction methods and excavation sites were again undertaken. Expectations 
of shrinking domestic cement production and new production processes involving 
8 G.J.A. Sigmond et al., 1974–1984, Tien Jaar: Industrie en Ontgrondingen (De Steeg, 1984).
9 G.W.  Grondelle, Ontgrondingen, over de Noodzaak en Mogelijkheden voor een Ander Beleid 
t.a.v. de Winning van Mergel, Grind, Zand, Klei, Veen, etc. (‘s Gravenland: Stichting Natuur en 
Milieu, 1978).
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fly ash decreased the need for marl. This made further digging at the existing pit a 
feasible short-term alternative. In 1985 the Council of State ruled that in the context 
of these developments, ENCI could not, for the time being, start digging on the 
Margraten Plateau. The Province granted a permit to mine the Sint Pietersberg until 
2010. This seemed to guarantee an adequate level of cement production for the 
coming 20 years. This compromise satisfied both opponents and proponents of marl 
mining on the Margraten Plateau. The peace, however, was of short duration.10
A new government memorandum  – titled Grounded Excavation (Gegrond 
Ontgronden) – explored the long-term state of the national raw materials supply. 
The draft version that appeared in 1987 once again named the Margraten Plateau as 
a potential mining site. This led to a resurgence of the mass protests. In 1989 mayor 
Herman Kaiser of Margraten succeeded in enticing the Minister of Transport and 
Public Works, Neelie Smit-Kroes, to visit the targeted area. The visit was accompa-
nied by a massive peaceful protest and led to the remarkable decision with which 
this chapter began. Two weeks after the visit the mayor received a phone call from 
the minister who said: ‘you may keep your plateau.’ The importance of a domestic 
cement industry was struck from the text of the definitive version of the memoran-
dum ‘Grounded Excavation.’ The minister framed cement production in the context 
of European developments. This would eventually lead to the termination of marl 
mining.
The publication of the draft version of ‘Grounded Excavation’ also served as a 
starting point for negotiations with the various provinces regarding the ‘targets’ for 
the supply of shallow subsoil-resources. The Limburg provincial estates succeeded 
in reaching an agreement about limiting the mining of gravel. Another 80 million 
tons of gravel would be extracted in Limburg, enough to supply the estimated need 
for the 1990s and possibly somewhat longer. The new policy assumed that after the 
turn of the century, demand could be satisfied with alternative materials, mining at 
sea and imports.11 Re-use of building materials was also an option.
Re-use of building materials was stimulated by various environmental measures 
taken in consequence of, among other things, the Waste Materials Law 
(Afvalstoffenwet) of 1978. In the course of the parliamentary debates on this law, 
the Christian Democratic parliamentarian A.G.W.J.  Lansink introduced the so- 
called Waste Hierarchy, a desirable sequence in dealing with waste materials: pre-
vention of waste, re-use of ‘waste’ flows in production, transformation into energy 
and as final option controlled dumping of non-processable waste.12 This approach, 
10 Thomas Rode, ENCI’s Struggle for the Margraten Plateau, a Clash of Economical and 
Environmental Interests (Maastricht University, Faculty of Cultural Sciences, Bachelor’s Thesis, 
December 6, 2009), www.oudsintpieter.com/Presentaties.htm; Thomas Rode, ‘Een Wereld van 
Cement? De Strijd Om Het Plateau van Margraten, 1976–1989,’ Studies over de Sociaal-
Economische Geschiedenis van Limburg 55 (2010): 26–48.
11 Paul Ike, De Planning van Ontgrondingen (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Geo Pers, 2000), 
43–44.; B. De Jong, ‘Ontgronden in Nederland een steeds groter probleem’, in De Ingenieur, nr 11 
(november 1989), p. 7–11.
12 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Zitting 1979–1980, Rijksbegroting voor het jaar 1980, 
15,800 Hoofdstuk XVII, Departement van Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiëne, nr. 21, ‘Motie van 
het lid Lansink c.s.’, voorgesteld 1 november 1979.
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that became known in the Netherlands by the name ‘the Ladder of Lansink’ became 
more nuanced in subsequent years. The first National Environmental Policy Plan 
(NMP) published in 1989 committed itself to reducing waste flows by employing 
so-called integral chain management. Industries were challenged to think through 
the environmental consequences of supplies, production, consumption and waste 
processing. This was supported by supplementary measures.
In the building sector, the emphasis was on the re-use of construction and demo-
lition waste. Research at TNO and universities inventoried possibilities for re-use of 
waste in concrete, asphalt and foundation materials. In addition, new designs were 
promoted that needed fewer materials.13 The private sector played a big role in these 
activities. It was therefore hardly surprising that initiatives started with the re-use of 
demolition waste and not with prevention of use by re-using buildings. Prevention 
was the economically less attractive option.
Ministries, the building industries, and knowledge institutes worked together on 
preparing the so-called Building Materials Decision (Bouwstoffenbesluit) that was 
enacted in 1995. This stipulated the possibilities, norms, and rules for re-use.14 In 
that year, too, a prohibition against the dumping of re-usable building materials 
came into force. This stimulated an enormous increase in the re-use of construction 
and demolition wastes. In 1985 half of the wastes were re-used; after the turn of the 
century this increased to 97% (see Graph 19.1). In surveys of supplies of construc-
tion and demolition waste granulates it was proudly announced that, after Hong 
13 Jacqueline Cramer, Milieu, Elementaire Deeltjes 16 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2014), 35–48.
14 R.T.  Eikelboom, E.  Ruwiel, and J.J.J.M.  Gouwmans, ‘The Building Material Decree: An 
Example of a Dutch Regulation Based on the Potential Impact of Materials on the Environment,’ 
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Graph 19.1 Available construction and demolition waste 1985–2012 (million kg)
Source: Compendium voor de leefomgeving
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Kong, the Netherlands was the  frontrunner in the use of these recycled raw 
 materials.15 Despite these achievements, critical voices were also heard. Re-use 
appeared above all to be so-called ‘down-cycling.’ Construction and demolition 
wastes served as fill material and as granulate for road foundations. In the use of 
concrete the primary raw materials still prevailed.16 For the time being this meant a 
continued significant need for gravel and masonry sand.
Regulations in the area of waste management and industrial developments in the 
area of integral supply chain management provided the basis for a policy program 
launched in 2013, ‘From Waste to Raw Material.’ These were the first steps on the 
road to a transition, embraced by the government and environmental organisations, 
toward a circular economy.17
19.4  Passing the Buck or Market Forces
In 2002 a commission under the chairmanship of the former state secretary for 
Public Housing, Spatial Planning and Environmental Policy (VROM) 
D.K.J. Tommel, formulated policy recommendations for the Structure Scheme for 
Shallow Subsoil Resources. The commission, entirely in line with the political cli-
mate of the time, recommended more leeway for market forces and less central 
steering by the state. The freshly elected Balkenende cabinet enthusiastically 
embraced the recommendations. The planning and coordination of shallow subsoil 
resources would no longer be a task for the government. Aspects of excavation 
policy, just like other spatial planning issues, were subsumed in the Space 
Memorandum of 2004. This memorandum expressed the new direction of policy. 
Government regulation was to be transformed into over-all planning. ‘Decentralize 
where possible, centralize where necessary’ became the new slogan according to 
which the state shifted responsibilities for spatial planning to the provinces and 
municipalities.
For excavation policy, this meant the gradual abandonment of coordination via 
targets and the liberation of market forces. The new policy underscored the impor-
tance of local extraction in order to prevent the displacement of environmental prob-
lems, needless transport, and excessive energy consumption. Policy aimed at 
so-called ‘multifunctional’ extraction, that united extractive imperatives with local 
needs.
It is expected of the excavating industry that it will orient itself to the development of quali-
tatively good and societally responsible projects in close cooperation with the affected par-
ties. (…) This means that in the course of extraction use must be made of the chances 
offered by excavations for the realisation of other desirable social functions like nature 
15 U. Hofstra et al., Scenariostudie BSA-Granulaten, Aanbod en Afzet van 2005 Tot 2025 (Sittard: 
INTRON / Expertisecentrum Bouwstoffen Rijkswaterstaat, 2006), 15.
16 Evert Mulder, Kringbouw, naar een Duurzame Grondstoffenvoorziening in de Bouw (Apeldoorn: 
TNO Industrie en Techniek, 2008)., p. 36–37.
17 Cramer, Milieu, 91.
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development, recreation, waterfront residences, water management, the dredging of ship-
ping channels. In this way projects can be realised that improve spatial quality and that 
provide the Netherlands with raw materials.18
This policy shift put an end to the promised reduction in gravel extraction. In 
Limburg the news was followed with eagle-eyes. In 2009, Limburg’s newspapers 
headlined: ‘Dredgers return’ and ‘Open door for gravel mining.’19 Nature conserva-
tion organisations took a more positive view of the news. They were of course 
already struggling with the right-populist policies of the first Rutte cabinet. Budgets 
for nature development projects had been cut by 70%, environmental regulations 
relaxed and elements of the European Natura 2000 network were postponed or ter-
minated.20 Multi-functional gravel mining offered unexpected chances for nature 
development. The former opponents, dredging companies and nature conservation-
ists, became new partners in the creation of wet nature development projects.21
As a rule, the additional demands placed on gravel and sand extraction led to 
price increases, to a decline in domestic production, and increasing imports of sand 
and gravel, particularly from Germany (see Graph 19.2 and Fig. 19.1). Germany 
18 Ministries of VROM, LNV VenW en EZ, Nota Ruimte, ruimte voor ontwikkeling, deel 4: text 
after parliamentary consent, Den Haag 2006, p. 165.
19 Cited in Bert Hammes and Jan Hensels ‘Baggermolen keert terug’ in Dagblad de Limburger, 
October 5th 2009; Bert Hammes en Jan Hensels, ‘Deur open voor ontgrindingen’ in Dagblad de 
Limburger October 5th 2009; Bert Hammes en Jan Hensels, ‘Grind roept emoties op’ in Dagblad 
de Limburger October 9th 2009.
20 Arjen Buijs, Thomas Matthijssen, and Bas Arts, “The Man, the Administration and the Counter-
Discourse:’ An Analysis of the Sudden Turn in Dutch Natures Conservation Policy,’ Land Use 
Policy 38 (2014): 676–84.












Graph 19.2 Excavation, import, and export of gravel 1980–2011 (million tons) 
Source: Rijkswaterstaat, Waterdienst en Compendium voor de leefomgeving (2000–2014)
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was not pleased. The Netherlands was simply transferring its sustainability prob-
lems to a neighbouring country. But the Tommel Commission redefined the prob-
lem. German irritation about Dutch policy shifts was seen as an indirect 
encouragement for Dutch policy:
The commission views resistance in Germany as a positive development for Dutch policy. 
Whereas in the Netherlands there seems to be a consensus that we want to work toward the 
development of qualitatively good and socially responsible excavation projects, in Germany 
the debate about goals is still in full swing. The commission expects that in the long run, 
due to social pressure, more demands will be made on projects, which will ultimately lead 
to a decline in the acquisition of cheap sand and gravel from Germany. (…) A possible price 
increase will, in point of fact, provide new possibilities for multi-functional projects and the 
utilisation of secondary raw materials.22
22 D.K.J. Tommel, G. Blom, and M.A. van Weel, eds., Slotadvies van de Commissie Taakstellingen 
en Flankerende Beleid Voor Beton- en Metselzandvoorziening (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, Interprovinciaal Overleg (IPO), December 17, 2009), 18.
Fig. 19.1 Net flows of trade in sand, gravel and crushed stone among the countries around the 
North Sea
Source: M.J. van der Meulen, T.P.F. Koopmans, and H.S. Pietersen, “Construction Raw Materials 
Policy and Supply Practices in Northwestern Europe,” Aardrijkskundige Mededelingen, Industrial 
Minerals – Resources, Characteristics and Applications., 13 (2003): 19–30
F. Veraart
427
The phasing out of a directive role for the national government was concluded in 
2012 with a parliamentary debate. In regard to the diplomatic pressure from 
Germany, Minister M.H.  Schulz van Haegen (Infrastructure and Environment) 
wrote:
Via diplomatic channels, the cabinet has received signals from the government of Nordrhein- 
Westfalen that it is not happy with this. The Netherlands does not unnecessarily want to 
burden its neighbours with the spatial demands of raw materials acquisition (…) I share the 
expectations of the Tommel Commission that new projects have the potential to replace a 
substantial share of these imports. But this is dependent on market and price developments 
and on the demands that are imposed in Germany on the execution of sand mining projects 
and on the processing after extraction.23
In the eyes of the Dutch government, increasing German exports to the Netherlands 
were the result of a free market. The lack of German sustainability measures made 
its shallow subsoil-resources attractive for the Dutch market. The remarks could be 
read as a covert bit of advice to German politicians. The Dutch government was not 
averse to more stringent demands and higher prices. It reasoned that these provided 
more possibilities for recycling and for more expensive multi-functional 
excavation.
The so-called ‘structure schemes’ for the shallow sub-soil resources with their 
estimates of demand and agreements about levels of supply were unique for the 
Netherlands. In contrast to surrounding countries, these kinds of strategic explora-
tions were unusual in the Netherlands.24 After the turn of the century, the Dutch 
government traded in its national perspective on mineral raw materials for a broader 
European perspective. Research undertaken at the behest of the European 
Commission revealed that the Netherlands was the largest net importer of mineral 
shallow sub-soil resources (see also Fig. 19.1).25 In 1910, the top layer of Dutch 
roads consisted of asphalt made with Belgian and Scottish crushed rocks. Concrete 
was to a significant degree composed of gravel from Germany. By contrast, the 
foundations of buildings and constructions consisted primarily of domestic con-
struction and demolition waste.
23 M.H. Schultz van Haegen (minister of infrastructure and environment), in letter to parliament 
‘Slotrapportage afbouw rijksregierol bij ontgrondingen’, March 5th 2012, p.  7. Kamerstukken 
2012.
24 Environmental historian Henk van Zon mentions among other things strategic surveys of coal in 
Germany and Great Britain from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. See Henk van Zon, 
Geschiedenis en Duurzame Ontwikkeling, Duurzame Ontwikkeling in Historisch Perspectief, 
Enkele Verkenningen, Vakreview (Nijmegen: Universitair Centrum Milieuwetenschappen, 2002), 
36–53.; Another unique exception is the dispute around the zinc mine in Kelmis that in the course 
of the determination of the boundaries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1820 led to a neutral 
territory administered jointly by The Netherlands (and after 1830 Belgium) and Prussia.
25 M.J. van der Meulen, T.P.F. Koopmans, and H.S. Pietersen, ‘Construction Raw Materials Policy 
and Supply Practices in Northwestern Europe,’ Aardrijkskundige Mededelingen, Industrial 
Minerals - Resources, Characteristics and Applications., 13 (2003): 19–30.
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After the turn of the century, local judgements about environment, economy and 
spatial planning determined the development of the national mining of raw  materials. 
Despite the existence of large quantities of sand, gravel, and marl, the domestic min-
ing of mineral raw materials languished. The Netherlands trusted to international 
trade for its supplies of raw materials. But the question was what the limits and risks 
were of this outsourcing of raw materials supplies.
19.5  ‘Toward a Strategy for Raw Materials’
This question began to nag in 2008, but at an international European level. The 
European Union (EU) had become increasingly dependent on countries outside the 
Union for its raw materials:
On the one hand, the EU has many raw material deposits. However, their exploration and 
extraction are facing increased competition for different land uses and a highly regulated 
environment, as well as technological limitations in access to mineral deposits. On the other 
hand, the EU is highly dependent on imports of strategically important raw materials which 
are increasingly affected by market distortions. In the case of high-tech metals, this depen-
dence can even be considered critical in view of their economic value and high supply 
risks.26
European leaders saw access to raw materials as strategic and necessary prerequi-
sites for remaining competitive and for economic growth and jobs. The coming of 
specialised high-tech industry and services from the 1980s on had altered the mate-
rial basis of the economy. On the one hand this mitigated the growth of material 
flows, while on the other hand ever higher demands were placed on exotic material 
properties and on purity. Scarce materials were the basis of a number of specific 
specialised applications. Rare molybdenum (Mo) for example, was used in the pro-
duction of steel alloys for the chemical, the offshore and the automobile industries. 
Antimony, also rare, was applied in fire arresting compounds, in catalysts for plas-
tics and in batteries.27
Materials scarcity proceeds from various causes. A number of these materials are 
geologically rare. In addition, mining plays an important role. Supply and demand 
are co-determinants of the scale of mining. Economically viable mining depends on 
the required purity and other effort required in the course of mining and purification. 
Economic profitability is varies with minerals that are by-products of other mineral 
26 “The Raw Materials Initiative - Meeting our Critical Needs for Growth and Jobs in Europe,” 
Communications from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council COM (2008) 699 
(Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, April 11, 2008), 2.
27 Th. Henckens, Managing Raw Materials Scarcity, Safeguarding the Availability of Geologically 




extraction. Due to all these factors, the debate concerning the degree of scarcity and 
depletion of materials is often left undecided.28
At the outset of the 1970s the Club of Rome had already put the issue of the 
depletion of raw materials squarely on the global agenda. After that, at least for 
mineral raw materials, the debate receded into the background. At the beginning of 
this century the issue received renewed attention in political circles. In November 
2008 the European Commission launched the Raw Materials Initiative. A year later 
a European working group showed how immensely vulnerable Europe was in regard 
to imports of raw materials. These imports were a result of changes in international 
market relations due to the concentration of extraction in specific regions. This geo-
graphic concentration was not simply a geological phenomenon. Social pressure 
had shifted mineral extraction in Europe to other continents.
The analyses acquired increased importance because of the imposition of a quota 
on the  extraction of rare earth metals by the Chinese government in 2009. An 
expected shortage of materials that threatened the production of mobile phones, flat- 
screen TVs, hybrid automobiles, solar panels and other developments in communi-
cations technology and sustainability, rapidly became world news.29
In 2010 the European Ad Hoc Working Group on Defining Critical Raw Materials 
presented the first results. It identified a group of 41 economically important miner-
als, of which 14 were potentially risky. The ‘rare earths’ and the platinum group 
metals (PGM) were risky due to quasi-monopolies by respectively China and 
Russia; the transition metals Tungsten and Niobium – much used in the fabrication 
of stainless steel – due to the enormous economic impacts.30
In response to the European investigation, the Dutch government requested 
Statistics Netherlands and TNO (the National Applied Science Research Institute) 
to do a study of materials crucial for the Dutch economy. The first results were reas-
suring. Direct use of the 41 ‘European’ minerals was relevant for only a small frac-
tion of the Dutch economy and the economy had no great degree of direct dependence 
on the 14 most crucial materials.31
But subsequent analyses of the production chains revealed a much greater depen-
dency. Critical materials were used as raw materials in only 7% of production pro-
cesses. These raw materials were much more often worked into metals (52%) or as 
28 A pessimistic current among scientists assumes depletion; more optimistic scientists stress that 
higher prices will lead to the discovery of new mining locations and that technological develop-
ments will lead to the adoption of alternative materials. Ibid. 16–18.
29 Piet Depuydt, ‘Chinezen beheersen de zeldzame aardmetalen: Tekort aan onmisbare grondstof-
fen zet verhouding in de wereld op scherp’, in NRC, sectie economie, 16–1-2010, p. 13.
30 Critical Raw Materials for the EU, Report of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Defining Critical 
Raw Materials (Brussels: European Commission, Enterprise and Industry, 2010).
31 Critical Materials in the Dutch Economy, Preliminary Results (The Hague / Heerlen: CBS 
Center for Policy Related Statistics, 2010).
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intermediate products (37%).32 A so-called ‘quick scan’ analysed the material flows 
of Indium, Neodymium and Copper for the Dutch economy.33 Indium was applied 
in solar panels and LEDs. Neodymium was imported into the Netherlands chiefly as 
an ingredient of permanent magnets, used in windmills because of their low 
 maintenance demands. The use of Neodymium had an added value of 268 million 
euros and was related to 7300 jobs. The impact of Indium at 938 million euros and 
22,700 jobs, was even greater (see Table 19.1). The report showed the impact these 
specific materials had in the Dutch economy. But the report did not commence with 
the economic interpretation, but with geopolitical concerns.
The West no longer determines international trade and the political and economic balance 
of power has shifted in favour of emerging economies like China, India and Brazil.
The report pointed out the increasing popularity of state capitalism, with China as 
an example. The new ‘multi-polar’ relationships in the world were characterised by 
instability and ad hoc relations. The increased complexity might possibly lead to 
32 Derk Bol and Ton Bastein, Critical Materials and the Netherlands - a View from the Industrial-
Technological Sector (Delft: M2i Materials Innovations Institute / TNO, 2012), 5.
33 Rem Korteweg, Op Weg Naar een Grondstoffenstrategie, Quick Scan ten behoeve van de 
Grondstoffennotitie (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies / TNO / CE Delft, 2011).
 Table 19.1 Share of the critical raw materials Indium, Neodymium en Copper in the Dutch 
economy in 2011 
Indium Neodymium Copper
Import of goods Million EUR 20,914 553 33,809
Re-exports Million EUR 15,686 343 22,314
Exports Million EUR 26,902 555 36,008
Domestic imports Million EUR 5229 210 11,495
Domestic export Million EUR 11,217 212 13,694
Domestic use:
Consumption % 15 19 12
Investments % 39 8 22
Intermediate use by industry % 46 73 66
Total domestic imports % 100 100 100
Added value Million EUR 938 268 2889
As % gdp % 0.2 0.1 0.6
Jobs × 1000 22.3 7.3 70.4
Jobs % of Dutch Total % 0.3 0.1 0.9
Import value Total NL Million EUR 375,393
Export value Total NL Million EUR 398,757
Total gdp Million EUR 513,525
Jobs (LISA) NL × 1000 7976
 Source: Korteweg (2011) p. 92 
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friction among countries. The scarcity of raw materials could become one of the 
most important bones of contention.
The report speculated on chances for the Netherlands in the areas of recycling, 
pre- and post-consumption. Much might be gained by applying supply chain 
approaches and ‘cradle-to-cradle’ principles to the flows of critical materials. And 
according to the report critical materials could also play a role in development aid. 
‘The raw materials sector, if well-organised, is a catalyst for economic growth in 
African countries.’34 How and if these recommendations were entangled, was not 
made clear. The ‘quick scan’ seemed above all to be a pragmatic summing up of 
opportunities.
The reports were the most important source of inspiration for the raw materials 
memorandum that was presented to parliament in 2011 by no less than four govern-
ment ministries. In the multi-polar world ‘security regarding the supply of raw 
materials had also for the Netherlands to a certain extent become an economic and 
safety concern.’ According to the politicians, it would be obligatory to interfere with 
the market if that proved necessary. But the scarcity of raw materials also offered 
possibilities, like urban mining. Waste should be seen as a raw material and it would 
be necessary to invest in so-called raw-materials roundabouts. The memorandum 
also noted that sustainable extraction and processing of raw materials also offered 
opportunities for development aid.35
New research by TNO into materials in the Dutch economy proposed another 
addition to the three familiar vulnerabilities. In addition to the geological-economic 
risks (reserves and production),36 the geo-political risks (stability of nations), and 
price fluctuations, TNO also pointed to the reputational damage for firms in the use 
of materials. A number of critical materials were appropriated with little respect for 
the environment or norms for well-being. This could possibly lead to reputational 
damage for companies that applied these materials. Suppliers to the transport equip-
ment industry ran the greatest risk, according to TNO. This was due to their use of 
gold, tantalum, and tin, the mining of which in African countries was controver-
sial.37 With this last point the report made visible the impact of economic activities 
on well-being and the environment elsewhere in the world. Well-being was not only 
a concern for governments, but also a strategic factor for companies.
34 Rem Korteweg, Op Weg Naar een Grondstoffenstrategie, Quick Scan ten behoeve van de 
Grondstoffennotitie (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies / TNO / CE Delft, 2011).
35 ‘Grondstoffennotitie’ aangeboden aan de Tweede Kamer op 15 juli 2011 door de ministers van 
Buitenlandse Zaken, Economische Zaken, Landbouw & Innovatie en staatsecretarissen van 
Infrastructuur & Milieu en Buitenlandse Zaken.
36 A recent dissertation pointed to the development of ‘absolute’ scarcity and to the depletion in the 
short term of a number of metals like antimony (20 year supply), gold (40 years), zinc (80 years) 
and molybdenum (80 years). Henckens, Managing Raw Materials Scarcity.
37 Ton Bastein and Elmer Rietveld, Material in the Dutch Economy, a Vulnerability Analysis (Delft: 
TNO, 2015), 42.
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19.6  New Issues in Well-being
New issues in well-being, both ‘here and now’, ‘later’ and ‘elsewhere’ emerged in 
relation to the acquisition both of abundant mineral raw materials like gravel and 
sand as well as scarce materials like molybdenum and indium. Questions concern-
ing trade-offs among economy, environment, and spatial planning; on the displace-
ment of problems from the Netherlands to abroad; on the dependence of Europe on 
the rest of the world. But also questions about the responsibility of private enterprise 
and governments. Where did these begin and end? And in addition, also questions 
about scale. What scale was best suited to taking action in a world of global flows 
of trade? And finally questions about initiative and engagement: where did initiative 
lie in a manifold ‘multi-polar’ world?
Finding a balance proved to be the big challenge and was at times no sinecure. 
For example in 2013, the Foundation ‘The Green Accountancy Chamber’ – a criti-
cal follower of Dutch environmental policy – issued a report on Neodymium. This 
material was used in the permanent magnets of windmills. In the course of extract-
ing this rare earth metal in Baotou in China, radioactive and poisonous by-products 
were deposited in a lake measuring 120 km2.
This is the deadly and sinister side of the windmill manufacturers that we don’t like to be 
reminded of.38
The report became popular above all under critics of wind energy. The VVD (the 
right-wing People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) asked questions about 
Baotou in parliament. Minister of Economic Affairs, Kamp, (also VVD) shared the 
concerns about people and the environment. He also offered China assistance via 
the Special Emissary in combatting the harmful side-effects, but no further steps 
were taken.39 In the provincial estates of North Holland, North Brabant and 
Gelderland the PVV (ultra-right populist Party for Freedom) got this issue on the 
agenda. In Gelderland in 2014 a proposal was submitted to ban the use of 
Neodymium in windmills. After legal evaluation, the proposal was withdrawn by 
the provincial government in 2015.40
38 Windenergie in Nederland, de Dodelijke Keerzijde van Windenergie (Apeldoorn: De Groene 
Rekenkamer, 2013).
39 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Aanhangsel van de Handelingen, vergaderjaar 2013–2014, 
‘Vragen gesteld door de leden der Kamer, met daarop door de regering gegeven antwoorden’ no 
1031
40 Besluitenlijst GS Gelderland 10 februari 2015, nr 3 (2014–002183) ‘Beleid over gebruik 
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Chapter 20
Energy and Plastics: The Slow Transition
Harry Lintsen
Abstract This chapter, exploring fossil subsoil resources, focuses on two domains: 
energy and plastics. The energy section analyses the difficult transition to renewable 
energy sources. The focus here is on electricity because promising renewable energy 
sources like biomass, windmills and solar panels contribute above all to the supply 
of electricity. There is, moreover, a close relationship among oil, natural gas and 
electricity.
Dutch electricity supply was long trapped in tensions among the policy of the 
provincial electricity suppliers, the energy policy of the national government (in 
particular the Ministry of Economic Affairs) and the environmental movement, with 
as main issues decentralised electricity generation, the inclusion of nuclear power, 
the role of domestic natural gas and energy-saving. Privatisation and liberalisation 
are setting the electricity sector completely on its head. There is now more room for 
other forms of electricity generation, in particular decentralised generation and 
heat-power coupling. Opportunities for renewable energy sources have increased, 
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among other things thanks to international agreements (‘Paris’) in connection with 
climate change.
The plastics sector too has undergone dramatic changes in this period. The pro-
duction of bulk plastics and artificial fibres still takes place in the Netherlands, but 
hardly at all by Dutch firms. The plastics processing industry, that consists above all 
of small and medium-sized firms (up to 50 employees) has developed into the 
Netherlands’ most innovative sector. The attitude toward plastics has become 
ambivalent. They have shaped a life of comfort, ease, luxury, sport, and games. At 
the same time they are a source of litter, waste, ‘plastic soup’ and micro plastics.
Keywords Energy · Oil · Gas · Coal · Electricity · Nuclear energy · Environment · 
Decentralised generation · Heat-power coupling · Wind · Solar cells · Plastics · 
Plastic soup · Microplastics
20.1  The Trial
On June 24th, 2016 the court of The Hague issued a remarkable ruling: ‘The [Dutch] 
State has to ensure that in 2020 the emission [of greenhouse gases] in the Netherlands 
is at least 25% lower than in 1990.’1 The ruling was world news. Foreign newspa-
pers, radio stations and websites like the Guardian, El Pais, the BBC and ABC 
Australian Radio covered the story. The BBC noted that
the judgement was unprecedented in Europe, and unexpected. It pushes the Dutch govern-
ment to honour its commitment to cut emissions.2
A foundation called Urgenda, directed by Marjan Minnesma, and almost 900 pri-
vate co-plaintiffs wanted to use a court decision to force the state to do more about 
the emission of greenhouse gases. But the question was whether a judge was com-
petent to pass such a judgment. In a democracy, was it not parliament that was 
responsible for dealing with issues like this?
An essential characteristic of the rule of law – so argued the court – was that an 
independent judge could (and sometimes had to) judge the actions of political 
organs like the government on the point of legal protection. That, it considered, was 
the case here. The state was legally obligated to take measures against climate 
change. After all, in all probability climate change has serious and life-threatening 
consequences for people and the environment:
… the Netherlands will be confronted with higher average temperatures, changing precipi-
tation patterns and rising sea levels … [with] heat waves and extremes of precipitation … 
1 Rechtbank Den Haag, zaaknummer C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, uitspraak 24-06-2015, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145.
2 ‘Netherlands ordered to cut greenhouse gas emissions’ in BBC News, 24 June 2015.
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dangerous situations on the lower reaches of the rivers … increasing salinity in the coastal 
zones and less available water for agriculture …3
In addition there are the global consequences of melting ice, desertification, a 
decline of biodiversity, threats to food production, and other big problems. In both 
national and international law, the precautionary principle then prevails: measures 
have to be taken, despite the fact that complete scientific certainty is lacking. The 
possible consequences are simply too serious. This has led to international treaties 
to combat climate change, signed, among others, by the Netherlands.
The court further pointed to the agreements made within the European Union. 
These have encumbered the state with the obligation to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2020 by 25–40% of 1990 levels. Present government policy will lead 
to at most a 20% reduction. According to the court this is unacceptable.
Meanwhile, the State has filed an appeal. Urgenda did not expect otherwise. Its 
strategy is ultimately to plead its case before the European Court. If Urgenda wins 
there, it will have consequences not only for the Netherlands, but also for the other 
member states. That could mean a breakthrough in the difficult energy transition. 
All the member states can then be compelled to take far-reaching measures.4
It is easy to see why Urgenda speaks of a difficult energy transition. At the 
moment, climate change is the most important argument for drastic cutbacks in the 
use of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas). But controversy about the problems of fossil 
raw materials has been around for much longer. In the 1960s, air pollution, particu-
larly due to coal combustion, was the main issue. The Club of Rome report in 1972 
put the issue of depletion of fossil fuels squarely on the agenda. The oil crisis of 
1973 fueled fears of foreign dependency, particularly on the Middle East. These 
issues continued to reappear in various guises and with shifting urgency in subse-
quent debates. The climate issue became dominant during the 1990s.
Suggestions for alternatives to fossil raw materials also go back a long way. 
Research into windmills, solar panels, biomass and other renewable energy sources 
goes back to the 1970s. But the harvest of a half-century of innovation, debate and 
policy seems rather meagre: around 4–5% of the total energy demand is supplied by 
‘sustainable,’ ‘green,’ or ‘renewable’ energy. With respect to the implementation of 
renewable energy sources, the Netherlands is suspended somewhere near the bot-
tom of the list of European Union member states.
Fossil energy sources have played an extremely important role in history. They 
contributed greatly to the fight against poverty. But since 1970 other issues are at 
stake and the Netherlands is searching for alternative ways to produce its energy. 
History reveals that radical changes often require a long gestation period. After that, 
things can nonetheless move quickly. Is the Netherlands now on the threshold of 
such a pivotal moment? It may also be possible that the process will grind to a halt 
and that the transition stagnates. This chapter will summarise the history of fossil 
and renewable sources of energy in the Netherlands over the past decades and make 
3 Rechtbank Den Haag, zaaknummer C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, uitspraak 24-06-2015, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145.
4 Cox, H. (2011), Revolutie met recht.(pp 288) Maastricht: Stichting Planet Prosperity Foundation.
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an effort to characterise the present phase in the transition. We set off with an over-
view of the supply of and demand for fossil energy sources.
20.2  The Energy Balance and the Energy Mix
A large stock of fossil raw materials is available in the Netherlands. In terms of the 
unit of energy ‘joule,’ the amount is about 10,000 PJ (petajoule or 105 joule, 2011). 
Two raw materials dominate: oil and natural gas. Oil is mainly imported, though 
83% of it is exported again, immediately or after refining. Seventy-five percent of 
the natural gas is domestically produced and more than half is exported. The actual 
domestic consumption of fossil fuels is therefore significantly lower. Of the avail-
able 10,000 PJ the Netherlands itself consumes roughly 2500 PJ. Not all fossil raw 
materials are destined for energy production. Fifteen percent is used to produce 
plastics and other chemical products. In discussions on sustainability these sub-
stances are a distinct topic. In this chapter, we shall deal with plastics in a separate 
section.
Energy production thus relies on a remaining 2100–2200 PJ. Part of the energy 
flow (about 30%) undergoes an important intermediate transformation before it 
reaches the end-user, namely the conversion of almost all the coal and part of the 
natural gas into electricity. Ultimately, the flow of energy (including the electricity) 
is delivered to four important categories of end-users. The industry is the biggest 
consumer of energy, followed by transport, services (and agriculture) and house-
holds (Graph 20.1). Within the industry, chemicals, metals and foods are the most 
important energy consumers. In transport, road traffic claims the biggest share.5
Since the 1970s, energy supply in the Netherlands has been composed of a mix 
of chiefly oil and natural gas. While coal has a smaller share, it has still not entirely 
disappeared (Graph 20.2). Over this period, the transformation of fossil fuels into 
electricity steadily increased. The flow of energy from oil is chiefly consumed in 
transportation, while natural gas, coal and electricity find their way mainly to house-
holds, industry and services.
Other raw materials and energy sources are only a small part of this story. 
Renewable energy sources (including biomass, water power and geothermal energy) 
appear as extremely thin lines in the graphs. They are clearly overshadowed by their 
big competitors. On the other hand, their share is growing steadily – if slowly. Let 
us look more closely at the dominant energy sources. We focus on electricity, 
because promising, renewable sources of energy like biomass, windmills and solar 
panels contribute above all to the electricity supply. Moreover, there is a close rela-
tionship between oil, natural gas and electricity.
5 An interactive overview of the energy balance and final consumption of the Netherlands 1975–
2015 can be found at the website of the International Energy Agency (IEA):
Energy balance 1975–2015 at http://www.iea.org/Sankey/#?c=Netherlands&s=Balance




Graph 20.1 Energy consumers, 1950–2002

















































Graph 20.2 Energy consumption by sources of energy, 1951–2012
Source: B.  Gales and H.  Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the Netherlands: Sustainability chal-
lenges in a historical and comparative perspective (Groningen, 2016) 11 and appendix 1




Around 1960 oil overtook coal in the Netherlands and 10 years later it became a 
dominant source of energy. Worldwide, five big American oil companies (Chevron, 
Exxon, Gulf Oil, Mobil and Texaco) and two European (Shell and BP) controlled oil 
production.6 Shell was the largest in the Netherlands.
The 1973 oil crisis was a game changer. The oil companies surrendered a good 
deal of their control to the oil producing countries, partly organised in the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). They were still privileged 
purchasers of raw OPEC oil, but that status too succumbed to the second oil crisis 
of 1979.
The price of oil had meanwhile risen sharply. Vacillating oil prices would there-
after exert a strong influence on energy policy and economic growth. In the 1990s 
Shell adroitly managed the new situation and became the world’s most profitable 
company. But the company’s position would weaken again around 2000 due to 
declining oil prices and the lack of takeovers. Growth in production stagnated. It 
appeared increasingly difficult and more expensive to develop new oil and gas 
fields. At the outset of the century, shale gas and shale oil occasioned a revolution in 
the energy supply.7 They turned the world of oil, dominated by the OPEC cartel, on 
its head once again. Oil prices, that had meanwhile increased again, were once again 
under pressure and declined from 2014 on.
The Netherlands – even with such a powerful player as Shell – has no influence 
on the supply and the price of oil. And that holds to a great extent for the demand as 
well. Most of the oil is destined for motorised traffic. At the end of the 1950s and the 
beginning of the 1960s the demand for mobility increased explosively.8 Initially it 
concerned mostly the increasing use of mopeds and only later the automobile. In the 
course of the 1970s, the government attempted to curb the explosion and saw an ally 
in the economic recession of the 1980s. But the number of passenger cars continued 
to increase exponentially, as did the number of kilometres driven per year and the 
average commuting time per week. Controversies about fuel for automobiles had no 
effect. Problems with the emission of carbon monoxide and other polluting gases 
were solved in the 1970s with the introduction of the catalyser. Threats to public 
health from lead in gasoline were eliminated by the development of lead-free gaso-
line in the 1980s.9 Since the 1990s, fine dust from, among other sources, diesel 
6 See for the following: K.  Sluyterman, ‘Concurreren in turbulente markten 1973–2007’ in 
Geschiedenis van Koninklijke Shell, deel 3, (Amsterdam, 2007: Boom) pp. 5–9; 93; 239.
7 Shale gas and shale oil are mined from shale rock formations, consisting primarily of clay 
minerals.
8 G.  Mom, R.  Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit. De mobiliteitsexplosie [1895–2005], 
(Zutphen, 2008: Walburg Pers), pp. 265, 374.
9 H. Lintsen, T. Van Helvoort,. and R. Van Veen. De kracht van de katalysator. De magie van het 
onderzoek, (Eindhoven, 2014: Stichting Historie der Techniek) pp. 17–29.
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engines, has become an issue. Such debates have little influence on the oil market. 
But the production of natural gas in the Netherlands is another matter.
20.3.2  Natural Gas
As little influence as the Dutch government had on the supply of oil, so strongly did 
it determine the supply and demand of natural gas. Intervention in sources of energy 
by the government was not new. It had decisively intervened in coal mining at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Now it was the turn of the natural gas located in 
the subsoil of the province of Groningen. The concession for extracting natural gas 
in Groningen had been granted in the early 1960s to the Netherlands Oil Company 
(NAM) in which Shell and Esso (later Exxon) cooperated.10 But the government 
retained a firm hold of developments in the field. The costs of production as well as 
the income were managed by the Maatschap Groningen in which the state partici-
pated for 40% via the State Mines (DSM). Initially 75% of the profits were claimed 
by the state. In the 1970s this would increase to 95%. The Maatschap Groningen 
sold the gas to the Gasunie, in which the government had a share of 50%, both 
directly and via DSM. As we saw, the Gasunie built an elaborate natural gas net-
work. Households switched from coal, fuel oil and municipal gas to natural gas for 
heating and cooking. Low prices stimulated firms to use natural gas and to invest in 
energy-intensive production processes, for example the aluminium smelter at 
Delfzijl. Energy-intensive branches like the greenhouse garden-farming industry 
began to use gas instead of fuel oil. Electricity companies switched from coal to 
natural gas. In 1970, the Netherlands supplied 92% of the internationally traded gas 
in Europe.
The oil crisis was a watershed for natural gas as well. The Netherlands restricted 
production of natural gas and acquired new competitors on the European market in 
the form of the Soviet Union, Norway and Algeria. The government lowered the rate 
of extraction in the Groningen field and encouraged the exploitation of smaller gas 
fields. Government policy aimed on the one hand at a leading role for natural gas in 
the Dutch energy supply, and on the other hand at maximization of the proceeds 
from gas sales in the short and long term. This made the government dependent on 
the oil price, from which the gas price was derived.
The European discussion over increased leeway for market forces in the European 
gas market made it necessary to restructure the natural gas supply system. The con-
sequence was that the Gasunie was split up in 2005. In its new embodiment, the 
Gasunie has become the owner of the gas network with the state as sole stockholder. 
Selling gas – the Gasunie’s other activity – has now devolved to Gas Terra, in which 
Shell and Exxon each participate for 25% and the state for 50%. In this way an 
10 See chapter 15 and also: Sluyterman, Concurreren in turbulente markten, pp. 225–229; Correljé, 
A. C. van der Linde en Th. Westerwoudt, Natural Gas in the Netherlands. From Cooperation to 
Competition? (Amsterdam, 2003: Oranje-Nassau Groep).
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independent gas transport network has come into being which every supplier can 
use to bring its gas to market. Gas Terra is only one of the suppliers and the gas 
comes not only from the Groningen field, but also from smaller fields and from 
foreign sources. The transformation meant further limits to governmental influence 
on the energy supply.
Of the original quantity of Groningen gas – amounting to about 2600 billion m3 – 
less than 800 billion m3 of retrievable gas remains in the subsoil (2013).11 Production 
has vacillated over recent decades and for several years hovered around 50  bil-
lion m3.12 Since then, production has declined significantly. In 2017 the government 
decided to reduce gas extraction to about 22 billion m3 (or 770 PJ). That was in part 
a response to the growing protest in Groningen against the increasing number of 
earthquakes in the gas fields and dissatisfaction about the way the earthquake dam-
age was being compensated.
In several instances over the past decades, gas extraction in the Netherlands has 
become controversial. A long struggle ensued over plans to extend gas mining into 
the Waddenzee. Only after gas mining was combined with nature development, did 
the government see fit to condone the development in 2004.13 At present, gas mining 
is the scene of an ongoing struggle between residential and environmental interests 
on the one hand and economic interests and those of energy policy on the other.
20.4  Electricity, Natural Gas and Coal14
The introduction of renewable energy sources seemed to have the greatest chance of 
success in the field of electricity supply, but it turned out to require a major effort to 
acquire a toehold in this sector.
Until the early 1970s the electricity sector had a relatively stable organisation. 
Provincial (and a few municipal) companies produced electricity. They worked 
together in the Cooperating Electricity Production Companies (SEP). Together they 
had complete control over the facilities and wished for as little governmental inter-
ference as possible. With the coming of natural gas, the sector became involved in 
the industrial and energy policy of the government. The transition in electricity pro-
duction from coal to gas went reasonably smoothly. By the mid-1970s, 80% of the 
electricity would be generated with natural gas. Conflicts emerged above all around 
11 Aardgas in Nederkand. http://aardgas-in-nederland.nl/de-toekomst-van-aardgas/aardgasre-
serves-en-verbruik/ consulted 19 April 2017.
12 NAM, Bron van onze energie. http://www.nam.nl/feiten-en-cijfers/gaswinning.html consulted 
19 April 2017.
13 J.J.  De Jong, E.O.  Weeda, E.O., Th. Westerwoudt, A.F.  Correljé, Dertig Jaar Nederlands 
Energiebeleid. Van bonzen, polders en markten naar Brussel zonder koolstof, (Den Haag, 2005: 
Clingendael International Energy Programme), pp. 153–155.
14 This section based on: G.  Verbong and  F.  Geels. ‘The ongoing energy transition: lessons 
from a socio-technical, multi-level analysis of the Dutch electricity system (1960–2004)’. Energy 
Policy 35 (2007) pp. 1025–1037.
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the introduction of nuclear energy, a darling of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
The Ministry was convinced that the future belonged to nuclear energy. It was 
essential to build up a new industrial sector in the Netherlands around this new tech-
nology. In this context, the construction of a nuclear power plant in the Netherlands 
itself would be very welcome. But the SEP charted its own course. One of the asso-
ciated companies bought such a power plant in Germany to be built in Borssele, in 
the province of Zeeland.
In this period, the electricity sector experienced next to no trouble from the 
emerging environmental movement. Resistance to nuclear power was still modest. 
Air pollution was a hornets’ nest, but this was mitigated by technical measures and 
the declining use of coal. The sector was totally disinterested in small-scale experi-
ments with sun and wind energy, let alone in the utopian dream of ‘small is 
beautiful.’
Once again, the oil crisis of 1973 initiated fundamental shifts. A year later the 
first Energy Memorandum appeared. This circumscribed the autonomy of the elec-
tricity producing companies. The Ministry of Economic Affairs acquired a decisive 
voice in the construction of nuclear power plants and the use of fuels in conven-
tional power plants. The wide-ranging memorandum was inspired by two basic 
principles: reliability of the supply and the cheapest possible energy for big indus-
try. To be sure it also took note of the environmental problems of electricity genera-
tion and addressed the depletion of raw materials, but these were clearly subsidiary 
issues. Only marginal attention was paid to renewable energy sources.
The electricity supply companies were also faced with a new phenomenon: the 
deployment of gas turbines and consequently the growth of decentralised energy 
production. Big industry already generated its own local electricity in order to partly 
provide for its own needs. With the advent of natural gas it began to install gas tur-
bines to handle peak loads and thanks to a new type of gas turbines, gas became 
dominant in decentralised energy production.15 This also generated waste heat (that 
the firms recycled into their production processes) and hence so-called ‘heat-power 
coupling’ was born.
The second oil crisis of 1979 led to the second Energy Memorandum. Saving 
energy became a top priority in addition to reliability and cheap energy. In this 
respect, heat-power coupling offered excellent opportunities. Surplus heat could be 
employed in the neighbourhood of the industrial plant and surplus electricity (on the 
basis of power) could be returned to the electricity grid. The government decided to 
provide extra natural gas for decentralised electricity production. But the electricity 
companies were far from happy with the ‘uncontrolled’ delivery of electricity by 
big industry. They were ill-prepared and paid only a low rate. The government had 
to intervene in order to enable local producers to connect up with the electricity grid 
on realistic terms.
In this period the government also began to champion nuclear power. It was, 
however, faced with a broad protest movement. Nuclear power would go on to 
15 It should be noted that the electricity companies too installed gas turbines in order to accommo-
date peak loads. Gas turbines are easier to start up than conventional power plants.
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 dominate the debate on energy supply for years to come, in the process overshadow-
ing other crucial issues like the scarcity of raw materials and the introduction of 
renewable energy sources. Resistance to nuclear power also contributed to a certain 
hesitancy within the environmental movement to address the climate issue. Fighting 
climate change would only strengthen the hand of the proponents of nuclear power, 
who framed this technology as the ultimate solution to global warming.16
The further diffusion of nuclear power was thwarted due to massive protests and 
the accident with the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986. Expensive oil was, 
however, quickly replaced as fuel for power plants by cheaper coal. That in turn 
demanded extra measures to deal with the environmental effects.
The electricity-producing sector was hard pressed. During the recession of the 
1980s, privatisation and efficiency were the key concepts; de-regulation and liber-
alisation those of the 1990s. The European Union supported the latter policy and 
was able to enforce it after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. The electricity sector 
tried to retain a grip on developments by advancing proposals for restructuring. But 
to no avail. The government was already working on a new Electricity Law. This 
came into force in 1989 and after modifications was superseded by the Electricity 
Law of 1998.
The Electricity Laws led to a reshuffling and splitting up of the grids of the old 
electricity companies. The high tension grid has become state property and is man-
aged by a new organisation, Tennet. The grids for medium and intermediate tension 
have become the property of public grid managers in the hands of municipalities 
and provinces. They deliver electricity to users who can in turn remit electricity 
from proprietary windmills and solar panels to the grid. At the moment, there are a 
limited number of regional grid managers in the Netherlands, like Endiner, Liander, 
and Stedin, all of which also deliver gas.
In addition, the laws have created a new set of actors. The old provincial and 
municipal companies have been privatised and transformed into commercial elec-
tricity companies. These buy electricity as well as produce it themselves. The big-
gest companies are Nuon, Essent, Eneco and EPZ. They are the owners of the power 
plants. In addition, the commercial electricity companies initiate joint ventures, 
make deals with firms that generate electricity locally and own windmill parks. 
End-users are free to choose from among these suppliers. Market mechanisms have 
come to replace the internal planning mechanisms of the original electricity sector.
The new structure provided opportunities for decentralised electricity genera-
tion. The Ministry of Economic Affairs especially supported heat-power coupling 
schemes by means of subsidies and tax breaks. These schemes either focused on 
power (and hence electricity) with heat as a by-product, or focused on heat for the 
heating of office buildings, hospitals and agricultural greenhouses with electricity as 
a by-product. However, the rapid increase in the number of such schemes occa-
sioned a crisis in the planning and monitoring of electricity production. This was 
exacerbated by the development of electricity production on the basis of wind and 
16 Duyvendak, W. Het groene optimisme. Het drama van 25 jaar klimaatpolitiek, (Amsterdam, 
2011: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker), pp. 65.
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solar power. Coordinating supply and demand has become much more complicated 
with the advent of decentralised electricity production. ‘Smart grids’ are currently 
among the ‘trending topics’ in the sector.
20.5  Environment, Depletion and Climate17
The driving force behind the changes in the electricity sector was initially the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, seeking to get a grip on the national electricity supply 
in connection with its interests in natural gas and nuclear power. Privatisation and 
liberalisation would only later begin to play a role and the European Union would 
also become a new actor in the background. The Ministry pursued low energy costs 
for industry, reliability of the supply, and decentralized generation. Environmental 
problems, depletion of fossil fuels and climate change were secondary consider-
ations. The introduction of renewable sources of energy was a marginal aspect of 
energy policy. The societal debate on sustainability barely made a dent, at least not 
in the energy policy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
The debate came in waves.18 At the beginning of the 1970s, protest groups, envi-
ronmental organisations and political parties were up in arms above all around the 
issues of air pollution, the depletion of raw materials and nuclear power. The debate 
on nuclear power polarised the country and dragged on interminably. Air pollution 
was a quite different matter. The focus here was on sulphur dioxide (SO2) and its 
effects on public health. The ministry of Public Health, Spatial Planning and 
Environmental Management (VROM) took the lead on this issue. The reduction of 
SO2 emissions in those years was a success. That was partly the outcome of legisla-
tion and the implementation of technologies like gas scrubbers to remove sulphur, 
but above all a beneficent side-effect of the transition from coal to natural gas. 
Concern about the depletion of fossil fuels moved the government to pay ongoing 
attention to energy conservation. The Ministry of Economic Affairs adopted energy 
conservation as one of the cornerstones of its energy policy. Subsidies and so-called 
‘multi-annual agreements’ were mobilised to enrol private industry. Regulation, 
permits and energy taxes comprised the stick in the event these carrots failed to 
produce adequate results.19 The recurring high energy prices formed a favourable 
backdrop. This story too turned out a success.
The debate ebbed away but resurfaced with renewed force in the course of the 
1980s. Nuclear power and acidification and their connection with fossil raw 
17 See for this section the elegant overview of the history of sustainable energy in the Netherlands: 
G.  Verbong. G, et  al. Een kwestie van lange adem. De geschiedenis van duurzame energie 
in Nederland. (Boxtel, 2001: Aeneas uitgeverij).
18 See also: J. Cramer, Milieu. (Amsterdam, 2014: Amsterdam University Press).
19 J.J. De Jong, E.O. Weeda, E.O., Th. Westerwoudt, A.F. Correljé, A.F. Dertig Jaar Nederlands 
Energiebeleid. Van bonzen, polders en markten naar Brussel zonder koolstof, (Den Haag, 2005: 
Clingendael International Energy Programme), pp. 106.
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 materials were the key issues. The accident at Chernobyl put an end to the nuclear 
dream of Economic Affairs and the nuclear power lobby. The debate on acidifica-
tion shifted attention from public health to the environment and from sulphur diox-
ide to ammonia emissions (SO2 and NH3). In this case too, it proved possible to take 
measures to keep emissions within legally defined norms.
From the 1990s on fine dust and greenhouse gas emissions were the most impor-
tant issues. The problem of fine dust (airborne particles smaller than 10 micro- 
meters) re-oriented the discussion once again to public health. With greenhouse gas 
emissions the debate about fossil raw materials acquired a new aspect: climate 
change. The biggest concern was CO2 emissions but these proved far more resistant 
to legal and technical measures than the other emissions. Moreover, the concern was 
global, leading to international agreements about reduction that the Netherlands 
could hardly ignore. In the short term – up to the year 2020 – it seems likely that the 
government can satisfy the norms with ‘classic’ policy measures (energy conserva-
tion, energy covenants and so on). For the long term, however, more ambitious 
measures will have to be taken.
At certain moments it could seem that there was broad support for taking mea-
sures in energy production. At other times support has proven to be quite limited 
and riddled with weak spots. One of the weak spots is that the debate is constantly 
plagued by uncertainties. In each period there has been fundamental debate about 
the reserves of fossil raw materials and about the effects of air pollution on public 
health and the environment.
The situation with respect to climate change and CO2 emissions is no different. 
Some question the analyses that predict global warming, consider the severity of the 
problem grossly exaggerated and find political support for their views.20 Others 
argue that the influence of CO2 emissions on global temperatures is still impercep-
tible and that humans do not have the power to fiddle with the ‘climate dials.’21 The 
court of law that ordered the Dutch state to reduce CO2 emissions acknowledged 
that there is scientific uncertainty about ‘…the question when and to what degree, 
which specific effects will become manifest, and also about the effectiveness and 
possible negative consequences of certain precautionary measures.’22 The court, 
however, considered the fact that there is consensus among climate scientists and 
within the international policy field about the serious consequences of CO2 
 emissions. The precautionary principle thus justified the ruling that appropriate 
measures be taken.
20 In this spirit the PVV (Party for Freedom) – the biggest but one party in the Second Chamber in 
2018 – submitted a motion in which the government ‘… in view of the fact that the climate treaty 
is bad for the Dutch economy … is requested to dump the climate treaty in the wastebasket’ 
Motion by parliamentarian Madlener (19 May 2016) Kamerstuk 31,793 nr. 150, Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal. Vergaderjaar 2015–2016.
21 A prominent representative of this line of thought in the Netherlands is S. Kroonenberg, emeritus 
professor at the Technical University Delft. See among other publications his book: S. Kroonenberg, 
S. De menselijke maat: de aarde over tienduizend jaar. (Amsterdam, 2006, (revised edition in 
2008): Uitgeverij Atlas).




20.6  Renewable Energy Sources23
CO2 emissions can be reduced by, among other things, saving energy or closing 
coal-fired power plants. Renewable energy sources play a special role. They provide 
an alternative for fossil raw materials, but their practical implementation has long 
left much to be desired. This is hardly surprising because these are new technologies 
that have to buck up against the prevailing mature energy technologies. Their future 
depends on investments in research and development, practical experiments, anchor-
age in laws and regulations and the building of networks. All these activities take 
much time and face numerous obstacles. Two examples – wind energy and solar 
panels – make this clear.
20.6.1  Wind
The wind energy story goes back to the 1970s. For a long time the technology was 
regarded with great sympathy. The ministry of Economic Affairs invested tens of 
millions of euros in research and development. A first National Research Program 
on Wind Energy was initiated (1976). This was followed up by a second National 
Development Program on Wind Energy (1981), an Integral Program on Wind 
Energy (1986), a Wind Plan (1989) and the Implementation of Wind Energy in the 
Netherlands (1992). The Energy Research Centre Netherlands (ECN) became the 
core of a national research network. The institute opted for large wind turbines. The 
small wind turbines championed by the environmental movement were pretty much 
ignored by the ECN and in the end lost the race against their bigger brothers.
But things went anything but smoothly with the big wind turbines. Researchers 
and designers struggled with technical shortcomings like broken blades and with 
what turned out to be a dead-end strategy. They invested in two-bladed turbines, 
while three-bladed turbines eventually became the dominant design. The most 
important obstacles, however, were the relations with the electricity sector on which 
the wind-energy developers were dependent for their practical trials. The creation of 
a wind-energy park at the beginning of the eighties gave rise to a host of conflicts 
with the electricity companies. The latter wanted complete control of the wind-park 
and managed to disengage the project from the national research program. It suf-
fices to note that one of the turbine manufacturers abandoned the project and the 
other nearly went bankrupt.
One of the issues was the coupling of wind energy to the electrical power net-
work. According to ECN, the electricity sector grossly underestimated the wind 
turbine capacity that could be coupled to its network without endangering the stabil-
ity of the electricity supply. Moreover, the sector was willing to pay only modest 
amounts for supplying electricity to the network. That created problems for local 
23 This section is based on: Verbong and Geels, ‘The ongoing energy transition’, pp. 1033–1035.
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wind turbine initiatives. And the costs of coupling a turbine to the network also 
played a role. The actual installation of windmills therefore lagged far behind the 
goals that had been set. And due to these problems a wind turbine industry also 
failed to develop. Manufacturers had too little experience with wind turbines and 
got too little feedback from actual practice.24 The obstacles disappeared after the 
privatisation and liberalisation of the sector and the founding of public network 
managers and private electricity companies. However, dependence on subsidies did 
not disappear. In terms of price, wind energy was no match for fossil energy sources.
Furthermore, after 2000, wind energy began to lose its societal base. According 
to critics, the actual implementation of wind energy was too much of a top-down 
affair managed by researchers and policy-makers or by individual farmers seeking 
to earn extra income. That created a backlash. Local residents increasingly agitated 
against the noise, shadow flicker and the ugly aspect of the high wind turbines, 
while nature conservationists protested against turbines as ‘bird choppers’ and 
‘landscape polluters.’ Politicians viewed windmills as a hardly cost-effective means 
to reduce CO2 emissions. In a study the introduction of wind energy at the start of 
the new century was characterised as:
… possibly the most painful policy domain… Despite the best of intentions and ambitious 
policy aims, this domain is characterised by a continual process of ‘pushing and shoving’ 
leading in the end to laborious outcomes. And then once again to ambitious new 
resolutions.25
Recently, the tide has turned. In 2013 the government, employers, the unions and 
nature and environmental organisations signed the Energy Agreement for Sustainable 
Growth.26 By 2023, 16% of all energy would have to be generated in sustainable 
ways. One of the strategies to achieve this aim was the installation of large wind 
turbine parks at sea.
In 2023 minimally 4450 MW of generating capacity will have to be installed at 
sea, of which around 35–40% will produce electricity due to wind fluctuations. (By 
comparison: the capacity of many gas-powered electricity plants runs between 300 
and 700 MW).27 And the government has even bigger ambitions for the period to 
follow: up to 2030 an additional 1000 MW per year.28 And the number of land-based 
windmills will also have to be increased substantially. The strategy requires signifi-
24 Davids, M., Lintsen, H., Van Rooij, A., Innovatie en kennisinfrastructuur. Vele wegen naar ver-
nieuwing. (Amsterdam, 2013: Boom),. pp. 179–183.
25 J.J. De Jong, E.O. Weeda, Th. Westerwoudt, A.F. Correljé, Dertig Jaar Nederlands Energiebeleid. 
Van bonzen, polders en markten naar Brussel zonder koolstof, (Den Haag, 2005: Clingendael 
International Energy Programme), pp.226.
26 Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei (2013) Den Haag: SER.
27 The biggest gas-fired power plant has an output of 1275 MW and the biggest coal-fired plant of 
1560 MW. See: https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lijst_van_elektriciteitscentrales_in_Nederland con-
sulted 22 mei 2017





cant subsidies, but thanks to, among other things, economies of scale and the learn-
ing curve these turn out to be lower than estimated.29 While wind energy is still not 
uncontroversial, it seems that a tipping point has been reached: wind energy will be 
implemented at a large scale.30
20.6.2  Sun
Every new source of energy follows a different trajectory. With solar cells, for 
example, the ambitions were completely the inverse of those for wind. Initially the 
government and policy makers saw little potential in solar cells, while nowadays 
they are the promise of the future in electricity supply. The solar cell (photovoltaic 
cell or PV cell) was considered ill-suited to the Netherlands. The country had too 
little sunshine due to its geographical location and frequent cloud cover. Nonetheless, 
academic researchers used their freedom to investigate solar cells. They also formed 
a lobby group that aimed to convince politicians, policy makers, industrialists and 
the environmental movement of the future of PV on the basis of demonstration 
projects.
The about-face in perception occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. PV acquired 
substantial support and became a serious option. Shell, for example, integrated solar 
cells into its future scenarios and the multinational predicted that PV would become 
an important energy source by the middle of the twenty-first century. Other parties 
like the ministry of Economic Affairs, Greenpeace and Nuon encouraged the adop-
tion of solar cells by households, among others. The budget for PV increased sub-
stantially in these years.
However, PV was definitely more expensive, certainly in comparison with fossil 
energy sources, but also in comparison with other renewable energy sources. Despite 
the improvement of the solar cell, the gap remained. PV scored poorly in an 
 evaluation by the government at the end of the 1990s. It barely contributed to CO2 
reduction and the costs were high. Implementation of PV stagnated.
29 J. van den Berg, ‘Buitengaats pionieren met miljarden’, De Volkskrant 8 mei 2017, 6. Zie ook: 
C. Grol and B. van Dijk ‘Shell gaat tweede grote Borssele-windpark aanleggen’ in het Financieel 
Dagblad, 12 december 2016, https://fd.nl/ondernemen/1179351/shell-gaat-tweede-grote-borssele-
windpark-aanleggen. For five wind parks at sea (two off Borssele and three off the Holland shore) 
a maximum of € 18 billion in subsidies had been estimated. The estimate in 2016 was € 6 billion. 
The decrease is also the result of low interest rates, cheap steel prices and the availability of cheap 
offshore material due to the malaise in the oil and gas sector.
30 See for example the debate between minister H. Kamp of Economic Affairs and Dercksen (PVV) 
in the Second Chamber on Dec. 19, 2016. Handelingen TK 2016–2017, 2, 19 December 2016. Or 
the reactions in response to an article by C. Grol and B. van Dijk ‘Shell gaat tweede grote Borssele-
windpark aanleggen’ in het Financieel Dagblad, 12 december 2016, https://fd.nl/onderne-
men/1179351/shell-gaat-tweede-grote-borssele-windpark-aanleggen
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Recently PV is once again on the rise thanks to technological developments, 
subsidies,31 and so-called salderen (charging private consumers on the basis of 
delivered energy minus energy returned to the network by local PV or wind sources). 
The contribution to the electricity supply is growing, but the technology has not yet 
reached the stage of large-scale implementation that wind power has achieved.
The two examples exhibit uneven and unpredictable trajectories.32 Future prom-
ises were often too ambitious. Technical problems were too easily made light of. 
Implementation took longer than expected. Factors largely beyond the control of the 
parties concerned also played a role: the oil price, an economic recession, concern 
for the environment, liberalisation, etc.
The development of renewable sources was often stimulated by technology. 
Researchers focused on technical designs and technical challenges and paid less 
attention to the political process and social acceptance. They failed to adequately 
anticipate resistance by the environmental movement and local groups.
The building of well-functioning networks among research institutes, industry, 
societal organisation and the government proved to be essential.33 Those networks 
were necessary to protect the new and vulnerable technologies against their harsh 
environments. Within these networks, the proponents of wind energy and solar cells 
had to organise subsidies, create favourable preconditions for innovations, organise 
practical experiments in sheltered environments, exchange knowledge and above all 
create optimistic images of advantages and disadvantages, costs, and profits. If a 
critical party became obstructive, as was the case with wind energy and the former 
electricity sector, the process could stagnate for years. The lack of stability of the 
networks and the changing role of the actors was remarkable. Policy makers had a 
tendency to change their strategies when results were disappointing and learning 
processes became more laborious than hoped for. The government often provided 
meagre guarantees for the longer term. Investors were uncertain and careful. Societal 
organisations tended to jump ship if the technology stimulated too much social 
protest.
In the short term investments in fossil energy sources will remain dominant. Low 
energy costs, market forces, reliability and diversification still have a high priority 
in the energy supply; climate, public health and environment take a back seat. To be 
sure there are clear EU norms for reducing CO2 emissions and those of other green-
house gases, but the solution will partly be sought within existing technologies and 
institutional structures. CO2 storage is an option. Possibilities for energy saving, 
heat-power coupling and decentralised electricity generation are not yet exhausted. 
There are new chances for fossil fuels, in particular for gas. ‘If coal was the fuel of 
31 In particular the subsidy measure ‘Stimulering Duurzame Energie (SDE+)’, Rijksdienst voor 
Ondernemend Nederland, 2017: http://www.rvo.nl/subsidies-regelingen/stimulering-duurzame- 
energieproductie-sde
32 Verbong and Geels, ‘The ongoing energy transition’, pp. 1035.
33 Also see: B. Verhees, R. Raven, F. Veraart, A. Smith and F. Kern, ‘The development of solar PV 
in the Netherlands: a case of survival in unfriendly contexts’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 19 (2013), 275–289.
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the nineteenth century and oil the fuel of the twentieth, then natural gas is predes-
tined to become the fuel of the twenty-first century’ as Jeroen van der Veer, presi-
dent of Shell, predicted in 2002.34
Still, it remains to be seen whether this prediction is correct. Wind energy has 
acquired momentum and will experience significant growth in the coming decade. 
Work will continue on the expansion of other renewable energy sources. Societal 
support is clearly not lacking. The Second Chamber aims to have sustainable energy 
account for 30% of the energy supply by 2030.35 This will only be the beginning, 
because the norms for CO2 reduction for 2050 are stringent.
We shall return to this point in the conclusion. First we investigate another func-
tion of ‘fossil.’ Fossil raw materials are not only sources of energy, but also raw 
materials for chemical products. We focus on plastics, because they are an important 
example of this use of fossil resources.
20.7  Fossil and Plastics: Prelude to a Second Revolution36
After the Second World War, plastics became a revolutionary force. They rapidly 
penetrated into the capillaries of society with plastic products in the living room, the 
kitchen, the playroom, the bathroom and the bedroom, with fibres in textiles, films 
in packaging, laminates in construction, coatings in the paint industry and with 
plastic parts in machines and plastic applications in medicine, agriculture, transpor-
tation and the office. The Netherlands emerged as one of the international leaders in 
the production, processing and use of plastics.
The oil crisis of 1973 initially led to panicked reactions in the plastics sector. 
Companies began to hoard, fearing a scarcity of raw materials for plastics. Demand 
increased enormously but subsequently took a nosedive with 1975 as a low point. 
Economic stagnation, rising prices for plastics and more efficient use were the 
causes of the hectic movements. ‘It will be clear…’ noted the trade journal Plastica 
summarizing the mood, ‘…that the entire complex of events during and after the oil 
crisis has thoroughly unsettled the plastics industry of the fatherland.’37 In retro-
spect, the oil crisis caused little more than a ripple in the ongoing increase of plas-
tics production and the use of plastics. It happened once again during the credit 
crisis of 2008. Up to the present day, production and use of plastics have continued 
to increase in the Netherlands, although the spectacular growth of the 1960s has 
never since been achieved.
34 Citation in: Sluyterman, Concurreren in turbulente markten, pp. 235.
35 Passed motion submitted by parliamentarians Jan Vos (PvdA) en Van Veldhoven (D’66), nr. 511 
(30196). Handelingen TK 2016–2017, 49, 7 February 2017.
36 See for this section: Lintsen H., Hollestelle M., Hölsgens R. (2017) The plastics revolution. How 
the Netherlands became a global player in plastics.
37 W. Bongers. ‘De Nederlandse kunststofindustrie in 1975’, Plastica 29 (1976), 239.
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20.7.1  The Heterogeneous Sector
Still, much has changed in the plastics sector. The production of bulk plastics and 
artificial fibres still takes place in the Netherlands, but not or rarely by Dutch com-
panies. The ‘classic’ big plastics producers, Shell, DSM and AkzoNobel, have with-
drawn from the fray. Shell still supplies raw materials for plastics. DSM has oriented 
itself to technical polymers and AkzoNobel to coatings. In the 1980s and 1990s the 
strategy was no longer oriented to diversification and the creation of broad con-
glomerates, but to core activities and the attainment of leadership positions in spe-
cialised markets. Profit margins on bulk plastics were too small and production 
suffered from extreme ups and downs. Currently, foreign companies have stepped 
into the breach as active bulk producers. Companies like General Electric, Dow 
Chemical and DuPont pioneered this strategy in the 1960s. Other big firms like the 
Saoudi SABIC, the Japanese Shin-Etsu and the international LyondellBasell are 
newcomers to the Netherlands.
The plastics processing industry consists above all of small and medium-sized 
firms (up to 50 employees) and has developed into the most innovative sector in the 
Netherlands. It is extremely heterogeneous. Many firms in the plastics processing 
sector are specialised in one way or another, for example in products like sliding 
roof systems, in materials (among others PVC), in technologies (for example injec-
tion moulding), or in market sectors like automobiles and construction. There is 
variety in age (many firms are not older than 40 years), in ownership forms (many 
are a BV, a private limited liability company, among which a number of family 
companies, some are an NV – a public company – or are part of a conglomerate) and 
variety in origins (founded as a plastics processing company or the continuation of 
a metalworking firm, a tool and die firm etc.).
The heterogeneity of the plastics sector has its positive and negative aspects. The 
advantage is that the sector can operate flexibly in national and international mar-
kets. The disadvantage is that the sector is hard to organise and that policy makers 
have difficulty getting a handle on it. Among other things, this plays a role in the 
many public controversies around plastics. In the field of energy problems the lay of 
the land is reasonably evident and it is possible to call large actors like the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and the big electricity companies to account for their policies. 
In the plastics sector this is much more difficult.
20.7.2  Controversies
In the 1950s and 1960s, plastics had an ambivalent image. The material had an aura 
of progress and modernity, but was also associated with low quality, litter and waste. 
These negative associations continued to rear their ugly heads in subsequent years. 
Other issues also surfaced with the emergence of the environmental movement. 
PVC became the bogeyman of the 1980s. According to critics, PVC production 
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released carcinogenic substances. As packaging material, this plastic threatened 
food safety. When burned in waste incinerators, dangerous quantities of poisonous 
dioxin escaped. In the same period a debate emerged on the dangers of additives in 
plastics to health and the environment. Later on this debate broadened to include 
sustainability, which also included energy production and the exhaustibility of fossil 
raw materials.
Recently plastics waste is once again high on the agenda due to problems with 
litter, ‘plastic soup’ and micro-plastics. Unimaginable quantities of plastics end up 
globally in rivers, along the coasts, and at sea. Birds and other animals perceive 
floating bits of plastic as food, consume it, are weakened and die. Plastics waste is 
concentrated in so-called gyres, large circular movements fed by multiple ocean 
currents. These result in enormous garbage dumps, many times larger than the 
Netherlands.
A portion of the marine plastics degrades into miniscule particles, providing a 
substrate for the growth of organic material and attracting poisonous substances like 
dioxin. They cover the ocean floor and enter the food chain via fish. Micro-plastics 
also end up in the water and sediments of sewage treatment plants because they are 
for example constituents of toothpaste, shampoos and cosmetics. The modern 
human body contains minimal but measurable quantities of plastics. As the 
Washington Post announced as long ago as 1972, ‘Every human is a little bit 
‘plastic.’38 What are the implications for health and behaviour? We do not yet know. 
‘Under the 10 micro-meters they penetrate through your cell membranes, enter into 
your bloodstream and travel through your body…’ according to Heather Leslie, a 
researcher in the field of micro-plastics at the Free University of Amsterdam.
…we still have to investigate how many of these particles you have to take in before you 
begin to experience severe discomfort, but laboratory tests already show that very fine plas-
tic particles can damage cells and tissue and that they can lead to all kinds of infections.39
The problems have an international dimension. Plastics are produced, exported, 
imported, used and disposed of worldwide. Within the Netherlands and the European 
Union this attracts some attention. Internationally there are hardly any organisations 
that articulate the problem. This is why a solution for one of the most pressing 
issues – marine pollution and the ‘plastic soup’ – still remains far distant. The Ocean 
Cleanup, founded by the Delft student Boyan Slat, is one of the few organisations 
that is preparing for one of the biggest clean-up operations in history.40
38 Quoted in: S. Freinkel, Plastic. A Toxic Love Story (Boston, 2011: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt), 
89.
39 D.  Cohen, ‘Geplastificeerde maatschappij. Er wordt te veel van de burger verwacht’, De 
Volkskrant 24 september 2016, bijlage Vonk, 2.
40 In 2013 Boyan Slat started a project to capture floating plastic trash in the oceans with the aid of 
inflatable barrier arms. The project generates much enthusiasm and receives financial support from 
all over the world. Slat works together with students, engineers, oceanographers and industry 
experts. Feasibility studies are underway. The first pilot project was launched in 2016. See: www.
theoceancleanup.com/ (Geraadpleegd op 8 maart 2017.)
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The problems with the ‘plastic soup’ and the micro-plastics can be traced back to 
the linear nature of the plastics supply chain. A large proportion of the plastics ends 
up in garbage dumps, leaks into the environment or is burned. In Europe that per-
centage is 74%, of which garbage dumbs and the environment accounts for 38% and 
burning for 36% (2012).41 In the Netherlands the percentage is 67% but a much 
smaller proportion ends up in garbage dumps and in the environment – 7% – and 
60% is burned. The advantage of burning is in any case that the plastics don’t end 
up in the environment and that they produce useful energy. The disadvantage is that 
finite resources are depleted.
The problems could be partly solved if degradable bio-plastics were to replace 
the current ones, so that the waste products could be taken up in the environment. 
Wageningen University and Research are investigating this, but an important contri-
bution from ‘green’ plastics should not be expected anytime soon. Degradable bio- 
plastics cannot compete with the majority of plastics and are used only in niches.
The solution for the time being would have to be sought in the closing of the sup-
ply chain, that is to say in the nearly complete recycling of plastics. In the Netherlands 
some 33% is recycled. Increasing this percentage will be a big challenge in view of 
the heterogeneous nature of the plastics sector and the absence of influential organ-
isations prepared to assume responsibility for the problem. It could be the prelude 
to a second plastics revolution.
20.8  Fossil as a Janus-Head
Fossil raw material is the Janus-head of well-being. It has two faces like the head of 
the Roman god Janus. As an energy source it was an important factor in modern 
economic growth, the elimination of poverty and the achievement of welfare. As 
raw material for plastics it shaped a life of comfort, ease, luxury, sport and games. 
At the same time it was a source of uncertainties and controversies. In the field of 
energy supply, dependence on foreign suppliers was an issue as early as the end of 
the nineteenth century. In recent decades this has been augmented by air pollution, 
depletion of raw materials and climate change. In the new domain of plastics litter 
became an issue from the 1950s on, now augmented by concerns over ‘plastic soup’ 
and micro-plastics.
Will the dark side of fossil lead to a transition? This is highly unlikely in the short 
term for issues like ‘plastic soup’ and micro-plastics. Little urgency is felt, nation-
ally or internationally, to undertake action on these points. Nonetheless there is a 
possibility for a slow but radical change in the domain of plastics if the tendency to 
recycling can be sustained.
The energy situation is another story. Climate change is currently the crowbar for 
the energy transition. Will this transition continue at a slow pace in the coming 
41 Plastics – The facts 2013. An analysis of European latest plastics production, demand and waste 
data (z.pl 2013). The text is published by Plastics Europe, Association of Plastics Manufacturers.
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decades with ‘fossil’ continuing to remain dominant? Or will there be a radical 
breakthrough in which renewable energy sources rapidly become the major suppli-
ers? Renewable energy sources now have a long gestation period behind them of 
some four decades. That is not unusual for a transition. It was no different with the 
rise of coal and steam and it was also the case with the transition to oil.
Much happens in the course of such a gestation period. In the fields of science 
and technology research is undertaken and elaborate experiments carried out. A 
base of support is organised among societal organisations. The government is wooed 
with expectations and solicited for favourable conditions. Niches are identified in 
the economy, so that the new options can come to fruition in a somewhat protected 
environment. The creation of social networks is essential to achieve synergy among 
all these efforts and to enable the creation of new institutions.
The question is whether wind energy, solar cells and other renewable sources of 
energy have reached the stage where they can compete with oil, gas and coal under 
equal, but newly formed, circumstances. That stage seems to have been reached for 
wind energy, although the technology is still dependent on subsidies. For solar cells 
this is not yet the case, but there is still hope.42 The new technologies are not only in 
competition with the classic energy sources. There is also a struggle among the 
alternative options, for example with biomass, heat-power coupling and geothermal 
energy. It is still unclear what kind of mix will surface in the end.
The conditions for a sustainable energy transition seem favourable at the moment, 
especially because important actors are lending their support. Business leaders like 
the chairman of the Employers’ Association, the director of the National Railways 
and even the director of the Gasunie have spoken out in favour of the transition.43 
The ABP, the Netherlands’ biggest pension fund, recently announced that it wants 
to commit itself seriously to sustainability. Chairman of the board, C. Wortmann- 
Kool, is pushing for a climate law and in this she is not alone: ‘We have to provide 
our clients with long-term security and be able to offer gains, so we are not going to 
sit back waiting on fickle subsidy policies. The cabinet has to provide clarity for a 
period of ten to twenty years.’44 The Netherlands Bank calls on the government to 
42 See for example the analysis by the Rabo Bank: ‘Zonne-energie (fotovoltaïsche zonnepanelen’, 
Rabobank Cijfers & Trends 40(2016/2017), 23 May 2017. https://www.rabobankcijfersentrends.
nl/index.cfm?action=branche&branche=Zonne-energie_fotovoltaische_zonnepanelen
43 See, for example: ‘Top Nederlands bedrijfsleven op excursie naar Noordpool’, Financieel 
Dagblad 2 mei 2017, https://fd.nl/ondernemen/1200342/top-nederlands-bedrijfsleven-op-
excursie-naar-noordpool. For example also: ‘Uniek paar: Marjan Minnesma en Hans de Boer’, 
Vroege Vogels Radio 12 februari 2017, https://vroegevogels.vara.nl/nieuws/uniek-paar- 
marjan-minnesma-en-hans-de-boer
44 See: C. Wortmann-Kool, ‘Nieuw beleggingsbeleid van het ABP is breuk met verleden’, https://
www.apg.nl/pdfs/abp-pensioendoc_2016.pdf. The chairman of the board of the General Citizens’ 
Pension Fund (ABP) indicates that it is difficult for the ABP to invest in sustainable projects 
because it often concerns projects that are too small for the ABP and because too many projects 
still return too little profit. See: N. Trappenburg and J. Groot, ‘Pensioenfonds zoekt grote groene 
projecten’, Financieel Dagblad 8 mei 2017, https://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1200685/abp-
duurzaam-beleggen-in-nederland-is-lastig. Typical of the situation is that in 2016 the ABP invested 
€2  billion extra in fossil energy: ‘ABP belegde € 2 mrd extra in fossiele energie’, Financieel 
Dagblad 15 mei 2017, https://fd.nl/beurs/1201824/abp-belegde-2-mrd-extra-in-fossiele-energie
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‘commit itself in a timely manner to a credible and feasible path toward a CO2- 
neutral economy’45 For this moment in time, it is hard to image a more powerful 
statement from one of the most influential organisations in the Netherlands.
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Abstract This chapter describes, first, the development of well-being between 
1970 and 2010 from the perspective of the efforts of the societal midfield, the 
national government, and the business community. In the second place, the situation 
around 2010 is evaluated from the perspective of 1970 and a present-day perspec-
tive. From the perspective of 1970 material welfare and well-being have developed 
in a positive sense between 1970 and 2010. Problematic from this perspective is the 
increase in criminality and unemployment. In the Netherlands the crisis of nature 
and environment seems to be past its deepest point.
The present-day perspective is described using the position of the Netherlands in 
European rankings for different themes and indicators. It confirms what has been 
said above in previous analyses: the Netherlands has a high quality of life. But this 
can be contested for the chances for future generations, especially in relation to 
human and natural capital. In addition, the Netherlands is more than ever inter-
twined with international supply chains for her resources and energy. In this way the 
Netherlands has displaced a part of its sustainability problems to foreign lands. On 
the other hand, international supply chains – as in the meat sector – have led to more 
landscape damage and environmental problems within the Netherlands.
Keywords Midfield · National government · Business community · Environment · 
Sustainability · Monitor · Tradeoff
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21.1  The Netherlands as a Temporary Global Leader 
in Climate Policy
What we are presently experiencing is not the destruction of the earth in one blow, but in a 
silent drama. Our world suffers from deforestation, desertification, pollution and the poi-
soning of air, soil and water, extinction of animal and plant species, erosion of the ozone 
layer that serves to protect us from dangerous radiation, and an increase in temperature with 
threatening consequences, such as sea-level rise. Slowly the earth is dying and the unimagi-
nable – the end of life itself – is nonetheless becoming imaginable.1
With these sombre words Queen Beatrix opened her 1988 Christmas Speech. By the 
end of the 1980s it looked like environmental problems were accumulating and 
increasing in scope. Well-being with respect for nature, the environment and climate 
were the challenges for the period between 1970 and 2015.
In 1988 the National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM) had 
published the Netherlands’ first future study on the environment, Concerns for 
Tomorrow (Zorgen voor Morgen). Recommendations by the RIVM and by the 1987 
World Commission on Environmental Development, chaired by Gro Harlem 
Brundlandt, inspired a first National Environmental Plan. This was broadly sup-
ported by the government. Despite this, Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers’ second cabi-
net fell due to several of the Plan’s proposals: the elimination of the default tax 
restitution for costs of commuting and an increase in excise tax on diesel.
In the 1989 elections, almost all the party platforms prominently flagged plans 
for sustainable development. The environment had captured the popular imagina-
tion. No less than 42% of the electorate considered this the most important issue. 
Brundlandt’s approach in particular, in which sustainable development and eco-
nomic growth were considered compatible, found favour among political parties. 
Wim Kok, the leader of the Labour Party, promised to solve environmental prob-
lems ‘within one generation.’ Targeted levies (ecotax) and regulations would 
encourage sustainable behaviours. The Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Liberals 
(VVD) focussed especially on the emerging concern for the climate problem. 
Candidate (and incumbent prime-minister) Lubbers (CDA) announced an 8% 
reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) in the coming cabinet term. The VVD published 
an ‘action plan for the protection of the atmosphere.’2 But policy for the climate 
problem was relatively new. The way this issue was dealt with reveals the then cur-
rent political and societal order and its ruling ambitions.
On November 6 and 7, 1989, environment ministers from 68 countries assem-
bled at the Dutch seaside resort of Noordwijk to discuss the contours of a global 
climate treaty. The plans for this meeting had arisen in 1988 in the course of the 
Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere. At that conference it was also 
1 Christmas Address 1988, Koning Beatrix cited in Carla van Baalen et al., eds., Koning Beatrix 
aan het Woord, 25 Jaar Troonredes, Officiële Redevoeringen en Kersttoespraken (Den Haag: Sdu 
Uitgeverij, 2005), 445.
2 W. Duyvendak, Het Groene Optimisme, Het Drama van 25 Jaar Klimaatpolitiek (Amsterdam: 
Bert Bakker, 2011), 39–52.
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decided to promote additional research in this area and for this purpose to found the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
The meeting in Noordwijk took place during the final two days of Ed Nijpels’ 
term as minister of the environment. He proudly announced that ‘The Netherlands 
wants to be the leader in the area of the climate treaty in spe, and with respect to 
reduction of CO2 pollution.’3 This was the first time that climate change and mea-
sures to reduce CO2 emissions had been spoken of at the ministerial level.
The issue was also remarkable because of the ambivalent attitude of the environ-
mental movement. The Foundation for Nature and the Environment (Stichting 
Natuur en Milieu) had been invited to the Noordwijk conference only at the very 
last minute. It submitted a proposal to reduce CO2 emissions by 20% by the year 
2000. At the same time it argued that nuclear energy ‘could not be an alternative in 
the struggle against the greenhouse effect.’4 Nuclear energy had been one of the big 
environmental issues of the 1970s and 1980s. The Chernobyl disaster in 1986 had 
closed the door on this option, or so it seemed. But with growing concern for the 
climate problem, the environmental movements were concerned lest nuclear energy 
threatened to become an option again.
In the wake of the conference newspapers headlined: ‘Disappointment after cli-
mate conference. Great powers block solid agreements.’ The Dutch hosts proved 
unable to forge a climate treaty at the Noordwijk meeting. The United States and 
Japan, in particular, first wanted to await results of the IPCC investigations. The 
meeting did settle on an agenda for international climate agreements, such as the 
different roles of developed and developing countries, the importance of forests and 
targets for levels of emission reduction with 1990 as a reference year.5
The meeting occurred at a peculiar moment in time for the Netherlands. Due to 
the transfer of political power, the election period of 1989 marked the temporary 
high-water mark of Dutch societal and political concern for environment and sus-
tainability in the period 1970-2015. Throughout the 1980s, the country had seemed 
to be buried under an ever-growing avalanche of environmental problems. After 
concern about air and water pollution in the early 1970s, a number of ‘pollution 
scandals’ called attention to the pollution of soil and groundwater. In 1982 there 
were 4253 reports of pollution nationwide, of which 1246 were classified as highly 
urgent.6
In the same period there were growing concerns about acidification. These were 
originally focussed on the emission of sulphur dioxide and the trans-border problem 
3 ‘Nijpels hoopt op afspraken tijdens milieuconferentie’, NRC 4-11-1989, 7.
4 ‘Milieuconferentie begint in sfeer van onenigheid, Nederland vraagt om hulp voor Derde Wereld’ 
in Nederlands dagblad 07-11-1989.
5 Duyvendak, Het Groene Optimisme, 53–54.
6 Investigations into the scope of the problems gained momentum after the pollution scandal in 
Lekkerkerk (1980). A first overview was prepared at the behest of Minister L. Ginjaar for the 
interim-regulations on soil-decontamination. See Klaas Bouwer, Jacques Klaver, and Marianne de 
Soet, Nederland Stortplaats, een Milieukundig en Geografische Visie op het Afvalprobleem 
(Nijmegen: Ekologische uitgeverij, 1983), 64–65.
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of acid rain. With improved knowledge and more accurate measurements, acidifica-
tion due to agricultural ammonia emissions also became part of the picture.7 The 
latter led to increased interest in eutrophication of the soil by nitrogen and phospho-
rous deriving from agriculture and households. By the end of the 1980s the 
 international problems of the erosion of the ozone layer and climate change had 
become prominent issues in the press and in politics (see Graph 21.1).
With its National Environmental Policy Plan and the debate on climate problems 
the Netherlands regarded itself as world leader in environmental policy. Was this 
justified? And did it retain this position? What happened to the attention for climate 
and environment after 1990?
7 Ed Buijsman, ‘Gisteren, Vandaag, Morgen, Een Terugblik op het Probleem van Zure Regen,’ 
Studium 4 (2008): 251–68; G.H. Dinkelman, Verzuring en Broeikaseffect, de Wisselwerking tussen 
Problemen en Oplossingen in het Nederlandse Luchtverontreinigingsbeleid (1970-1994) 


























Trends of words connected to air pollution.
Solid lines & left scale: Number of articles in Dutch 
national and regional newspapers 
Dotted lines & right scale: Terms mentioned in notes, 
minutes, questions and reports of second chamber and
senate.Years in the graph are ordered according to the starting year 
of the parliamentary year. E.g. in the graph 1960-1961 is 1960. This 
skews these lines slightly to the left.  
Graph 21.1 Topics related to air pollution in Dutch newspapers and in the Transactions of the 
Second Chamber of Parliament 1960–1990
Note 1: after 1990 the newspaper data set is incomplete
Note 2: Regarding the newspaper data it may be the case that newspaper articles appearing in both 
regional and national newspapers are counted twice. In the parliamentary and senate notes, min-
utes and reports there is a distinction between loose remarks and full reports. The content of these 
articles, notes, etc. was not checked. Articles might, for example, review foreign news or suffer 
from other anomalies. This is especially problematic with small numbers
Source: Royal Library – online Newspaper database Delpher-Kranten (www.delpher.nl) and online 
database governmental notes of parliament and senate (www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl)
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21.2  Turbulence and Crisis
21.2.1  Tense Years: 1970 – 1990
In the 1970s and 1980s the Netherlands had more worries than only those concern-
ing environment and sustainability. The economy was in bad shape. The economic 
wonder of the 1950s and 1960s with its almost unbroken growth had begun to lose 
momentum. Increasing wage levels and prices in the course of the 1960s had already 
compromised Dutch competitiveness.8 The expansion of world trade ground to a 
halt in response to extreme fluctuations in currency markets, stock exchanges and 
markets for raw materials. A wave of global inflation flooded the economy. The first 
oil crisis of 1973 brought further wage and price increases.9 The business commu-
nity suffered. Turnover stagnated. Profits declined. The proportion of those 
employed in industry declined drastically and unemployment rose. After the second 
oil crisis of 1978 the economic situation declined even more dramatically, to recover 
only at the end of the 1980s.
The economic situation was hardly favourable to measures aimed at improving 
the environment or sustainability. Despite this, the government maintained that an 
environmental policy including investments by the business community was essen-
tial in order to change existing ‘dirty’ production processes and to repair past envi-
ronmental damage. However this created even more problems for the business 
community. It complained loudly about the costs of the environmental measures.
Environmental policy was not the only cause of increasing costs for the business 
community. During the 1970s the welfare state also expanded.10 The General Law 
on Labour Incapacity (Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet) insured not only 
employed workers but also non-employed workers against the consequences of 
unfitness for work. The minimum wage and the budgets for social security were 
increased. The number of Netherlanders dependent on social services increased, in 
part due to growing unemployment. The minimum wage and welfare benefits were 
coupled to wage levels in the market sector. This all contributed to increased costs 
for business: higher wages and increased taxes and welfare contributions.
The government was itself also confronted with the consequences of its policies. 
In the course of the 4 years after 1973, government expenses increased from 45% of 
the Gross Domestic Product to 51%. After 1974 the state budget showed a chronic 
deficit. The gradual decline in the magnitude of the national debt came to a halt in 
1977.
Fundamental tensions among the welfare state, the economy and sustainability 
became apparent in the 1970s. By expanding welfare services, the government 
8 J.L van Zanden and R.T. Griffiths, Economische geschiedenis van Nederland in de 20 e eeuw 
(Aula, Utrecht 1989), 48–49.
9 Van Zanden and Griffiths, Economische geschiedenis van Nederland, 255–258.
10 See for the following: J. Peet en E. Nijhof, Een voortdurend experiment. Overheidsbeleid en het 
Nederlandse bedrijfsleven (Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam 2015), 199–205.
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hoped to shore up the purchasing power of the unemployed, the ill and the poor and 
in this way to stimulate the economy. If that appeared still to work in the 1970s, it 
proved impossible to maintain in the long run. Government largesse was financed 
by proceeds from the sale of natural gas, by government loans and by an increase in 
the budget deficit. But workers stuck by their hard-won rights. Massive protests fol-
lowed on a proposal to terminate automatic price compensation for wage earners in 
the market sector. Environmental groups demanded rigorous environmental mea-
sures. Employers pointed to the structural economic problems caused by govern-
ment policy. In many firms profits were inadequate to enable production to continue 
or to invest in expansion. The business community argued that society was much 
more concerned with distributing welfare than with creating it.
21.2.2  The Dynamic Midfield: Breakdown and Reconstruction
Societal contradictions increased in the 1970s, ultimately leading to an about-face. 
The economic miracle after the Second World War had exacted offers from the 
Dutch population. Parsimony ruled the day. There had been little opportunity for 
consumption. The reconstruction of the country, the modernisation of the economy 
and the Delta Works had exacted enormous investments. The resulting tensions had 
been absorbed by the pillarised social structure. The necessary consensus had been 
created within the pillars, with their organisations in the fields of work, enterprise, 
education, sport and social life. This is where the shock of modernisation had been 
absorbed.11
But by the second half of the 1960s de-pillarisation had set in. The influence of 
the church and religion on social life declined. The membership of the confessional 
parties declined and their political dominance began to wane. This also meant the 
end of the soundless achievement of a societal consensus. In the course of the 1970s 
the number of strikes began to increase after a long period of quiescence. Workers’ 
associations increasingly went their own way. Labour contract negotiations and bar-
gaining in the Social-Economic Council no longer ‘automatically’ led to a 
consensus.
A new societal midfield emerged but did not replace the pillars. To have done so 
it would have had to have been less specifically oriented to the issue of the environ-
ment. Groups like the national Association for the Preservation of the Wadden Sea 
(1965), the Foundation for Nature and the Environment (1972) and the Central 
Action-Committee Rijnmond (1970) were oriented above all to exercising political 
and administrative influence. Groups like Action Last Hope (1970) and the 
Association for Environmental Defence (1970) used demonstrations and publicity to 
11 K. Schuyt and E. Taverne, 1950. Welvaart in zwart-wit (Den Haag, 2000: Sdu Uitgevers), 40–41.
H. Lintsen and F. Veraart
465
advance the environmentalist cause. Associations like De Kleine Aarde (1971) and 
ecologically inspired working communities used concrete examples to try to win 
the broader public for an environmentally friendlier and energy-conserving 
lifestyle.12
These organisations became highly visible in the collective protest against 
nuclear energy. In the 1980s they were able to mobilise thousands of people for 
protest demonstrations at the experimental reactor at Dodewaard and the uranium 
enrichment facility Urenco in Almelo.13 Another broadly supported protest aimed to 
prevent the closure of the East Scheldt and the expansion of marl mining. In the 
course of these engagements the environmental movement gradually acquired a 
new role. They increasingly became sources of information and expertise in the area 
of environmental technology. This enabled them to make substantive contributions 
to proposals and solutions.
In the 1980s idealism gave way to pragmatism. In cooperation with governments 
and the business community, the overthrow of capitalism was abandoned as an aim, 
to be replaced by a transition to ecological modernisation. This was inspired in par-
ticular by the sustainability concept as worked out in the Brundtland report. At the 
same time the environment became a more central concern for businesses and gov-
ernments, who found useful partners in the environmental organisations with their 
new knowledge and expertise.14
In the 1980s, strategies of cooperation were reintroduced into the economy. In 
1982 representatives of employees and employers, under the benevolent eye of the 
government, signed the famous ‘Wassenaar Agreement.’ A long period of polarisa-
tion thereby came to an end as a new era of compromise began to take shape. 
Workers were now prepared to relax wage demands in return for shorter working 
hours. The expectation was that this would both improve the competitive position of 
the business community as well as increase employment opportunities. In the same 
spirit, the relationship between social policy and the economy was redefined. 
Guarantees of social security were not rejected out of hand, but limited to what was 
necessary and to what was manageable from an economic and financial point of 
view.15
12 J. Cramer, Milieu (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2014), 21–22.
13 In 1980, 15,000 people demonstrated at the Dodewaard nuclear power plant. In 1987, 25,000 
people protested against the underground storage of nuclear wastes in Gasselte and 40,000 at the 
uranium enrichment facility in Almelo. Duyvendak, Het Groene Optimisme, 62.
14 Cramer, Milieu, 53–54.
15 Peet en Nijhof, Een voortdurend experiment, 223. At the national level there was the tri-polar 
consultation among employers, employees and the government. In the 1990s this would become 
known as the ‘polder’ model and come to be seen as the basis of the Dutch miracle: a well-oiled 
economy, growing employment, decreasing budget deficits and a less-costly welfare system. 
B. Bouwens and J. Dankers, Tussen concurrentie en concentratie. Belangenorganisaties, kartels, 
fusies en overnames (Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam 2012), 205.
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21.2.3  The National Government: In Search of a New Role
In regard to environment and energy, the government had long pursued a directive 
policy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs imposed its will on energy policy by 
advocating a central role for energy conservation and nuclear power. A new minis-
try, the Ministry of Public Housing and Environmental Hygiene, founded in 1971, 
developed legal instruments to compel the business community to take environmen-
tal measures.16 These measures were primarily aimed at managing local environ-
mental pollution, initially of air and water and by the early 1980s of the soil as well. 
Problems were defined chiefly as public health risks. The policy was inspired by 
research conducted by the National Institute for Public Water Supply, the Institute 
for Waste Research, and the National Institute for Public Housing that had been 
investigating air quality since the 1960s. Norms, permits and subsidies were mobil-
ised to force a reduction of emissions and energy consumption.
At local levels this strategy was certainly successful. End of pipe technologies 
decreased emissions.17 And as far as SO2 emissions were concerned: the transition 
to natural gas also had an effect. Nonetheless, there was increasing unease about the 
environment and energy. Policy makers began to focus on biodiversity and damage 
to the landscape. Problems became more and more global in nature. Acid rain, cli-
mate change and destruction of the ozone layer were not limited to the Netherlands. 
The national government once again had to reconsider its strategy in regard to envi-
ronmental and energy issues.
The environmental issues were transferred to the newly-formed ministry of 
Public Housing, Spatial Planning and Environmental Management. At the end of 
the 1980s, a report, Concerns for Tomorrow (Zorgen voor Morgen) and the National 
Environmental Policy Plan opted for drastic reductions in the emissions of many 
substances and the prevention of future environmental damage. Toughening up 
technical specifications for firms, devices and vehicles was no longer enough. It was 
necessary to pursue an integral strategy for energy supply, agriculture and traffic 
and transport.18 Spatial planning was also subjected to an integral approach. The 
16 H.T. Siraa, A.J. van der Valk and W.L. Wissink, Met het Oog op de Omgeving. Het Ministerie van 
Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, 1965–1995 (Den Haag: SDU Uitgeverij, 
1995), 244–67.
17 Cramer, Milieu, 18–19.
18 Cramer, Milieu, 29-31. The shift in environmental policy can also be interpreted in another way, 
namely from end of pipe policy to policy based on the precautionary principle to a no-regret policy. 
The precautionary principle was the point of departure for the policy entailed in the report Concerns 
for Tomorrow (Zorgen voor Morgen, 1988). A much-used definition states that new technologies 
may not be implemented without precautions if there is a chance of serious or irreversible damage 
even when there is no scientific certainty about risks. See, among others: A. Reichow, Effective 
regulation under conditions of scientific uncertainty: How collaborative networks contribute to 
occupational health and safety regulation for nanomaterials (Enschede, UT Twente, 2015) (dis-
sertation), 37–38.). The actual application of this approach was often highly problematic and there 
was political concern about the possible adverse effects on competitiveness of new environmental 
regulations. In the 1990s the precautionary principle made way for the no regret policy of ecological 
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first National Nature Policy Plan of 1989 featured the so-called Ecological Main 
Framework, in which nature zones were connected to one another by means of con-
nective corridors.19 The national plans translated into spatial programs like the 
VINEX (1990–2010) and the Space Memorandum (2004).
Progressive European unification also inspired important changes. This brought 
with it a uniform set of environmental regulations in the various member states. 
Environmental regulations now increasingly came from ‘Brussels’ instead of ‘The 
Hague.’ It should be noted that these were partly based on Dutch experience. The 
Dutch Ecological Main Framework inspired the European ecological network of the 
Natura 2000 program.20 European norms regarding air quality (fine dust norms) 
bore the mark of the Dutch National Institute for Environmental Management 
(RIVM) throughout the 1980s and 1990s.21
In another respect, too, there was a change of course. The directive policies were 
gradually abandoned. Government policy now more often than not aimed at coopera-
tion with the business community and the societal organisations. Self-regulation 
within business sectors was emphasised. In the 1980s the national government was 
busy re-inventing its societal role. The change of course was also possible thanks to the 
changing attitude of the business community toward environmental and energy issues.
21.2.4  The Business Community: In Search of Its Own 
Responsibility
Originally the business community reacted defensively and strategically to the criti-
cisms it had to endure as the ‘chief suspect’ in the environmental crisis.22 It dele-
gated representatives to government commissions charged with developing 
environmental regulations. It arranged representation in the directorates of water 
modernisation, such as measures to limit the effects of climate warming. (Jeroen P. van der Sluijs, 
Rinie van Est, and Monique Riphagen, Room for Climate Debate, Perspectives on the Interaction 
between Climate Politics, Science and Media (The Hague: Rathenau Instituut, 2010), 18–20.)
19 Hans van der Cammen and Len de Klerk, Ruimtelijke Ordening, van Grachtengordel tot Vinex-
Wijk (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 2003), 252–53.
20 See also chapter 18. The Netherlands, together with Flanders and Germany, were pioneers in the 
development of ecological networks. In Rob H.G.  Jongman, ‘Nature Conservation Planning in 
Europe: Developing Ecological Networks’ Landscape and Urban Planning 32 (1995): 196–183. 
Per Högselius, Arne Kaijser, and Erik van der Vleuten, Europe’s Infrastructure Transition, 
Economy, War, Nature, vol. 4, Making Europe: Technology and Transformations, 1850–2000 
(Basingstoke / New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 261–65.
21 See also chapter 20; T. Arnoldussen, The Social Construction of the Dutch Air Quality Clash. 
How Road Expansions Bit the Dust Against Particulate Matter (Eleven International Publishing, 
The Hague 2016), 125–64.
22 See for the following among others: H. Lintsen and J. Korsten, De veerkracht van de Brabantse 
economie. De Kamers van Koophandel en de kracht van netwerken [1840–2015] (Stichting 
Zuidelijk Historisch Contact & Uitgeverij Verloren, Hilversum 2017), 134–139. The Chambers of 
Commerce represent the business community in many environmental issues.
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boards that developed policy on the pollution of surface water. It made an inventory 
of the problems entrepreneurs ran into due to environmental regulations, the need to 
process wastes and the associated costs. It for example protested against ‘… the 
disproportional increases that are the consequence of the new levies associated with 
the implementation of the Law on Surface Water Pollution…’.23 But in the course of 
the 1970s this attitude began to change.
In the previous decade one could roughly say that in societal consciousness concern for the 
environment was most highly valued. This was possibly not unjustified as a counterweight 
to the increased appreciation for the aspect of welfare in the period immediately after the 
Second World War. It seems to me that the time is now ripe for a balanced approach in 
weighing these priorities…24
In this way the entrepreneur and freshly minted chairman of the Eindhoven Chamber 
of Commerce, H. Schellens, expressed the feelings of the business community in 
1976. At the end of the 1980s, representatives of the business community took an 
additional step. A sound environmental policy was considered to be highly impor-
tant for ‘the preservation of an attractive residential, working and living environ-
ment’ and hence also for a favourable climate for attracting new firms.25 The new 
Law on Environmental Management of 1993 thus enjoyed a positive reception. 
‘The business community is aware of its own environmental responsibility and does 
not seek to avoid it…,’ but it did request from the government ‘the necessary room 
for manoeuvre to operate in this manner. On an international level, too, it was neces-
sary to seek a fit between norms and requirements.’26 Contacts with the governments 
were intensified.
In addition to consultations, the business community also undertook its own ini-
tiatives in the area of environment and energy. ‘…Not only because the government 
and society have given it an important priority, but precisely also from the viewpoint 
of efficiency, quality control, cost control, use of raw materials, working conditions, 
shop floor risks and market image.’27 Firms set up their own internal environmental 
care departments or employed external environmental services.28
23 Jaarverslag Kamer van Koophandel Eindhoven 1975, 28 en 65.
24 Jaarverslag Kamer van Koophandel Eindhoven 1975, 68.
25 Beleidsplan Provinciaal Samenwerkingsorgaan Kamer van Koophandel Noord-Brabant 
Beleidsplan 1989, 11 in Archief Provinciaal Bureau Kamers van Koophandel in Noord-Brabant, 
BHIC 1157, map 44.
26 Jaarverslag Kamer van Koophandel Noordoost Brabant 1993, 27–28. The chamber informed the 
business community in its area both collectively and individually about the new law and its conse-
quences. In Oss, for example, it cooperated with the municipality. Jaarverslag PSK over de peri-
ode 1 juli 1992 tot 1 juli 1992, in Archief Provinciaal Bureau Kamers van Koophandel in 
Noord-Brabant, BHIC 1157, map 43.
27 Jaarverslag Kamer van Koophandel Noordoost-Brabant 1991.
28 Lintsen en Korsten, De veerkracht van de Brabantse economie, 138–139.
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21.2.5  Toward a New Order and New Approaches After 1990
A more pro-active business community and fewer directive interventions by the 
government fit perfectly in the new era in which liberalisation of the economy had 
become the watchword.29 The economic crisis at the end of the 1970s and the begin-
ning of the 1980s cleared the way for a reassessment of private initiative in a free 
market. The American president Ronald Reagan and the British prime minister 
Margaret Thatcher gave the international example as they advocated privatisation 
and de-regulation. The government should no longer play an active role in the steer-
ing of the economy. State enterprises were better off in private hands. Private firms 
could in many cases perform government tasks more efficiently.
The Dutch government toed the international line. It sold its shares in companies 
like KLM and the Hoogoven steel mills and withdrew from public utilities like the 
postal and telephone services. Suppliers of energy and waste processing facilities 
were privatised. The government also undertook severe cutbacks and chiselled away 
at social security. The Competition Law of 1998 sought to create more room for 
market dynamics. It prohibited agreements among companies to suppress competi-
tion, a measure that meant the end of cartel-formation in the Dutch economy.30 The 
dirigiste tradition in agriculture also made way for government at a great distance 
from this sector. Agriculture increasingly became just another economic sector. But 
not all forms of societal coordination were abandoned. One mode did fit with the 
liberal model, namely the covenant. This instrument enjoyed immense popularity in 
the area of energy and environment.
The government used covenants to create a constituency for environmental goals 
in the short and long term.31 A covenant emerged out of consultations among the 
government, the business community and societal groups. Out of this came volun-
tary, but by no means non-committal, agreements – often at the level of a specific 
branch. These were congruent with general policy frameworks established by the 
political system. Branch-organisations shouldered part of the responsibility for pol-
icy and oversaw the implementation. The government supported progress by pro-
viding permits, subsidies and other ‘supplementary policy.’32 Environmental 
organisations partnered with the business community and contributed concrete and 
realistic solutions.
The shift to self-regulation also stimulated the business community to undertake 
other initiatives like ‘sustainable entrepreneurship’ (later also called ‘socially 
responsible entrepreneurship’). Firms pursuing this course formulated a vision of 
sustainability, coupled this to a corporate strategy, established a monitoring and 
29 See for the following: Bouwens and Dankers, Tussen concurrentie en concentratie, 203–207.
30 The economic-political policy also resulted in the dismantling of long-established coordinating 
organisations such as the Agricultural Board (Landbouwschap, 2001), the Chambers of Commerce 
as independent regional organisations (2014) and the industry and product boards (2015).
31 Bouwens and Dankers, Tussen concurrentie en concentratie, 213–215; Peet and Nijhof, Een 
voortdurend experiment, 236.
32 Bouwens en Dankers, Tussen concurrentie en concentratie, 213; Cramer, Milieu, 40–41.
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reporting system and infused the vision into their corporate culture. The financial 
sector followed with sustainable investing. Sustainability funds ranked firms on the 
basis of their achievements on economic, social and environmental dimensions.33
There was also another shift. Policies had long aimed at suppressing emissions 
of noxious substances. From the 1990s on, prevention became the main strategy: 
designing production and other processes in such a way that the emission of envi-
ronmentally polluting substances was kept to a minimum. With ‘sustainable entre-
preneurship’ the focus was on the production process of the individual firm. 
So-called ‘integral chain management’ shifted attention from discrete production 
processes to production-consumption chains and aimed at redesigning the entire 
chain from an environmentally conscious perspective.34
The transition to a preventive and integral approach also had to do with the glo-
balisation of environmental and energy issues. The emergence of new industrial 
economies in countries like China, Brazil and India extended environmental prob-
lems beyond the previously industrialised countries. More than ever, environmental 
issues were transported to other places (‘elsewhere’) and as such became a global 
concern. Two issues dominated the agendas of international organisations and 
national governments: climate and raw materials.
These issues became prominent in the Netherlands as well.35 For example, in 
2007 the government set a goal for 2020: a 30% reduction in CO2 emissions, 20% 
energy saving and 20% sustainable energy, all relative to 1990. An encompassing 
program called ‘Clean and Thrifty’ was set up. Nine ministries were involved. 
Municipalities and provinces signed the climate agreement and made deals with the 
national government regarding their contributions to the goals. Branch organisa-
tions agreed to an overarching covenant and ten sectoral covenants. Funds were 
made available for research and innovation.
The program was inspired by the transition approach. This went a step further 
than the integral strategy. A society-wide, long-term vision on sustainability formed 
the point of departure for short-term actions. All the societal actors had to be 
involved. There had to be sufficient space for experiments and learning. It was 
accepted that the course of a transition process could not be fixed beforehand. 
Actions at the micro-level had to influence structural changes at the meso-level, 
which also entailed processes at the macro-level. New images of the future revealed 
the fundamental character of the transition. Changes in the domains of energy and 
raw materials would form the basis of a third industrial revolution. The social fabric 
of 2050 would be interwoven with a new economic system that would be based on 
the re-use of products and resources and the conservation of natural resources. 
33 Cramer, Milieu, 63–64.
34 Cramer, Milieu, 46.
35 For the following see: Cramer, Milieu, 81–82; 91; 109–111.
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Material flows would then become closed cycles and energy sources become renew-
able. The Netherlands would have to pursue the road to a circular economy. We will 
deal extensively with this last image in the epilogue to this book.
What were the results of the ‘Clean and Thrifty’ program?36 None of the aims for 
2020  in regard to CO2 reduction, energy saving and sustainable energy will be 
achieved. The feasibility of a reviewed and revised energy agreement signed in 2013 
is also in doubt (chapter 20). One of the reasons was that the system of emissions 
trading ended up a failure. The system was developed at the European level. It gave 
businesses rights to CO2 emissions and the possibility to trade these rights. It would 
have encouraged the reduction of CO2 emissions had the price remained at € 30–€ 
40 per ton of CO2, but the price dropped to less than €5 in 2014.
Another important reason was the change in the political climate. After a change 
of government in 2010, the ‘Clean and Thrifty’ program was put on the back burner. 
Terrorism, migrants and economic crises drove sustainability issues to the back-
ground. Concern for the environment and sustainability once again became a politi-
cal choice. According to many in the field, the government did not show itself at its 
most trustworthy. Subsidy policy changed continually. Governments repeatedly 
failed to achieve the goals they set.37
But relationships in the field had also changed. Citizens lost interest in the envi-
ronment as new societal issues emerged. The professionalisation of environmental-
ism also played a role. The environment had become the property of experts in 
industries, the government and environmental organisations. After the turn of the 
century a new popular movement emerged that was independent of the established 
institutions and that developed initiatives like local energy cooperatives and small 
businesses for sustainable products.
It is within this context that we now evaluate the quality of life in the Netherlands 
for the last sample date of this book. We do that using the monitor for 2010 and from 
two perspectives: from the perspective of 1970 and from a present-day 
perspective.
36 Cramer, Milieu, 82–84.
37 In October 2017, the Planning Bureau for the Environment, for example, expressed doubts 
whether the Rutte-III cabinet would be able to meet its own climate goals. The Bureau states: ‘The 
emission goal of 49% proposed by the Rutte-III cabinet fits with the ambitions of the Paris accord 
to limit temperature rise to well under 2 degrees. The measures analysed here achieve roughly half 
of the necessary reduction in emissions. A transition policy is in place but can acquire more 
momentum. In order to achieve the aimed-for reduction of 49% in 2030, it will therefore be neces-
sary to work out additional measures in a new climate and energy agreement.’ Analyse regeerak-
koord Rutte-III: effecten op klimaat en energie (Uitgever: Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, Den 
Haag 2017), publicatienummer: 3009, 33.
21 The Tensions Between Well-being and Sustainability. Well-being…
472
21.3  The Monitor for 2010: Development of Well-being 
and Sustainability
21.3.1  Perspective 1970: Progress
How should well-being and sustainability around 2010 be evaluated from the per-
spective of 1970? Which themes were then on the societal agenda and what is their 
present state? We arrive at the following brief summary.
An evaluation from the perspective of 1970 shows a mixed verdict. Material 
welfare has increased and the inequality between men and women has declined. 
Netherlanders are older, taller and heavier. Dwellings and facilities are of higher 
quality. All this with more free time. In these respects the image is positive.
But unemployment levels have, grosso modo, increased. During the economic 
recession at the end of the 1970s these increased for the first time since the 1930s. 
After that, unemployment followed the ups and down of the economy. The reces-
sions impacted on social inequality. Due to the lowering of the minimum wage in 
the 1980s, the chronic pressure on welfare budgets and restructuring of the social 
security system income inequality grew between 1985 and 1990 and again around 
the year 2000.38
From the perspective of 1970 the participation of the populace in politics is also 
disappointing. The democratisation of society and the levelling of power differen-
tials were important issues around 1970. In this respect the Netherlands has shown 
no improvement. Quite the contrary. The Dutch demonstrate less quickly, attend 
consultation meetings less frequently and have less recourse to political parties. 
They are, moreover, less frequently members of political parties, trade unions, con-
servation societies and consumer organisations (in terms of percentage of 
population).39 These trends are not a sign of greater satisfaction, but rather of lower 
levels of participation and commitment. There is mistrust of politics and dissatisfac-
tion with the existing institutions.40 The linkages between politics and social net-
works were lost with the end of pillarisation. New linkages have yet to emerge in 
their stead. For example, more Netherlanders are active politically via the internet 
and more frequently boycott products because they cause environmental damage or 
involve child labour. In addition there is evidence that small-scale local forms of 
citizens’ initiatives are emerging. The populace certainly appears to be sensitive to 
38 W. Salverda et al., Nederlandse ongelijkheid sinds 198. Loonvorming, overheidsbeleid en veran-
derde samenstelling van huishoudens (Uitgever: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour 
Studies/ University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam 2013).
39 R.  Bijl et  al. (ed), De sociale staat van Nederland 2015 (Uitgever: Sociaal en Cultureel 
Planbureau, Den Haag 2015), 221–222.
40 See among others the following publication, with which we opened this book: P.  Schnabel, 
‘Feiten en gevoel’, in: C. van Campen et al. (eds.),Sturen op geluk. Geluksbevordering door natio-
nale overheden, gemeenten en publieke instellingen (Uitgever: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 
Den Haag 2012), 17–23.
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societal issues but possibly have more faith in their own initiatives than in those of 
politics and the government.
Concern for the environment and nature seems to have bottomed out and is again 
on the rise. Local environmental problems have been rigorously dealt with. Nature 
restoration projects have commenced. The numbers of seals, beavers, badgers and 
birds of prey – symbolic for the restoration of natural habitats – have increased. But 
measured against the quantity of all animal species the comeback is still quite mod-
est. In any case, the decline seems to have been arrested.
International and global environmental problems were hardly at issue around 
1970. That was not the case for the problems with raw materials that became a 
major concern in the light of the Report of the Club of Rome. This concern persists, 
but is now overshadowed by the climate problem.
21.3.2  Perspective 2010: New Issues
How should we evaluate the present situation from a present-day perspective? We 
could look with the gaze of politicians, policy makers, opinion leaders or business 
leaders. An evaluation could also proceed from the priorities of the Dutch popula-
tion, as they can be deduced from surveys. Here we choose the approach used by 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) in which the situation in the Netherlands is compared 
with the other countries of the European Union. This is done on the basis of the 
indicators of the ‘well-being monitor’ (Table  21.1). These provide an image of 
important societal issues. We assume that the political and policy establishment also 
considers them important. We also assume that the Netherlands is doing well if it 
occupies a place near the top of the EU rankings. If the Netherlands finds itself near 
the bottom, we regard the situation as problematic.41
According to the monitor, the quality of life ‘here and now’ is, by European 
standards, very high. The Netherlands is in good shape with respect to material 
welfare, health, life-expectancy, housing, free time and various other indicators for 
the personal situation. However, after making an inventory of all relevant indicators, 
Statistics Netherlands and the three Dutch planning bureaus offer the following 
caveat: ‘… we create the quality of life in the here and now in a manner that makes 
it difficult for future generations to create welfare.’42 The present generation partly 
shifts the solution of the sustainability problems it has created to the future. The 
bureaus also note that the present welfare of the Netherlands contributes to sustain-
ability problems in foreign countries (see below).
41 An approach of this nature can be found in Monitor Duurzaam Nederland 2011 (Centraal Bureau 
voor de Statistiek, Den Haag/Heerlen 2011) en Monitor Duurzaam Nederland 2014. 
Indicatorenrapport ( Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Den Haag/Heerlen 2014).
42 Monitor Duurzaam Nederland 2011, 51.
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(continued)






Population Million inhabitants 16.5





















Satisfaction with life Score 0–10 7.8 + +
Personal characteristics
Health Life expectancy year women 83.0
men 79.3
+ women  
men +




Housing Housing quality % slums <1 +
Public water supply m3/capita 120
Physical 
safety




Labour Unemployment % workforce. 5,0 – +
Education Level of education years (11) + –
Free time Free time hours per week. 44.7 + ?
Natural environment
Biodiversity MSA % original 
biodiversity
(63) – ?
Air quality SO2 kg SO2/ capita 4 + +
Greenhouse gas 
emissions
ton CO2/capita 10.6 + –
Water quality Public water supply m3/capita 120
Institutional environment





Note: The numbers in brackets are from J.L. van Zanden et al. (ed.), How was life? Global well-being
since 1820 (OECD Publishing 2014) and relate to the year 2000. Numbers for these indicators –




Table 21.1 Dashboards well-being and sustainability in 2010 from the perspectives of 1970 and 
a present-day perspective (EU position) 




Natural capital Indicator Unit
Energy Energy consumption TJ /capita 0.17 – –
Non-fossil fuels Gross domestic 
consumption
ton/capita 9.8 – ?
Biodiversity MSA % original 
biodiversity
(63) ?
Air quality SO2 emissions kg SO2/ capita 4 + +
Greenhouse gas 
emissions
ton CO2/capita 10.6 + –
Water Public water supply m3/capita 120
Economic capital:





Financial capital Gross national debt % gdp 59 +










Labour Unemployment % workforce 5,0 – +
Educational level Schooling years (11) + –
Social capital:




Political institutions Democracy democracy 
index 0–100
(39) +
Dashboard well-being ‘later’ 2010 Perspective NL in EU
–
Note: The numbers in brackets are from J.L. van Zanden et al. (ed.), How was life? Global well-being
since 1820 (OECD Publishing 2014) and relate to the year 2000. Numbers for these indicators –
measured according to the same methodology – are not available for 2010.
Dashboard well-being ‘elsewhere’




Consumption, income Development aid % gdp 0,8
Natural capital
Natural capital Import of raw materials ton/capita 12,5 –
Table 21.1 (continued)
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The problems pertain above all to the capitals, in other words to the resources for 
‘later.’ This does not concern economic or social capital – these are in reasonable 
and even good shape – but rather natural and human capital.
In previous chapters human capital has barely been mentioned. An important 
issue is the level of education of the Dutch populace. To be sure, the level of educa-
tion measured as years of schooling has increased, but the number of school drop-
outs is substantial and the quality of primary and secondary education is declining, 
judging by the scores of Dutch pupils on international comparative tests.43 A well- 
educated populace is important for labour productivity and the material welfare of 
a country. In addition, education also to a great extent determines the quality of an 
individual’s personal life.44 The well-educated get the better jobs, have a higher 
income, are healthier and live longer. The less-educated are vulnerable in the labour 
market, change jobs more often, have to work more years and have a materially less 
secure existence. Social inequality is not only a question of income but also mani-
fests itself in these kinds of aspects. Nowadays school diplomas are the main deter-
minant of this dimension of inequality.
Of the four capitals, natural capital is the most problematic.45 In the 1990s, with 
its research and policy experience, the Netherlands set the tone for European policy 
that was rolled out from 2000 on, but the Netherlands itself, paradoxically enough, 
seemed barely able to meet the norms it had implicitly set for itself. The Netherlands 
43 Monitor Duurzaam Nederland 2011, 58.
44 Also see: Kwaliteit van leven in Nederland (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Den Haag 2015), 
56–58.
45 Monitor Duurzaam Nederland 2011, 51.
Table 21.1 (continued)
+ Not problematic/was not problematised from the perspective of 1970. Present-day 
perspective: The Netherlands is in good shape because it belongs among the
nine highest-scoring EU member states.
– Problematic from the perspective of 1970. Present-day perspective: the situation is 
problematic because the Netherlands belongs among the nine lowest-scoring EU 
member states.
Under discussion: different opinions about the scale and nature of the problems. 
Present-day perspective: No evaluation in terms of problematic or not problematic. 
The Netherlands scores in the middle group of the 27 EU member states.
? Unknown  
Remark 1: For present days perspective the table indicates the Netherlands position within the 
EU-27 (see legend)
Remark 2: Public water supply is left blank; this indicator became irrelevant as an indicator for 
water quality
Source: See note 23 of Chap. 2; The position of The Netherlands in EU derived from Monitor 
Duurzaam Nederland 2014. Indicatorenrapport (Den Haag 2014), 158–169. Numbers from years 
between 2010 and 2013
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is among the EU countries with the highest per capita energy consumption, the low-
est investment in renewable energy sources and the highest per capita emissions of 
greenhouse gases. The nutrient surplus in the soil is among the biggest in Europe. 
Despite many improvements, Dutch surface water nowhere meets the European 
quality norm. And the Netherlands still has little forest and nature compared with 
other European countries. Biodiversity in the countryside and in nature preserves is 
chronically under pressure.
There are also problems with the degree to which the Netherlands places a bur-
den on nature and environment ‘elsewhere.’46 It belongs among the EU countries 
with the biggest per capita import of bio-raw materials and mineral and fossil sub- 
soil resources. The raw materials that are imported into the Netherlands from devel-
oping countries are a special problem. To be sure, this trade creates incomes in 
developing countries, but an analysis by the World Bank shows that these local 
incomes are generally spent in consumption and frequently to the benefit of a small 
elite. There is also the problem of depletion, loss of biodiversity and often also of a 
one-sided economic structure.47 The Netherlands has shifted some of its sustain-
ability problems elsewhere.
On the other hand, Dutch exports and hence the Dutch products consumed in 
other countries contribute to problems in the Netherlands. For example the massive 
export of meat is associated with sustainability problems in cattle husbandry and the 
bio-industry.
This short evaluation confirms what has emerged in this and preceding chapter: 
The most import sustainability issues for the coming decades are energy, raw mate-
rials and biodiversity. In the Epilogue we summarise the historical process that has 
led to these problems. We also investigate, from a historical perspective, the concept 
of ‘circular economy,’ a notion that is regarded as the most important option for a 
way out of our present-day predicament.
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Chapter 22
The Long-Term Development: In Search 
of a Balance
Harry Lintsen and Jan-Pieter Smits
Abstract The chapter summarises the development of well-being and sustainabil-
ity in the Netherlands between 1850 and 2010. It commences by establishing that 
any summary has a normative dimension. Issues relating to quality of life must 
consistently be analysed from a historical (contemporary) and a present-day 
perspective.
The summary shows the great transformation of a society with extreme poverty 
and a circular economy into a welfare society with a linear economy. Present-day 
sustainability issues, including climate change, resource depletion, raw materials 
dependency, and worrisome biodiversity have their roots in this transformation. 
Well-being and sustainability were in balance during only a brief period. Around 
1960 the old historical challenge of extreme poverty had been solved and the quality 
of life as seen through contemporary eyes was reasonably in order, while the claims 
on nature and the environment were still modest. The balance would be shattered in 
the course of the 1960s.
Gradually, sustainability has become the new historical challenge. At the same 
time society is confronted with the so-called welfare paradox: despite the high level 
of welfare, there is much unrest among the populace.
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22.1  The Historical Challenge
‘Global extreme poverty for the first time under 10%’ according to the newspaper 
Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant on October 5, 2015.1 For the first time in human his-
tory the scope of extreme poverty was expected to fall below 10% of the global 
population, a feat to be achieved by the end of 2015. While the reliability of the 
figures leaves room for doubt (data are lacking, for example, on a number of poor 
countries) the decline of extreme poverty is clearly evident. Only 25 years earlier – 
at the outset of the 1990s – the percentage had been nearly 40%! And the ambitions 
are hardly modest. ‘This is the best story in the world today,’ according to the presi-
dent of the World Bank, ‘these projections show that we are the first generation in 
human history that can end extreme poverty.’2
In the Netherlands, extreme poverty – on the basis of a poverty line of $ 1.90 per 
day (in 2015) as defined by the World Bank and the United Nations – fell below 10% 
at the end of the nineteenth century. That was for the first time in its history. But his-
tory shows that the struggle against extreme poverty is not a linear march to victory. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century 40%–50% of the Dutch population also 
lived below the poverty line. That percentage declined to some 21% around 1850, only 
to increase again thereafter to about 40%. After 1870 a declining trend set in. Wars and 
economic recessions, among other factors, influenced the levels of poverty and would 
continue to do so throughout the twentieth century, even though in that century the 
percentage of the extremely poor in the Netherlands would never exceed 10%.
Another issue is also at play in the struggle against poverty. The World Bank and 
the United Nations aim to put an end to extreme poverty by 2030. The experience of 
the Dutch with the abolition of extreme poverty shows that that is by no means the 
end of poverty altogether. Extreme poverty is defined on the basis of a purchasing 
power (of $ 1.90 per day) that is sufficient to provide a person with just the bare 
necessities: adequate means to feed and clothe himself and to protect himself, more 
or less, from the elements. That says little about the quality of dwellings, health 
1 S. Klumpelaars and M. Somers. ‘Extreme armoede wereldwijd voor het eerst onder 10 procent’, 
NRC 5 oktober 2015, retrieved from https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/10/05/
wereldbank-extreme-armoede-wereldwijd-voor-het-eerst-onder-10-procent-a1412636
2 World Bank Group. World Bank Forecasts Global Poverty to Fall Below 10% for First Time; 
Major Hurdles Remain in Goal to End Poverty by 2030, retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/
en/news/press-release/2015/10/04/world-bank-forecasts-global-poverty-to-fall-below-10-for-
first-time-major-hurdles-remain-in-goal-to-end-poverty-by-2030. Consulted 20 January 2017.
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care, education and labour. In the Netherlands in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, the conception of poverty broadened to include problems like the many 
slums, poor hygiene, miserable working conditions, and dubious food quality. 
Around 1960 these problems had been solved to a great extent.
That does not mean that poverty has disappeared in the Netherlands. Every gen-
eration defines poverty anew. Every year, the National Institute for Budget 
Information establishes a minimum budget that is just sufficient to meet basic costs 
(food, clothing, housing, internet etc.) and supplementary costs for social participa-
tion (vacation, sport, entertaining etc.).3 In 2014 this minimal budget for a family 
with two children was € 1830 per month or about $ 16.40 per day. 1.2  million 
Netherlanders (7.6% of the population) lived below this poverty line.
Banishing extreme poverty is seen as an historical challenge. In 2015, 193 gov-
ernment leaders proclaimed that extreme poverty should disappear by 2030.4 It was 
the first point of a broader United Nations agenda for sustainable development. In the 
Netherlands, the abolition of extreme poverty within the country had already been 
high on the social agenda at the beginning of the nineteenth century. History shows 
that the struggle had to be pursued on many fronts and that it demanded perseverance 
and patience. It included a social struggle, that is, a struggle around the distribution 
of material welfare. It was also a struggle between the Netherlands and the colonies 
about the way in which the colonies would be exploited. History also shows that 
banishing poverty involved trade-offs: the abolition of extreme poverty has sown the 
seeds of new problems. Those problems are first and foremost associated with the 
environment, the finiteness of raw materials, the quality of the landscape and green-
house gas emissions. Or, in terms of this study: They are above all associated with 
the exploitation of natural capital in the Netherlands and elsewhere in the world.
To get a grip on this, the present study is built around three analytical points of 
entry (Chap. 1). First of all, use has been made of a new instrument developed by 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS), the Personal Wellbeing Index (aka the Monitor Well- 
Being). The instrument also provides an antidote to the misapprehension that soci-
etal progress is first and foremost a question of economic growth. It does this by 
showcasing three dimensions of well-being: quality of life ‘here and now,’ ‘later’ 
and ‘elsewhere.’ ‘Here and now’ includes issues like income, social inequality, 
health, education, environment and democracy. In this study the question of poverty 
is positioned in relation to these issues. The dimension ‘later’ reveals what a society 
confers on later generations in terms of natural, economic, human and social capital. 
The dimension ‘elsewhere’ reveals the effect of domestic activities on societal 
development in other countries.
3 S. Hoff, J.M. Wildeboer Schut, B. Goderis and C. Vrooman (2016), Armoede in kaart. Den Haag: 
Sociaal en cultureel planbureau.
4 United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals. 17 goals to transform our world (1. No Poverty). 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
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In the second place, the institutional context plays an important role in our analy-
ses. The developments revealed by the monitor are not abstract processes and the 
struggle against poverty is not an abstract struggle. They are the work of social 
groups that in the course of things abolish old institutions and create new ones. In 
this study the institutional context is broken down into state, market, the societal 
midfield (civil society), and technology (including science and innovation). These 
four contexts largely shape the activities of historical actors and are among other 
things the foundation of poverty (for example as supports for social inequality). 
Institutional changes are essential, but are often difficult to realise.
In the third place, this study has granted pride of place to natural capital. It sees 
natural capital as the foundation of a given quality of life. The way a society deals 
with natural capital (soil, air, water, subsoil resources) in large part shapes social 
structure in the ‘here and now’ and ‘elsewhere.’ It also has a great impact on the 
quality of life ‘later.’ Trade-offs, as the study reveals, are essential in this context. 
Modern agricultural methods, for example, encourage greater productivity and are 
important for food production and food security, but at the same time influence 
biodiversity and have various environmental impacts. In this study, the role of natu-
ral capital is portrayed by dividing the capital into three types of raw materials and 
concomitant material flows: bio-raw materials (agriculture and foods), mineral sub-
soil resources (building and infrastructure) and fossil subsoil resources (energy and 
plastics).
We will summarise well-being and sustainability between 1850 and the present- 
day from the perspective of these three analytic approaches. We subsequently orient 
ourselves to the future from the point of view of natural capital. With respect to 
well-being this is one of the most important new historical challenges. Maintaining 
a certain level of well-being in the Netherlands requires a substantial investment in 
natural resources, here and elsewhere. Eliminating poverty elsewhere makes 
extraordinary demands on global natural capital, certainly if humanity wants to pur-
sue this project for generations to come. Moreover, successive generations will con-
tinue to define well-being and sustainability in new ways and thus continue to make 
significant demands on natural capital.
22.2  Well-being and the Normative Point of Departure
An historical evaluation of poverty and well-being is determined by the norms and 
preferences cherished by us in the present or by contemporaries in earlier times. 
That can be illustrated with a number of graphs that portray the quality of life 
between 1850 and 2010 from different perspectives.
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With Graph 22.1a we started in the prologue. It is based on ten indicators from 
the monitor.5 These are related to the four themes of quality of life: prosperity 
(including income), personal characteristics (such as health), natural environment 
(including air quality) and institutional environment (such as democracy). The 
graph provides a historical evaluation of the quality of life, with the well-being 
indicators between 1850 and 1960 being given the maximum weight in the calcula-
tions, while they are participating in average weight after 1960. On the other hand, 
the indicators of the natural environment until 1960 have been given a minimal 
weight, while after 1960 they are included maximal in the calculation. This picture 
roughly corresponds with the picture that contemporaries until 1960 put maximum 
value on the growth of prosperity and economy and considerably less on the envi-
5 The Graphs 22.1a–c, compare the development of GDP per capita with an index for broad pros-
perity. This index consists of a weighted average of a number of sub-series concerning the quality 
of life (see table below). The various series move in different bandwidths. In order to perform the 
weighing in a technically clean way, all series are first normalized (they have all been given the 
same bandwidth) before applying the weighting factors.
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ronment and nature, while the environment and nature after 1960 repeatedly 
appeared as priorities on the societal agenda..
What does such a normative framing tell us? After an initial decline in quality of 
life, a reversal sets in after 1870 with an increase that is stronger than the growth of 
the GDP. After the 1950s, the rate of increase in quality of life slows down, declin-
ing absolutely in the 1970s and 1980s and increasing again at the end of the twenti-
eth century, though the increase lags far behind economic growth.
How important normative frameworks are for evaluating the development of 
well-being is shown by the following two graphs. Graph 22.1b assumes a societal 
agenda that is only concerned with economic growth and health. It is the only graph 
in which throughout the entire period there is a direct link between economic growth 
and quality of life (which is of course hardly surprising). In Graph 22.1c are nature 
and the environment to be valued most highly after 1850, then well-being would 
decline over a long period and only rebound again during and after the 1960s, but it 
would never exceed the level of 1850.
In the following overview we shall have to indicate clearly the norms and prefer-
ences underlying the evaluation of the development of well-being and 
sustainability.
We started the study with a periodisation in which 1910 and 1970 formed the 
sample years, namely 1850–1910, 1910–1970 and 1970–2010. Historical research 
leads to a modified periodisation that will here be further developed, namely 1850–
1900, 1900–1960 and 1960–2015, in which 1900 and 1960 are the watershed years.
Around 1900 poverty gets redefined in the Netherlands and the new definition is 
anchored in legislation, after which the struggle against poverty enters a new phase. 
Around 1960 the use of natural capital appeared to be increasing exponentially, at 
which point the problem of environment and nature entered a new phase.
22.3  Around 1850: Extreme Poverty in Context
The well-being monitor for 1850 shows that the Netherlands was rich, but not pros-
perous. Around 1850 the country was among the richest in the world, but the wealth 
was unequally distributed. Hundreds of thousands of Netherlanders lived in 
extremely poor circumstances, regularly suffered hunger, were reduced to beggary 
or the dole in order to stay alive, lived in slums or on the streets clothed in rags. 
Some contemporaries might possibly speak of a prosperous country. Elsewhere in 
the world it was often more miserable. It is estimated that the extremely poor con-
stituted about 85% of the population living south of the Sahara, about 77% of the 
Asian population, 69% of South Americans and 35% of West Europeans.6 In the 
Netherlands, the percentage came to 21%. Nonetheless, few Netherlanders were 
acquainted with the situation elsewhere. Around the mid-nineteenth century they 
6 J.L.  Van Zanden, J.  Baten, P.  Földvari, and B. van Leeuwen, The changing Shape of Global 
Inequality 1820–2000. Exploring a new dataset (Utrecht 2011), working paper no.1, table 12.
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saw themselves confronted in their own country with cholera, failed harvests, high 
food prices and flooding rivers.
In the eyes of the contemporary bourgeoisie extreme poverty was one of the most 
important social problems of their time. In present-day terms it was one of the key 
issues of well-being. In retrospect this historically stubborn problem could have 
been solved at the time by means of a more equitable distribution of wealth. If 
income inequality had been at the same level as now, then the incidence of extreme 
poverty would have fallen far under 10%. The necessary institutions (for example 
trade unions) that might have consolidated a struggle for more equality, simply did 
not exist. Moreover, the system of poor relief ensured adequate survival chances for 
the poor and most of the time for enough social tranquillity.
Another option to eliminate poverty was economic growth. It would have 
required an annual economic growth of 3.6% between 1820 and 1850. Given the 
existing natural capital of the Netherlands in combination with the technology of the 
day, that turned out to be impossible. Under King William I, the Netherlands 
achieved no more than 2.3% annual growth and even that was a considerable accom-
plishment. The King had done everything he could to modernise the economy and 
technology. He succeeded only in part. Old corporatist structures and institutions 
like protected local markets, urban autonomy and guild-like organisations persisted. 
Innovations in agriculture, industry and transportation were limited. The use of 
steam power as a key technology remained stuck in an introductory phase. King 
William I did succeed in realising economic growth with new colonial policy. He 
mobilised the Dutch East-Indies as a source of profit by using the cheap mass labour 
of Javanese farmers to generate income for the Dutch state and economy.
The basis of Dutch wealth was its natural capital: its situation in a delta at a 
crossroads of shipping and trade routes; the availability of turf as cheap source of 
energy and the exploitation of agricultural lands for the high-value production of 
dairy produce (butter and cheese) and industrial crops (among others, madder). And 
there was more than enough potential to intensify the exploitation of domestic natu-
ral capital. In the ‘high’ Netherlands, agriculture was only marginally integrated 
into national and international markets. The delta’s infrastructure left much room 
for improvement. Dutch natural capital also contributed to biodiversity. The country 
had a rich variety of agricultural systems in addition to its wealth of original ecosys-
tems like dunes and mudflats. But natural capital also had a downside. The 
Netherlands was a vulnerable country. The nation was forced to wage a never- 
ending battle against water. It was also confronted with an immense environmental 
problem, namely the urban detritus of human and animal faeces and food remnants. 
Organic waste was a major cause of the high mortality rates and the low life- 
expectancy. The combination with excessive and saline water exacerbated the prob-
lem in the low parts of the Netherlands.
Three developments provided a new perspective for well-being and sustainability 
around 1850. The liberalisation of international trade created opportunities for eco-
nomic growth. The political revolution and the new constitution of 1848 put an end to 
the autocratic reign of William I and laid the basis for new constitutional relationships. 
The societal midfield, i.e. civil society, became much more dynamic thanks to the rise 
of a young generation of professional physicians, engineers and architects.
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22.4  1850–1900: Manifold Dynamics
Economic growth was the motive force behind the assault on extreme poverty in this 
period. Initially, however, extreme poverty increased because agriculture and a 
small farming and urban elite profited from the liberalisation of international trade. 
After 1870 modernisation of the economy and growing welfare became linked. 
They were strongly influenced by the introduction of coal and steam technology.
From 1870 on, economic growth in the Netherlands definitively became depen-
dent on fossil subsoil resources.7 Up to the middle of the twentieth century this 
meant coal and after the Second World War oil and natural gas. Economic growth 
around 1850 was still largely dependent on classical sources of energy like muscle 
power, turf, wind and water. Human and animal muscle power were the largest 
single source of energy, contributing about 38% of the total (against 16% for coal). 
By 1900 muscle power had declined to 20% (against 63% for coal). In the twentieth 
century physical labour as a source of energy would become almost irrelevant: in 
1950 it dipped under 1% of the total energy consumption for the first time.8
The modernisation of the economy was also associated with a revolution in the 
food supply chain, the mass flow of bio-raw materials. Agriculture in the ‘high’ 
Netherlands became part of national and international markets and began to special-
ise in cattle husbandry, among other things. Heathlands were reclaimed. Farmers 
started to use artificial fertiliser. Food production became mechanised with the com-
ing of bread and flour factories, dairies and slaughterhouses. Production and con-
sumption in the food chain lost their circular character and acquired the characteristics 
of a linear economy. In the mixed farming sector, animal husbandry with its manure 
production was no longer subservient to crop farming; instead, crop farming became 
subservient to animal husbandry. Urban organic waste lost its function as fertiliser 
and was replaced by artificial fertiliser. Massive amounts of artificial fertiliser and 
cattle fodder were imported, while butter, cheese, cattle, meat and eggs left the 
country. Agricultural production was uncoupled from the local and regional produc-
tion of raw materials.
The supply chain in construction, in other words the massive flow of mineral raw 
materials, kept much of its circular character and its national orientation. Sand, 
gravel and clay were mined and processed in the Netherlands. They were embodied 
in buildings, dikes, roads etc. and after use broken down into materials that were 
re-used. Production and use in this supply chain led to a substantial improvement in 
the Dutch transportation infrastructure (among others, railways and canals, includ-
ing the North Sea Canal) and in this way contributed to economic growth. They also 
led to a considerable amelioration of the water management situation and thereby to 
7 Here it must be noted that turf – also a fossil fuel – played a crucial role during the lengthy period 
of economic growth of the Netherlands during its ‘Golden Century.’
8 Calculations based on appendix 1 uit: B. Gales and H. Hölsgens, ‘Energy consumption in the 
Netherlands (1800–2012), in: H. Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the Netherlands: Sustainability 
challenges in a historical and comparative perspective (Groningen 2016), 207–217.
22 The Long-Term Development: In Search of a Balance
492
the safety of the Netherlands in its struggle against water. An enormous effort went 
into the improvement of the rivers.
The modernisation of the economy was deeply rooted in a dynamic societal mid-
field. Periodicals propagated a belief in progress. Organisations like the Society for 
Industry zealously advocated modern technology. A new generation of profession-
als created a network of trade schools, laboratories, knowledge institutes and pro-
fessional associations. A new generation of politicians dedicated themselves to 
creating a modern society, but from different ideological perspectives: a progressive 
liberal, a confessional or a socialist perspective. In that connection they worked on 
a unique social structure, namely ‘pillarisation’: networks of social organisations 
for education, labour and entrepreneurship on the basis of a single mentality (lib-
eral, confessional, socialist) that were anchored in political culture.
22.5  Around 1900: Poverty Defined Anew
The dynamic societal midfield defined the issue of poverty more broadly than it had 
been in the past. It was no longer only about the survival of the poor, but also about 
their quality of life. Cellar-dwellings, sod-huts, slums or – in general – dwellings of 
one or two rooms without hygienic facilities were no longer acceptable. A diet con-
sisting chiefly of potatoes and grain products was considered inadequate for a 
healthy body. Having work was no guarantee for a humane existence. Long working 
hours, low wages, female and child labour were unworthy of a modern society. 
Labour ought to contribute to personal development. Safe machines ought to pre-
vent dangerous working situations. Public health required public hygienic facilities. 
Public housing had to start complying with minimal standards of quality like ade-
quate light, air and space. Domestic appliances were to lighten heavy housework. 
Foods had to be varied and safe.
It was not only about improving the material condition of the people, but also 
about inculcating bourgeois values. The bourgeois elite insisted that in addition to the 
construction of better public housing a rigorous inspection of family life was also 
necessary. Next to the introduction of a bath and shower also exercises in bodily 
hygiene; next to providing qualified work also training in labour discipline and doing 
one’s duty; next to improvement in foodstuffs also education for a healthy diet.
Around 1900, the broader definition of poverty acquired a footing in social leg-
islation directed at, among other things, labour and housing. This initiated a new 
phase in the development of well-being, one that would lead to the emergence of the 
caring state in the Netherlands.
New values around nature and environment also emerged in the periphery of the 
dynamic midfield. These still had little political influence. It would take more than 
a half-century before they had social consequences. In this period the exploitation 
of natural capital, both from domestic sources and abroad, would increase 
significantly.
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22.6  1900–1960: The Historical Challenge Realised
Though it is true that around 1900 a start had been made with social legislation, 
many questions had to be worked out more precisely or addressed by additional 
legislation in the subsequent decades. Netherlanders invested a lot of energy in 
debates about the minimum floor area of workers’ housing, the eight-hour working 
day, a proper diet, a minimum wage, mandatory health insurance, a mandatory col-
lective old-age pension and many other social issues. In the course of this period and 
these debates they defined the minimal demands on quality of life in the Netherlands. 
That took place in the framework of new social relations.
The dynamics of the societal midfield had eventuated in a corporatist social 
structure that would long remain dominant in the twentieth century. Trade unions, 
employers’ associations, professional societies and the ‘pillars’ had pride of place 
in this new constellation. Dutch citizens were connected in manifold ways, partly 
within separate worlds, but always with connections to politics and the government. 
Within this constellation, social inequality decreased. Income differences declined 
and societal incomes were redistributed by means of government subsidies and col-
lective measures. Declining inequality together with economic growth were the pri-
mary trends responsible for the near-elimination of extreme poverty and of poverty 
as seen from the modified perspective of 1900.
Solving the question of poverty was no straightforward process. Two world wars 
and the economic crisis of the 1930s were a considerable setback. It is significant 
that around the wars, life expectancy decreased by no less than 10 years. That was 
also the case during the First World War, even though the Dutch themselves were 
not at war. The social disruption in Europe claimed victims far beyond the battle-
field. Popular welfare had a fragile basis in this period. The national government 
was burdened with the task of managing these vulnerabilities by means of interven-
tions in the economy and social life.
These interventions concerned, among other things, the exploitation of natural 
capital, seen as the most important prerequisite of economic development and well- 
being. Food security had to be built in to agricultural policy. State mines served to 
secure the supply of coal. The founding of the Hoogovens iron and steel plant was 
intended to make the Netherlands independent of steel imports. Governmental man-
agement of the mining of sand and gravel was necessary to solve the post-Second 
World War housing shortage and complete the Delta Works. In short, the Netherlands 
had to become self-sufficient with respect to its crucial raw materials.
Intervention by the state was not the only change in the exploitation of natural 
capital and the concomitant supply chains of production, consumption and use. 
Compared to the nineteenth century the supply chain had become significantly more 
complex. That was due in part to the rise of new technologies that revolutionised 
existing supply chains or that facilitated new supply chains altogether, particularly 
in the domains of electrical engineering and chemistry. More often than in the past, 
for example, agricultural raw materials were mechanically processed (pressed, 
sifted, cut and rasped) and chemically treated (with a variety of methods of extrac-
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tion). The substances thus isolated could be recomposed into new products by 
means of mixing, kneading, pressing and spraying (as in the fabrication of marga-
rine). There were also all kinds of new techniques by means of which foodstuffs 
could be roasted (for example in the case of coffee), baked (bread, among others), 
fermented (as with cheese), pasteurized (for example, milk) etc. More and other 
kinds of processing became common in the case of mineral sub-soil resources (for 
example the making of concrete and concrete products) and fossil sub-soil resources 
(such as the production of plastics from coal and petroleum).
This processing could take place in different plants in sequence (lengthening of 
the chain) or within a single firm at the same location (intensification of the chain) 
or it could be split up into different chains (differentiation of the chain). Some com-
panies like Unilever ceased to be simply a link in a chain, but developed into a node 
in a network of international and domestic flows of matter. These flows came 
together in the firm and left it as a variety of products destined for domestic and 
foreign markets. New kinds of organisations like inspectorates and research insti-
tutes became part of the supply chains and their networks.
A characteristic of the dynamics in these chains is also the increase in the mass 
flows through them. This was inherent to an economy of mass production and mass 
markets, dominated by large firms and multinationals like Philips, Shell and 
DSM. They had to ensure that the complex flows of raw materials, semi-products, 
goods and products were skilfully managed. Cooperative organisations did the same 
in agriculture as did family firms in the medium and small business sector. 
Cooperation in the form of cartels was part of what was considered the essential 
regulation of the economy. As might be expected in a corporatist state structure, the 
government supported this strategy.
Mass production presupposed mass consumption. This link was already in the 
making prior to the Second World War. The middle class experimented with a wide 
range of new products that were on offer: the gas stove, the refrigerator, the automo-
bile, the radio, to name just a few. It gained experience with a broader range of food 
products, new services (like telephony) and white goods (for example the washing 
machine). Its daily life changed as a result of new ideas about comfort, hygiene, 
beauty, adventure, personal development and the quality of life. This middle class 
was the vanguard of the new consumer society.
A fragment of the middle class was also the vanguard for the protest generation 
of the nineteen-sixties, that would address the consequences of mass production and 
mass consumption for natural capital across a broad front. Up to then, the increasing 
exploitation of natural capital had incited incidental resistance, mostly locally 
 oriented and focused on detail problems. The smouldering unease about land recla-
mations in the 1930s was resolved with the acquisition of parcels of heathland by 
the Society for the Preservation of Natural Monuments. The delving of marl for 
cement production incited limited opposition in and around Maastricht. Gravel min-
ing caused opposition in communities in South Limburg. Chemical herbicides and 
pesticides were criticised by agronomists immediately after the Second World War. 
Air pollution due to coal combustion was a nuisance that was addressed by the 
Netherlands Association against Water, Soil and Air Pollution. Serious opposition to 
H. Lintsen and J.-P. Smits
495
polluted air emerged in Rotterdam in 1960 when that led to smog – but only because 
it was considered a public health hazard.
More or less universal disquiet surfaced around only one issue. Intensive hunting 
of whales for the production of soap and margarine at the start of the twentieth cen-
tury resulted in a rapid decline of the whale population and encouraged concerted 
international political action by the 1930s. But the agreements were hardly enforce-
able in the international constellation of the time. They were not in the first place 
inspired by concern about the extinction of species, but above all by concern about 
economic losses due to a shortage of whales.
A perennial issue in the Netherland was water pollution.9 This was so in the 
nineteenth century around the issue of increasing salinity and water polluted by 
urban wastes. In the twentieth century it acquired a new dimension with discharges 
of industrial waste, the use of agricultural chemicals and the introduction of house-
hold detergents. The Netherlands Association against Water, Soil and Air Pollution 
asked for legal restrictions as early as 1919. A research institute, the Government 
Institute for the Purification of Waste-water (RIZA), was founded the very next 
year. In subsequent decades the Rijkswaterstaat appropriated the issue. The motiva-
tion was not preserving the environment but safeguarding agriculture and the food 
and water supply. But policy to combat water pollution failed to crystallise. Incidents 
like the massive fish starvation on the Hollandse Ijssel in 1959 due to the dumping 
of toxic wastes had little effect. Industrialisation triumphed over the struggle against 
pollution.
The opposition possessed no common denominator like ‘environment,’ ‘energy,’ 
or ‘sustainability’ that could channel political action or coordinate campaigns. It 
was never a mass movement, but only mobilised a small group of concerned citizens 
and committed professionals like chemists and agronomists.
22.7  Around 1960: Well-being, Sustainability and Economic 
Growth in Balance
After the Second World War, the Netherlands immediately initiated a fast-paced 
process of reconstruction. The associated normative framework was for the most 
part in place. The basic principles for quality of life were undisputed. Reconstruction 
proceeded along the lines of existing networks among government, business and 
trade unions. Social relations remained pillarised, but the parties were willing to 
cooperate and agreed on the ideal of a caring and welfare state.
By 1960, that ideal had been all but realised and with that the classic historical 
challenge of well-being had been substantially met. Extreme poverty had been all 
but banished and the basic facilities to guarantee quality of life for the poor, workers 
and the aged were in place. A few issues remained that continued to make the issue 
9 A. Bosch and W. van der Ham, Twee Eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat. 1798–2015 (revised edition, Asten 
2015). 182–187.
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of well-being problematic. One of these was the housing shortage that had risen to 
new heights due to war-damage and under the onslaught of a burgeoning post-war 
population. The government, public housing associations and building companies 
worked hard on this problem.
Another aspect of well-being that made great strides was the securing of the 
vulnerable Delta. This specifically Dutch issue had culminated in a worthy response 
to the threat of the sea in the form of the Zuiderzee Closure Dike and the Delta 
Works. That did not mean that the struggle against water was over. As early as 1956, 
Rijkswaterstaat concluded that the river dikes were too low and began to formulate 
new safety norms for the rivers. But for the moment the Delta Works had priority.
How was natural capital faring? The creation of the caring state had only been 
possible thanks to an intensified exploitation of natural capital. The increase in 
exploitation of natural capital in the first half of the twentieth century was roughly 
the same as in the second half of the nineteenth century. For example, the use of 
fossil raw materials between 1850 and 1910 increased by approximately 3.2% 
per annum and between 1910 and 1960 by 2.7%. Around 1960, however, there was 
a trend break: Between 1960 and 1975, the annual growth rate suddenly rose to 
7.0% (Table 22.1), after which the growth started to fall again. A trend break around 
1960 can also be observed for the other two mass flows (Graph 22.2).10 The sixties 
and early seventies show a strong growth of the bio-raw per annum materials and 
mineral raw materials with a strong decline after 1975. It is remarkable that the 
growth figures of the Dutch population lag behind those of the raw materials. The 
pressure on natural capital is not only related to population growth (Table 22.1).
Similar shifts can be seen in emissions and the use of substances like artificial 
fertiliser. CO2 and SO2 emissions increase gradually up through the 1950s, after 
which they exhibit a steep increase (Graphs 22.3 and 22.4). The same is the case for 
the use of artificial fertiliser (Graph 22.5). Remarkably, present-day norms for CO2 
10 Graph 22.2 consists of various long-term datasets in the field of fuels, agricultural and mineral 
products. The trend lines are calibrated with the detailed datasets from the study of the reference 
years 1850, 1913, 1970 and 2010 (see: F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland. In de jaren 1850, 
1913, 1970, 2010 (researchrapport Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, oktober 2016). The trend 
for fossil fuels is made up of data from the final use of coal, lignite, peat, petroleum and gas (taken 
from Rick Hölsgens, Energy Transitions in the Netherlands, Dissertation University of Groningen, 
2016). For agricultural products an average was taken for a number of long-term production statis-
tics (derived from Statistics Netherlands Historical series: Agriculture, from 1851). These are the 
production statistics of starch (potatoes), milk and sugar beet (from 1895). The trend of these 
agricultural products was indicative of the normalized trends including cereal and meat produc-
tion. The trend line mineral products is formed by the consumption of cement. This trend was 
indicative of the normalized consumption of fill sand, industrial sand, masonry bricks, sand-lime 
bricks and gravel. The datasets of mineral materials derived from CBS: Minerals extraction, CBS: 
Production statistics for Sand-lime-brick industry 1961; CBS History minerals and industry; 
Cement production: A. Heerding, Cement in the Netherlands (IJmuiden: Cement factory IJmuiden, 
1971); N. Smit Kroes, Basis Ontgronden, policy memorandum on surface mineral resources for 
the long term, House of Representatives of the States General (Parliamentary document number 
21.100, under numbers 1 and 2), session year 1988–1989 and Cement & Betoncentrum (http://
www.cementenbeton.nl/).
Note: Graph 2.1 and Graph 19.5 are based on the same datasets of Graph 22.2.
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emissions and the use of artificial fertilisers are not, or if so only marginally, 
exceeded up to the time of the trend shift. By contrast, SO2 emissions had already 
exceeded present-day norms as early as the 1950s.
On the basis of the historical account we can advance the hypothesis that by 
comparison with the rest of Dutch history, well-being and sustainability were best 
in balance around 1960, at least from the point of view of the issue of poverty. The 
historical challenge of poverty had been resolved with the realisation of the caring 
state, while demands on natural capital were still relatively modest by present-day 
standards. Not only had material wealth increased substantially, but numerous 
aspects of individual quality of life (health and level of education) were in excellent 
shape, while social stability was high. Reasonable economic growth (on the basis of 




















































































Graph 22.2 Estimation of the trend in bio-raw materials, mineral sub-soil assets and fossil sub- 
soil assets, 1850–2010 (kton)
Source: See note 10 of this chapter
Table 22.1 Growth in the use of bio-raw materials, mineral subsoil resources and fossil subsoil 
resources in the Netherlands, 1850–1910, 1910–1960, 1960–1975 and 1975–2010 (percentages)
1850–1910 1910–1960 1960–1975 1975–2010
Bio-raw materials 1.6 1.8 3.3 1.0
Mineral subsoil resources 2.9 3.5 4.1 0.5
Fossil subsoil resources 3.2 2.7 7.0 1.3
All raw materials 2.3 2.7 5.1 1.0
Dutch population 1.1 1.3 1.2 0.6
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Up to around 1960, well-being increased at the same rate as economic growth (or 
even forged ahead of it, see Graph 22.1a).
This hypothesis demands additional research. Were environmental problems up 
to then – as this study postulates – above all local and limited in scope? Did the big 
changes in the landscape and the associated decline in biodiversity take place pri-
marily after the Second World War with land consolidation, urbanisation and the 


































































Graph 22.3 CO2 emissions in kiloton, 1850–2010, set out against the EU sustainability norm for 
2030
Source: H. Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the Netherlands: Sustainability challenges in a histori-













SO2 emissions SO2 emissions (extended)
Graph 22.4 SO2 emissions in kiloton, 1800–2010, set out against the EU sustainability norm
Source: H. Hölsgens, Energy transitions in the Netherlands: Sustainability challenges in a histori-
cal and comparative perspective (Groningen 2016), figure 4.1, 90
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The image of a balance among economic growth, well-being and sustainability 
needs some correction. ‘Balance’ suggests an equilibrium for an extended period. 
But a number of factors in the 1950s were responsible for a rapid disruption of the 
equilibrium. The Netherlands were confronted with a strong population growth that 
had to be accommodated. The country placed its bets on industrialisation as a strat-
egy for employment and economic development. Moreover, during the interbellum 
a middle class had explored a modern lifestyle that also became an attractive per-
spective for the working class. After the Second World War the Netherlands strove 
to realize a welfare society. This new dynamic demanded strong economic growth. 
From the 1960s on, well-being lagged far behind the significantly higher economic 
growth that set in and that required a considerably larger mobilisation of natural 
capital (Graph 22.1a). The trend reversal around 1960 thus had its roots in the pre-
ceding period.
22.8  1960–2015: Well-being, Sustainability and Economic 
Growth Out of Balance
In this period, growth in well-being was out of kilter with that of the economy and 
the rapidly increasing GDP. That had various causes. An important cause was the 
rapidly changing relationship with the natural environment. On the one hand the 
Dutch were confronted with phenomena like strong algae growth due to the leach-
















Graph 22.5 Use of fertilizer, 1850–2010, compared with sustainability standards of the European 
Union
Remark: There are norms for the agricultural use of nitrogen. Since 1990 the general norm has 
been the EU nitrate guideline that stipulates a maximum of 170 kilograms of nitrogen per hectare. 
Exceptions to this can be granted. The Netherlands has such an exception (a derogation) that 
includes the provision that a precise accounting is to be kept for the various types of soil. The 
higher norm (with the derogation) is 250 kg/ha. The Netherlands itself has worked out norms for 
different crops and for five different soil types (clay, sand – northern, western and central, sand 
southern, loess and peat).
Source: CBS (Agriculture and Fisheries 1899–1999) and reworked CBS (Nitrogen in animal 
manure, artificial fertiliser and gaseous losses, 1990–2015)
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starvation and incidents of smog-formation due to the emission of SO2 and smoke. 
On the other hand, norms regarding nature and the environment changed and these 
phenomena began to be defined as problems. The idea took root that the natural 
environment was suffering inordinately under the onslaught of economic growth 
and that many important subsoil resources were characterised by finite supplies. 
The alarm set off by the Club of Rome in the 1970s was loud and widely heard. A 
new normative framework for well-being began to take shape, one which revealed 
that the norms for the exploitation of the environment and nature were being seri-
ously violated. If humanity did not succeed in rigorously changing its production 
and consumption patterns, then vital ecological limits would soon be transgressed.
An entirely different cause for laggard well-being was the massive unemploy-
ment and wage moderation in the 1980s and during the crisis of 2008. These 
depressed welfare levels and household consumption. Social inequality in terms of 
income and wealth increased.
But while unemployment, wage moderation and a deferred increase in consump-
tion had an adverse effect on well-being, the health and educational levels of the 
Dutch population continued to increase. These aspects of quality of life appeared to 
be relatively unaffected by the vagaries of economic cycles.
The dramatic decline of well-being in the domains of safety and democracy is 
remarkable. Having reached a peak in the mid-1950s, indicators for this category 
subsequently exhibited a steady decline. To an important degree, this development 
can be attributed to the process of de-pillarisation that set in during the 1960s. 
Within the pillarised structure the elites of the different religious and ideological 
pillars were in close touch with their constituencies though numerous societal 
organisations. This made the societal agendas propagated by the elites sufficiently 
recognisable by the grassroots constituencies of the pillars. At the same time the 
system of pillarisation was characterised by a large measure of social control. The 
literature speaks of a ‘decently pillarised society.’ From the 1960s on, religion no 
longer provided a fixed normative framework for Netherlanders.
This process intensified toward the end of the twentieth century, when political 
party-formation on the basis of traditional ideological orientations began to become 
less important. This did not mean that citizens were bereft of social visions, only 
that these were experienced less and less in the context of a group and on the basis 
of established religious or political viewpoints.
De-pillarisation also contributed to a process of individualisation. From the 
viewpoint of well-being, this had many positive effects. More than ever, citizens 
could make choices in complete freedom. But the process also had its dark sides. 
The self-evident connection of political elites with their constituencies that had pre-
viously been the rule became weaker. In the last quarter of the twentieth century the 
contours of a new societal midfield had become visible, but the connection with 
political parties remained weak. This was one of the reasons that citizens could no 
longer see their reflections in ‘Hague politics.’ Trust in political institutions declined 
visibly, especially after the turn of the century (and particularly after the assassina-
tion of the populist politician, Pim Fortuyn, in 2002). The erosion of traditional 
societal bonds characteristic of the ‘decent pillarised society’ and the concomitant 
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decline in social cohesion and control, also brought in its wake increasing crime 
rates, more suicides and a strong increase in alcohol consumption (that by interna-
tional standards had always been relatively low in the Netherlands).
Looking back, another important issue manifested itself in this period, namely 
the issue of climate change. Initially the issue led a covert existence among contem-
poraries. Nowadays, however, climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions is 
seen as one of the most pernicious problems in the domain of nature and environ-
ment. The figure below shows how the emission of one of the most important green-
house gases, CO2 can be explained (Fig. 22.1).
As one would expect, the increase in CO2 emissions can be explained to a large 
extent by the growth of production (the production effect). Production is of course 
to a significant degree associated with the burning of fossil fuels and hence with 
CO2 emissions. In the period 1961–1974 – when CO2 emissions increased signifi-
cantly – this growth was also caused by two other factors. First, by energy-intensity, 
that is the amount of energy necessary to produce a unit of GDP. Up to 1974, a 
higher energy-intensity appears to have been a driver of the increase in CO2 emis-
sions. In addition, the structure effect also played a big role. This should be taken to 
mean that the growth in emissions cannot be explained only with reference to eco-
nomic growth in the various sectors of the economy. Emissions are exacerbated by 
a shift of the economic centre of gravity in the direction of more energy-intensive 
activities (industries using relatively large amounts of energy in the production pro-
cess). Due to the active industrialisation policy that was pursued in the first post-war 
decades, the share of energy-intensive branches like petrochemicals and iron- and 
steelmaking in the GDP increased strongly up to the early 1970s. The discovery of 


































Fig. 22.1 Results of an Index Decomposition. Analysis of the growth of CO2 emissions, 1960–
1974, 1975–1989 and 1989–2008. (change in CO2 emissions in megatons)
Source: R.P. van der Helm, R. Hoekstra en J.P. Smits, Economic growth, structural change and 
carbon dioxide emission: The case of The Netherlands 1960–2008. Article presented at the 18th 
International Input- Output Conference (2010)
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In the period after 1974 this developmental pattern changed. Economic growth 
remained the strongest driver of CO2 emissions, but the increase in these emissions 
was mitigated to some extent because energy intensity improved as a result of tech-
nological developments. In addition production during this period shifted increas-
ingly in the direction of activities like services, in which traditionally less energy 
was consumed. Though these two developments have tempered a further increase in 
CO2 emissions, the latter still remains at a high and unsustainable level. Significantly, 
industrial emissions have declined in the most recent period while households and 
especially the transport sector continue to emit more and more CO2.
In retrospect we can say that in the period from 1960 to the present, by contrast 
with earlier periods, economic growth and increasing well-being no longer marched 
to the same drummer. Though certain specific forms of welfare suffered, well-being 
in general continued, grosso modo, to increase. But only thanks to the depletion of 
natural capital and at a cost in terms of pollution that has become increasingly evi-
dent. If we look at the quantity of CO2 that has been emitted since 1960 and how 
much it will cost to reduce these emissions to levels that have been agreed upon in 
international climate accords, then we can only conclude that we will be facing 
costs estimated at about 12% to 25% of the GDP in 2010. To a significant degree, 
current and coming generations will be paying the price for the energy-intensive 
industrialisation and the concomitant growth in prosperity since 1960.
22.9  Around 2015: Sustainability as New Historical 
Challenge
It was only quite recently –some 50 or 60 years ago – that well-being and sustain-
ability were still reasonably in balance: the classical issue of poverty had been 
solved while claims on natural capital remained reasonably modest. Since then, the 
monitor for well-being manifests a deep duality: a considerable increase in material 
welfare, while well-being lags behind and sustainability is seriously compromised. 
The perennial question since then has been: to what extent does economic growth 
contribute to quality of life in the ‘here and now’ and is the claim on natural 
resources not so exorbitant that the costs will have to be paid for by lower quality of 
life ‘later’ and ‘elsewhere’? What can we learn from history in this connection?
As early as the 1960s and 1970s there was already broad public concern about 
environmental problems and the finiteness of raw materials. Groups of citizens 
mounted forceful protests and environmental groups flexed their muscles. In some 
areas progress was rapid, for example in the area of water and air pollution. In other 
areas it took decades before results could be seen, for example, biodiversity, the 
decline of which has been halted (although many still consider it to remain at a piti-
fully low level). And in yet other fields like energy, the yield is even more meagre – 
even after all this time. Sustainability is a stubborn problem.
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Early environmental successes were related to the corporatist state order with its 
‘pillars,’ cartels, multi-national corporations and professional organisations that 
formed the institutional framework of the Dutch striving for well-being until well 
into the twentieth century. Environmental policy could be rapidly implemented in 
those cases where the established political parties embraced the environmental 
issues, the professional organisations possessed the requisite expertise and the pro-
posed measures did not overly disturb existing relations of production and con-
sumption. Legislation and subsidies encouraged the large-scale construction of 
sewage treatment plants, the installation of smokestack gas scrubbers and the clean-
ing up of polluted industrial sites. These ‘end of pipe’ solutions had a very benefi-
cial effect on the environment. In the 1980s the Netherlands belonged to the 
European vanguard in addressing environmental issues and was a creative force in 
the conceptualisation of EU environmental guidelines and measures.
But the corporatist structure also impeded progress on the road to sustainability, 
in particular when it appeared necessary to intervene in existing institutions. The 
problem of excess manure demanded breaking through the ‘green front,’ a coalition 
of parties in the agricultural sector that was united as one man against fundamental 
changes in agricultural policy. The Cooperating Electricity Producing Companies 
(the SEP, disbanded in 2000) long blocked experiments with alternative means of 
generating electricity (using windmills and solar panels). Until the 1990s, the 
Rijkswaterstaat found it very difficult to integrate ecological values into their water 
management policies. To a certain extent old institutions had to be demolished in 
order to give solutions to sustainability issues a chance.
That said, the erosion of the corporatist state structure would not in the end lead 
to a breakthrough in the problem of sustainability. The national state was weakened 
by the emergence of the EU. The liberalisation of the economy, the retreat of the 
state and the abolition of corporatist organisations created great rents in the social 
fabric. Environmental improvement did proceed, partly thanks to EU guidelines, but 
in three key areas little or no progress was made.11
11 The Compendium voor de Leefomgeving (Compendium for the Environment) provides the fol-
lowing time series data along with norms and conclusions:
Air quality
Fine dust in NL decline since 1990. Fine dust in Rotterdam decline since 1970. Currently under the 
EU norm.
See: http://www.clo.nl/indicatoren/nl0243-fijn-stof-pm10-in-lucht
Nitrous oxides NOx in NL and Rotterdam, decline since 1973. Currently under the EU norm
http://www.clo.nl/indicatoren/nl0231-stikstofdioxide
Acidification and large-scale air pollution emissions. Decline since 1980. Currently under EU 
norms, except for concentration NH3 that is somewhat above the norm.
http://www.clo.nl/indicatoren/nl0183-verzuring-en-grootschalige-luchtverontreiniging-emissies
Water / Fertiliser load
Fertiliser load large rivers decline since 1970. Currently under EU norms, except for Meuse.
http://www.clo.nl/indicatoren/nl0249-vermesting-in-grote-rivieren
Lakes and ponds 1980-2014. Concentration nitrogen, phosphor, algae and transparency above the 
targets.
http://www.clo.nl/indicatoren/nl0503-vermesting-van-meren-en-plassen-
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The CBS monitor for 2014 is clear about the present situation: ‘Of the four forms 
of capital, the preservation of natural capital in the Netherlands has the bleakest 
outlook.’12 Four capitals (the economic, social, human and natural capital) must 
safeguard well-being of future generations. The way in which we leave behind the 
natural capital at this moment, is worrying in that respect. CBS defines three main 
problems in particular13:
 – Energy and climate: The Netherlands consumes much fossil fuel (compared to 
other EU countries) has high per capita emissions of greenhouse gases and has 
an extremely low share of renewable energy sources.
 – Exhaustion of raw materials: Over the past decades the Netherlands has largely 
exhausted its own supply of natural gas. It belongs to the group of European 
nations making the biggest claims on raw materials from the least developed 
countries in the world. Finally, the country contributes to the exhaustion of those 
raw materials whose total depletion may be expected in the present century, like 
petroleum, antimony and zinc.14
 – Nature and environment: In a number of ways the Netherlands is still not compli-
ant with EU environmental norms. Natural habitats and biodiversity are (com-
pared to other EU nations) still under considerable pressure. The country also 
places a great environmental burden on other countries, in particular developing 
countries.
Environmental pressure on Nature (acidification / fertiliser load / dessication)
‘The environmental conditions in water and nature preserves have improved, but are often still 
insufficient for sustainable conservation of biodiversity. Policy is aimed at achieving conditions 
that make the sustainable conservation of plants and animal species possible.’http://www.clo.
nl/indicatoren/nl1522-milieudruk-op-natuur
Green growth
From: CBS, Green growth in the Netherlands (The Hague, 2015)
Direct environmental pressure by the Dutch economy has declined. All the environmental effi-
ciency indicators pertaining to wastes and emissions get a green score, while the economy is 
growing. One can therefore speak of an uncoupling of economic growth and environmental 
effects. The Netherlands is an average (or poor) performer compared to other countries. http://
www.download.cbs.nl/pdf/green-growth-in-the-netherlands-2015.pdf
12 Monitor duurzaam Nederland 2014. Indicatorenrapport (Den Haag 2014), 32–33.
13 See also: CBS, Meten van SDGs: een eerste beeld voor Nederland (Den Haag 2016), 27 and 
CBS, Internationaliserings-monitor 2015, vierde kwartaal (Den Haag 201%), 12–17. SDG refers 
to Sustainable Development Goals.
14 For zinc and antimony see: Th. Henckens, Managing raw materials scarcity (Dissertation 
Utrecht University, 2016), 27–33.
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22.10  Around 2015: The Welfare Paradox
Well-being is a vulnerable prosperity and not just for future generations.When we 
compare the achievements of the Netherlands in the domain of well-being to those 
of other countries, it is obvious that the Netherlands scores well on a large number 
of aspects. As far as the sense of happiness is concerned, the 2016 World Happiness 
Report pegs the Netherlands at no less than seventh place in a field of 156 nations. 
At the same time, parts of Dutch society are oppressed by great worries and feel 
sombre about the future. Is this a question of ‘emotion,’ and can we dismiss this 
unease as simple ‘cantankerousness,’ or is there perhaps more at issue?
This paradox is also visible in the CBS monitor for 2014.15 The general level of 
well-being has been high and stable over a long span of time and the Netherlander 
has on average a bit more to spend than 10 years ago; still, satisfaction with life has 
declined (though still remaining high by international standards). How can we 
explain this welfare paradox? The historical analysis presented in this book can give 
us more insight into this issue. Four factors that have played a role in this study 
immediately spring to mind:
22.10.1  Social Inequality
A society can experience a welfare-increase, but that says nothing about how it is 
distributed. Halfway through the nineteenth century the Netherlands was the richest- 
but- one nation in the world, while a large part of its population balanced around the 
bare minimum of existence. This kind of social inequality can have a great influence 
on the way citizens experience welfare, as shown by the literature on the economics 
of happiness. It seems that people’s satisfaction with life not only depends on their 
objective welfare, but above all on whether there are people in their immediate sur-
roundings that are much more prosperous. People with a low level of welfare can be 
more satisfied if people in their environment enjoy a similar quality of life, than they 
would be if they were more prosperous but those around them even more so.
Even though at the moment in the Netherlands extreme poverty such as prevailed 
in the nineteenth century has ceased to exist, nonetheless the contours of a new 
societal duality are becoming visible. A recent report by Statistics Netherlands 
(CBS) demonstrates that the schism runs along the distinction between the less and 
the better educated. The less-educated have a lower chance of employment, are 
15 Monitor duurzaam Nederland 2014. Indicatorenrapport (Den Haag 2014), 29 and figure 2.2.2, 
p. 31.
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often less healthy and report a lower degree of satisfaction with their existence. 
These satisfaction scores seem to be lower than might be expected on the basis of 
the actual material welfare. The level of schooling appears to have deep conse-
quences for very many aspects of quality of life.
22.10.2  Insecurity and Vulnerability
Satisfaction with life often depends not so much on objective welfare factors, but 
rather on the fear of losing a given level of welfare. In the past there have been peri-
ods of political uncertainty and disruptions of the global economy that resulted in 
extensive societal unrest (think for example of the Great Depression of the 1930s). 
At the present time the Netherlands is suffering greater uncertainty than it has been 
for a long time. Processes of globalisation and flexibilisation, even though generat-
ing an enormous economic momentum, also increase feelings of insecurity among 
large parts of the population. The Monitor Sustainable Netherlands reports that 
people are above all concerned about keeping their jobs and incomes. The young 
and less-schooled are especially vulnerable. Half of the youthful population up to 
the age of 25 and more than 35% of the less-educated employees had a flexible (i.e. 
temporary) labour contract in 2014. This is 50% more than in 2003. These groups 
are facing big obstacles in ensuring pensions and taking out mortgages. The welfare 
paradox can thus be partly explained by increasing uncertainty and the fear of losing 
ground in the future.
22.10.3  Changing Preferences
A certain measure of critical awareness in society is quite healthy. This enables 
problems and blockages to be identified, making it possible to work on solutions. In 
the period 1850 to the present this was a perennial phenomenon. In 1910, for exam-
ple, when the grinding poverty of the mid-nineteenth century had been solved, 
much higher demands began to made on quality of life and social criticism conse-
quently began to address new issues. Every generation determines what it sees as 
quality of life. As soon as old welfare problems have been solved, a new standard 
for quality of life begins to take shape. Societal dissatisfaction is therefore not as 
such a negative thing, as long as problems are tackled in an active way and citizens 
do not turn their backs on society.
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22.10.4  Channelling the Societal Debate
One of the essential aspects of the institutional quadrants that have been used as an 
analytical tool in this book concerns the way in which ‘civil society’ (the societal 
midfield) and the government are connected. Halfway through the nineteenth cen-
tury the Netherlands was confronted with big social problems that did not admit of 
an easy solution. This situation improved after the 1870s as a result of the rise of a 
broad societal midfield and pillarisation in particular. The political elites of the vari-
ous societal groups were closely tied to their constituencies via the diverse organisa-
tions in civil society. In this way concerns and wishes that circulated in society 
could be quickly and clearly communicated to the political level. At the same time, 
social acceptance of the policies was high.
The process of de-pillarisation was the main factor in increasing the distance 
between government and citizens. The result is that at present a substantial segment 
of the electorate feels that it is not being heard. The fact that a significant number of 
political decisions have been delegated to Brussels has not increased the involve-
ment of citizens in political processes. As in earlier historical junctures, it is now 
essential to find new forms in which the state and society can reciprocally fortify 
one another. This is absolutely essential given the fundamental issues, the Grand 
Challenges, now facing the world in the domain of well-being and sustainability.
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Chapter 23
Contemporary Problems of Well-being 
and How We Got Here
John Grin
Abstract In this chapter we analyse the historical genesis of the contemporary 
crisis of natural capital as groundwork for exploring possible routes for future 
development up to 2050. The central question is: How did currently problematic 
couplings between GDP growth, well-being, resource use, energy use and pollution 
emerge?
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In this connection, we analyse three value chains (grain-for-meat; gravel-for- 
construction; plastics-for-domestic-quality of life) asking the following sub- 
questions: How did practices of production, consumption and distribution shape (1) 
specific value chains into non-circularity, and (2) yield a vast expansion of material 
flows, especially after 1960? What problem definitions and value orientations have 
guided those developments and how have they been institutionally and spatially 
embedded?
A fourth case is devoted to energy, in particular to electricity-for-households: 
How did practices of production, consumption and distribution shape the evolution 
of energy intensity in households? What problem definitions and value orientations 
guided those developments and how were they institutionally and spatially 
embedded?
The results of the analyses are used for reflections on future strategies to promote 
sustainability (see final Chap. 24).
Keywords Crisis · Natural Capital · Value Chains · Grain · Meat · Gravel · Plastics
23.1  Exploring Contemporary Issues
By 1960 the process of state formation and societal modernization that took off 
around 1850 had attained its goals: more well-being and greater democratic partici-
pation. Moreover, the underlying practices respected the available stock of natural 
capital. That is, until about 1960. After that, the continuous growth in GDP meant a 
steep increase in resource and energy consumption (Graph 22.2). This did not go 
unnoticed. A better-educated populace demanded more political and social say, and 
began to hold government and business responsible for the massive ecological prob-
lems that surfaced in the course of the 1960s.1 By 2010 social unrest posed a serious 
threat to Dutch democracy while in the background the country’s natural capital was 
being consumed at alarming rates.
In this chapter we analyse the historical genesis of the contemporary crisis of 
natural capital as groundwork for exploring possible routes for future development 
up to 2050. We focus on dominant problem definitions and value orientations and 
the associated institutional embedding – as argued in Chap. 1. These are also salient 
because they co-shape future developments, the substance of Chap. 24.
For the same two reasons, we also zero in on the long-term “landscape” trends 
that have shaped practices (Chap. 1) especially their spatiality. Preceding chapters 
showed that the spatial dimension of practices deeply informs present-day 
1 U.  Beck, The re-invention of politics. Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997).
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 dilemmas – as emphasised in recent transition studies.2 In sum, the central question 
of this chapter will be:
Q: How did currently problematic couplings between GDP growth, well-being, resource / 
energy use and pollution emerge? What problem definitions and value orientations have 
guided that development and how have these been institutionally embedded?
23.1.1  Material Flows
While a few key resources like oil and phosphates are dwindling rapidly, increasing 
demand on resources in general is savaging landscapes and biodiversity at extrac-
tion locales. And though achievements like the tenfold reduction of per capita SO2 
emissions, approaching 1850 levels, are hopeful, newer problems like soil acidifica-
tion due to surplus manure and the pollution of the oceans by micro-plastics are still 
far from being solved. Such problems are rooted in two developments. The first is 
the way economic supply chains evolved since 1850 – especially their degrees of 
differentiation and specialisation. This resulted in an economy of non-circular 
chains of production and consumption. When, around 1960, this non-circularity 
intersected with a second phenomenon, a vast expansion of production and con-
sumption, massive problems ensued (cf. Graph 22.2).
As a mercantile country traditionally poor in resources, the Netherlands has long 
imported crucial resources, while finished products are domestically consumed or 
exported. Depending on the spatial and institutional specifics of the economic sup-
ply chains involved, repercussions therefore quickly extend beyond the ‘here and 
now’ and into the ‘elsewhere’ and/or ‘later.’
2 M. Hodson, S. Marvin, Can cities shape socio-technical transitions and how would we know if 
they were? (Research Policy, 39: 2010), 477–485.
P. Späth, H. Rohracher, ‘Energy regions: The transformative power of regional discourses on 
socio-technical futures’ (Research Policy, 39,4: 2010), 449–458.
P. Späth, Philipp, H. Rohracher, Beyond Localism: The Spatial Scale and Scaling in Energy 
Transitions (Padt 2014), R. Raven, J. Schot, F. Berkhout, 2012: Space and scale in socio-technical 
transitions (2012), Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 4, 63–78.
B. Truffer, L. Coenen, Environmental Innovation and Sustainability Transitions in Regional 
Studies (2012), Regional Studies, 46,1: 1–21.
A. Switzer, L. Bertolini & J. Grin, Understanding transitions in the regional transport and land-
use system: Munich 1945–2013 (2015), Town Planning Review, vol. 86 no. 6. p.  699–723., 
A. Switzer, L. Bertolini, J. Grin, Transitions of Mobility Systems in Urban Regions: A Heuristic 
Framework (2013), Environmental Policy and Planning, 15,2: 141–160.
J. Grin, N. Frantzeskaki, V. Castan Broto, L. Coenen, ‘Sustainability Transitions and the City’ 
(2015), Linking to transition studies and looking forward chapter 22 (conclusions) in: 
N.  Frantzeskaki, V.  Castan-Broto, L.  Coenen (ed.s), Urban Sustainability Transitions. J.  Grin, 
N.  Frantzeskaki, V.  Castan Broto, L.  Coenen, Sustainability Transitions and the City (2015), 
Linking to transition studies and looking forward chapter 22 (conclusions) in: N. Frantzeskaki, 
V. Castan-Broto, L. Coenen (ed.s), Urban Sustainability Transitions.
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Hence the following sub-questions will inform our detailed examinations of sev-
eral supply chains (grain-for-meat; gravel-for-construction; and plastics-for- 
domestic- quality of life):
Q1: How did practices of production, consumption and distribution shape (i) specific value 
chains into non-circularity, and (ii) yield a vast expansion of material flows, especially 
since 1960? What problem definitions and value orientations have guided those develop-
ments and how have they been institutionally and spatially embedded?
23.1.2  Fossil Energy Use
As Graph 22.4 indicates, air pollution due to the rapid increase in fossil energy use 
since the 1950s was largely solved by first generation “end of pipe” environmental 
policies3 not to mention the early 1970s transition to natural gas. But whatever the 
size of remaining fossil stocks, current rates of (increase of) fossil energy consump-
tion cannot be environmentally sustained throughout the present century – certainly 
not in view of climate change and certainly not if developing countries seek to 
emulate western industrialisation since 1850.
Depletion of fossil resources and climate change are serious problems for both 
‘later’ (inasmuch as the consequences of depletion and the worst consequences of 
climate change are yet to come) and ‘elsewhere’ (inasmuch as the consequences of 
climate change will hit the global South hardest).4 That said, climate change and 
fossil resource depletion are also serious problems in the ‘here and now.’ Fossil fuel 
extraction has had undesirable local effects both in the Netherlands and elsewhere: 
its spatiality has had and will continue to have, important implications for energy 
security and financial flows.
Increased energy consumption is directly to blame. Graph 22.2 shows how 
energy consumption skyrocketed in the 1960s. This follows a similar pattern of 
growth in overall production and consumption and thus speaks to our first question. 
The coupling between material production and energy consumption obviously 
reflects the very nature of industrial production: using mechanical energy to aug-
ment labour productivity. And inasmuch as prior to 2010 that energy was largely 
fossil energy, the correlation between production and CO2 emissions also appears 
evident. Between 1961 and 1974 the rapid, large-scale introduction of natural gas 
3 J. Grin, H. van de Graaf. P. Vergragt, Een derde generatie milieubeleid: Een sociologisch perspec-
tief en een beleidswetenschappelijk programma, (2003), Beleidswetenschap, jrg. 17, nr. 1, 
p. 51–71.
4 Brauch, H. Günter, Ú. Oswald Spring, J. Grin, C. Mesjasz, P. Kameri-Mbote, N. Chadha Behera, 
B. Chourou, H. Krummenacher, Facing Global Environmental Change: Environmental, Human, 
Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts. (2009), Hexagon Series on Human and 
Environmental Security and Peace, vol. 4 (Berlin – Heidelberg – New York: Springer-Verlag).
Brauch, H.  Günter, Ú. Oswald Spring, J.  Grin, C.  Mesjasz, P.  Kameri-Mbote, N.  Chadha 
Behera, B. Chourou, H. Krummenacher, Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters 
and Security – Threats, Challenges,
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mitigated CO2 emissions. At the same time, energy-intensive industries, most nota-
bly the utilities and the chemical sector, became more important in the Dutch econ-
omy. After 1974, levels of CO2 emissions were the combined effect of more efficient 
production (in response to the oil crises) and greater volumes of production. For 
most sectors in this period, increases in export were the main drivers of increased 
CO2 emissions. The big exception was the utilities where household consumption 
was responsible.
Below, therefore, we will seek answers to the following sub-questions as we 
analyse cases of energy use in specific chains:
Q2: How did practices of production, consumption and distribution shape the evolution of 
energy intensity in particular value chains? What problem definitions and value orienta-
tions guided those developments and how were they institutionally and spatially 
embedded?
23.2  Analytical Approach
We will analyse four value chains: grain-for-meat; gravel-for-construction; plastics- 
for- domestic-quality of life and electricity-for-households. These cases cover much 
of the increase in well-being since 1850: first the satisfaction of basic needs and, 
especially since the 1960s, increasing convenience, comfort and fun. They also 
cover the spectrum of contemporary problems, partly because they exhibit different 
patterns of spatiality in material flows. The first three chains exemplify organic, min-
eral and fossil resources, respectively, selected on the basis of volume and on above-
average import shares for their respective categories. These three cases are used to 
answer Q1 above, explaining how production (and with it, emissions) increased in 
the three sectors. The last two cases – exemplifying the consumption and production 
of electricity – show how CO2 emissions evolved and will be used to answer Q2.
23.3  Grain-for-Meat
23.3.1  Breaking Circularity
Recall the two dynamics underlying contemporary sustainability problems: first, the 
non-circularity of economic chains and, second, their sheer volume, especially since 
1960. Non-circularity in the grain-meat chain5 may be summarised by noting that 
by 2010 the Netherlands
5 Denkgroep Duurzame Veehouderij, Toekomst voor de veehouderij. Agenda voor een herontwerp 
voor de sector, (2001) Advice to the Dutch Agricultural Minister.
Van Zeijts, H, M.M. van Eerdt, W.J. Willems, G.A. Rood, A.C. den Boer, D.S. Nijdam, Op weg 
naar een duurzame veehouderij. Ontwikkelingen tussen 2000 en 2010. (Den Haag/Bilthoven, 
2010), Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving (PBL).
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• imported 80% of its available grain, nearly half of which was used for cattle fod-
der. Soy (products) alone accounted for 9 Mton (around 30% of EU flow), mainly 
(75%) from Brazil and Argentina.6
• exported 63% of its available meat, while it imported somewhat less than a third
• crop production was wedded to artificial fertilisers, which largely replaced ani-
mal manure. Hence nutrients from surplus manure end up as effluents in soil, 
surface waters and oceans.
As such, this chain is exemplary for the Netherlands a node of food supply chains7 
(contrary to e.g. England which is more an endpoint). The classical Dutch pattern is 
exporting processed foodstuffs and importing raw materials like cattle fodder and veg-
etable oils; this fits seamlessly with what we have called “a chemical-analytical per-
spective on agricultural and fisheries products as raw materials for foods.” (Chap. 13).
Experts associate this pattern with nutrient depletion both globally8 and in the 
source countries, where it also despoils landscapes and ruins soils. In the Netherlands, 
the dominance of animal over crop production has had similar consequences. For 
one thing, it entails the long-range transportation of animals and meat (Dutch pigs 
travel to Italy, and then Parma ham is exported everywhere, including the 
Netherlands) which stresses the animals, augments CO2 emissions and contributes 
to the spread of pandemics9 The sheer size, transnational nature and complexity of 
the production chain, the second core element, has only exacerbated all these 
problems.
How did practices of production, consumption and distribution give rise to a non- 
circular grain-for-meat chain; what problem perceptions and values animated these 
practices, and how were they institutionally and spatially structured?
6 E. Hees, Voedsel, grondstoffen en geopolitiek. Rapportage aan het Platform Landbouw, lnnovatie 
& Samenleving (Culemborg 2013), 23–28.
7 See ch. 13 and WRR, Naar een voedselbeleid, Den Haag/Amsterdam 2014), rapport nr. 93, 
60–64.
8 D. Cordell, The Story of Phosphorus:Sustainability implications of global phosphorus scarcity 
for food security (2010), Linköping: Linköping University Press.
M. de Ridder, S. de Jong, J. Polchar, S Lingemann, Risks and Opportunities in the Global 
Phosphate Rock Market (The Hague, 2013), The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). 
Rapport No 17 | 12 | 12.
M. Heckenmüller, N. Daiju G. Klepper, Global Availability of Phosphorus and Its Implications 
for Global Food Supply: An Economic Overview (2014), Kiel Working Paper No. 1897. University 
of Kiel.
9 Zeijts et al., Op weg naar een duurzame veehouderij (2010).
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23.3.2  How the Netherlands Embedded Itself in the Grain-for- 
Meat Chain
From 1850–2010 around half of the available grain in the Netherlands was used for 
cattle fodder.10 But increasingly, that grain has been imported. Since 1970, around 
80% of the total has been imported, an increase compared to 1913 (68%) and espe-
cially to 1850 (21%). What lies behind this?
Specialisation was the chief culprit. This had long been the rule in the western 
provinces, but on the sand grounds the transition occurred between 1850 and 1913 
with a shift from crop cultivation to cattle husbandry at the then still ‘mixed’ farms. 
The process (cf. Chap. 8) was triggered by the international trade liberalisation of 
the 1840s, the first effect of which was to substitute commercial gain for self- 
sufficiency as the basic normative orientation of farming on the sand grounds and 
around the large rivers. But it also toppled grain prices to the point of undermining 
mixed farming and encouraging the transformation of crop fields into grazing pas-
tures. Given the new orientation to commercial gain and the price effects of trade 
liberalisation, agriculture shifted toward exporting expensive meat and importing 
relatively cheap grain. Industrialising England and Germany were especially enam-
oured of ‘luxury’ Dutch meat. By 1913, the Netherlands was exporting 31% of its 
available meat, while importing 28% – a tremendous increase compared to 1850, 
when these figures were 4% and 2% respectively.
Thus crop farming increasingly focused on serving livestock farming, while the 
latter increasingly became a value chain in and of itself, de-coupled from crop pro-
duction. Here lies the cradle of the Dutch position as a node in international food 
chains.
As discussed in Chap. 8, the international agricultural crisis of the 1880s was a 
very rough patch for the Dutch primary sector. Still, this only accelerated the devel-
opments just sketched. The US was already decisively on the track to modernisation 
and, at the cost of soil depletion, was producing vast quantities of grain that could 
be transported cheaply to the East coast by the new railway lines. From there, steam-
ship companies and older trade networks (the Dutch had long been global grain 
traders) shipped it to Europe. This seriously depressed European grain prices, fur-
ther stimulating the trend that set in during the 1840s and reinforcing the orientation 
to commercial gain.
The spatial and institutional embedding of these practices and their normative 
orientation was consolidated by ever-cheaper international transportation as well as 
by the shift from the commons to agricultural co-operatives with their collective 
bulk purchasing and selling power. Between 1850 and 1913, the total amount of 
available grain increased by a factor of 3.3 while the amount used for cattle farming 
increased by a factor of 4.5; at the same time, the share of imports more than tripled. 
All told, these developments yielded a shift from a circular chain centred around 
10 F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland in de jaren 1850, 1913, 1970, 2010 (Eindhoven 2016), 
open access researchreport, 11, 17, 25, 35.
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mixed farms working for domestic or local production to a de-localized, non- 
circular meat production chain.
In the wings, a newly interventionist government was also keen to maintain and 
expand its position by serving the national interest. After the hygienist movement 
had revealed the dangers of unreliable food, food quality had also become part of 
the normative repertoire of the food sector – with a vigilant government looking 
over its shoulder. Following several scandals and disputes, the government mobil-
ised the Codex Alimentarius, developed in the late nineteenth century by the hygien-
ists, to define standards (1902) for meat, among other things to safeguard the export 
market. By 1919, chronically unreliable food supplies during World War I had made 
a Food and Drugs Act inevitable, a move that further bolstered the position of the 
Netherlands as an exporter of high-quality foods, including meat.
23.3.3  How Nutrients Came to Leak from the Grain-for-Meat 
Chain
The commercialisation of farming between 1850 and 1913 also became possible 
thanks to the adoption of artificial fertilisers that gradually replaced the mix of ani-
mal manure, urban waste and faeces, fish and animal waste and Guano. Chili 
Salpeter, imported from Latin America, was a key artificial fertiliser. Other fertilis-
ers were imported from especially Belgium and Germany, which surpassed the 
Netherlands both as users and as importers of artificial fertilisers well into the 
1920s. (Chap. 8) By then, though, domestic Dutch production of artificial fertilisers 
was also rapidly increasing (see Graph 13.2). This shift was triggered by World War 
I, when nitrates became critical military resources, especially in those countries 
from which the Netherlands imported its artificial fertilisers. (Threats of) food 
shortages and the emergence of new political movements compelled the govern-
ment to intervene. To compensate for the closing down of international trade, it 
forced merchants, co-operatives and importers to work together in acquisition asso-
ciations to supply the superphosphate factories established in the previous decade 
with scarce nitrates.
These wartime changes in the institutional quadrants persisted into the post-war 
period. In the following years, the new networks created in the market would pro-
mote the rapid growth of the fertiliser sector; and government, once involved, con-
tinued to promote fertiliser production by supporting (semi) state enterprises like 
the State Mines (coal) and Hoogovens (iron and steel). These firms employed new 
fertiliser production methods, developed internationally during the War. The 
Netherlands thus swiftly developed the portion of the international market allocated 
to it by the European nitrogen cartel created to regulate destructive competition. By 
the end of the decade, domestic producers began to dominate the national market 
(Table 13.4). The wartime crisis of international trade had ultimately yielded strong 
networks in the national institutional quadrants.
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Such rapid growth in production could of course not have occurred without an 
equally dynamic demand for fertilisers. This was partly due to the establishment, by 
the early 1920s, of collective purchasing by agricultural co-operatives. Another fac-
tor was the drive for self-sufficiency during the First World War, which enabled 
production to exceed momentary demand, though with due consequences for prices. 
While by the early 1930s the fertiliser cartel had managed to stabilise prices, fertil-
isers had still become much cheaper: from 18 guilders per 100 kg in 1922 down to 
5 in 1932. Demand was also stimulated by a knowledge infrastructure that transmit-
ted new insights seamlessly to agricultural practice, and equally seamlessly fed 
farmers’ experiences back into further R&D. Goaded by the holy grail of increased 
productivity, the same knowledge infrastructure also promoted other innovations 
that multiplied the benefits of artificial fertilisers, like novel plant varieties and cul-
tivation methods. (Chap. 13).
These developments led to higher agricultural productivity and thence to greater 
well-being: more income for farmers, and more domestically produced and afford-
able meat for the population at large (from 32 kg/capita/year around 1913 to no less 
than 63 kg in 1970). The radical differentiation of the supply chain and the massive 
expansion of production following on the demise of mixed farming grew out of the 
institutional arrangements just discussed. They were the seedbed for the institu-
tional framework that nurtured post-1945 agricultural modernisation: the so-called 
Iron Triangle for policy making and the OVO knowledge infrastructure. This 
entailed a vast increase in knowledge and in the capital intensity of farming, again 
promoting further specialization: from mixed farming through animal husbandry 
and poultry farming towards either chickens for meat or chickens for eggs. 
Modernisation also increased the scale of production, but that process started earlier 
and deserves separate analysis.
23.3.4  Expansion of Material Flows in the Grain-for-Meat 
Chain
By 2010, the volume of meat production was 34 times that of 1850 while meat con-
sumption per capita was 2.5 times as high. The stage for this increase was set 
between 1913 and 1970. By 1913, meat production had nearly quadrupled relative 
to 1850 though – due to exports and doubling of the population – per capita domes-
tic consumption had increased by only 12.5%. By 1970, however, meat production 
had again increased by a factor of 4.7. The bulk of this increase was due to post- 
1945 modernisation policies. This increase was large enough to effect a per capita 
increase in meat consumption of 75% (1913–1970) despite another doubling of the 
population and increased exports.
All in all, 1970 marked the end of a long struggle to provide sufficient meat; a 
struggle that had been a driving force in food production since 1850. Food security 
had become political dogma around World War I, when socialist movements tried to 
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seize power by exploiting societal unrest about food scarcity. The established par-
ties countered by arranging emergency imports of food from England, leading to a 
lasting consensus on the need to increase domestic food production – an orientation 
that would inspire emergent corporatist arrangements for decades to come.
The most dramatic increase in food production occurred between 1945 and 1970 
through a self-reinforcing process of modernisation, aimed at increasing GDP by 
producing affordable food domestically, while freeing agricultural labour for indus-
try. This process became self-reinforcing due to its drivers: a persistent cultural 
inclination towards Americanisation (especially among young farmers) and the 
demonstrably increasing returns that encouraged imitation and provided investment 
capital. The ‘logic’ of investments in modernisation – increased capital intensity – 
increased scale  – increased scale  – increased returns  – new investments11 was 
equally inescapable. Modernisation was nurtured within an efficient knowledge 
infrastructure put together by post-war Minister Sikko Mansholt. From the early 
twentieth century co-operatives had provided capital for investments even to small 
farmers and the increased scale was facilitated by structural policies (land reclama-
tion and improved water management) introduced by Mansholt shortly after WW 
II. All these elements were seamlessly connected through the iron triangle, a corpo-
ratist policy-making machinery shaped by Mansholt and rooted in the consensus 
that had emerged earlier and reinforced during the hardships of WW II.
Second, these years also witnessed the emergence of mass consumption, includ-
ing food consumption. Not only did virtually the entire population now have access 
to essential foods, like meat, but also to a range of new foodstuffs – foreign food and 
items like chicken, convenience and luxury food – that had been unavailable till 
then. This was promoted by the landscape trends of increased traveling, decolonisa-
tion, the spread of refrigerators in households and retail stores and increased leisure 
time; as well as by the supermarket and the car. Institutionally, these factors were 
stimulated by governmental measures, especially subsidies for imported cooling 
and freezing equipment, the liberalisation of the retail sector, the liberalisation of 
wage increases, the issuing of the disk-of-five guidelines for a healthy diet and the 
introduction of a five-day working week.12
By 2010, with an 81 kg/capita/year meat consumption, the Dutch occupied a 
44th place among 170 countries. While this is only slightly more than recommended 
by the World Health Organization, urban lifestyles are still nurturing an upward 
trend. This yields both health and ecological problems that have stimulated national 
policies and to which we will return in Chap. 24.
11 J.  Grin, Changing governments, kitchens, supermarkets, firms and farms: the governance of 
transitions between societal practices and supply systems (2012), p.  35–56  in G.  Spaargaren, 
P. Oosterveer, & A. Loeber (Eds.), Food practices in transition: changing food consumption, retail 
and production in the age of reflexive modernity (New York), Routledge.
12 Chapter 13; J. Grin, ‘Changing governments, kitchens, supermarkets, firms and farms: the gov-
ernance of transitions between societal practices and supply systems’, in G.  Spaargaren, 
P. Oosterveer, & A. Loeber (Eds.), Food practices in transition: changing food consumption, retail 




23.4.1  Contemporary Problems and Historical Trends
Between 1850 and 2010, flows of mineral assets steadily increased, absolutely by a 
factor of 32, per capita by a factor of 16. While the trend became visible between 
1850 and 1910, it acquired momentum over the next 60 years, levelling off only 
after 1970. Within the category of mineral assets, gravel is a revealing example: not 
only is it an important flow in its own right (constituting between 15–35% of total 
mineral flows since 1910), but also growing by a factor of nearly 400 between 1850 
and 2010. Most of this increase took place between 1910 and 1970, with the rise of 
(gravel-rich) concrete as construction material. As to spatiality: in recent years the 
share of imported gravel exceeded 80%, twice the average for all mineral assets.
Gravel is a revealing example for understanding contemporary resource prob-
lems because its main environmental problem derives from its extraction: damage 
to the local landscape and ecosystems. The environmental effects of its actual use 
are less important.13 This implies that ecological damage is proportional to total 
gravel recovery. But the precise location where harm is being done (‘here’ or ‘else-
where’) depends on how much is mined domestically vs. how much is imported. 
Between 1970 and 2010 the combined effect of reduced use and a higher share of 
import led to a fourfold decline in the amount of gravel extracted in the Netherlands, 
while the amount extracted ‘elsewhere’ (mainly the three neighbouring countries) 
has increased by 25%.14
In terms of the two issues noted in research question Q1 (non-circularity of eco-
nomic chains, and the sheer volume of mass flows), we note the following:
• mass flows of gravel increased by a factor of 24 between 1850 and 1910; while a 
nearly equal increase occurred over the following 60 years. After 1970, gravel 
use declined by just over 25%.
• until around 1900, the gravel chain was largely circular: obsolete buildings, dikes 
and road infrastructure were demolished and reduced to re-usable materials.
• between 1850 and 1910, the share of imports quadrupled, reaching 67% of the 
total or twice the mean percentage for mineral flows. Between 1910 and 1970, 
this share declined to 47%, just 1.25 times the average, only to exceed 80% by 
2010 in spite of an overall decrease in gravel use.
13 The production of concrete and concrete products, an important use for gravel, contributes 1,1% 
and 1,7%, respectively, to energy use and CO2 emissions; t0068e main problem is particulate mat-
ter emissions, constituting more than 10% of annual Dutch emissions.
M.  Bijleveld, G.C.  Bergsma, M. van Lieshout, Milieu-impact van betongebruik in de 
Nederlandse bouw Status quo en toetsing van verbeteropties (Delft, 2013), CE Delft. 
Publicatienummer: 13.2828.24
14 F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland, 25, 35.
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To explain these features, we will discuss construction practices (of buildings, 
hydraulic engineering objects and road infrastructures), which were the main desti-
nations for gravel, emphasising their institutional and spatial contexts.
23.4.2  Volumes of Gravel: From Historically Vast Increases 
of Mass Flows to Gradual Decline
In 1850, most of the 8800 ktons of material flows (58%) comprised organic matter; 
subsoil mineral assets constituted a mere 28%. Of those, clay, sand and gravel were 
the main bulk construction materials and largely extracted domestically; only gravel 
was imported to any degree (16%, see Table 3.1). By 1910, both absolute gravel 
flows and the level of gravel imports had increased dramatically. Despite the enor-
mous increase in imports, domestic extraction continued to increase over those six 
decades by a factor of 24, from 50 to 1200 kton. In the next 60 years, it would 
increase again by a factor of 22, reaching more than 27,000 kton in 1970. This 
vastly growing demand for gravel derived both from an increase in construction 
efforts and from changes in the nature of construction.
23.4.3  Increasing Construction Efforts
Hydraulic engineering and transportation infrastructure, especially canals and rail-
ways, were the two sectors responsible for the initial increases in construction vol-
umes. While the former was ordained by the geographic realities of living in a delta, 
infrastructure construction aimed to modernise an ailing economy. Around 1850, 
this was a critical issue both for the King and, after 1848, the national government, 
both of whom championed increasing welfare and thus supported modernisation 
and infrastructure construction.
Housing construction was another sector that required ever more building mate-
rials. In the final decades of the nineteenth century, growing societal concern about 
poor housing as a factor limiting popular well-being led to an enormous increase in 
urban housing construction. This was further stimulated by a number of long-term 
trends: population growth accelerated after 1880 as mortality fell in the wake of 
improvements in health care and nutrition.15 The upshot was a doubling of the popu-
lation from 3.1 million in 1850 up to 5,9 million in 1910. In 1900, the housing short-
age stood at 9% for the country as a whole (Graph 14.2), and even higher in the 
industrialising and rapidly growing cities. There, hygienists as well as a new caste 
15 Ekamper, P.  R. van der Erf, N. van der Gaag, K.  Henkens, E. van Imhoff, F. van Poppel, 
Bevolkingsatlas van Nederland  – Demografische ontwikkelingen van 1850 tot heden. (2003), 
NIDI. Main results in English at https://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/research/pd/120504
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of experts acquired a new audience as they voiced their concerns over the housing 
conditions of especially the lower class.
These groups promoted housing efforts according to the new hygienist norms. Their 
experiments helped shape the 1901 Housing Law. This law would become the corner-
stone of a typically welfare-state institutional arrangement in housing and it immedi-
ately triggered a further acceleration in housing construction. As Graph 14.3 shows, 
annual housing production increased from around 15,000 in the late nineteenth century 
up to 20,000 around 1900 and more than 30,000 after 1905. As a consequence, the hous-
ing shortage fell to 3% by 1940, only to rise again to nearly 20% after the destruction of 
the Second World War. Around 1970 it was back to 3% again and fell to 2% by 2010 
(Graph 14.2). Public surveys conducted between 1967 and 1972 revealed it to be per-
ceived as the biggest social problem (cf. Chap. 15, note 41). Key drivers of the shortage 
were two long term trends: population growth (population again doubled between 1910 
and 1970) and individualisation (leading to a demand for more rooms per household).
In consequence, housing production increased throughout most of the twentieth 
century. From next to nothing during World War I it rose to around 45,000 per annum 
during the interbellum, only to collapse again between 1940 and 1945. Between 
1950 and the early 1970s housing production tripled: from 50,000 to 150,000 
per annum; in subsequent decades it would hover at around 100,000. These efforts 
were coordinated by the institutional arrangement that had emerged with the 1901 
Housing Act. Government played a key role. It pushed for high production rates and 
was itself responsible for a significant share of the construction, aided and abetted 
by housing corporations and private parties (Graph 14.1). It also defined norms for 
the quality of dwellings (including the number of rooms and quality of construc-
tion) as well as for rent rates.
23.4.4  Changing Construction Practice: Concrete and More 
Spacious Dwellings
Two developments in housing design increased the demand for gravel in housing 
construction. The first was the use of concrete, especially after 1910. Concrete 
solved problem definitions prevailing since 1900: the need for cost-effective 
improvements in lower class living conditions, and the need to increase welfare 
through economic modernisation. Concrete also had symbolic appeal: it resonated 
with the cultural inclination toward progress.
The second development was an increase in the size of dwellings and in the num-
ber of rooms per dwelling, signs of increasing well-being and modernistic individuali-
sation. The trend was driven by government policy and enabled by increasing national 
income. Between 1948 and the mid-1970s, the average floorplan increased from 
about 55 to around 70 m2 (Table 14.2) Also, while around 1900 only one-third of the 
homes had more than three rooms, this increased to more than two-thirds by 1930. By 
1947 more than 75% of the homes had at least four rooms, and by 1970 more than 
90%. In that year, more than a third even had six rooms or more (Table 14.3).
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23.4.5  More Concrete, More Gravel
In light of these developments, concrete production grew apace. Concrete produc-
tion took off in earnest during the 1920s, to climb to more than 11 million tons in 
1970, still largely domestic in origin and consuming roughly 20% of the total gravel 
production.16 By the mid-1950s, largely due to demand from the housing sector, it 
had already climbed to 7 Mt, reaching 10 Mt by 1960, 16 Mt in 1965 and more than 
20 Mt in 1970, at which point output remained constant until 1980, when decline set 
in.17 By 2010, 28% less gravel was being consumed than had been in 1970. While 
the decline in housing construction after the mid-1980s (from more than 
100,000 units per year down to around 80,000) is clearly responsible, gravel con-
sumption had already stabilised a decade earlier, due to the completion of the Delta 
Works and stagnation in the housing market (Chap. 19).18
23.4.6  The End of Circularity and the Increasing Share 
of Import
The evolution of the gravel-for-construction chain is typical of many Dutch chains 
(Chaps. 12 and 14): core demand practices (e.g. infrastructure and housing) become 
a central node in a network of specialised actors embedded in increasingly ramified 
supply chains. While gravel continues to flow directly and in its pristine form to the 
workplace, increasing quantities came to flow through separate chains, especially 
concrete, that also required coordination with other chains (sand and cement). These 
chains differ in terms of their circularity and the share of imported gravel. Both 
features were shaped by the tensions between demand, domestic gravel extraction 
and processing capacity and concerns about the local side- effects of extraction.
Why did the circularity of 1850 disappear? One key factor was the vast increase 
in demand. While around 1850 raw building materials were usually recovered in the 
course of demolishing obsolete constructions, this became untenable with the 
increased pace of construction of new infrastructures and the housing boom of the 
16 Rough estimates of gravel use in concrete production by JG, assuming that gravel constitutes 
roughly 50% of the mass of concrete – based on the traditional ‘1,2,3 rule’ for volumes and the 
roughly equal densities of cement, sand and gravel.
17 CBS figures, cited by Ike (1985). While river gravel production had declined from 3 to about 
0,65 Mton during the Second World War, it returned to pre-war levels within about a year, and then 
increased steadily up to 7,5 Mton over the next ten years. B.C.E. Janssen, ‘Het veranderend gelaat 
van Nederland. Grindwinning in Midden-Limburg’, Tijdschrift Nederlands Aardrijkskundig 
Genootschap, 1965, deel 82, 376–380.
Similarly, in Limburg, where much of the Dutch gravel extraction was concentrated, extraction 
increased immediately after WW II, stabilised around 1965 and declined again around 1975. Cf 
Provincie Limburg. Letter on ‘Afronding Grindfonds’ d.d. 4/10/2005. Janssen, ‘Het veranderend 
gelaat’, 378.
18 Provincie Limburg. Letter on ‘Afronding Grindfonds’ d.d. 4/10/2005.
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twentieth century. Especially after the Second World War, with population growth, 
a housing shortage and a desire for more spacious homes driving the demand for 
construction, the volumes of material needed for new construction vastly exceeded 
what could be procured from the demolition of redundant facilities. Circularity had 
ceased to be a meaningful option.
What did remain throughout post-war reconstruction was strong governmental 
intervention in allocating scarce resources and ensuring a steady supply of subsoil 
mineral resources, especially gravel and marl as a basis for cement. In consequence, 
the national government took a firm stance when protests erupted in Limburg against 
the ENCI’s proposed expansion of marl extraction near Maastricht. While the pro-
test was unusual for the time, the outcome was more typical of the era: the ENCI got 
its concession for more cement production, although within strict spatial limits and 
subject to other mitigating measures.
Around 1950, a striving for national autarchy (after two wars and a crisis) inter-
secting with the perceived problem of insufficient housing made it necessary to 
expand domestic production of gravel (and sand). But extracting sand and gravel 
from beneath arable land ran afoul of efforts to solve another key problem of the 
time: insufficient food production. It also incited local protests against despoiling of 
the landscape. Gravel dredgers and the Province of Limburg eventually agreed on 
increased levels of extraction, but on condition of refilling the exhausted gravel pits 
and making them suitable for agriculture again – all paid for by a levy on the gravel. 
These kinds of compromises were institutionalised in 1965, with a Law on Subsoil 
Excavations coming into force by 1971. In the interval, nature and recreation 
became prominent issues. This brought alternative solutions for domestic gravel 
extraction to the fore, like turning empty gravel pits into economically viable recre-
ational lakes. After 1970, local resistance finally got the upper hand. The national 
government capitulated by cutting back on domestic gravel extraction, banking on 
sources elsewhere within the EC. (Chaps. 16 and 19).
These vagaries of domestic gravel production and demand determined levels of 
import. Domestic gravel consumption increased 20-fold between 1910 and 1970. 
Nonetheless, the import share decreased from 67% to 47%. And after the reorienta-
tion in 1970, in spite of a 28% decline in gravel consumption, imports again 
increased to 82% by 2010.
We thus see how the volume of domestic gravel extraction, and with it levels of 
import, have responded to successive dominant problem definitions: increasing wel-
fare, well-being and a striving for autarchy and the management of landscape qual-
ity. While it was the breakdown of circularity and increased gravel demand that 
incited more intensive domestic extraction and the despoiling of local landscapes, 
the increasing reliance on import implied that more and more of that damage was 
being exported elsewhere (see Sect. 23.4.1).
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23.5  Plastics-for-Daily-Life
23.5.1  Exploring Contemporary Problems
Plastics are an interesting example of the shift to processed products that occurred 
between 1910 and 1970 (Table 12.6). The shift originated with organic materials 
and mineral subsoil assets, but after 1945 the breakthrough of plastics brought fossil 
assets into the fold. The volume of plastics subsequently skyrocketed over the past 
half century: production in the Netherlands increased by more than a factor of 6 
between 1970 and 2010; consumption by a factor 4 to 5.19
While plastics have many industrial uses, households and consumer packaging 
are also an important market. Plastics were part and parcel of the new well-being 
achieved after 1960, when most people felt that their primary needs were satisfied. 
As discussed in Chaps. 14 and 16, plastics brought comfort, luxury and design prod-
ucts to the homes of all classes, as well as a new emphasis on convenience (packag-
ing in retail and shopping practices!). While a contrapuntal critique persisted in 
seeing plastics as ‘cheap’ and ‘artificial’, the new products doubtless fostered more 
equality in the domain of ‘second order well-being.’ However, from a contemporary 
environmentalist point of view, plastics remain far from unproblematic, especially 
after their useful life.20
Plastics are seen as virtually synonymous with the ‘waste society’ – and for good 
reason. About half of the amount of plastic consumed by Dutch households is 
wasted – the same as for the EU as a whole.21 Also, the share of plastics in Dutch 
domestic waste flows increased threefold between 1970 and 2010. This is the out-
come of a steady increase until 2005 followed by a policy-driven decline after 2008.22 
Symbolically and materially, plastic waste is exemplary for the inefficient husbanding 
of natural resources. Or, as the World Economic Forum23 puts it “Plastic packaging is 
an iconic linear application with USD 80–120 billion annual material value loss.”
19 F. Lambert, Massastromen in Nederland, 27, 37.
20 Energy consumption is not the most crucial plastics problem. While plastics do belong to the 
most energy-intensive sectors, they account for only a few percent of Dutch CO2 emissions. 
Hoekstra en Van der Helm and Lintsen et al. argue that their production is less energy-intensive 
than that of the products substituted. In addition, plastic materials are relatively light, which makes 
some of its applications (e.g. in cars) less energy consuming. R. Hoekstra en R. van der Helm, 
Paper prepared for the 18th International Input-Output Conference (Sydney 2010), June 20-25th.
H.  Lintsen, M.  Hollestelle and R.  Hölsgens (2017), The Plastics Revolution. How the 
Netherlands became a global player in plastics (Eindhoven 2017, open-access).
21 Plastics Europe, Plastics – the Facts 2012. An analysis of European plastics production, demand 
and waste data for 2011. Plastics Europe (Brussels 2012), 9.
22 It was 17% (increase by factor of 3,4 by 2010) and 14% (factor 2,8) for 2011–2015, when the 
share was constant at 14%. Rijkswaterstaat, Samenstelling huishoudelijk restafval. http://afval-
monitor.databank.nl/Jive/Jive?cat_open=landelijk%20niveau/Samenstelling%20van%20huis-
houdelijk%20restafval
23 World Economic Forum, Ellen MacArthur Foundation and McKinsey & Company, The New 




Second, plastic waste that is not properly disposed of and processed may cause 
environmental harm24 Although there are increasing concerns about micro-plastics 
on land, little is known about them. More is known about damage to marine eco- 
systems, especially about entanglement and ingestion by fish. According to WEF 
et al., 2016, the oceans contain a mass of plastics amounting to 1/5 of the total mass 
of fish; they expect the quantities to be equal by 2050. Other known impacts concern 
changes in habitats and the transport of alien species, and human and animal health 
effects due to additives in plastics. While these problems also affect the Dutch 
marine environment,25 they are unevenly distributed over the globe,26 most notably 
affecting the Pacific.
In sum, contemporary problems with plastics are for here and now as well as for 
later and elsewhere; and they are a consequence of the vast waste flows produced. 
So it is relevant to understand the origin and increase of these waste flows. As above 
we explain the enormous growth of production and consumption, certainly funda-
mental to the increase of waste flows and we discuss the nature and evolution of the 
non-circularity of the chain.
23.5.2  How the Chain Became So Vast: The Plastics 
Revolution
The first plastics were developed at the end of the nineteenth century, and even in 
those early days their universal appeal was foreseen by, especially American, proph-
ets of mass consumption. Until World War II, consumer products would constitute 
the most important market. By 1920, as the US started to export the new lifestyle, 
Berlin and Paris were becoming its European showcases27 – which may explain why 
Germany and France were early adopters of plastics – But wartime developments 
were at least as pertinent: novel systems, like plastics use in radar, or the use of plas-
tics as substitutes for silk parachute textile after Japan entered the war (Chap. 15).
Prior to 1970 the Netherlands was certainly not a frontrunner in plastics con-
sumption, joining the fray only after 1950. The same goes for production. In 1950, 
a mere 17  kton was produced, but that swiftly increased: to 239  kton by 1963, 
24 DG Environment of the EU (2011). Science for Environment Policy, In-depth Reports, Plastic 
Waste: Ecological and Human Health Impacts.
World Economic Forum, The New Plastics Economy.
25 H.A. Leslie, M.D. van der Meulen, F.M. Kleissen, A.D. Vethaak, Microplastic litter in the Dutch 
marine environment: Providing facts and analysis for Dutch policymakers concerned with marine 
microplastic litter (Delft 2011).
26 World Economic Forum, The New Plastics Economy.
27 R. Oldenziel, A. de la Bruhèze, Theorizing the mediation junction for technology and consump-
tion (2009) in A. de la Bruhèze and R. Oldenziel (eds) Manufacturing technology, manufacturing 
consumers: The making of Dutch consumer society, (Amsterdam: Aksant).
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900 kton by 1970, 1785 kton by 1975 and up to nearly 9445 kton in 2010.28 Thus by 
1963, the country was in the sub-top of producers (after the US, Germany and 
Japan) both in absolute and per capita terms, and by 1975 to the global top in terms 
of per capita production (106 kg/capita, compared to 78 and 45 for Germany and the 
US, respectively.29
That Dutch consumers were ‘late adopters’ is not that strange, given the country’s 
culture of conservative domesticity that also retarded their adoption of mass con-
sumption until well into the mid-twentieth century.30 But how then was it possible 
for the Netherlands to catch up so swiftly after the war? For one thing, the 1950s saw 
a ‘silent revolution’ in ‘culture and mentality’31 (augmented by a cultural inclination 
towards ‘Americanisation.’ That shift, together with higher incomes, a five day 
working week, car mobility, TV and the emergence of the supermarket, created an 
avant garde in the Dutch middle class ready for the thrills of mass consumption32(see 
also Chap. 22). These developments had been actively promoted by the Dutch gov-
ernment and by Marshall Plan projects, for example excursions by housewives and 
retailers to the US as well as exhibitions on the American way of life.33
Supply-side factors also help explain the swift growth of the chain. Frontrunners 
in industry and in the R&D sector shared the disposition to modernisation, 
Americanisation and mass consumption. That they were prepared to cater to the 
needs of the consumer market is evident from the nature of the plastic products: 
crockery, statues, medals, chains, dolls as well as furniture and clothing that incor-
porated the lower classes in the world of design and good taste. This coordination of 
supply and demand clearly helped the chain’s swift expansion. And the underlying 
expectations about the future of mass consumption indeed stimulated firms to invest 
in further developments. (Chap. 15).
Yet, at a deeper level, earlier developments were responsible for the ability and 
preparedness of firms to join the plastics revolution. To be sure, Dutch firms had 
played no meaningful role in developing and producing plastics (excepting Philips’ 
production of Bakelite). Three circumstances in particular enabled Dutch industry 
to catch up. Spatiality helped: DSM was located on top of the Limburg coal mines, 
and was very knowledgeable about fossil resources and ways to process them. Also, 
the globally important port of Rotterdam was a nodal point for the global oil trade, 
28 The number for 1950 is an estimate, inferred from Graph 3.1 in Lintsen et al., which shows that 
consumption and production were roughly equal. Numbers for 1963 and 1975 were taken from 
tables 3.2 and 3.3 in Lintsen et al.
29 Numbers from table 3.1 in Lintsen et al., 2016.
30 R. Oldenziel, M. Hård, Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels: The People who Shaped Europe. (Series: 
Making Europe: technology and transformations, 1850–2000). (New York, 2012), Palgrave 
McMillan.
R. Oldenziel et al. Theorizing the mediation junction for technology and consumption.
31 P. Luykx, P. Slot, Een stille revolutie? Cultuur en mentaliteit in de lange jaren vijftig. (Hilversum, 
1997): Uitgeverij Verloren.
32 J. Grin, Changing governments, kitchens, supermarkets, firms and farms.
33 R.  Oldenziel, K.  Zachman, Cold War Kitchen. Americanization, Technology, and European 
Users. (Cambridge, 2008, The MIT Press).
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making it an interesting plastics production site for multinational firms like Shell, 
DSM, Dow Chemical and ICI, that had developed much of the basic knowledge of 
polymer production. Other firms, like the AKU (predecessor of AkzoNobel), 
invested in delivering semi-finished products. Second, the Dutch government spon-
sored the establishment of a Plastics Institute within TNO – the national public- 
private R&D agency. The Institute not only became a centre of expertise in plastics 
production and processing, but also played a main role in the development of mate-
rial, product and process standards. Finally, other firms using plastics at small scales 
before the war – like the Draka cable factory, where plastics were used for insula-
tion – were readily able to connect to this open network, promoting an efficient, 
economically viable sector. (Chap. 15).
The upshot was a self-organizing ‘platform’-like institutional arrangement of 
polymer producers, processing firms and a supportive, public-private R&D infra-
structure. Its structure mimicked plastic production itself, which is essentially a 
matter of recombining and processing a limited set of basic polymers in virtually 
endless ways. The platform’s links with transport nodes and the participation of 
major multinational firms facilitated the import of key materials and of products not 
(yet) domestically produced, as well as promoting export. The share of imports in 
plastics flows rapidly declined. In 1950 import and export were roughly equal to 
each other. By 1963, the import share was still 44%, but by 1970 it had declined to 
23%. Over the same period, exports increased dramatically,34 further stimulating the 
sector: export shares were 52% (1963), 70% (1970) and 81% (1975) and despite 
absolute increases in volume, they continue to fluctuate around the 1975 level, with 
e.g. 77% in 2010 and 83% in 2014. One key factor behind the rapid expansion of 
both production and export after 1966 was the abundance of cheap domestic natural 
gas, a big competitive advantage in this energy intensive industry (Chap. 15).
Here, as in our other two cases, a traditional Dutch supply chain structure 
emerged as a complex web of specialized, differentiated suppliers and clients, well- 
embedded in trading activities and the associated institutional and spatial networks. 
By 2014 it included some 125 producers and more than 1300 intermediate proces-
sors. The mostly small and medium-sized enterprises comprising the sector were 
ranked first in innovation power among all SME sectors. The total turnover of the 
sector was 17.5 billion euro, i.e. about 2% of Dutch GDP.
The dark side of this significant contribution to economic welfare was increasing 
waste flows. Levels of waste production were more than proportional to domestic 
consumption. Less is destined for construction, and more for product categories 
with a shorter life cycle: applications in cars and electronics devices (two expres-
sions of ‘the new well-being’ that evolved after 1960) and, most notably, an increas-
ing use of plastics packaging, that inevitable handmaiden of modernisation.35 As a 
consequence, in 2014 no less than 40% of the plastics waste flow derived from 
short-lived applications.
34 Percentages here and in the paragraphs below are taken from Lintsen et al. (2016, Graph 3.1 and 
tables 3.2, 3.3; for 1950, 1963 and 1975); and for 2014 from the Factsheet Rethinking Plastics 
issued by the Dutch Federation of Rubber and Plastics Industry NRK (Den Haag, 2016).
35 Lintsen et all, The Plastics Revolution, 157–171.
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23.5.3  Understanding the Chain’s Non-circularity
In contrast to the organic and mineral chains, the plastics chain has never been even 
close to circular. The most basic reasons are the same as those for the swift, positive 
reception of plastics: they are cheap; and they have a cultural resonance with ‘prog-
ress’ in the form of makeable materials.
Plastic packaging is emblematic. A cultural disposition towards disposability 
existed in Dutch society by the time plastics became an object of mass consumption. 
The Dutch were quite ready for “the the idea that packaging is made to be thrown 
away” (1957 industrial expert quote, cf. Chap. 15). A second- order cultural effect 
was that the modernistic ideal of the supermarket also promoted pre-packaged food 
products and beverages that dramatically increased the volume of plastic packaging, 
goaded of course by governmental food safety regulations. By the early 21st century 
the idea had become deeply entrenched: plastics are “an iconic application of linear-
ity”, as the WEF35 put it.
These factors are clearly reflected in the figures. Between 1970 and 2010, the 
share of plastics in domestic waste increased from 5 to 17%. Tellingly, in the same 
period the share of glass decreased from 11 to less than 5%. By 2015, packaging 
constituted some two-thirds of the share of plastics in domestic waste (around 14%). 
This consisted mostly of plastic bags and foil (3,5%), shape fast packaging (3%) 
and bottles (1,9%, of which 1,2% for non-food products).36
The persistent non-circularity of the sector has other roots as well. As Lintsen 
et al.37 note, the production of basic polymers is based on an economy of scale, their 
processing into end products on a logic of scope (in terms of amounts and diversity 
of end products). These logics have become institutionally entrenched in the sec-
tor’s platform-like institutional arrangement. This has led to a virtual neglect of the 
waste issue in the shaping of production practices and their connections to con-
sumption practices. This is only aggravated by the fact of the Netherlands being a 
global plastics player, thus further uncoupling production from the conditions of use 
and waste practices.
23.5.4  Energy Consumption
Together, this lack of circularity and the vast expansion of the chain explains con-
temporary problems with plastics waste. As a twofold sector analysis by Hoekstra 
et al.38 demonstrates, increased volume is also one key factor explaining increases 
36 Rijkswaterstaat Samenstelling van het huishoudelijk restafval, sorteeranalyses 2015; Gemiddelde 
driejaarlijkse samenstelling 2014. (Utrecht2016), Rijkswaterstaat.
37 H. Lintsen, M. Hollestelle and R. Hölsgens (2017), The Plastics Revolution. How the Netherlands 
became a global player in plastics Eindhoven 2017, open-access).
38 All figures in this and the preceding paragraph are from R. Hoekstra en R. van der Helm, Paper 
prepared for the 18th International Input-Output Conference (Sydney 2010), June 20-25th
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in the energy intensity of Dutch industry in the years 1961–1974. The abundance of 
natural gas since the mid-1990s increased the share of energy intensive sectors like 
the chemical industry, lured by golden opportunities in export markets.
The sector’s sensitivity to energy costs made it especially responsive to the 1973 
and 1979 oil crises. Reducing energy consumption became a guiding principle for 
innovation in chemical processing in general: new machinery, electronic process 
control and design and, more recently, 3D printing.47 In consequence, the sector’s 
overall energy intensity declined by 7.5% between 1961 and 2008; its growth rate 
for CO2 emissions dropped from 11.4% per year (1961–1974) to zero (1975–1989), 
and between 1990 and 2008 emissions even dropped at a rate of 3% per year. Its 
share in national energy consumption became 11.6%, and in CO2 emissions 7.2%.
Yet with an eye to the future it is important to note that the reduction in the sec-
tor’s energy intensity was only half that of the Dutch economy as a whole (15%). 
Also, after 1990, the reduction in energy intensity was more than offset by an expan-
sion of production, mainly driven by export markets. The changed fuel mix incor-
porating more natural gas was both behind relatively low emissions, and behind the 
increasing volume, especially through the export effect. In sum, for the decades to 
come, the fuel mix will be a key determinant of CO2 emissions and exports alike.
23.6  Electricity for Households
23.6.1  Exploring the Problem
Several sectors were chiefly responsible for making the Dutch economy much more 
energy-intensive: air and water transportation, the chemical industry and agricul-
ture, but certainly also the utilities. In fact, the latter accounted for one third of the 
total increase in CO2 emissions between 1960 and 2008. In this sector the main 
driver of changes in energy flows was not export, but household consumption – in 
spite of the fact that the latter accounted for a mere 20% of all electricity consump-
tion. Exports (by other Dutch industries!) take second place as drivers of change.39 
We focus here on household consumption, on practices that consume electricity and 
that reflect the evolution of well-being.
The sector is relevant not only for explaining key contemporary dynamics; it is 
also significant in absolute terms. In 2008 the sector was the single biggest con-
sumer of energy (11,8% of total) and the single biggest producer of CO2 emissions 
(29,4%). The sector is thus a major culprit in resource depletion and climate prob-
lems ‘later’ and ‘elsewhere.’
Against this background, we will seek to understand
• the development of the dynamic relationships between household electricity 
consumption and overall electricity production;
39 All figures in this and the next paragraph are from R. Hoekstra en R. van der Helm (2010).
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• the evolution of domestic electricity demand
• the development of the relationships between electricity production, overall pri-
mary energy use and CO2 emissions.
23.6.2  Households and Electricity Production
As in most countries, electricity in the Netherlands was initially a lighting technol-
ogy, first adopted by businesses and well-to-do households, as a replacement for 
dangerous, smelly and noisy gas lighting. Around 1900, when electricity also 
became a source of motive power for trams and factories, municipalities and prov-
inces began to establish electrical power plants (Chap. 16).
As the networks spread geographically to include additional users, marginal 
costs for additional connections declined: a well-known mechanism of network 
expansion. (Chap. 14) The resulting dynamic networks linked centralised produc-
tion to decentralised consumption. That structure implied an economic incentive to 
further electrify households. One early example, the vacuum cleaner, was success-
ful partly because it took over a rather laborious domestic task. Like other appli-
ances (the electrical iron being an important second example), its use was promoted 
by ‘trailblazers of the consumer society,’ intermediaries with close ties to the prod-
uct developers (Chap. 16). These intermediaries not only fostered receptivity for 
electrical novelties among housewives, but also transmitted housewives’ experi-
ences and needs back to R&D departments.40
These intermediaries were certainly driven by the economic logic of (municipal) 
electricity companies, but also drew on the efforts of feminists. Drawing on an inter-
national cultural (‘landscape’) inclination towards a modern rational lifestyle as well 
as on an indigenous preference for a healthy, cozy family life, contemporary femi-
nists encouraged middle-class women to reconsider their overstuffed homes and 
adopt more efficient approaches to housework. The aim was also to create more free 
time for social engagement, especially for working-class women. In 1912, the 
Netherlands Association of Housewives was founded; followed in 1932 by the 
Women’s Electricity Society. These women, informed by experience and inspired by 
scientific advances, undertook a variety of initiatives to rationalise the household: 
‘home supervisors’, experimental cooking schools, conferences and exhibitions, and 
publications on how to manage a household in more rational and hygienic ways.41
40 T. de Rijk, Het elektrische huis: vormgeving en acceptatie van elektrische huishoudelijke 
apparaten in Nederland. (Rotterdam, 1998). P. van Overbeeke & G.P.J. Verbong, ‘De strijd om het 
huishouden’ in: J.W.  Schot en anderen (red.), Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw. 
(Zutphen 2000), 174–189.
41 R.  Oldenziel & Carolien Bouw (ed.). Schoon genoeg. Huisvrouwen en huishoudtechnologie, 
1898–1998. (Nijmegen 1998). A.H. van Otterloo, ‘Voeding’, in J.W.  Schot en anderen (eds.) 
Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw (Zutphen 2000), 140–150. L.  Bervoets and 
R. Oldenziel (2009). ‘Speaking for Consumers, Standing Up as Citizens: the Politics of Dutch 
Women’s organizations and the Shaping of Technology, 1880–1980,’ in: Adri Albert de la Bruhèze 
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Against this background, it is easy to see why electrification could proceed so 
swiftly. In Amsterdam, for instance, some 7000 homes were connected in 1913. By 
the end of the First World War, that number exceeded 100.000. By 1924, some 
144.000 out of a total population of 165.000 were connected.42 Sockets had become 
standard in new homes, as “the most effective propagators of electrification” inas-
much as they “yelled for contact.” The assumption that electricity was just there, 
ready to hand, became deeply entrenched, helping to pave the way for a swift elec-
trification of the household.
This central-decentral, fossil fuel-based infrastructure, as well as the cultural 
esteem for the ‘electric home’,43 as both an expression of well-being and a symbol 
of faith in progress, still shape present-day electricity consumption and production. 
That said, privatisation of electricity production and distribution has begun to cor-
rode electrical centralism. Also while user demand initially sprung from a desire to 
rationalise the household, and thus improve quality of life (Chap. 22), around 1960 
the emphasis shifted towards luxury, convenience and mass consumption (see also 
Graph 17.1). Since the mid-1990s, ICT appliances have added another layer to this 
trend and produced a space for the electronic homo ludens.
23.6.3  The Evolution of Domestic Electricity Demand
The increase in consumptive expenditures has led to a drastic increase in domestic 
energy consumption, from 3,2 to 12,5 GJ/capita between 1950 and 2010. But not 
uniformly. Between 1982 and 1988 it decreased by 12% to remain at that level until 
1993; it then increased until 2005, only to decrease again: by 2010 it was back at the 
2000 level.
To understand this pattern we need more details. In 1988, an average household 
used 20% of its electricity for cooling, in 1993 this had fallen to 17%; in the same 
period lighting declined from about 25% to about 17% and the share of audio/video 
appliances increased from 8.5 to 12%.44 ICT applications accounted for nearly the 
entire 20% growth of overall electricity consumption between 1990 and 2006. By 
2008, computers, communication and auxiliary appliances accounted for 15% of 
the average household’s electricity consumption.45
and Ruth Oldenziel (eds.), Manufacturing Technology, manufacturing consumers. The making of 
Dutch consumer society. Amsterdam: Aksant, p. 44–47.
42 P. van Overbeeke, Kachels, geisers en fornuizen. Keuzeprocessen en energieverbruik in 
Nederlandse huishoudens, 1920–1975 (Hilversum 2001: Verloren), 46.
43 T. de Rijk, Het elektrische huis.
44 K.F.B. de Paauw, J.M. Bais, Sectorstudie huishoudens en woningen. (Petten, 1995: E).
45 Clevers, P.  Popma, Energiemonitor ICT 2008. (Den Haag, 2009), Tebodin/Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken.
J. Ganzevles, R. van Est, Energie 2030. Maatschappelijke keuzes van nu. (Den Haag: Rathenau 
Instituut).
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This evolution of domestic energy consumption is the outcome of heterogeneous 
developments. On the one hand, consumption increased due to the proliferation of 
different types of appliances and their penetration into households (e.g. dishwash-
ers; audio/video; ICT), and more frequent use (e.g. washing machine). On the other 
hand, many appliances have become more energy efficient.46 The development of 
more efficient light bulbs explains the decrease in the share of lighting: from 710 
down to 511  kwh/yr./household between 1988 and 1993, and further down to 
390 kWh in 2014.47 For cooling, increased refrigerator efficiency was compensated 
by increases in volume and the rapid adoption of the freezer: total electricity con-
sumption for cooling was 578 kWh in 1988, and 555 in 1993. Due to the increased 
number and variety of audio and video appliances, their power consumption 
increased from 247 to 391 kWh between 1988 and 1993, after which more efficient 
appliances began to turn the tide – down to 191 kWh by 2014.48 In a similar pattern, 
the more recent ICT appliances first increased domestic consumption but with e.g. 
the introduction of laptops their consumption declined again.
23.6.4  The Evolution of Energy and the CO2 Intensity 
of Electricity Production
The Dutch electricity market is again traditional in the sense of being a trade mar-
ket: the volume of trade in electrictiy is twice what is demanded by Dutch industries 
and households.49 That said, we can still say something about the energy and CO2 
intensity of electricity production. While in 1922, some 22 MJ of primary energy 
was needed to generate one kWh of electricity; by the 1940s, only 15  MJ was 
needed. Upon the introduction of natural gas (Chap. 15) and with improved effi-
ciency, consumption per kWh rapidly declined to 10 MJ by 1964. By 2000, due to 
improvements in efficiency, it had further declined to around 8.4 MJ/kWh until 2003, 
and again from 8.1 in 2004 to 7.0 in 2011. But in 2012, the energy intensity again 
increased, up to 7.4 MJ/kWh by 2015, due to the replacement of gas by coal in power 
plants. Not surprisingly, CO2 consumption per kWh declined by 20% between 2000 
and 2011, but then increased again by 20% due to this change in the fuel mix. In 
46 H. Jeeninga, Analyse energieverbruik sector huishoudens, 1982–1996. Achtergronddocument bij 
het rapport. ‘Monitoring energieverbruik en beleid Nederland. (Petten, 1997: ECN).
CPB, Naar een efficiënter milieubeleid; een maatschappelijk-economische analyse van vier 
hardnekkige milieuproblemen. (Den Haag, 2000): CPB/SDU.
47 K.F.B. de Paauw, J.M. Bais, Sectorstudie huishoudens en woningen, 22.
48 K.F.B. de Paauw, J.M. Bais, Sectorstudie huishoudens en woningen, 22. ECN, Energie-Nederland 
en Netbeheer Nederlan, Energietrends, 2014 Rapport ECN-O--14-041 (z.pl 2014).




short, energy intensity in electricity production, just like that in plastics production, 
responded to changes in fuel mix related to the availability (and exhaustion) of 
domestic natural gas between about 1960 and 2013.
23.7  In Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discussed how currently problematic couplings between 
GDP growth, well-being, resource / energy use and pollution have historically 
emerged. Drawing upon the rich historical discussions in previous chapters, and 
guided by transition theory, we have shown how this may be understood on basis of 
the evolution of practices of production, consumption, and distribution, as well as 
their guiding problem definitions and value orientations and their structural and 
spatial embedment of these practices. We showed for three discuss supply chains 
(grain-for-meat; gravel-for-construction; and plastics-for-domestic-quality of life) 
how they became non-circular in character, and how material flows in these chains 
expanded so vastly, especially since 1960.
We will now turn our analytical perspective 180 degrees. Looking from the per-
spective of a more sustainable society, now widely desired, we will discuss strate-
gies to make the first three value chains less massive and more circular, and to 
reduce the climate change effects of the fourth one, preferably down to zero. While 
we will, in the next chapter, contextualize this discussion also in ongoing long term 
trends that will shape early twenty-first century developments, we will draw on the 
analysis of this chapter to appreciate how historically evolved practices, structures, 
and spatial conditions both constrain and enable such strategies.
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Chapter 24
Conceivable Strategies for Sustainable 
Well-being
John Grin
Abstract The final chapter of this volume explores how – at this moment in time – 
strategies can be developed in the Netherlands to achieve sustainable well-being. In 
addition to key problems like the non-circularity of supply chains and the vast 
increase in volumes of mass flows since 1960 (cf. Chap. 22) the Netherlands is also 
struggling with a ‘welfare paradox,’ i.e. high levels of welfare accompanied by 
widespread alienation and cynicism. The development of a circular economy and 
the achievement of sustainable levels of mass-flows are the key goals. Three strate-
gies to achieve these goals are described: regeneration, restoration, and de- 
materialisation. For all four cases described in Chap. 23 it is shown how each of the 
three strategies contributes to more circularity and more manageable mass flows. In 
a final section it is argued that the transition toward a circular economy harbours 
promises about resolving both some patent defects of the market system as well as 
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a potential resolution of the “welfare paradox” by aiming at an economy that is 
integrated into society and that fosters markets and social institutions that include, 
rather than exclude, ordinary citizens.
Keywords Circular economy · Mass flows · Welfare paradox · Regeneration · 
Restoration · De-materialisation · Markets · Grain · Meat · Gravel · Plastics · 
Electricity
24.1  Introduction
The previous two chapters have provided a backdrop against which to develop strat-
egies for sustainable well-being: here and now, at the end of the second decade of 
the twenty-first century. Chapter 22 recapitulated how, by 1960, the problems of 
well-being that had plagued Dutch society from the mid-nineteenth century (pov-
erty, poor housing, poor health) had largely been resolved – accompanied by a vast 
expansion of resource and energy flows and associated damage to natural capital in 
the Netherlands and elsewhere. It also showed how, ironically, 50 years later Dutch 
society sees itself confronted with a welfare paradox: while the country’s level of 
welfare is spectacularly high, certainly by international standards, there is wide-
spread public discontent and pessimism about the future.
In the previous chapter, we analysed three exemplary value chains (grain-for- 
meat; gravel-for-housing; plastics-for-everyday life) and showed how two key prob-
lems emerged from evolving practices of production and consumption and their 
structural and spatial embedding: the non-circularity of chains and the vast increase 
in the volume of mass flows since around 1960. A fourth case, electricity-for- 
households, explored increasing energy intensity, showing how domestic electricity 
consumption, the efficiency of electricity generation and primary energy use and 
emissions evolved over time.
In this chapter we will, first, proactively evaluate, for each of the cases, basic 
strategies to address these key problems and then, second, discuss the relationship 
between these strategies and society’s potential for coping with the welfare paradox. 
In the remainder of this introductory section, we introduce the analytical framework 
for the first task: elaborating three basic strategies and assessing their plausibility. 
This will provide a basis for the work of the next section where we will answer, for 
each case, three questions:
 1. How, for this case, could the three strategies be elaborated?
 2. How plausible is each strategy, and what could be done to promote them?
 3. How (much) do these strategies and associated changes contribute to resolving 
the welfare paradox?
We conclude the chapter with a reflection on the mix of routes Dutch society could 
take towards 2050, and the ways in which and conditions under which that might 
contribute to dealing with the welfare paradox described in Chap. 22.
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24.1.1  Basic Strategies for Resource Use
Two of our three basic strategies are related to notions that, at the time of this writ-
ing, are comprised in the notion of a circular economy. If, as the Ellen MacArthur 
Foundation puts it “[a] circular economy seeks to rebuild capital, whether this is 
financial, manufactured, human, social or natural” in order to ensure “flows of 
goods and services,” then a circular economy is obviously one potential solution for 
the basic challenge outlined in Chap. 22, of sustaining well-being, broadly defined. 
It particularly takes issue with the non-linear character of supply chains, due to 
which key resources are wasted. To be sure, as of now few resources are actually 
close to global depletion. Yet in the long run, wastage is not tenable and a few 
resources are already suffering local depletion; in even more cases around 2050 
increasing scarcity may produce political-economic and geopolitical ramifications. 
These were in fact the motives for the Dutch government to declare in 2016, that the 
Dutch economy should be circular by 2050.1
What exactly is a circular economy? Its authoritative propagator, the Ellen 
MacArthur Foundation characterises it as a catch-phrase for a variety of approaches: 
Cradle to Cradle, Performance Economy, Biomimicry, Industrial Ecology, Natural 
Capitalism, Blue Economy and Regenerative Design.2 More explicitly, a circular 
economy is ‘an economy that is restorative and regenerative by design, and which 
aims to keep products, components and materials at their highest utility and value 
at all times, distinguishing between technical and biological cycles… In a true cir-
cular economy, consumption happens only in effective biocycles; elsewh. ere use 
replaces consumption. Resources are generated in the biocycle or recovered and 
restored in the technical cycle.’3 Thus, there are two broad modes of circularity: 
regeneration of resources (the ‘biological cycle’) and restoration of materials and 
products (‘technical cycle’). Ideally, resource consumption is limited to biocycles 
that are fully regenerative, with solar (and hence wind) energy as the sole external 
inputs; in all other cases resources are used rather than consumed. The proper col-
lection of (what in a linear case would be called) waste, so as to re-introduce it into 
the chain, is part and parcel of both modes. All this may be summarised in three 
main principles.4
 1. Preserve and enhance natural capital by controlling finite stocks and balancing 
renewable resource flows.
 2. Optimise resource yields by circulating products, components and materials at 
the highest utility at all times in both technical and biological cycles.
1 Grondstoffenvoorzieningszekerheid, Tweede Kamer 32852 no. 33; Ministerie van Infrastructuur 
en Milieu (2016). Rijksbrede Programma Circulair Economie. «Nederland circulair in 2050»
2 Ellen MacArthur Foundation. Towards a Circular Economy: Economic and business rationale for 
an accelerated transition (2013), pp. 26–27.
3 https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/circular-economy/overview/ (consulted May, 2017).
4 Ellen MacArthur Foundation. Towards a Circular Economy: Business rationale for an acceler-
ated transition. (web publication, 2015), pp. 5–8.
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 3. Foster system effectiveness by revealing and designing out negative externali-
ties, including damage to other systems (food production, forests) and externali-
ties such as land use, and air, water and noise pollution.
In the Foundation’s framework, one basic strategy is regeneration, pertaining to the 
production of renewable materials in the biological cycle. While these materials 
may be consumed, the natural capital needed for production (nutrients) may, in 
principle, be largely regenerated in the biological cycle. Restoration strategies focus 
on the technical cycle. Materials, parts or derivatives from products used are fed 
back into the technical cycle. In operationalising restoration as a second basic strat-
egy, it helps to distinguish among three modalities. We can distinguish among recy-
cling (processing materials so as to retrieve the original functionality) down-cycling 
(processing for lower functionality) and upcycling (processing for higher 
functionality).
The third overall strategy is de-materialisation. Here we follow the approach 
taken by Potting et al.5 We thus avoid bracketing consumption practices or treating 
them simply as different modes of appropriating products emerging ‘from the sup-
ply side.’ Rather, we consider consumption practices as relatively autonomous, both 
as parts of the problem and as an element of potential solutions.6 Iconic examples 
are wearing a sweater to maintain bodily warmth at a lower room temperature and 
building a larder in homes to replace electric refrigerators7 or vegetarianism as a 
way to make more efficient use of plant protein.8
Refuse Make product superfluous, by discarding its function or by fulfilling that function with 
a radically different artefact
Rethink Intensify product use (e,g, through sharing it, or through multifunctional use)
Reduce Manufacture the product more efficiently, using less resources and materials; or design 
it for less resource- and material-intensive use
With regard to our fourth case, finally, the three basic strategies are more efficient 
appliances, more limited electrification and renewable electricity production.
5 Potting, J., M. Hekkert, E. Worrell & A. Hanemaaijer (2016): Circulaire economie: Innovatie 
meten in de keten, Den Haag: Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving PBL.
6 Elisabeth Shove, Frank Trentmann, Richard Wilk. Time, consumption and everyday life. Practice, 
materiality and Culture. (Oxford, 2007); Elisabeth Shove, Matthew Watson, Martin Hand, Jack 
Ingram. The Design of Everyday Life. (Oxford, 2009).; Elisabeth Shove, Gordon Walker. 
‘CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management’ in 
Environment and Planning A, 39,4: 763–770.; Hui, A. Shove, E. and Schatzki, T., The Nexus of 
Practices: Connections, constellations, practitioners, (London, 2016); Gert Spaargaren, Peter 
Oosterveer ‘Citizen-consumers as agents of change in globalizing modernity: the case of sustain-
able consumption’. Sustainability vol. 2 no. 7 (2010), p.  1887–1908.; Gert Spaargaren, Peter 
Oosterveer, Anne Loeber (Eds.), Food practices in transition: changing food consumption, retail 
and production in the age of reflexive modernity, (New York, 2012) p. 1–31.
7 Elisabeth Shove, Frank Trentmann, Richard Wilk. Time, consumption and everyday life. Practice, 
materiality and Culture; Hui, A. Shove, E. and Schatzki, T., The Nexus of Practices: Connections, 
constellations, practitioners.
8 Spaargaren et al. Food practices in transition. (New York, 2012).
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24.1.2  Assessing Strategies
Absent a crystal ball, any pro-active analysis of the merits and limits of these strate-
gies requires a theory of change. In Chap. 1, we outlined the claim of transition 
theory that innovations will normally follow the patterns implicit in a regime: a web 
of incumbent practices oriented to resolving dominant social problems aligned to a 
particular normative orientation, and the spatial and institutional structures in which 
they are embedded. If dominant (perceptions of) societal problems shift, there will 
be pressure to change practices and their embedding. Such changes may be induced 
by new problem definitions and novel, often experimental, practices that address 
these, but also by more or less exogenous ‘landscape’ trends pressing on the regime.
Thus, in discussing the possibilities and opportunities for the different strategies, 
we will focus on the historically emerged institutional and spatial embedding of 
contemporary supply chains, as well as on the long-term trends that are likely to 
shape the further evolution of the practices and structures of production, innovation, 
policy-making, and consumption that constitute them.
24.2  Grain-for-Meat
The grain-for-meat case is an occasion to explore a transition in a transnational, 
biotic chain. In fact, two nested biotic chains may be distinguished: meat production 
with grain serving as a resource; and grain production with water, nutrients and 
arable land as resources. Thus, in an ideal-typical circular chain, natural capital 
would be maintained through a closed nutrient cycle between the meat production 
and grain production chain, and through the regeneration of soil quality (first circu-
lar principle), while minimising externalities for other eco-systems (third principle). 
However, the present situation is rather remote from this ideal. First, grain produc-
tion is hardly regenerative and it is rife with negative externalities. Second, due to 
the transnational nature of the chain, nutrients are exported from countries where 
grain is produced, only to be, third, largely wasted during meat production and con-
sumption – yielding, fourth, local pollution (acidification of the soil; eutrophication 
of surface waters) and, finally, extracting significant flows of nutrients from global 
stocks. The latter is especially problematic for phosphates. While the degree of 
depletion of mineral phosphate resources is a contested issue, the political- economic 
and geo-political ramifications may still be significant.
The consequences of this non-circularity are exacerbated by the vast volume of 
flows. As we have seen (Chap. 23), non-circularity emerged historically after nine-
teenth century agricultural practices sought to resolve domestic problems of food 
quality, availability and affordability, as well as to cull benefits from international 
trade. These practices were structurally and spatially embedded in a robust incum-
bent chain that was characterized in Chap. 23 as an analytical-chemical web, inter-
connecting practices from different sectors on different continents through main 
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ports and other trade infrastructures, as well as to supportive institutional arrange-
ments for governance and innovation. In the Netherlands, more specifically, animal 
and crop production became structurally differentiated, with animal production tak-
ing the lead. These same factors promoted the vast expansion of the chain, which 
was oriented as much to export as to domestic consumption. After about 1960, meat 
consumption both in the Netherlands and in export countries also boomed due to 
increased welfare and the emergence of mass consumption.
We will now take one specific example, soy-for-pig-breeding, and assess possi-
ble strategies for making such a massive, transnational, non-circular chain more 
sustainable. In doing so, we will consider the nature of the incumbent regime, as 
well as address long-term trends that may (be mobilized to) change it: e.g. liberali-
sation of global food trade and increasing recognition of food (resource) security in 
a post-Cold War, post-colonial multi-polar world – the latter trend lending addi-
tional salience to two other crucial trends: climate change and water scarcity.
24.2.1  Towards More Regenerative Grain Production
Two basic strategies may be distinguished to make grain production more regenera-
tive: more sustainable production of soy elsewhere, and increased production of 
cattle fodder in The Netherlands. In either case, restoring phosphates in the 
Netherlands is an essential complement.
Land use is a significant externality of soy-for-pigs production: the largest share 
of land dedicated to meat consumption in Europe is used for fodder production.9 
Soy production in Latin America frequently competes with food production for the 
domestic population and impacts on other ecosystems there. By 2050, ceteris pari-
bus, a more numerous global population will generate even greater impacts.
Soy production impinges negatively on the regeneration of soil and water qual-
ity; much of current soy production is a mono-culture with adverse consequences 
for soil structure. These problems may be partly solved by more appropriate farm-
ing methods (more nature-inclusive, more diversified, more water recycling etc.). 
Inasmuch as there are many Latin American soy producers all competing to sell to 
a limited number of Dutch customers, some arrangement for transnational collabo-
ration between chain actors is essential. An early initiative was the Round Table on 
Responsible Soy, a private standard setting organization (PSO). Subsequently, in the 
mid-2000s, the Sustainable Trade Initiative (STI) was established, a Netherlands- 
based private initiative that was ultimately co-sponsored by the Dutch government.10 
Such transformational physical and informational links among chain players and 
between private and public parties may facilitate demand for fairly priced sustain-
able soy and promote an appropriate incentive structure (like legal provisions) in the 
9 Baltussen, W.H.M., M.A.  Dolman, R.  Hoste, S.R.M.  Janssens, J.W.  Reijs, A.B.  Smit,. 
Grondstofefficiëntie in de zuivel-, varkensvlees-, aardappel- en suikerketen. (Wageningen, 2016).
10 Eric Hees. Voedsel, grondstoffen en geopolitiek. Rapportage aan het Platform Landbouw, lnno-
vatie & Samenleving. (Culemborg, 2013), pp. 27–28.
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source countries.11 Such initiatives, together with transnational certification organi-
zations, may also re-orient the incumbent chain, and improve coordination between 
different market arrangements and PSOs.12
In principle, this strategy is congruent with the chain’s traditional institutional 
arrangement. However, the chain’s orientation to reducing costs is at odds with 
attempts to achieve more ecologically and socially (a fair price for primary produc-
ers) sustainable soy production. Long-term developments in the WTO framework 
and Europe’s changing position in the global economy, not to mention the market’s 
increasing sensitivity to societal pressure, may all help.13 Moreover, the specific polit-
ical economy of the soy market harbours paradoxical opportunities.14 While the 
Netherlands is the world’s second soy importer (30% of EU-27) after China, the lat-
ter’s share is more than 5 times that of the EU-27 countries put together. Also, China 
is a major soybean crusher. Since 2010, changing food lifestyles and water scarcity 
have increased Chinese imports of soy beans. This (increasingly) dominant position 
in a market with only a few source countries (US, Brazil and Argentina account for 
75% of the production) enables China to ‘play’ with the prices, as part of its resource 
security strategy.15 Paradoxically, should European countries be prepared to pay more 
for sustainably produced soy, they may come to exploit this as an opportunity to 
include soy in a resource security strategy, as argued for by e.g. De Ridder and Hees.16
To be successful, such policies will also have to keep restoring nutrients high on 
the agenda of players outside the agri-food sector, like the Port of Amsterdam that 
in 2010 announced its aspiration to become a circular economy hub. While such 
efforts may hasten the coming of greater circularity, it is quite possible that much of 
the impetus toward a circular economy will come primarily from established actors 
in the waste and energy sectors, for whom global food issues may be less central 
than other problem dimensions.17 In that case, while manure and residual soy flows 
may be used more (efficiently) for bio-based production, restoring nutrients may 
not be high on the agenda. Thus, to facilitate phosphate recovery (an objective in an 
emerging Dutch policy for a 50% circular economy by 2050), the national govern-
ment and logistic main ports must ensure an integral approach, properly embedded 
in a broad societal, economic and policy context, and involving a wide range of 
11 https://www.idhsustainabletrade.com/sectors/soy/ Consulted May, 2017.
12 Fransen, Luc.´The Politics of Meta-Governance in Transnational Private Sustainability 
Governance´ in Policy Sciences, Volume 48 (2015), No. 2, June 2015.
13 John Grin, Understanding Transitions from a Governance Perspective, (Part III, 2010) in: Grin, 
John; Rotmans, Jan; Schot, Johan,Transitions to Sustainable Development. New Directions in the 
Study of Long Term Structural Change (New York, 2010: Routledge), pp. 223–314.
14 Eric Hees, Voedsel, grondstoffen en geopolitiek. Rapportage aan het Platform Landbouw, lnno-
vatie & Samenleving. (Culemborg, 2013), pp. 23–28.
15 Marjolein de Ridder, Sijbren de Jong, Joshua Polchar and Stephanie Lingemann Risks and 
Opportunities in the Global Phosphate Rock Market. (The Hague, 2011).
16 De Ridder, Marjolein et al. (2011). Op weg naar een Grondstoffenstrategie. Quick scan ten 
behoeve van de grondstoffennotitie. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS); 
Hees, Eric (2013). Voedsel, grondstoffen en geopolitiek. Rapportage aan het Platform Landbouw, 
lnnovatie & Samenleving. Culemborg: CLM.
17 Rob Weterings, Elsbeth Roelofs, Roald Suurs, Frans van der Zee. Tussen gouden bergen en 
groene business. Systeemverkenning van een biobased economy. (Den Haag, 2011), pp. 1.
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actors and stakeholders dedicated to shaping a circular economy.18 Even then, full 
nutrient recovery remains a remote objective.
24.2.2  Regenerating Nutrients Regionally: Replacing Grain 
from Elsewhere by Dutch Inputs
Alternatively, the Netherlands may reduce pressure on natural capital elsewhere by 
replacing a portion of the imported soy in animal fodder by domestically cultivated 
soy or other foodstuffs and use that for regeneration by closing the cycle on a 
regional level. The main challenge to replacing soy by other foodstuffs is to find 
fodder material with sufficient proteins  – particularly with sufficient so-called 
essential amino acids – and preferably less phosphates. Substances that fit the bill 
are fish meal and bone meal (but these are sensitive, and partly prohibited, after the 
BSE pandemics), peas, waste flows from diverse plant oils, protein from potatoes, 
milk and traditional crops like rapeseed and lupine. Economically, a mix would be 
most optimal.19
Since the mid-2010s, opportunities for such regional fodder production have 
been explored. The smaller scale of production and reduced opportunities for cas-
cading with human food production (which is easy with soy and palm oil), may 
incur 5–10% price increases for fodder.20 If retailers do not apply a multiplier effect 
on these increases, as has been the practice in similar cases, this price-hike need not 
be prohibitive.21 Different strategies to mitigate these effects against the backdrop of 
the future global soy market (see above) include: better information flows between 
primary producers and actors further downstream in the chain,22 different retail 
strategies23 or alternative, more local chains.24
That said, regional fodder production would require a shift from the current ori-
entation to discrete products toward more circular (collaborative) business proposi-
tions, where the costs and productivity of different products hang together. 
18 Rijksoverheid Nederland circulair in 2050. Rijksbreed programma Circulaire Economie. (Den 
Haag: 2016).
19 Harry Vahl. Alternatieven voor Zuid-Amerikaanse soja in Veevoer. (Utrecht: 2009).
20 Harry Vahl, Alternatieven (2009); Raad voor Regionaal Veevoer. Naar 100% regionaal eiwit. 
Kansen en knelpunten voor eitwitrijke veevoergrondstoffen.(Amsterdam 2016).
21 Harry Vahl, Alternatieven (2009); Baltussen W.H.M. et  al. Prijsvorming van voedsel; 
Ontwikkelingen van prijzen in acht Nederlandse ketens van versproducten. (Wageningen, 2014).
22 Baltussen W.H.M et al. Prijsvorming.
23 Oosterveer, Peter, ‘Restructuring Food Supply: Sustainability and Supermarkets.’, in Spaargaren 
et al. Food practices in transition: changing food consumption, retail and production in the age of 
reflexive modernity. (New York, 2012). pp. 153–176.
24 Roep, Dirk & Han Wiskerk,‘Reshaping the Foodscape: The Role of Alternative Food Networks.’ 
8) in Spaargaren et al. Food practices in transition: changing food consumption, retail and produc-
tion in the age of reflexive modernity. (New York, 2012). pp. 207–22.
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Interestingly, the Dutch could mobilise their own historical experience by establish-
ing novel co-operatives of livestock and crop farms, possibly also involving non- 
agricultural enterprises.
But there are some fundamental problems. First, the primary sector (and associ-
ated knowledge institutes) suffer from a lack of knowledge about protein-rich culti-
vars like lupine, rapeseed and clover, about embedding agriculture in surrounding 
nature and about the use of animal manure rather than artificial fertilizers. This is 
rooted in the historical, institutionally and spatially embedded, shift from mixed 
farming to a husbandry- centered agriculture based on imports of the bulk of the 
animal fodder. Another fundamental problem is that, inasmuch as the livestock sec-
tor has historically far outgrown the capacity for producing animal fodder, a maxi-
mum use of regional fodder would require all the crop growing land available.25 
This strategy therefore could not do without some form of reduction of meat 
production.
A more recently explored possibility is the use of advanced protein sources like 
seaweed, algae and duck brood. Significantly, these are often phosphate rich (the 
latter is even used to retrieve phosphates from surface water). Their prices may be 
reduced thanks to cascading fodder production, bio-energy production and phos-
phate recovery.26 For these advanced foodstuffs as well as the more traditional alter-
natives, pertinent knowledge gaps would need to be addressed while options for 
cascading need further exploration and development. Over time, pressures from the 
source countries (which will increasingly have to face the consequences of climate 
change for their food production and ecosystems) may stimulate such innovations, 
as may growing awareness about increasing resource scarcity and climate change. 
In fact, the first set of considerations are included in the Dutch government’s sup-
port of the Sustainable Trade Initiative, and the second in its 2011 white paper 
(‘Grondstoffennotitie’) on resources policies.
24.2.3  Regenerating Phosphates
These pressures may also stimulate the development of a key complement to both 
strategies just discussed: recovering the phosphates wasted in meat production and 
consumption, through the food cycle of animals and humans, respectively. While 
directly closing the phosphate cycle with source countries does not seem viable, a 
more realistic strategy might be to feed retrieved nutrients back into fertilizer and 
soil improvement markets. There are basically two options. The first is to retrieve 
phosphates from surface water (e.g. through duck brood, see above), from waste 
water (e.g. through bonding P to magnesium to produce struvite; or, more recently, 
to iron) or from deep soil (by deeply-rooted plants). As of the mid-2010s, interesting 
25 Raad voor Regionaal Veevoer. Naar 100% regionaal eiwit. (2016).
26 Nieuwenhuis, R. & L. Maring. Naar nieuwe ketens voor het benutten van eendenkroos., (Utrecht: 
2009).
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novel opportunities have emerged like the ‘resources factory’, i.e. a wastewater 
treatment facility whose core business is retrieving and marketing resources from 
waste water rather than discarding them as waste. In the decades up to the 2050s, 
significant novelties may be expected, and there will especially be room for attrac-
tive, circular / cascaded business models.27
The second option for regeneration is collecting and re-cycling manure, or at 
least the nutrients it contains. As of 2016, half of the manure was processed at the 
farm, often by burning it (sometimes retaining the phosphate-containing ash for use 
as a soil improver). The rest, including a portion of the first half (sold domestically 
or exported) was partly used for crop production and partly for the production of 
bio-energy, generally without nutrient recovery. One urgent goal for regeneration is 
to develop cascaded forms of bio-energy production, that no longer waste nutrients. 
A second one is a governmental intervention in the nutrient market to make manure 
more competitive. The legal obligation to dispose of manure in a proper (and hence 
costly) manner, the historical path leading to (Sect. 23.3) the widespread availability 
of artificial fertilisers, as well as the ever more restrictive legal limits on fertiliser 
use in crop production depress manure prices. Thus by 2016, responsible manure 
disposal had become a serious burden for the animal sector (about € 250 million per 
year for the sector), while it saves the crop production sector a similar amount.28
24.2.4  Dematerialisation
Dematerialisation might proceed along two tracks. The first is reducing the phos-
phate content of animal fodder. In the early 2010s, the market undertook voluntary 
initiatives in this direction, partly out of shared concern but also to avoid govern-
ment limits being imposed on the volume of livestock. In 2017, PBL estimated that 
pursuing this option might ultimately reduce phosphate emissions by 10%.29 The 
other track is to reduce meat production, tackling both of the above problems by 
reducing the volume of the mass flows. To be sure, some reduction of meat produc-
tion in the Netherlands is conceivable, if not likely, as a response to environmental 
problems and the risk of pandemics. For instance, in 2016, the province of Noord 
Brabant (home to 38% of Dutch pigs) decided to reduce the number of pig farms by 
about 30%, retaining only those prepared to adopt sustainable production methods.
The more radical approach is refuse: reducing meat consumption. This is at 
odds with deeply embedded (e.g. in nutritional education and advertising) cultural 
notions that meat is important for human health. This idea is rooted in earlier 
27 Bocken, Nancy M. P., Ingrid de Pauw, Conny Bakker & Bram van der Grinten (2016), ‘Product 
design and business model strategies for a circular economy’ in Journal of Industrial and 
Production Engineering. 33 (5) published online.
28 Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving. Evaluatie Meststoffenwet 2016-Syntheserapport, (Den Haag, 
2017), p. 14, p. 27; chapters 2, 9.
29 Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving (2017). Evaluatie Meststoffenwet 2016-Syntheserapport, Den 
Haag: Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving PBL, pp. 146–151.
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times, when it had some justification (although vegetarianism was always an alter-
native practice). Until 1960, diets were often unhealthily low on proteins. But 
since 2005, vegetarianism has become more popular in both domestic and European 
export markets. While by 2015 the number of strict vegetarians did not exceed 4% 
of the population, a middle-course known as ‘flexitarianism’ had become much 
more popular. In 2010 and 2015, respectively, some 43% and 55% of the popula-
tion ate meat not more than 4 days a week. Motives for vegetarianism and flexitari-
anism vary from concerns about one’s own health (antibiotics, cholesterol) to 
animal welfare and environmental concerns. Also, personal lifestyles are increas-
ingly shaping food choices.30 In this connection, meat consumption tends to be part 
of urban lifestyles.31
These developments are an instructive instance of how the shift in welfare 
dynamics beyond meeting primary needs may both produce and help resolve sus-
tainability problems. Thus the future of meat consumption in northern countries like 
the Netherlands will be shaped by the degree to which societal concerns remain in 
place (partly dependent on the evolution of meat production) as well as by trade-offs 
among different cultural changes.
24.3  Gravel-for-Construction
As discussed in Sect. 23.4, the main problem associated with gravel use is the dam-
age caused to nature and ecosystems by its excavation. Wartime excepted, the chain 
was virtually completely linear: waste was hardly ever re-used. Thus, the balance 
between imported gravel and domestic gravel excavation has fluctuated with the 
tensions between national gravel demand on the one hand, and domestic gravel 
excavation and processing capacity on the other.
Historically, gravel demand was shaped largely by the volume of construction, 
that in turn has been shaped by population growth and the increasing size of homes, 
initially to improve a primary life need (hygienic conditions) and later, especially 
after 1960, in response to changing lifestyles: individualisation yielded smaller 
households and more rooms per household. Counter-tendencies included alternative 
30 De Bakker, Erik en Hans Dagevos. Vleesminnaars, vleesminderaars en vleesmijders. Duurzame 
eiwitconsumptie in een carnivore eetcultuur. (Den Haag, 2010); Klintman, Mikael; Boström, 
Magnus (2012). ‘Political Consumerism and the Transition Towards a More Sustainable Food 
Regime Looking Behind and Beyond the Organic Shelf’ in: Spaargaren et al. Food Practices in 
Transition: Changing Food Consumption, Retail and Production in the Age of Reflexive Modernity. 
(New York, 2012), pp.114–116.; Keuchenius, Cecilia en Bram van der Lelij. Motivaction Quickscan 
2015: eetpatronen van verschillende sociale milieus, duurzaamheid en voedselverspilling. (Den 
Haag, 2015), pp. 134–148.
31 Murray, Shannon, Saman Brock & Karen S Seto. ‘Urbanization, food consumption and the envi-
ronment.’ in Karen C.  Seto et  al. The Routledge Handbook of Urbanization and Global 
Environmental Change. (New York: 2015) pp. 27–40.
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construction materials – especially plastics – (since 1970), and the completion of 
the hydraulic infrastructural ‘Delta works’ in 1986.
Domestic excavation has historically been shaped by political controversies in 
response to its local side-effects, as well as by strong governmental interventions. 
The latter was initially a response to scarcity during WW I, after 1980 to protests 
against landscape damage and somewhat later to a paradigmatically changed waste 
policy, with more emphasis on re-cycling. In spite of the latter, since 1980 the 
Netherlands has largely exported its gravel-related landscape damage – retaining, 
however, a significant domestic institutional capacity for concrete production and 
innovation (Chaps. 14 and 22).
The chain thus exemplifies cases in which the Netherlands exports its problems, 
yet retains adequate autonomous potential to make the chain more circular and less 
voluminous through domestic measures. These strategies will be contextualized for 
the present gravel regime, and in a long-term landscape. First and foremost, it is 
expected that population will more or less stabilise towards 2050. By 2010 natural 
population growth had sunk below 2 per 1000, and it is expected to become negative 
by 2038 for the population currently living in the Netherlands. After that date, the 
migration balance and annual population decline are expected to stabilise the popu-
lation. Different estimates of actual migration, birth rates (life choices, develop-
ments in well-being) and death rates (developments in health care) yield a range 
between 16 and 20 million.32 Two other trends, ageing (associated with declining 
birth and death rates) and individualisation, will yield some decline in the number 
of people per household.33
All in all, the total number of households is thus expected to increase from 7,3 
million (2010), through about 8,5 million (2030) up to around 8,6 million after 
2040. The demand for housing construction will decline from the 50,000 dwellings 
per year around which it will fluctuate until about 2025, down to 20,000 after 2040, 
slightly more than the demolition rate (15.000 per year after 2016).34
Finally, partly due to the emergence of the information society (miniaturisation 
and the rise of flex-working) and partly due to market failures in the real estate busi-
ness, an increasing stock of unused office and industrial buildings has come into 
being. The associated devaluation of real estate and land that occurred by the mid- 
2010s adversely affected local governmental budgets and this is likely to affect 
future construction and land-use plans.35
32 Stoeldraijer, Lenny, Coen van Duijn, Corina Huisman. Kernprognose 2016–2060: 18 miljoen 
inwoners in 2034 voorzien. (Den Haag: 2016).
33 Hofstra, U, B. van Bree, J. Neele, R. de Wildt. cenariostudie BSA-granulaten: aanbod en afzet 
van 2005 tot 2025. (Delft, 2006), 29; 35; 39.
34 Poulus, Co, Gerard van Leeuwen, David Omtzigt, Kenneth Gopal, Ruud Steijvers, Marnix 
Koopman. Tussenrapportage. Prognose bevolking-, huishoudens- en woningbehoefte 2015–2050. 
(Delft: 2016), pp. 21–23.
35 Janssen-Jansen, L. & Lloyd, G. Property booms and bubbles: a demolition strategy – towards a 
tabula. rasa? Journal of Surveying, Construction and Property, 3 (2012) 2, p.  1–11; Janssen-
Jansen, L., Lloyd, G., Peel, D., & van der Krabben, E. (2012). Planning in an environment without 




24.3.1  Restoration: From Down-Cycling to Re-cycling
By the mid-2010s, two trends in restoration could be distinguished: a shift from 
down-cycling demolition waste to more valuable forms of restoration, and a shift 
towards designing for re-use.
Crushing concrete into concrete granulates to be used in foundations for road and 
hydraulic construction has long been a rather common practice, a paragon of down- 
cycling. Since the 2010s, recycling has been on the rise, i.e. using these granulates 
to replace gravel in concrete production. Established firms like Mebin now advertise 
with concrete in which e.g. 30, 50 or even 100% of the gravel has been replaced by 
granulates.36 Simultaneously, newcomers like Paro (established in 2010 in the Port 
of Amsterdam) collect flows of construction waste brought to the Port by ships and 
sorts them, using innovative processes, into different fractions.37 While some are 
down-cycled, others are deemed fit to be sold to other firms (e.g. the neighbouring 
Voorbij Prefab), that specialise in re-cycled concrete materials).38
These early adopters reveal that although, historically, practices in the gravel-for- 
construction value chain changed mostly in response to governmental pressures, by 
the early twenty-first century, other actors and forces have come into place. Around 
2010, the Dutch concrete branch, collaborating with societal stakeholders, launched 
the Beton Bewust initiative that seeks to promote 100% recycling and that co- 
founded, in 2014, the global Concrete Sustainability Council.39 By the mid-2010s, 
other actors were also bringing their influence to bear on the sector, for example 
bank real-estate account managers, claiming that “whoever did not yet have a sus-
tainable business model, was actually out of the game. Circularity is the next step. 
The task of the bank is to promote awareness and create funding opportunities.”40 
Given the historical record, however, unless re-cycling becomes clearly economi-
cally superior, some (national or EU) governmental intervention will probably be 
indispensable to move the sector as a whole into the era of sustainable production.
The early efforts just outlined have important technical limits. Not all waste can 
be recycled as yet, and not all concrete products can presently be made from 100% 
recycled granulates. The sector’s current institutional arrangement, with close ties 
among concrete manufacturers, R&D infrastructure and government may nurture 
the necessary innovation. Also, newcomers like Paro may draw on the Dutch tradi-
tion of the trafiek manufacturing in main-ports. As such, it is part of a wider strategy 
of the Port of Amsterdam to become a hub in the global circular economy. A poten-
36 ENCI, Mebin, Sagrex. Sustainability Update. Het duurzaamheidsbeleid van de bedrijven van 
HeidelbergCement Benelux (2016); www.mebin.nl (consulted June, 2017).
37 www.paro-bv.nl (consulted June, 2017).
38 www.voorbijprefab.nl (consulted June, 2017).
39 www.concretesustainabilitycouncil.org/ and www.betonbewust-csc.nl/beton-verduurzamen 
(consulted June, 2017).
40 Rudolf Scholten of ABN AMRO Bank, (April 2017). www.insights.abnamro.nl/2017/04/
circulair-bouwen-heeft-de-toekomst/
24 Conceivable Strategies for Sustainable Well-being
550
tial risk is that this may lead to the lock-in of a sub-optimal solution: less than 100% 
recycling coupled to long-distance transportation.41
24.3.2  Designing and Building for Re-cycling
The circularity promoted by the bank manager cited above includes designing for 
re-use. “A building thus becomes a collection of materials with an eternal life,” he 
says – a vision summarised by his colleague as “Lego-lisation.” This entails a major, 
systemic innovation: a different architecture, which ‘designs for deconstruction’, 
takes available materials as a point of departure and adopts accordingly different 
aesthetics; novel business models, based on including materials and parts in a cycle 
(e.g. through conferring a ‘passport’ with their biographies); involvement of suppli-
ers of materials and parts in the design process art the outset; and even different 
property models, in which e.g. materials and parts remain the property of their sup-
plier, who is seen to provide a service to the owner of building.
An early adopter of such a more radical strategy is Beton Prefab Veghel, an inno-
vative family firm established in 1967 as a prefab concrete floors producer. Since 
2012 the firm has sought not only to maximize re-cycling in all products, but also to 
design their products for re-use after 50–100 years, when their initial application is 
expected to have reached the end of its lifetime. A concept for even more compre-
hensive steps towards re-use, ‘Lekker Eigen Huis’ (‘Delightful Own Home’) have 
been proposed by a novel consortium, TBI, a flexible network of a developer and 
several construction companies (some relatively new enterprises, as well as a pre- 
war family firm that transformed itself). The core asset is a smart design system that 
supports a client in designing a home tailored to the clients own authentic desires, 
meeting high sustainability criteria and re-using materials and parts that are avail-
able at the time.42
These examples show both a-priori feasibility and the need for a very significant 
R&D effort, not only aimed at better recycling options, but also at novel design 
methods for both materials and final construction products. While such options may 
draw in part on the sector’s incumbent regime, structural change may well be needed 
for other aspects: new relations between customers, designers and constructors; 
novelties like a material passport; and new financing schemes that adequately incor-
porate the value of the materials. The cultural landscape trends of increasing auton-
omy and individual distinctiveness, which for instance also express themselves in 
the growth of DIY construction in the Netherlands, may help to overcome these 
obstacles.
41 Port of Amsterdam (2014). Visie 2030. Port of Amsterdam, Port of partnerships. Amsterdam: 
Port of Amsterdam; Port of Amsterdam (2017). Koers naar de Amsterdam Metropolitan Port. 
Strategisch plan Havenbedrijf Amsterdam, 2017 — 2021. Amsterdam: Port of Amsterdam.




Dematerialisation may take four basic forms. First, a ‘reduce strategy’: e.g. using 
less gravel for the same construction performance by employing more brick (from 
river clay) or laminated wood and polymer materials.43 Interestingly, the latter two 
may be produced through a biotic rather than a technical cycle, implying a shift 
from restoration to regeneration of resources (but demanding additional sustainable 
production of raw materials in a more bio-based economy). Second, ‘reduce‘may 
also result from a longer concrete lifetime (now often shorter than the technical 
lifetime of the constructions in which it is applied). Emerging options like self- 
healing concrete (e.g. through calcium phosphate producing bacteria) are estimated 
to enhance lifetime by 20%.44
More fundamentally, given that (see above), around 2040 home demolition and 
construction rates are likely to be close to each other, while business buildings will 
increasingly be vacated, not only ‘reduce’ in the sense of construction with zero 
gravel use becomes conceivable, but also ‘refuse’ in the sense of avoiding construc-
tion altogether through using superfluous business buildings for novel purposes. 
Janssen-Jansen propose ‘planning without growth,’ by adopting a more holistic 
view of land and property development.45 By the mid-2010s, re-developing old 
industrial areas into shared spaces for communal leisure, housing, social functions 
and creative industry was rapidly becoming popular, and ideas for converting e.g. 
superfluous office space into small apartments were spreading. Janssen-Jansen 
argues that these options are promising in many respects, but only if property and 
power relations can change to suit. Smart, reflexive planning will be needed in order 
to identify and deal with such difficulties, drawing on the long term trends men-
tioned above as both the rationale for changing and as a force for change on the 
incumbent construction and planning regime.46
A final strategy for refuse is ‘Design/Build for Change’ (VITO, Flanders): homes 
and offices grow and shrink with the biography of their use, i.e. through modular 
design.
43 Van Dam, Jan & Martien den Oever. Catalogus Biobased bouwmaterialen. Het groen bouwen. 
(Wageningen: 2012).
44 Van Lieshout, Marit Update Prioritering handelingsperspectieven verduurzaming betonketen 
2015, (Delft: 2015).
45 Janssen-Jansen, L., et al. Planning in an environment without growth (2012).
46 Lissandrello, Enza & John Grin (2011). ‘Reflexive planning as design and work: lessons from the 
Port of Amsterdam,’ Planning Theory and Practice, 12 (2), p. 223–248.
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24.4  Plastics for Everyday Life
The plastics-for-everyday-life chain exemplifies the mass consumption associated 
with contemporary lifestyles, strong non-linearity and the global environmental 
consequences of local, wasteful use. The problems associated with plastics use and 
production are (section 23.4) that it is an iconic example of wasteful use of resources 
(yielding problems for ‘later’); and that the waste generated threatens organisms 
and ecosystems as well as human health (both locally and ‘elsewhere’, and given 
the accumulative nature, especially ‘later’). These problems are seriously aggra-
vated due to the very massive nature of the chain, its non-circularity from the outset, 
and its semi-open-ended nature (80% of plastics produced in the Netherlands is 
exported).
These properties emerged in response to cultural inclinations, and structural and 
spatial conditions that still shape consumption and production to this day. From its 
inception around 1945, the use of plastics in everyday life, including the use of 
disposable packaging, was seen as progress through artificial materials: diffusing 
convenience, comfort and aesthetics to all classes. It thus exemplifies a chain associ-
ated with the mass-consumption, lifestyle-focused well-being that emerged after 
1960. The same cultural trends shaped the supply side, so that supply was well- 
matched to consumer preferences. Supply practices were able to draw, and continue 
to do so, on spatiality (mainports with major fossil flows) and a helpful platform- 
like institutional rectangle, tying together polymer producers, polymer processors, 
and government sponsored knowledge institutes (typical for the era, civil society 
hardly played a role). Also, value creation around mainports is rooted in the Dutch 
trafieken tradition. Finally, the chain’s non-circularity was reinforced over time by 
the institutional logic of the massive scale of polymer production, and the institu-
tional logic of the enormous scope of polymer processing.
Future developments will be co-shaped by these spatial, cultural and structural 
forces, as well as by various long-term trends. First, the emergence of tailor-made 
production, symbolized by the swift emergence of 3D printing, may both increase 
plastics’ popularity and generate new opportunities for polymer re-use in  recycling.47 
Increasing world population and growing welfare in developing countries will – 
ceteris paribus – yield a growing demand for plastics. China, for example, tripled 
its per capita consumption between 1980 and 2010.48 Simultaneously, the European 
plastics industry is under threat as China is increasing its plastic production, and 
India the volume of its plastics recovery and processing, while oil producing coun-
tries are seeking downstream integration and Brazil and other Latin American 
countries are increasing bio-based plastics production.49 Other long terms 
47 Ford, Simon Mélanie Despeisse. Additive manufacturing and sustainability: an exploratory study 
of the advantages and challenges, Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 137, (2016) p. 1573–1587.
48 The European House Ambrosetti. Excellence of the Plastics Supply Chain in Relaunching 
Manufacturing in Italy and Europe. (Milano, 2013), pp. 39–40.
49 The European House Ambrosetti. Excellence of the Plastics Supply Chain (2013), pp. 94–96.
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trends that may (be made to) affect the plastics regime are the increasing volatility 
and geopolitical vulnerability of fossil resources50 the rapid expansion of use and 
possession of electronic and electric appliances in daily life (Sects. 23.5 and 23.6); 
and the politicisation of the side- effects of plastics use, which has become a con-
cern of the plastics industry.
24.4.1  Restoration
By the mid-2010s, a range of efforts had been mobilised to make plastic chains 
more circular.51 In the Netherlands, plastics collection, the most basic form, 
embarked upon a significant volume expansion in the mid-2010s: from 25 kton 
(3%) in 2009 to 162,2 (20%) kton in 2014 and 250 (30%) kton in 2016.52 The Plastic 
Heroes waste collection initiative undertaken by the packaging sector in collabora-
tion with municipalities, yielded volumes of waste plastics and triggered increasing 
processing capacity. While, in the mid-2010s, a significant share is still being down- 
cycled (making carpets from PET bottles) polymers are increasingly being broken 
down into monomers (mechanical recycling, already occurring with e.g. PET), or 
more basic molecules (chemical recycling) – but in what are as yet energy-intensive 
processes.53
On the positive side, the platform-like institutional arrangement between plastics 
producers and processors offers optimal conditions for connecting flows of col-
lected waste to plastics processing enterprises. As of the mid-2010s, however, 
 economic viability was still problematic. While a reasonable price was usually paid 
for PET, PE and PP, the price for other less easily processable plastic waste flows 
(mixed plastics, foils) tends to become negative as soon as oil prices make virgin 
feedstock cheaper than recyclates. Due to subsidies for domestic waste this is mostly 
a problem for industrial plastic waste. Thus WEF stipulate that a much better devel-
oped after-use plastics economy is crucial.54 Ongoing innovations that make collec-
tion, cleaning and separation easier and less costly, may help here. Food safety 
regulations, on the other hand may yield another kind of inertia. For most types of 
recycled plastics there is, as of 2017, no regulation for plastic food packaging in 
50 World Economic Forum (WEF), Rethinking the future of plastics, (2016). p. 36; PlasticsEurope 
and European Plastics Converters Association (EuPC). The plastics industry: a strategic partner 
for economic recovery and economic growth in Europe. Manifesto on the competitiveness of the 
plastics industry. (Brussels: 2014), p, 11.
51 World Economic Forum (WEF), Rethinking the future of plastics, (2016).
52 KIDV & SNM Factcheck Plastic Recycling. (Den Haag: 2016) NRK, Kunststof Recycling in 
Nederland, (Den Haag: 2016).
53 Rahimi, Aliurezza Jeannette M. Garcia.Chemical recycling of waste plastics for new materials 
production. Nature Reviews Chemistry 1 (2017), Article nr 0046 (online journal) doi:https://doi.
org/10.1038/s41570-017-0046
54 World Economic Forum (WEF), Rethinking the future of plastics, (2016), p. 33.
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place (which may contain impurities).55 The platform-like plastics institutional rect-
angle may help overcome these barriers, fostering the conditions listed by WEF i.e. 
maintaining a “cross-value chain dialogue mechanism”, “matchmaking mecha-
nisms” for recycled materials, the redesign and convergence of materials, formats, 
and finally, after-use systems and policy measures.56
A higher form of recycling is re-use of plastics for the same function. More than 
20% of the total mass of plastic products could be re-used, especially short-lived 
plastics products, most notably packaging.57 In the UK, a small charge for plastic 
bags has led to an 85% reduction of single use. Interestingly, first experiences in the 
Netherlands suggest that this may also make consumers bring durable shopping 
bags from home: a form of de-materialization.
Finally, some 30 mass% of the plastics in use as of the mid-2010s cannot be re- 
used or recycled absent fundamental redesign or innovation: they are too small (e.g. 
sweet wraps), multi-material, use uncommon materials (like pill strips) or are con-
taminated (coffee capsules; waste bags). While ongoing innovations remain to be 
implemented, dematerialization remains a competitive strategy.
24.4.2  Regeneration
A more recent and innovative kind of recycling is the recovery of plastics from 
waste water. In an early example, the PHARIO demonstration project, biopolymers 
from the polyhydroxyalkanoate (PHA) family were produced by mixed microbial 
cultures from surplus activated sludge, fed with volatile fatty-acid-rich liquors from 
a local candy industry.58 The process is part of a cascade with biological nitrogen 
removal and chemical phosphorus removal. Significantly, and contrary to most bio-
degradable polymers, PHA polymers degrade relatively swiftly in water – reducing 
the plastic soup risk. The project is part of the so-called ‘resources factory’ concept: 
a waste-water-treatment-plant-turned-resource-recoverer, demonstrating that con-
sistently high quality production is possible in an economically viable way. There 
are significant energy and greenhouse gas emissions benefits compared with tradi-
tional water treatment and with producing PHA bioplastics from monocultures (soy, 
grain, sugar cane or beet).
Residual biotic flows involving potatoes, sugar beets, grass and the like are also 
objects of experimentation and debate.59 Responding to fears that using such crops 
55 KIDV & SNM, Factcheck (2016); Van den Oever, Martien, Karin Molenveld, Maarten van der 
Zee, Harriëtte Bos. Bio-based and biodegradable plastics  – Facts and Figures. (Wageningen: 
2017); Rahimi and Garcia, 2017. Chemical recycling of waste plastics for new materials 
production.
56 World Economic Forum (WEF), Rethinking the future of plastics,(2016), p. 13.
57 World Economic Forum (WEF), Rethinking the future of plastics, (2016).
58 Bengtsson, Simon, Alan Werker, Cindy Visser, Leon Korving. PHARIO: stepping stone to a 
sustainable value chain for PHA bioplastic using municipal activated sludge. (Amersfoort: 2017).
59 Asveld L., R. van Est & D.  Stemerding. Naar de kern van de bio-economie: De duurzame 
beloftes van biomassa in perspectief. (Den Haag: 2011).
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for biomass (and biofuel) production will compete with agriculture and ecosystems 
for land and lead to soil deterioration, sophisticated schemes have been proposed 
and explored that optimise the cascaded use of e.g. maize to regenerate phosphates 
and to extract proteins for animal fodder and carbohydrates for bio-based materi-
als.60 More recently, the breeding of algae and seaweed as an additional source is 
being explored by major companies.
Even more radical is the idea of producing bioplastics directly from carbon diox-
ide through artificial photosynthesis.61 CO2 and hydrogen may be made to react to 
produce methanol, which can be used as a building block for larger organic mole-
cules. A more innovative option is bringing the CO2 molecule as a whole into a 
carbon-hydrate skeleton to produce novel polymers. One promising example is 
polypropene carbonate, which contains 43% CO2 and might be made from metha-
nol and CO2: a 100% bio-based polymer. Also higher carbohydrate-based polymers 
(with an even higher CO2 content) may be made in a bio-based mode. While, by the 
mid-2010s interesting progress had been made, artificial synthesis remained a for-
midable challenge and far from trivial.62 Also, while it may certainly capture a por-
tion of CO2 emissions, the overall impact on the concentration of greenhouse gases 
is limited, and it must not be forgotten that given the inert nature of CO2 these are 
very energy-intensive processes.63
Overall, the use of bio-based plastics is still limited: in 2015 it was less than 1% 
of all plastics, though it is expected to rise to 2,5% by 2020.64 Bioplastics tend to be 
more expensive than traditional ones. An analyst like Nossin is therefore pessimistic 
about the future role of bioplastics, although he stresses that, technically, 90% of the 
existing plastics could be replaced by biopolymers. At the bottom of the pyramid, 
biobased bulk polymers like polyethylene lose the price battle.65 That may be differ-
ent for some commodity polymers, like PET, used in bottles. For high performance 
polymers and specialties, price is less important than functionality, though bioplas-
tics may fall short on the latter count as well. Others, like Harmsen & Hackmann are 
much less pessimistic, pointing out consumer demand, governmental pressures and 
the increasing scarcity of oil derivates.66
Long terms trends discussed in the introduction to this section  – such as the 
increasing volatility and geopolitical vulnerability of fossil resources and the politi-
60 van der Hoeven, Diederik and Paul Reinshagen. Biomaterialen, drijfveer voor een groene econo-
mie. Strategie voor een groene samenleving. (Den Haag: 2013).
61 Van der Hoeven and Reinshagen. Biomaterialen. (2013).
62 Purchase, R.. H. de Vriend, H. de Groot, Kunstmatige fotosynthese. Voor de omzetting van zonli-
cht naar brandstof (Leiden: 2015).
63 Van der Hoeven and Reinshagen. Biomaterialen. (2013).
64 Van den Oever, Martien, Karin Molenveld, Maarten van der Zee, Harriëtte Bos. Bio-based and 
biodegradable plastics - Facts and Figures. (Wageningen: 2017), pp. 11.
65 Nossin, P. (2012) Biopolymeren in breder perspectief. Nut en noodzaak, p.21; cited by Lintsen 
H., Hollestelle M., Hölsgens R. The plastics revolution. How the Netherlands became a global 
player in plastics. (Eindhoven: 2017).
66 Harmsen. P. en M. Hackmann, Groene bouwstenen voor biobased plastics. Biobased routes en 
marktontwikkeling. (Wageningen: 2012): cited by Lintsen et al. The plastics revolution (2017).
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cisation of the side- effects of plastics use – might indeed (be mobilised to) promote 
bioplastics. This is especially so because, while the prices of fossil based plastics 
fluctuate with oil prices, biomass prices are more stable, and at larger scales (and 
more cascading in the use of biomass – JG) they are likely to decrease.67 To further 
close the price gap, institutional innovations will be important. These will have to 
support circular value propositions involving the cascaded use of biomass. Such 
circular products and their associated markets require a different set of relation-
ships, market rules and funding arrangements than linear chains, focused on a single 
end product – market combination.
24.4.3  Dematerialisation
In regard dematerialisation strategies, it should first be noted that plastic itself has 
led to dematerialisation through a ‘refuse’ strategy, partially replacing metals in e.g. 
home and car construction. That said, there is significant additional potential for 
dematerialisation through ‘refuse’ or ‘rethink,’ especially in regard to plastic’s 
short-lived applications. In packaging, for instance, alternatives like re-usable pack-
aging, and house-to-house delivery and simply less packaging (especially by pro-
ducers and deliverers) are ready to hand.68 The challenge is mainly cultural. As the 
Plastic Heroes campaign noted above has shown, it is possible to change behaviour 
in regard to e.g. re-usable bags. Using less plastic in e.g. food packaging however, is 
likely to run afoul of cherished convictions, embedded in legislation on food safety.
Other short-lived applications are endemic especially in everyday electronics 
and electric equipment, which is often replaced every few years. Repair is often 
possible, the main problem being that disproportionality between labour and 
 materials / energy costs often make it too expensive  – although niche activities 
began to surface in the mid-2010s like Repair Cafés or mutual services trading net-
works. In a further developed sharing economy, novel opportunities for demateriali-
sation might arise. The ‘millennials’ generation may be more prone to such a way 
of life than earlier generations, though this may extend mostly to costly items, like 
cars and luxury goods. Finally, by the mid-2010s combining various functions (a 
calculator, a web browser, a flashlight and a camera) into one artefact (a mobile 
phone) was widespread. It had, however, not yet led to abandoning the purchase of 
calculators, laptop computers, stand-alone flashlights and a proper camera. The cul-
tural inclination to own a wide variety of objects is strong.69
67 Van den Oever, Martien, Karin Molenveld, Maarten van der Zee, Harriëtte Bos. Bio-based and 
biodegradable plastics - Facts and Figures. pp. 10.
68 Van Ours, J.C. Gezinsconsumptie in Nederland 1951–1980. (Rotterdam: 1985).





Obviously, the most crucial contemporary problem with electricity consumption by 
households is its significant contribution to climate change. Since the turn of the 
twentieth century, this contribution has increased due to nearly universal electrifica-
tion, i.e. (1) increasing numbers and (2) more intensive use of (3) more kinds of 
appliances. These effects outweighed countervailing developments: (4) drastically 
increased efficiency of appliances, (5) a steady reduction of the energy intensity of 
electricity production over the twentieth century – especially since the mid-1970s, 
and (6) use of a different fuel mix in electricity production.
As argued in Sect. 23.6, electrification proceeded apace because from the outset 
electricity was presented as an asset ‘waiting to be used’, and user experiences were 
folded back in to promoting and developing new appliances. The economic logic of 
a network connecting centralised provision to decentralised consumption was 
another driver. The modern idea of progress brought with it a strong cultural inclina-
tion towards the ‘electric home.’ After the Second World War, domestic practices in 
the Netherlands became Americanised, and since the 1980s dynamic lifestyles have 
become unthinkable without audio, video and ICT appliances. These factors con-
tinue to drive electrification as audio and video appliances, ICT, communication and 
auxiliary equipment penetrate into ever expanding markets. Additional new drivers 
of electrification are trends like the termination of the natural gas network and 
increasing electric mobility.
One countervailing development, the improved efficiency of appliances, has 
become institutionally and discursively embedded in EU and national regulation, 
energy labels, parameters in comparative commodities tests et cetera. Increasing 
awareness of climate change and the Paris Treaty obligations provide additional 
momentum. Changes in the electricity generation fuel mix have been historically 
important as a countervailing development; the contemporary functional equivalent 
is the shift towards renewable resources. This development too is supported by 
 climate change concerns and treaty obligations. The world of finance may well 
become an independent countervailing factor – key players, especially after 2015, 
have begun to abandon the fossil sector. The handwriting on the wall has included, 
internationally, the Rockefeller family’s 2014 divestment of the fossil sector as well 
as Bloomberg advising investors along similar lines. Domestically, we can point to 
the decision by a major pension fund (ABP) to withdraw more than €5 billion from 
the fossil sector, as part of a systematic divestment policy.70
It is important to note that the change in the ‘fuel mix’ of centralised generation 
is being reinforced by a second development: a very significant increase in the share 
of decentralised electricity generation by households /neighbourhoods and busi-
70 ‘Rockefellers, Heirs to an Oil Fortune, Will Divest Charity of Fossil Fuels’, New York Times, 
September 21, 2014; ‘Rockefeller family charity to withdraw all investments in fossil fuel compa-
nies’, The Guardian, March 23, 2016; ‘Lage grondstofprijzen zet waarde fossiele beleggingen 
ABP onder druk; Financieel Dagblad, March 6, 2016; Corine Wortman-Kool (CEO), Nieuw beleg-
gingsbeleid ABP is breuk met het verleden. (www.apg.nl/pdfs/abp-pensioendoc_2016.pdf).
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nesses / industrial zones as well collaborations among them. These developments 
have a great deal of momentum, anchored not only in increasing climate awareness 
and the Paris Treaty, but also in strong cultural inclinations. The latter include an 
appreciation of autonomy, authenticity and a new sense of inclusive entrepreneur-
ship which integrates economic and societal objectives through novel modes of 
value creation. Roofs, industrial heritage and abandoned buildings become ‘capital’ 
and in the same movement a new understanding of ‘the commons’ is emerging. 
Giddens (1991) has interpreted such inclinations as typical of high modernity. They 
are firmly inscribed in the ‘source code’ of the generations born after 1980, and 
were reinforced in the aftermath of the financial crisis.71 That crisis de-blocked the 
labour market by engendering more entrepreneurial attitudes, especially amongst 
starters. It also led to low interest rates and thus improved the ‘competitive position’ 
of investments in individual and collective decentralised energy generation. 
Moreover, it has created a sense among scholars72 and upcoming social movements73 
that these modes of value creation are a viable and necessary alternative to the mar-
ket system that evolved since 1945.
These developments have also yielded a novel type of energy actor: prosumers, 
i.e. citizens, firms and others who both produce and consume electricity. Together 
with the rather intermittent character of two key renewable electricity providers, sun 
and wind, this novel type of actor will profoundly change the structure and meaning 
of the electricity system. Against this background, we will now discuss in greater 
detail, first, electrification and increasing efficiency of households, and then the 
changing electricity networks.
71 Van Steensel, Karin. Internetgeneratie; de broncode ontcijferd. (Den Haag: 2005).
72 Kemp, R., Strasser, T., Davidson, R., Avelino, F., Pel, B., Dumitru, A., Kunze, I., Backhaus, J., 
O’Riordan, T., Haxeltine, A. and Weaver, P. ´The humanization of the economy through social 
innovation.´ SPRU50 (Brighton: 2016); Van Bavel, Bas The Invisible Hand? How Market 
Economies have Emerged and Declined Since AD 500. (Oxford: 2017); Van der Heijden. Na het 
neoliberalisme. Klimaatverandering, sociale bewegingen en politiek. (Delft: 2017).
73 Including the transition towns movement in especially the UK and Flanders, the Energiedörfer in 
Germany, de ‘Nederland kantelt’ movement in the Netherlands, and the transnational ‘city-mak-
ers’ Peer2Peer movements. Typically, these movements bring together citizens and community 
organizations, entrepreneurs and experts. Their structure and operations have been extensively 
documented in scholarly publications, see e.g.
Seyfang, G., Haxeltine, A. Growing grassroots innovations: exploring the role of community-
based initiatives in governing sustainable energy transitions, Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy, vol. 30 (2012), p. 381–400.; Broto, Vanesa Castán, Harriet Bulkeley. ‘A 
survey of urban climate change experiments in 100 cities’, Global Environmental Change 23 
(2013), p. 92–102.; Seyfang, G., Longhurst, N. Growing green money? Mapping community cur-
rencies for sustainable development, Ecological Economics vol. 86 (2013), pp. 65–77.; Loorbach, 
D., Avelino, F., Wittmayer, J.M., Haxeltine, A., Kemp, R. O’Riordan, T. and P. Weaver. The eco-
nomic crisis as a game-changer? Exploring the role of social construction in sustainability transi-
tions, Ecology & Society, 21 (2016), 4.; Scholl, Christian & René Kemp. City Labs as vehicles for 
innovation in urban planning processes, Urban Planning, 1(2016) 4: 89–10.; Longhurst, N., 
Avelino, F., Wittmeyer, J., Weaver, P., Dumitru, A., Heilscher, S., Cipolla, C., Afonso, R., Kunze, 
I. and Elle, M. (2017). “New economic” logics and urban sustainability transitions. (TRANSIT 
working paper # 8).
J. Grin
559
24.5.1  Electrification and Increasing Efficiency, 2010–2050
By the mid-2010s, at least five (relatively) novel modes of electrification may be 
discerned. Two are still emergent and associated with the necessary phasing out of 
fossil fuels. First, electric cars were declared the key long-term option for individual 
transportation in the Fuel Vision (2015) one of the elaborations of the 2014 multi-
lateral Energy Agreement. The implementation of this agreement became more 
urgent in June, 2015, after a sustainability organization, Urgenda, won a court case 
mandating the government to intensify its efforts.74 The conclusion of the Paris 
Treaty in November of that year added fuel to this fire. Widespread use of electric 
cars will both generate a significant extra demand for electricity, in part in house-
holds, as well as add considerable storage capacity to the electricity network.
The phasing out of natural gas, partly to combat climate change and partly 
because of public outrage about earthquakes above empty gas fields, is firmly 
anchored in the government’s 2016 Energy Agenda, stipulating that by 2050, the 
natural gas grid is to be terminated. The most likely scenario will be a shift from 
‘heating’ to ‘maintaining temperature’. Homes will enjoy more rigorous thermal 
insulation (part of the 2014 Energy Agreement), so much so that less than 10% of 
current amounts of external energy supply will be needed. Temperature maintenance 
may rely on solar collectors, geothermal installations, heat pumps, heat nets as well 
as providing space in homes to heat-generating business assets, such as servers. Heat 
may be extracted from waste water coming from showers, washing machines et 
cetera. The associated apparatus, especially heat pumps and boilers for hot water 
supply, will imply additional electricity consumption. Tailor-made  solutions will be 
needed, given the requirement to make regional heat plans to co-shape spatial plan-
ning and, for instance, new businesses ventures and business zoning.
A rare estimate of the increase in electricity demand due to those forms of elec-
trification implicit in phasing out fossil fuels, mentions a 50% increase.75 Clearly, 
and as we will elaborate below, achieving this transition will require novel institu-
tional arrangements – and a significant cultural shift: a shift from the belief that 
‘practices for living and working may assume that energy is abundant’ to the new 
idea that ‘society will become co-responsible for energy provision, both in planning 
and in every-day life.’ Experiences in water management, where a similar cultural 
shift (from controlling the water in order to support social and economic practices, 
to living with the water) suggest that this will be far from a smooth process. But to 
the extent that these changes are perceived as yielding more autonomy and space for 
the entrepreneurial energies of citizens and businesses, this shift may also draw on 
the new cultural inclinations just mentioned.
74 ‘Hague court orders cuts in Dutch carbon emissions’, Financial Times; John Schwarz ‘Ruling 
Says Netherlands Must Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, New York Times; ‘Dutch court orders 
state to slash carbon emissions’, Al Jazeera English Edition (all dated June, 24, 2015).
75 de Joode, J. ‘The role of power-to-gas in the future Dutch energy system’. Report ECN_E_14_026. 
(Petten: 2014), cited in Daniëls, B. & P. Koutstaal. De rol van de elektriciteitsvoorziening in het 
klimaatbeleid. (Petten: 2016), pp. 7 8. Items included differ somewhat, but 50% is warranted as a 
rough, indicative estimate.
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Other forms of contemporary electrification are related to the dominant lifestyles 
of 21st century homo ludens. The use of domestic ICT and mobile devices is ram-
pant and progressing; the Internet of Things (IoT) looms on the horizon. The growth 
of electrification due to increasing numbers of laptops, tablets, smart mobile devices 
and so on per household shows no sign of abating, and novel forms of ‘electricity- 
based leisure’ may yield yet further expansion. In all likelihood, the associated life-
styles are here to stay: the desire for self-expression has become a basic need since 
the 1960s, and these lifestyles reflect a deep-rooted fascination with the technologi-
cal culture and the cultural inclinations and communication modes driven by long 
terms trends like individualisation and (transnational) network society.76 Robotisation 
may lead to more leisure time. Most of these factors will also promote the Internet 
of Things, including the robotisation of domestic practices.
History shows that improvements in efficiency may partly compensate for the 
additional electricity consumption resulting from electrification. Domestic electric-
ity use associated with ICT and communication appliances increased until the early 
2000s, but after that was mitigated by improved efficiency. Since 2008, ICT use has 
shifted from mainly desktop computers to laptops, tablets and smartphones, while 
new appliances like e-readers also entered the scene. As a result, there are more 
appliances, although each of them uses less electricity than a desktop. Auxiliary 
devices such as wifi routers are also swiftly becoming more efficient, partly due to 
EU regulation.77
Extrapolating from these developments, Afman & Scholten foresee that by 2020 
we may expect a reduction of about 30% (compared with 2008) in ICT-related elec-
tricity consumption (from 2 down to 1,4 TWh/year for all households), and an 
increase of 30% (from 1 to 1,3 TWh/year) for communications.78 For 2030, two 
scenarios are conceivable. First, ICT related electricity consumption will decrease 
by 15% (down to 1,2 TWh/year) while communication related use will slightly 
increase (with about 7,5% up to 1,4 TWh/year). Second, the Internet of Things may 
lead to a doubling of the electricity consumption associated with communication 
(up to 2,7 TWh/year). The authors consider both scenarios ‘plausible’. While cul-
tural analysis is missing, this study of the impact of ICT and the Internet of Things 
shows that associated changes in electricity consumption depend crucially on the 
evolution of user practices and parallel improvements in the efficiency of communi-
cations devices.
76 Giddens, Anthony. Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. 
(Stanford: 1991).
77 Afman, M.R. & T. Scholten. Trends ICT en Energie 2013–2030. (Delft: 2016), pp. 17–19.
78 Afman, M.R. & T. Scholten. Trends ICT en Energie 2013–2030. pp. 50–53.
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24.5.2  Options for the Electricity System
We may conclude that the future of the electricity system is more open than it has 
ever been since the 1930s. Yet, at a certain level of abstraction, we can identify three 
features that are likely to emerge.
First, the electricity system will be a mixed network, comprising a wide diversity 
of central and decentral sources and with many (potentially nearly all) former con-
sumers becoming prosumers.79 Energy sources will include:
• solar energy (especially decentral: roofs, walls and maybe even roads in the built 
environment)
• wind energy, both decentral (from farms, villages and industrial parks) and cen-
tral, especially off-shore (4500 MW, or 4–5 traditional coal/gas/nuclear power 
plants are planned for 2023)
• hydropower (in the Netherlands, mostly pumped-hydro storage as a medium for 
supply-demand-match management);
• biomass, with or without carbon capture and storage (CCS). If the biomass is 
sustainably produced, this may lead to negative CO2 emissions. The availability 
of sustainably produced biomass, that is also needed for the bio-based economy, 
is the most important limiting factor. Novel forms of biomass production, e.g. 
employing seaweed and algae, may offer partial solutions.
• coal or gas, combined with CCS;
• nuclear (in the Netherlands the most likely way would be through procurement 
from other EU countries  – replacement of the country’s sole nuclear plant is 
politically not salient)
• several relatively new options: osmosis, deep geothermal electricity generation, 
tidal energy and wave energy (some of these may account for some share by 
2050).
Solar and wind will probably form the spine of the future system, but given their 
intermittent character, several of the other options will be necessary as well. 
Intermittency may also be dealt with by buffering electricity (e.g. in charged cars, 
batteries integrated in underground constructions of e.g. a parking garage, and 
pumped-hydro storage) and by electrifying functions that may be organized in a 
flexible way, such as producing organic fuels and other chemicals from CO2 and 
hydrogen, or producing heat. Realising such provisions will add to energy costs.
The relative contributions that these various sources might make to the electricity 
mix in 2050 are still unclear. Many analyses are based on a comparison of the costs 
per ton CO2 reduced.80 An alternative logic would consider the costs as investments 
essential to attaining a competitive position in a new, sustainable economy with 
79 Daniëls, B. & P. Koutstaal ‘De rol van de elektriciteitsvoorziening in het klimaatbeleid’, (Petten: 
2016); Blanford, G.J., Aalbers, R.F.T., J.C.  Bollen, K.  Folmer. ‘Technological Uncertainty in 
Meeting Europe’s Decarbonisation Goals’, CPB Discussion Paper 301, (Den Haag: 2015).
80 Blanford et al., (2015) ‘Technological Uncertainty in Meeting Europe’s Decarbonisation Goals’.
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moderate sensitivity to international developments. In addition, in the new econ-
omy, business models (e.g. for bio-ethanol produced in a cascade) will often be 
circular rather than linear as assumed in these analyses. Also, they typically assume 
that investments will be forthcoming from major parties in order to fund the central-
ised production of electricity. Meanwhile, however, decentralised solar power is 
mushrooming, thanks to the cultural inclinations and financial conditions discussed 
above. The only certainty seems that the future system will be much more heteroge-
neous and flexible than our present one.
Second, citizens and businesses will no longer be able to assume that energy is 
simply abundant, but will increasingly have to cut their coats according to their 
cloth. First, the network structure and its management will increasingly depend on 
regional constraints and the other way around. What has said above about heating 
plans may apply in an analogous way to regional opportunities for solar, wind and 
other forms of electricity generation. Second, the intermittent and variable nature of 
sun and wind and the changing demand over the course of days and seasons, make 
matching supply and demand much more of a challenge.
Finally, at least over the medium-term, there is a tension between further electri-
fication and meeting Paris Treaty objectives. Regarding security and reliability of 
supply in a mixed network, a lot of questions remain to be answered. The same goes 
for household demand, the combined effect of increased efficiency and continued 
electrification. Also, little is certain about the rate of electrification of car transport 
and heating81 Other scenarios and visions suggest how society could – and should – 
deal with its electricity system to facilitate continuing electrification, assuming only 
‘moderate’ use of ICT82 All scenarios share one salient point: recognition of the 
tensions between meeting the requirements of the Paris Treaty and ensuring supply 
security and reliability.
In sum, although major changes are afoot, there is still ample reason to support 
Ganzevles and Van Est’s83 recommendation that reducing electricity consumption 
should become a national objective, canonizing and reinforcing a development 
already going on since 2004.84 In Daniëls & Koutstaal’s words: “the development of 
electricity demand is no longer an exogenous given to be taken into account in elec-
tricity generation, but also a consequence of choices on the ways to reduce 
81 Blanford et  al. (2015); Schoots, K. and P.  Hammingh. Nationale Energieverkenning 2015. 
(Petten: 2015); Daniëls and Koutstaal. ‘De rol van de elektriciteitsvoorziening in het klimaat-
beleid’ (Petten: 2016); Ros, J et  al. Opties voor energie- en klimaatbeleid, (Den Haag: 2016); 
Enexis. Eindeloze energie. Inspiratieboek. (Den Bosch: 2016); International Energy Agency World 
Energy Outlook 2015. (Paris: 2016).
82 Greenpeace International, Global Wind Energy Council and Solar Power Europe. Energy 
Revolution. A sustainable world Energy Outlook 2015. 100% renewable energy for all.(Amsterdam: 
2015), Urgenda Nederland 100% duurzame energie in 2030. Het kan als je het wilt! www.urgenda.
nl/visie/actieplan-2030/ (Amsterdam: 2016)
83 Ganzevles, Jurgen en Rinie van Est. Energie 2030. Maatschappelijke keuzes van nu. (Den Haag: 
2011).
84 ECN, PBL, CBS and RvO. Energieverkenning Nederland, 2015. (Petten: 2015). pp. 74–79.
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emissions.”85 Crucially, this also pertains to the various options for circularity dis-
cussed in previous sections.
The network’s heterogeneity and flexibility, and the need for continuous tuning 
of demand and supply, require novel modes of network coordination and manage-
ment. Similarly, business models fitting such a system also need to be developed. 
Given the importance of place and differences in conceivable economic logics, what 
eventually may result is a system of different, regionally oriented, systems.
Let us consider one perspective, consisting of four scenarios put forth by Enexis, 
an incumbent network manager.86 The scenarios may co-exist, and even (more or 
less lightly and visibly) overlap. In two scenarios, large-scale, central generation 
dominates. In new housing estates, storage capacity, heat pumps etc. are installed in 
the neighbourhoods; the second scenario is appropriate to established, perhaps his-
toric urban quarters, depending almost exclusively on external, centralised resources. 
Either way, network managers control the system, drawing on a flexible configura-
tion of sources, and performing demand management through smart meters and, 
sometimes, enforcing limited use. Here, the business model resembles the current 
one: network managers continuously buy and sell electricity from a variety of 
sources. These options may draw on incumbent institutional arrangements, but pre-
suppose significant institutional trust, and stable relations between citizens and 
large players.
In two other scenarios, a regional population takes responsibility to ensure an 
energy-efficient and comfortable way of life, with an emphasis on regional electric-
ity generation. Homes generate solar energy; heat is provided from biogas produced 
by local farmers from manure; other, tailor-made innovative solutions are installed; 
there is ICT-based demand-supply management and a regionally oriented, sharing 
economy. The region may or may not be coupled to the national grid. In the former 
case, the community may frequently sell excess electricity at profitable prices to 
other regions; in the latter case, inhabitants choose a form of autonomy or even 
autarky. Either way, ICT will be used to optimize the business model and realize a 
fair distribution of costs and benefits. More radically, distributed management is 
also very conceivable, based, for instance, on the block chain system. Local com-
munities could thus arrange intermittency management through supply-demand 
matching and storage among their number, with similar communities elsewhere and 
even with central providers. Both scenarios may be likely outcomes in regions 
where inclinations for autonomy are strong and trust in big players in industry and 
government relatively weak, and where there is some minimal level of social 
capital.
National and EU political choices will also set important boundary conditions. 
Innovation policy to promote the development of central and decentral modes of 
electricity generation; physical planning to enable regionally tailored solutions; and 
legislation to provide an institutional framework. As of the mid-2010s, government 
seemed to be favouring ‘both’ options, both in terms of physical planning (working 
85 Daniëls and Koutstaal (2016). pp. 6.
86 Enexis. Eindeloze energie. Inspiratieboek. (Den Bosch: 2016).
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both on large scale off-shore wind parks and decentralizing much of the other mea-
sures from the Energy Agreement); as well as in terms of legislation (adopting a 
new framework law on spatial planning, enabling local initiatives by municipalities, 
citizens and others parties by simplifying the planning process). Innovation policy 
was still underdeveloped, de facto leaving a lot to the discretion of main market 
players; while more specific legislation to regulate the electricity market was also 
still in statu nascendi. Absent more governmental effort, the bets are on the side of 
the established main players. That said, that prospect may generate a sense of dis-
comfort amongst those with limited trust in main players, and may even foment 
rebellion among those who are taking energy matters into their own hands.
24.6  Beyond the Welfare Paradox – Towards a New 
Economy and Society?
The above discussion makes it clear that strategies to resolve contemporary prob-
lems of well-being imply vast changes, not only in technologies, but also in social 
and economic practices of production and consumption. Pursuing them will obvi-
ously require a major effort, which will be met with inertia, contestation and resis-
tance. We have weighed the chances of these strategies by considering them in the 
context of their historically grown structural and spatial embedding, as well as of 
their long-term sectoral trends. In this concluding section we will add one more 
generic trend, and discuss two important promises of the transition we have been 
discussing that, in the most favourable of circumstances, might help generate sup-
port for the strategies proposed.
The generic trend is the transition from what Carlota Perez has called the fourth 
techno-economic paradigm, based on oil, physical mobility on the basis of the com-
bustion engine and mass production and consumption, toward a new paradigm, 
based on information, network collaboration and tailor- made production as its key 
characteristics.87 Clearly, a transition to circular production and smart grids, and to 
more ongoing alignment between demand and supply, is congruent with this shift, 
as further argued in Perez.88 An important qualification she makes is that any accel-
eration and amplification of this trends depends utterly on governmental agency to 
effect the necessary institutional transformation.
The first promise associated with the transition discussed is that the idea of ‘mak-
ing ends meet’, through circularity and alignment between demand and supply of 
electricity, may mitigate the source of what economic historian Bas van Bavel has 
identified as the key source of the repeated failures of free markets – the fact that the 
87 Perez, Carlota, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and 
Golden Ages, (Cheltenham: 2002).
88 Perez, “The financial crisis and the future of innovation: A view of technical change with the aid 




market mechanism focuses on transactions of economic commodities, but hardly on 
the inputs into the economy: land, financial capital and natural capital.89
A second promise, potentially, would be that these strategies might help mitigate 
the welfare paradox identified in Chap. 22: income and fulfilment of basic needs have 
significantly increased; yet there are widespread sentiments of dissatisfaction and 
institutional distrust. It is important to appreciate what goes on beneath the surface of 
widespread satisfaction. Sociologist Arlie Hochschild, in an important ethnographic 
study on dissatisfied citizens in Louisiana, finds that these people feel marginalized, 
a moral minority, ‘strangers in their own land.’90 Their wages remain stable or decline; 
they experience swift demographic change and they detest a cosmopolitan dominant 
culture of ‘white wine and cappuccino.’ Though they suffer from pollution and unem-
ployment due to corporations’ behavior, they are neglected by the government, which 
has failed them and which they perceive to be run by a cosmopolitan elite that sees 
them as bad and backward. Similarly, Belgian cultural- historian David Van 
Reybrouck, during a long stay in Germany, witnessed similar feelings among discon-
tented people there – alienation prevailing most of all in the former East.91 He stresses 
the fact that these people may vote, but lack opportunities to voice their concerns. 
Anthropologist and investigative journalist Joris Luyendijk undertook a series of 
interviews with discontented citizens in the Netherlands, and came to similar find-
ings; he sees a connection with the fact that people are increasingly aware that not 
only banks (as he had found in an earlier book), but also other corporations, hospitals, 
and so on have become the private playground of investors, to whom they are mere 
objects of profit making.92 Such analyses also echo Van Bavel’s findings that the con-
temporary market system is in deep crisis, because crucial inputs into the economy 
have been monopolized by an elite. As a consequence, there is barely anything resem-
bling a free market, and society is less and less able to make autonomous choices.93
If these are the underlying problems, then Kemp et al.’s proposal to re-embed the 
economy in society and nature points towards an interesting route for solutions.94 
Building on Polanyi, they observe a triple movement in society: marketisation, the 
spread of market thinking and coordination throughout society, state-based social 
protection and (here they extend Polanyi’s analysis) a humanisation of the economy, 
re-embedding it into society and nature.95 With the latter movement, based on a 
major European research project on social innovation, they refer to “less hierarchi-
89 Van Bavel, Bas The Invisible Hand? How Market Economies have Emerged and Declined Since 
AD 500. (Oxford: 2017).
90 Hochschild, Arlie Russell. Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American 
Right. (New York: 2016).
91 Interview with Sander van Walsum in De Morgen, October 10, 2017.
92 Interviews of Luyendijk can be found at: www.kunnenwepraten.nl
93 Van Bavel, Bas (2017). The Invisible Hand? How Market Economies have Emerged and Declined 
Since AD 500. (352 p.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
94 Kemp, R., Strasser, T., Davidson, R., Avelino, F., Pel, B., Dumitru, A., Kunze, I., Backhaus, J., 
O’Riordan, T., Haxeltine, A. and Weaver, P. ‘The humanization of the economy through social 
innovation’. Paper presented at SPRU50, (Brighton, United Kingdom, 2016).
95 Karl; Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. 
(Boston: 1944).
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cal forms of decision-making in business and public organisations, new and non- 
profit ownership models, greater self-determination in work, ethics-based forms of 
consumption (…) commons-based peer production, social enterprises, alternative 
currencies, communal ways of living and working, the sharing of urban spaces and 
participatory budgeting (…) in all sectors.” (p. 8) It “involves people from different 
walks of life” and is partly a reaction to marketisation and associated phenomena, 
and partly an expression of people’s need for autonomy, social bonds and meaning-
ful relationships with others, “and desires to engage in meaningful activity (…) and 
contribute to a better world that is more equal, fair and respectful of people and 
nature.” (p. 11).96
It is not difficult to see how elements of the strategies discussed above fit into this 
picture: re-connecting different agricultural sectors to each other and to ecosystems, 
re-developing real-estate into shared spaces with communal functions, setting up 
mixed central-decentral energy systems et cetera. Importantly, Kemp et al. point out 
that such systems may also fulfill the need for self-determination (understood as 
autonomy, competence and relatedness) that has been identified as a primary need 
in a cross-cultural study by Chen et  al.97 Thus, such changes may contribute to 
reducing feelings of alienation and lack of self-determination that figured so promi-
nently in the above studies into public discontent.
That is the optimist account. In a more pessimist scenario, a darker movement, 
dominated by radical leaders and subversive forces, wielding internet-based disin-
formation, may win the battle for people’s minds and hearts. As Cox (put it in a 
remarkably insightful analysis, “Civil society has become the crucial battleground 
for recovering citizen control of public life.”98 One does not need to be a neo- marxist 
to share his point that the outcome will depend not only on technical advances but 
also, and especially, on “resurrecting a spirit of association in civil society together 
with a continuing effort by the organic intellectuals (…) to think through and act 
towards an alternative social order at local, regional and global levels.”
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